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Why do states commit to international labor standards?: interdependent ratification of core ILO conventions, 1948-2009

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Why do states commit to international labor standards?

The importance of "rivalry" and "friendship"

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Abstract

Ratifying conventions adopted by the International Labor Organization creates legal obligations to improve labor standards in the domestic economy. Why and when do states choose to ratify them? Two influential theoretical approaches lead to the expectation that states are influenced by the ratification behavior of other states. Drawing on rationalist institutionalism, we expect states to use institutions such as the ILO to improve or consolidate their preferred standards domestically while reducing the risk of suffering competitive disadvantages in world markets. In this view, ILO conventions are devices for the prevention and mitigation of regulatory "races to the bottom" among trade rivals. Drawing on sociological institutionalism, we expect states to ratify ILO conventions if doing so conforms to a norm of appropriate behavior that is prevalent in a state's peer groups. We elaborate on the latter explanation by identifying the domestic conditions of interdependent ratification. The paper develops observable implications of these hypotheses and tests them by applying spatial regression models to seven core ILO conventions and 187 countries between 1948 and 2009. The analysis yields strong evidence in support of both rationalist and the sociological hypotheses. The paper contributes to the literature on treaty ratification and policy diffusion.

Introduction

Since its creation in 1919, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has adopted 189 conventions on topics such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, forced labor, child labor, gender and other forms of discrimination, social security, working time, and occupational health and safety. ILO conventions are international treaties that are legally binding for states that choose to ratify them. But they occupy a peculiar position among international treaties. In other policy domains such as trade and arms control, treaties are often signed in the expectation of reciprocal behavior: for instance, a state may grant access to its domestic market in exchange for access to foreign markets for its own producers; or it may commit to refrain from developing certain kinds of weaponry in order to secure a similar commitment by other states. But reciprocity cannot be considered a key driver in all policy domains. Most notably, human rights treaties are unlikely to be ratified, and complied with, on the basis of direct reciprocity. As Beth Simmons notes, "[n]o government is likely to alter its own rights practices to reciprocate for abuses elsewhere."[1] The conventions adopted by the ILO should be particularly interesting for IR scholars because they mix features of both kinds of treaties: those that are negotiated primarily on the basis of reciprocity and those that are not. On the one hand, at least some of the ILO conventions are designed to mitigate regulatory competition in labor and social standards. The ILO itself points at this motivation in its promotional material:

> "An international legal framework on social standards ensures a level playing field in the global economy. It helps governments and employers to avoid the temptation of lowering labour standards in the belief that this could give them a greater comparative

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[1] Simmons 2009, 129.

advantage in international trade … Because international labour standards are minimum standards adopted by governments and the social partners, it is in everyone's interest to see these rules applied across the board, so that those who do not put them into practice do not undermine the efforts of those who do."[2]

The logic described in this excerpt implies reciprocity: states are expected to commit to *international* labor standards primarily to get other states to commit to, and comply with, those same standards.

On the other hand, the ILO and many other actors portray commitment to core labor standards as having intrinsic normative value: the same ILO document quoted above stresses that adherence to international labor standards is imperative because work "is crucial to a person's dignity, well-being and development as a human being".[3] Several conventions, such as those on freedom of association, child labor, forced labor, discrimination, migrants, and domestic workers are explicitly presented as protecting "fundamental human rights".[4] In this logic, states are expected to ratify conventions as way to endorsing and expressing a public and legally binding commitment to a universally valid conception of human dignity.

So, why do states ratify ILO conventions? More precisely, why and when do some states choose to ratify certain core conventions? To the extent that they want to avoid regulatory

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[2] ILO 2009, 10-11.

[3] ILO 2009, 10.

[4] ILO 2009.

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competition, their decision to ratify should be influenced by the ratification behavior of their economic competitors. To the extent that they want to show support for a norm they believe in, we should expect ratification by those states whose values and practices in labor and social policy are consistent with ILO norms. The latter expectation is consistent with the theory of "rationally expressive ratification" proposed by Simmons in relation to human rights treaties.[5] But the values that state agents choose to affirm by making international commitments are not entirely endogenous: they are likely to be influenced by the norms expressed by other states, particularly by states that they consider to be "peers".

This suggests that we should expect ratification decisions to be interdependent not only insofar as they reflect competitive considerations, but also insofar as they reflect a desire to belong to a normative community of states. But *who* is influenced *by whom* is likely to be different in the two cases. The aim of this paper is to develop hypotheses about interdependent ratification and provide empirical tests. The hypotheses are derived from rationalist institutionalism as well as sociological institutionalism, and thus draw on both rationalist and constructivist research traditions in International Relations. The relationship between rationalist and constructivist theories has attracted considerable attention over the past two decades.[6] Our analytical starting point is that the social mechanisms theorized within the two traditions can coexist and operate in parallel, and thus we have no reason to expect that any evidence pointing at the importance of one class of mechanisms *ipso facto* proves that the other plays a negligible

[5] Simmons 2009.

[6] See Fearon and Wendt 2002 for an in-depth discussion.

role. In other words, we want to avoid what Jeffrey Checkel has called a "gladiator" style of analysis, where "one perspective goes forth and slays all others".[7]

The next section develops hypotheses on interdependent ratification derived from rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Drawing on the former, we argue that states should use international labor standards to solve cooperation problems under conditions of strategic interdependence. If states desire to improve domestic labor standards but are concerned that this may advantage their economic competitors in world markets, a joint commitment to international labor standards monitored by the ILO may provide sufficient reassurance that their relative competitiveness will not be substantially affected. If this is correct, we should expect states to be more willing to commit to ILO standards when their trade rivals have already done so. We then develop a hypothesis based on sociological institutionalism: states will make formal commitments to international labor standards when doing so conforms to a norm of appropriate behavior that is prevalent in a state's peer groups. More specifically, states should be more willing to ratify conventions in the wake of ratification by states to which they are intensely linked through international organizations. The third section presents our methodological strategy, which based on spatial regression models applied to seven core ILO conventions and 187 countries between 1948 and 2009. The fourth section presents the outcome of this analysis: we find that there is strong empirical support for both the rationalist and the sociological hypotheses.

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[7] Checkel 2001, 243.

Our focus on international interdependencies is compatible with the fact that the ratification of ILO conventions is ultimately a process driven by domestic actors interacting within a domestic institutional setting. The fifth section of this paper aims to gain a deeper insight into the causal mechanisms of interdependent ratification, by considering how foreign influences *interact* with domestic politics in the ratification process. A case study of the ratification of the ILO's equal pay convention by the United Kingdom provides qualitative evidence for our constructivist hypothesis and at the same time suggests the following conjecture: ratification of ILO conventions by social peers can "tip the balance" in the domestic contest between supporters and opponents of ratification, by providing argumentative ammunition to former. A quantitative test of the ratification of two ILO anti-discrimination conventions provides further evidence in support of that conjecture: ratification by social peers has a statistically significant effect on ratification where the pro-ratification coalition (using the percentage of legislators who are female as proxy) is neither very strong nor very weak. These are the conditions under which foreign examples have the greatest potential to tip the balance in favor of ratification. The final section draws some conclusions.

Theories of interdependent ratification

Two influential perspectives in IR theory, rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, provide reasons to expect the decision to ratify ILO conventions to be influenced by the ratification behavior of other states. While both approaches would predict the interdependence of ratification decisions, they stress different sets of causal mechanisms and thus would expect different patterns of interdependence to emerge.

Rationalist institutionalism in IR theory conceives states as unitary actors that pursue their own interests as if they were rational utility-maximizers, in an environment characterized by the absence of an external enforcer of agreements and by variable levels of uncertainty about the interests and behavior of other states.[8] Rationalist institutionalism focuses on situations of strategic interdependence, in which the benefits accruing to each state are determined not only by its behavior but also by the behavior of other states. In such situations, often states have mixed motives: they have a common interest in cooperating, but also incentives to cheat and/or shift the distribution of gains from cooperation to their advantage. As a result, the outcomes of state interaction are often inefficient, as potential gains are "left on the table". The key thesis of rationalist institutionalists is that states are able to mitigate the problem of inefficiency by manipulating the context of their interaction and specifically by creating and sustaining international institutions and organizations. International institutions and organizations can alleviate distributional and enforcement problems by providing information about state preferences, constraining bargaining strategies, providing focal points in negotiations, facilitating issue linkages, reducing ambiguity about what constitutes compliance and non-compliance, monitoring compliance, and coordinating decentralized sanctioning.

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[8] The literature on the theoretical building blocks and empirical applications of rational institutionalism is vast. The first full book-length exposition was Keohane 1984, and concise statements of the key assumptions and expectations of this approach are provided by Keohane and Martin 2003 and Stein 2008.

There is ample evidence that the ILO was created in order to address problems of strategic interdependence in labor standards policy.[9] This rationale is clearly stated in the preamble to the Constitution of the ILO, approved in 1919 as Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles: "the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries". Policy-makers hoped that, by agreeing on and implementing common standards, they would be able to improve labor conditions according to domestic preferences without compromising the ability of their industries to compete with foreign producers. There is some debate on whether strategic interdependence with regard to labor standards has the form of a "prisoner's dilemma" (PD) game or an assurance game. Thomas Palley, for instance, models it as a PD.[10] Alan Hyde, by contrast, argues that at least some types of labor standards give rise to a stag hunt, or assurance game.[11] The key difference is that in an assurance scenario mutual cooperation is a stable equilibrium because each state prefers to keep high labor standards in its jurisdiction provided that other states do the same, whereas in a PD scenario mutual collaboration is more fragile because states are tempted to defect from cooperation and use low standards to gain a competitive advantage. What is common to both PD and assurance situations is the worst outcome that states want to avoid, i.e. they are left to implement high standards while their competitors lower theirs or fail to raise them. This may be because the welfare losses caused by the loss of market shares are perceived to be higher than the welfare gains resulting from improved labor standards. When states are uncertain about whether their counterparts prefer mutual cooperation to unilateral

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[9] See the Web-Appendix for an account of the historical process that led to the creation of the ILO.

[10] Palley 2004.

[11] Hyde 2009.

defection or vice versa, in order to avoid the worst-case outcome they may decide not to cooperate even if they themselves prefer mutual cooperation to unilateral defection.

Rationalist institutionalism expects states to design institutions that have a good "fit" with specific types of cooperation problems. Specifically, institutions meant to address assurance problems are likely to be different from institutions aimed at solving PDs.[12] The key task of the latter is to reduce the temptation to cheat, notably by monitoring compliance and helping states to use strategies of decentralized sanctioning that would sustain cooperation in a repeated game. By contrast, institutions addressing assurance problems must make it easier for states to assure each other that they indeed prefer mutual cooperation to cheating. When states are highly uncertain about the preferences of other states, monitoring institutions may need to be as robust and intrusive as they would be in a PD. This means that, under conditions of high uncertainty, the institutional implications of the two situations may be quite similar.

The ILO has several of the features that rationalist institutionalists would expect to find in an organization aimed at addressing PD and assurance problems. The often detailed content of ILO conventions reduces ambiguity about what constitutes compliance and makes it easier to determine whether a state has complied or not. States are subject to demanding reporting obligations, and the supervisory system of the ILO processes information on national labor laws and practices that originates not only from governments but also from private organizations, notably labor unions. States that are found to be in violation of their obligations are "named and

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[12] See, for instance, Martin 1992.

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shamed".[13] While the ILO itself does not apply sanctions, its findings about, and criticism of, serious violators of ILO norms can be used by other states to legitimize sanctions that they may decide to impose.[14]

As noted above, both in the assurance and in the PD scenario the worst outcome for each state is to implement high labor standards while its competitors lower theirs or fail to raise them. The implication of this is that the decision to ratify ILO conventions should be affected by whether other states, and specifically direct trade competitors, have ratified or not. Ratification by trade rivals does not guarantee effective implementation of ILO standards on their part, but it creates domestic and international costs that may be sufficient to reassure states that other states are willing to comply.[15] The hypothesis derived from rationalist institutionalism is thus the following:

> *Hypothesis 1: A state is more likely to ratify an ILO convention when its economic competitors have ratified it.*

Our hypothesis is similar to the idea "strategic complementarity" tested by Nancy Chau and Ravi Kanbur, by which "the adoption of high labor standards in one country raises the net

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[13] Weisband 2000.

[14] For instance, in 2003 the United States Congress enacted the "Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act", which banned imports from Myanmar and cited the ILO's condemnation of Myanmar for its use of forced labor.

[15] On the potential importance of the legal commitment expressed by ratification of treaties see Simmons 2009.

benefits of raising standards in another country."[16] For the reasons explained in the next section, we offer a more fine-grained empirical test of this idea than Chau and Kanbur's study.

The second major approach that leads us to expect ratification decisions to be interdependent is sociological institutionalism. Even more than rationalist institutionalism, sociological institutionalism is a complex body of theories, which cannot be reviewed in much depth here. These theories depart from rationalism, as they expect states to be guided not only by a "logic of consequentialism" but also by a "logic of appropriateness"[17] and possibly a "logic of arguing"[18]; and from materialism, since even when states consider expected consequences, often these consequences have a social character, such as a sense of belonging, esteem, and shame. For sociological institutionalists in IR, the goals, values, normative constraints, and cognitive maps of policy-makers are not endogenous to the process of interaction with their foreign counterparts, but are at least partly constructed in a social process that transcends state boundaries. A particularly influential version of sociological institutionalism has been developed by the so-called "Stanford School", according to which there is a world culture that shapes conceptions of appropriate social actors, collective goals, and public policies, and a world polity constituted by organizational linkages that transmit this world culture to all states.[19] This world culture defines social expectations in a wide range of policy domains, such as human rights, gender relations, science, education, economic policies and environmental protection,

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[17] March and Olsen 1998.

[18] Risse 2000.

[19] See Finnemore 1996a; and Meyer et al. 1997.

and in which state agents seek normative legitimacy by adopting "policy scripts" that are widely perceived as being integral to the identity of a "modern" or "good" state.

The ratification of international treaties can be interpreted as one of the ways in which states affirm their adherence to norms and thus membership in a normative community.[20] The conventions adopted by the ILO can certainly be seen as embodying global norms with universalistic scope and moral content. The preamble to the ILO constitution justifies its creation with reference not only to strategic interdependence in labor policy, as seen above, but also to "social justice" and its contribution to world peace. The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 reaffirmed this goal and stated that "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity." Core labor rights are sometimes presented as integral part of human rights and sometimes as a distinct normative complex with its own roots in a conception of human dignity,[21] but the ILO and other actors routinely frame the conventions as normative models that all legitimate states should adopt or at least strive to be in a condition to adopt.

The ratification of ILO conventions can thus be interpreted as an action that affirms a state's membership in a normative community: the community of states committed to promoting a conception of social justice. Three points are crucial for the assessment of this interpretation. First, the international diffusion of ILO norms can be the result of a range of different social

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[20] See Frank 1999; Cole 2005; Wopitka and Ramirez 2008; and Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008.

[21] See Fudge 2007-2008.

mechanisms. For instance, in a landmark contribution to sociological institutionalism Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell argued that institutional (as opposed to competitive) isomorphism could take three forms: coercive, mimetic and normative.[22] Building on sociological and psychological research, IR scholars have identified a range of micro-mechanisms that can produce socialization, i.e. the induction of actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Alastair Iain Johnston distinguishes between mimicking, social influence and persuasion;[23] Jeffrey Checkel distinguishes between strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion;[24] Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks between coercion, persuasion and acculturation.[25] While compliance with norms as a result of material sanctions and rewards does not normally qualify as socialization, *social* sanctions and rewards – back-patting, esteem, well-being resulting from personal consistency, shaming, shunning, etc – can be considered a form of socialization even if the norm in question is not fully internalized by the actor. Furthermore, as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have noted, different mechanisms may be predominant at different stages of the norm life cycle.[26] In recent years there has been significant progress in understanding under what scope conditions such mechanisms work or not.[27]

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[22] DiMaggio and Powell 1983.

[23] Johnston 2001, 2008.

[24] Checkel 2005,

[25] Goodman and Jinks 2004.

[26] Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898.

[27] See, for instance, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; and Zürn and Checkel 2005. On domestic scope conditions, Cortell and Davis 2005.

The second important aspect highlighted by recent research is the variety of channels through which norms can "travel" from one country to another, notably the media, transnational advocacy networks and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), epistemic communities, transgovernmental networks, bilateral diplomacy, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). For a variety of reasons, which have been discussed by Alastair Iain Johnstone,[28] IGOs understood as social environments have provided a particularly fertile ground for research on international socialization.[29]

Third, the population of IGOs has grown massively over the course of the twentieth century and thus opportunities for socialization and norm diffusion have multiplied dramatically. However, in contrast to what world polity theorists imply when they state that the world is "a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks,"[30] patterns of membership in IGOs and possibly in other environments of state socialization are increasingly fragmented and heterogeneous. The issue is not simply that some states have stronger connections to the world polity than other states – in fact, inequality in the number of IGO memberships per state has decreased. The issue is rather that, as Jason Beckfield points out, "while states are growing more even in the number of IGOs they belong to, they increasingly belong to different IGOs."[31] He found that, since 1945, the network of IGOs has become more fragmented, more heterogeneous, less cohesive, and less "small-worldly" in its structure. This means that the study of norm

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[28] Johnston 2008, 26-32.

[29] See, for instance, Finnemore 1996b; Gheciu 2005; Johnston 2008; and Greenhill 2010.

[30] Boli and Thomas 1997, 172.

[31] Beckfield 2010.

diffusion through intergovernmental networks requires a detailed analysis of *who is connected to whom*.

Scholars who apply world polity theory to the analysis of patterns of treaty ratification accept that states are likely to differ as to the timing of ratification. For instance, Christine Min Wotipka and Francisco Ramirez focus on three factors that should affect the timing of the ratification of human rights treaties: the availability of global conferences that promote the relevant treaty, the behavior of other states in the world and in their region or other "reference groups", and the degree to which a state is embedded in the wider world that supports the relevant norm.[32] However, in the light of the uneven and fragmented patterns of IGO involvement shown by Beckfield, and the resulting fragmented character of social relations through which socialization mechanism can operate, it is important to develop and test more fine-grained hypotheses about the interdependence of ratification decisions. If social peer groups are defined as states with frequent and intense opportunities for socialization – that is, opportunities to persuade each other, express opprobrium or approval, undermine or boost self-esteem, etc – then the relevant hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

> *Hypothesis 2: A state is more likely to ratify an ILO convention when its social peers have ratified it.*

Chau and Kanbur examined whether the ratification of ILO conventions is affected by regional peer effects, by counting how many states in a regional grouping have ratified the

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[32] Wopitka and Ramirez 2008.

relevant conventions.[33] Several studies on the ratification of other kinds of treaties also consider the proportion of states in a state's region that have ratified the treaty in question among the explanatory variables. However, this is not necessarily the best quantitative indicator of socialization effects. As Beth Simmons has stressed, regional effects may be due to purely strategic "social camouflage": if many neighboring states have ratified human rights treaties, persistent non-ratifiers are more likely to "stand out" and be targeted by NGOs and other advocacy organizations, which often take a regional perspective. If, on the contrary, a government is surrounded by other government that have not ratified, then the risk of being singled out for criticism is much lower and the incentive to ratify is correspondingly reduced. In her study of human rights treaties, Simmons interprets her finding that regional effects are much weaker in regions with more persuasion opportunities as evidence that regional clustering is caused by strategic calculation rather than localized socialization.[34] Rather than taking this rather indirect route, this paper aims at capturing the extent of socialization opportunities more directly. As we explain below, we measure the degree to which states see each other as belonging to the same social peer group by counting the number of IGOs of which any two states are joint members. We expect ratification choices of a state to be influenced by the ratification behavior of another state in proportion of their opportunities to interact within IGOs.

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[33] Chau and Kanbur 2001.

[34] Simmons 2009, 88-96. Simmons seems to equate socialization with what Johnson considers a subtype of socialization, i.e. persuasion. In Johnston's conceptualization, if the sanctions that states want to avoid are *social* rather than *material* – shame, loss of esteem, shunning, etc – then strategic behavior would not exclude socialization.

This indicator provides a more fine-grained picture of socialization networks than regional belonging, although we expect relevant regional effects to be captured by our measure as well.[35]

Our focus on joint IGO memberships allows us to examine *two additional implications* of hypothesis 2. The first implication is that, if IGOs function as socializing environments that may facilitate the diffusion of labor standards norms among their members, then we should expect the effect of joint IGO membership on ratification to be stronger for IGOs that provide better opportunities for socialization. We test this implication by comparing the effect of joint membership in three categories of IGOs, which differ in the extent to which they provide the kind of organizational infrastructure that tends to facilitate socialization processes.

The second implication of hypothesis 2 is that we need to distinguish the extent to which ratification is influenced by interaction with *specific* states from the effect of occupying a central position in the *general* network of states connected through IGOs. To achieve this empirically, we assess the effect of the absolute number of IGO memberships of countries on ratification behavior. If *joint* IGO memberships are found to have an effect even after controlling for the *absolute* number of IGO that a country is member of, then this would provide particularly strong support for our specific socialization hypothesis.

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[35] In the Web-Appendix, we include the geographical distance between two countries as an additional control variable.

Research Design

We estimate a model including a spatial lag of the variable that captures whether a country ratifies an ILO convention, weighted by the number of joint IGO memberships and the intensity of economic competition between countries. We also include several variables for country characteristics and potential external shocks.[36] Consistently with earlier research, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards model, with standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries.[37] The advantage of using the Cox model, among the various survival models on offer, is that it does not require us to make assumptions about the shape of the underlying survival distribution. Moreover, when a spatial term is included, the use of the Cox model rather than parametric survival models is recommended by recent studies.[38] The test based on Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the proportional-hazards assumption holds.[39] We thus estimate the following equation:

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[36] As recommended by Ward and Gleditsch 2008, we calculate the Moran index, using the total number of ILO conventions ratified by each country. The result confirms that there is statistically significant spatial correlation among countries. Thus, the inclusion of spatial lags is appropriate here.

[37] Beck 2008, 486. Survival analysis is an elegant way to model our empirical analysis because we are dealing with both right-censored data and left-censored data. See Beck et al. 2002; and Darmofal 2009. See Elkins et al. 2006 for a widely cited application of spatial econometrics with a Cox model, and Barthel and Neumeyer forthcoming for a more recent example. For applications of the Cox model in the literature on the ratification of ILO conventions see Boockmann 2001 and 2006; and Chau and Kanbur 2001.

[38] Golub 2008.

[39] See the Web-Appendix for further details.

$$h_{i,t} = h_0(i,t)\exp[\beta\, x_{i,t-1} + \delta\, w_{ij,t-1}\, y_{i,t-5} + \varepsilon_{i,t}] \tag{1}$$

where h_{it} is the hazard rate for country i at time t, h_0 is the baseline hazard, β and δ are the coefficients, $x_{i,t-1}$ is a vector of control variables that are lagged by a year, and $w_{i,t-1}\, y_{i,t-5}$ is a vector of spatial lag terms.[40] Significance tests are based on Huber (robust) standard errors. These standard errors control for possible heteroskedasticity (serial correlation) or *intra-group* correlation of the data.

The unit of analysis is country-year. We analyze 187 countries across 62 years, from 1948 to 2009. However, Convention 29 was ratified before 1948 (in 1930), whereas the others conventions were ratified either in 1948 or later. Thus, the time span for this second group of conventions starts from the year in which the convention was ratified. For instance, Convention 100 starts in 1951. Some (mostly very small) countries had to be excluded from the analysis because of data limitations. Many countries enter the database in the year of their independence, which is often after 1948. Our dataset is therefore unbalanced.

Dependent variables

For each country in the dataset, we coded whether it ratified an ILO convention in a specific year, which allowed us to calculate the time (in terms of years) that a country went without ratifying a convention, that is, the hazard rate. We focus on seven conventions that were designated "core conventions" by the ILO and whose special importance in the ILO normative system has been recognized by the ILO as well as independent observers: these are Convention 29 (C29), C87, C98, C100, C105, C111, and C138. Two core conventions protect labor union

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[40] For a discussion on how to estimate spatial lag models, see Beck et al. 2006.

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rights. These are C87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, adopted in 1948 and ratified by 150 states; and C98 Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted in 1949 and ratified by 160 states. Two core conventions mandate the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. These are C29 Forced Labor Convention, adopted in 1930 and ratified by 174 states; and C105 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, adopted in 1957 and ratified by 169 states. One core convention mandates the abolition of child labor: C138 Minimum Age Convention, adopted in 1973 and ratified by 156 states (another convention designated as core, C182 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, was adopted in 1999 and is not included here). Finally, two core conventions prohibit discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These are C100 Equal Remuneration Convention, adopted in 1951 and ratified by 168 countries; and C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted in 1958 and ratified by 169 countries.

Figure 1 shows the survival rate of each convention over the period under investigation. Several countries, mainly developed economies, ratified Convention 29 before 1948. These observations are therefore left-censored. Specifically, 67 countries are left-censored for C29. We analyze each convention independently from the others, and therefore countries drop from the dataset when they ratify a convention. Finally, some observations are left censored since a few countries ratified these ILO conventions after 2009. For instance, Afghanistan ratified C138 on 7th April 2010. Ratification information is taken from the ILOLEX Database of International Labor Standards.[41]

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[41] Database available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Independent variables

Our main independent variables are N*N*t spatial weight matrices. A spatial weight matrix measures the impact of a policy change in a country on all other countries. It uses specific factors, such as spatial proximity or degree of economic interdependence, to weigh the importance of a policy change in one unit for other units. In our case, the policy change is whether a state has ratified an ILO convention during the previous five years. The variable is lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity bias.[42] For instance, Afghanistan ratified C105 in 1963 and thus our lagged dependent variable scores 1 from 1964 to 1968. It should be noted that this may lead to underestimating the spatial effect, if a state's announcement of its intention to ratify is sufficient to trigger a reaction in other states. The reason for the five-year cut-off point is that, after some time, the external effects of ratification should disappear, with other countries either having ratified the same ILO convention or having decided not to "react".[43]

We weigh the influence of policy change on other states in a way that approximates as closely as possible the theoretical logics of rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Hypothesis 1 generates the expectation that the degree to which state A will

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[42] See Beck et al. 2006.

[43] The five-year cut-off point is consistent with the operationalization used by Egger and Larch 2008 in a spatial econometric analysis on the proliferation of trade agreements. In the Web-Appendix, we check the robustness of our results by changing this value to three years.

respond to B's ratification by ratifying the same convention itself depends on the degree of economic competition between A and B. To measure the degree of competition we use an index developed by Elkins, Guzman and Simmons.[44] This indicator is obtained by disaggregating trade flows into 17 sectors and then assessing whether countries export the same basket of goods. Data are from the World Development Indicators. To create an index of export similarity, we correlated the export basket of all countries.[45] We label this variable EXPORT SIMILARITY. [46]

Formally, the spatial weight of the variable COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION for state A is:[47]

$$\overline{COMPETITORS'\ RATIFICATION}_A = \sum_{B,C,D,...} \left[EXPORT\ SIMILARITY_{A\_B,C,\ D} * ILO\_CORE\_CONV\_RATIFICATION_{B,C,D,...} \right] \quad (2)$$

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[44] Elkins et al. 2006, 830.

[45] For computational reasons, and following Elkins et al. 2006, we rescale the correlation index from 0 to 2.

[46] This way of operationalizing export similarity provides the basis for a more fine-grained analysis than the approach used by Chau and Kanbur 2001, who classified countries into five categories: exporters of manufactures, primary products, fuel, services, and diversified exporters, on the basis of 1988-1992 data.

[47] The spatial matrices have been calculated using the software MATLAB 7.0, whereas estimations are computed using the software STATA 11. We do *not* row-standardize our weighting matrix because of theoretical and methodological reasons. Indeed, in line with our theory we are interested in the absolute pressure on a country independently of the pressure on another country. Moreover, row-standardization does not come without consequences and may impact inference – see Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 428-31.

where ILO CORE CONV RATIFICATION is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country B (C, D …) ratified a given ILO convention during the previous five years and EXPORT SIMILARITY is the variable described above, which ranges between -1 and 1. [48]

Hypothesis 2 generates the expectation that a state is more likely to ratify a convention if it has been ratified by states with whom it interacts within socialization environments. We capture the concept of socialization opportunities by treating IGOs as social environments and counting the number of shared memberships in IGOs among any two states. The empirical implication is that, if state A has a high number of joint memberships with country B, A is more likely to ratify an ILO convention if B has ratified it already. Data from the Correlates of War dataset on memberships in intergovernmental organizations (version 2.0) are used to construct the variable IGOs MEMBERSHIP.[49] Formally, the spatial weight of the variable ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION for a country A is:[50]

$$\text{ASSOCIATES'\_RATIFICATION}_{\overline{A}} = \sum_{B,C,D,\dots} \left[IGOs\_MEMBERSHIP_{A,B,C,D} * ILO\_CORE\_CONV\_RATIFICATION_{B,C,D,\dots} \right] \quad (3)$$

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[48] Our measure of economic competition are likely to lead to an *underestimation* of the effect of interdependent ratification, because it captures the attention that states pay to the ratification behavior of states hosting competing exporters, but not the attention paid to states hosting sizeable import-competing producers, who compete for shares of their own home market with the first state's exporters. Thus, our empirical analysis should be seen as a *conservative* test of our hypothesis.

[49] Pevehouse et al. 2004.

[50] To help the reader visualize the two spatial variables, we present a section of the connectivity matrices for both COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION in the Web-Appendix. Since the three spatial terms are highly left-skewed, we use the logarithm to reduce the impact of outliers. In the Web-Appendix we show that our results are not sensitive to the logarithmic transformation.

As noted above, hypothesis 2 has two additional implications that will be tested as well. The first implication is that, if IGOs are socializing environments that may facilitate the diffusion of labor standard norms among their members, then we should expect the effect of joint IGO membership on ratification to be stronger for IGOs that provide better opportunities for socialization. Specifically, we would expect IGOs with permanent and well-resourced bureaucracies to have a larger effect because of their stronger ability to frame policy issues, gather and circulate information, promote interaction among national officials, provide technical assistance and capacity building, establish mechanisms for social pressure and informal sanctions, and engage in other activities that may generate socialization effects. IGOs without permanent and well-resourced bureaucracies correspond to the "minimalist" type identified by Ingram, Robinson and Busch.[51] In their coding, IGOs with permanent and well-resourced bureaucracies can either be "structured" or, if they have means to coerce states, "interventionist". Ingram, Robinson and Busch code about 250 IGOs as minimalist, whereas about 150 and 50 IGOs are coded respectively as structured and interventionist. We use their categorization to examine whether the structure of an IGOs has an impact on the extent to which their member states influence each other's ratification decisions. For this purpose, we created three new variables based on joint membership in minimalist, structured or interventionist IGOs and called them respectively ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.), ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.), and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.).[52]

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[51] Ingram et al. 2005. The coding was originally developed by Boehmer et al. 2004.

[52] Structured and interventionist IGOs have, on average, a larger membership compared to minimalist IGOs, and therefore spatial terms are comparable in terms of mean, standard deviation, and maximum value. Since the three

The second implication of hypothesis 2 is that the number of joint IGO memberships of country dyads should influence ratification even after controlling for the absolute number of IGO that a country is member of. To assess this proposition, we include in our models a variable that expresses the number of ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS that each state has individually.

Control Variables

Other factors are likely to influence a state's decision to ratify an ILO convention beyond our spatial terms.[53] Hence we include several economic and political control variables in our model to avoid overestimating the effect of our main explanatory variables. Indeed, the ratification of the same conventions may happen due to correlated unit-level factors or exogenous shocks that are common to various countries. Most of these variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems.

As recommended by Achen (2005), we start from a baseline model that includes only two control variables, which express fundamental economic and political features of countries: (the logarithm of) GDP per capita (GDPPC), since we expect wealthier countries to be more willing to promote potentially costly labor standards, and the type of political REGIME, since we expect

variables are highly correlated, i.e. $\rho > .7$, we include them into two separate models for each convention to avoid multicollinearity problems.

[53] For discussions of some of these variables see the studies on the ratification of ILO conventions conducted by Chau and Kanbur 2001; Boockmann 2001, 2006; Flanagan 2003; Horny et al. 2008; and Kim 2010.

groups favoring labor standards to be more influential in democracies.[54] Such a model provides preliminary evidence on whether interdependent ratification of ILO conventions is at play at all, as stated by our theory.

In a further step, we enrich our baseline model with a larger set of covariates. We include (the logarithm of) POPULATION and LEGAL TRADITION, which is a dummy variable that scores 1 if a country has a common law system; 0 otherwise.[55] We also include a dummy that scores 1 during the Cold War period, i.e. before 1989.

Finally, we take into account that a set of historical, cultural and political factors may affect the propensity of states to commit themselves to comply with human rights norms in general, [56] and/or norms relating to the protection of core workers' rights in particular. To capture the first aspect, we create a variable – RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – that counts how many core international human rights treaties a state had ratified in previous years.[57] To capture the second aspect, we create a variable - RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS - counting the number of core ILO conventions that the state had ratified in previous years. Table 1 summarizes the univariate statistics.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

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[54] Data on GDP per capita come from IMF (2008), whereas data on the variable REGIME, which ranges between -10 (full autocracy) and +10 (full democracy), are from Polity IV.

[55] Data are from World Bank 2011 and Ayyagari et al. 2006, respectively.

[56] We are grateful to [name omitted] for directing our attention to this issue.

[57] See the Web-Appendix for details of these treaties.

Findings

Tables 2-8 report the results of the analysis of the baseline model including only three covariates (first column) and the models including the full set of covariates for each of the seven core conventions. For ease of interpretation, Table 9 provides an overview of the sign and significance of our main covariates for each convention. Overall, there is strong support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.[58]

<div align="center">TABLES 2-9 ABOUT HERE</div>

Regarding COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION, coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the conventional level for all seven conventions except C138. Results are particularly strong for C29 and C111, i.e. COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION is positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level.

We obtain similar results for ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION. Coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the conventional level for all conventions except C98, whose coefficient is however still positive. For C29, C87, and C105, the variable ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION is positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level. This indicates that, if state A has a large number of joint memberships in IGOs with another state that has

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[58] Goodness-of-fit tests are reported in the Web-Appendix.

previously ratified an ILO core convention, country A is more likely to ratify the same convention.

The impact of the spatial terms on the dependent variable is not only significant, but also substantively large. Figures 2a and b, Figure 3a and b, and Figure 4a and b illustrate the magnitude of the effects of both COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION on the probability of ratification. We show here the survival curves for conventions 29, 87 and 111.[59]

FIGURES 2-4 ABOUT HERE

Regarding COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION, moving from a standard deviation below its mean to a standard deviation above its mean makes a country substantially more likely to ratify an ILO convention. Specifically when the value of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION is a standard deviation *above* the mean, over the 60 year period a country's survival rate falls to almost 0 for C29, to 0.55 for C87, to 0.6 for C98, and to less than 0.4 for C100 and C111. Especially for C29, C87, and C111 the area between the two survival curves is very large, suggesting that economic competition between countries plays an important role in ratification decisions.

The impact of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION is also very strong. In particular, when the value of this variable is a standard deviation *above* the mean, a country's survival rate falls to 0 for C29

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[59] Where statistically significant, the survival curves for conventions 98, 100, 105 and 138 are shown in the Web-Appendix.

after only 45 years. Similarly, moving from a standard deviation below its mean to a standard deviation above its mean makes the survival curve drop to 0.5 for C87, to less than 0.6 for C98, and to 0.4 for C100 and to 0.25 for C111. Similar to COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION, the area between the two survival curves is large particularly for C29, C87, and C111. Moreover, ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION outperforms COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION in all the conventions except C100. We can conclude that any model that aims to predict the ratification of core ILO conventions, but neglects interdependent decision-making among countries, is poorly identified.

The last three columns of tables 2-8 show the outcomes of the analysis that distinguishes between minimalist, structured and interventionist IGOs. While the findings on structured IGOs are mixed, there is clear evidence that interventionist IGOs have stronger effects than minimalist IGOs. ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.) is positive for every convention and statistically significant for C29, C87, C111, and C138. By contrast, ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.) is positive and statistically significant at the conventional level only for C29 and C87.

As expected, joint IGO memberships have an effect even after controlling for the ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS of countries, which confirms our argument that the spatial effect is separate from the potential effect of possessing more connections to the global IGO network.

Among our control variables, LEGAL TRADITION, POPULATION, and RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS seem to be important predictors of the probability of ratifying ILO conventions, whereas the other control variables are not usually statistically significant.

The *robustness* of our results is confirmed by several additional analyses, which are reported in the Web-Appendix. In brief, our findings are not altered substantially by (1) using a measure of economic competition based on a different measure of export similarity, developed by Polillo and Guillén;[60] (2) adding further control variables (constitutional hurdles to the ratification of international treaties, the number of international nongovernmental organizations with members in the country, the number of countries that had ratified each convention in previous years, GDP per capita squared, and geographical distance between countries); (3) removing certain subsets of IGOs (industry-specific and non-prominent IGOs) from the sample; (4) changing the cut-off point for the effect of the lagged dependent variable; (5) omitting logarithmic transformations; (6) including ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION in the same model. The Web-Appendix provides details of these analyses and discusses any differences with the results presented above.

Finally, in our analyses so far, we considered each convention separately, although we controlled for the number of core ILO conventions ratified by country i before time t. However, it is possible that the ratification of a core convention x by country i might influence the probability that country j ratifies a core convention other than x. In the Web-Appendix, we take this possibility into account by performing a pooled analysis of six core conventions and find a statistically significant effect for most of them.

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[60] Polillo and Guillén 2005.

The interaction between international and domestic processes

The case of equal pay legislation in the United Kingdom

Earlier in this paper we have hypothesized that states are more likely to ratify international labor conventions if their social peers have ratified them, and we focused on peer status that derives from common memberships in international organizations. Our statistical analysis found empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. As noted above, international organizations are social environments that can influence behavior through a range of mechanisms, such as mimicking, social pressure and persuasion.[61] But the formal ratification of international treaties in general, and ILO conventions in particular, usually is a process that involves a number of *domestic* actors in a context determined by domestic political institutions. A fuller explanation of ratification decisions in terms of social peer effects should therefore attempt to identify causal mechanisms that connect changes in the international environment (i.e., ratification by other states) with domestic political processes. In order to develop a hypothesis on the interaction between international and domestic factors in the ratification of ILO conventions, in this section we consider more closely one particular case, the process that led to the ratification of the Equal Remuneration Convention (C100) by the United Kingdom. The case study is intended to be both "confirmatory", i.e. aimed at ascertaining *whether* foreign ratifications played a role, and "exploratory", i.e. aimed at developing hypotheses on *how* they played that role.[62] In a further

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[61] Johnston 2001.

[62] See Seawright and Gerring 2008 on confirmatory and exploratory case studies.

step, the resulting hypothesis about international-domestic interaction is then assessed in a cross-national statistical analysis.

Britain's ratification of C100 is consistent with our hypothesis, as it came in the wake of international commitments made by several "peer" countries to implement equal pay for men and women. Such commitments included the ratification of the European Social Charter adopted by the Council of Europe, of which Britain was a member, the equal pay provisions in the treaty establishing the European Economic Community, which Britain aspired to join, and the ratification of ILO Convention 100 on equal pay. Figure 5 shows that the values of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION for the UK, i.e. ratification of C100 by states with which Britain shared many IGO memberships, peaked at the beginning and then again at the end of the 1960s. The first peak triggered the start of an insistent "shaming" campaign on the part of equal pay advocates in the UK, while the second peak coincided with the decision to ratify C100.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

The British case thus can be considered a "typical" case from the perspective of our hypothesis,[63] and other authors have noted that the presence of international legal commitments to equal pay by socially close countries was one of the factors that led to Britain's decision to ratify and reform its domestic legislation in the late 1960s.[64] A closer analysis of the case can be

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[63] Seawright and Gerring 2008.

[64] See Povall 1992.

a source of more fine-grained hypotheses on how international factors affect what is ultimately a domestic political process, ratification.

By the time the United Kingdom ratified C100 in 1971, twenty years after its adoption by the ILO, the issue of equal pay for men and women had been on the British political agenda for over a century. While equal pay legislation was advocated by Conservative members of parliament such as Irene Ward and Thelma Cazalet-Keir, among the most vocal supporters of legislation mandating equal pay for work of equal value were women activists in the labor movement, including female politicians elected to parliament as candidates for the Labour Party. These elected representatives were relentless in raising the issue of equal pay in parliament, demanding appropriate legislation and the ratification of C100. A particularly prominent role in the equal pay campaign was played by Edith Summerskill, who forcefully advocated new legislation throughout her long career in the House of Commons and then in the House of Lords.[65] In attempting to enlarge the coalition for equal pay legislation, supporters of reform developed a wide range of arguments; some of them were based on considerations of efficiency, but most were based on considerations of justice and fairness. Opponents also used a mix of economic and ethical arguments, and were able to block comprehensive legislation until the late 1960s. Historians attribute the resistance to change at least partly to traditional conceptions about gender roles, which were more common among male legislators than their female colleagues. Black and Brooke noted that, "[d]espite Labour's stated support for equal pay during and after

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[65] See, for instance, Henig and Henig 2001, 20.

the Second World War, traditional sexual views still precluded many male M.P.s from giving serious political consideration to the matter."[66]

An analysis of parliamentary debates during the 1960s highlights the role played by foreign examples in the argumentative strategy of equal pay supporters. In 1963 Edith Summerskill stressed that several countries had already ratified C100 and that "[c]ountries within the Common Market are establishing equal pay for equal work and it has been written into the Treaty of Rome. Britain is lagging behind."[67] Shirley Summerskill, Edith's daughter and herself a prominent feminist member of Parliament, also complained in the House of Commons that "Forty-four countries have ratified the convention [C100], but the United Kingdom has not. The Common Market countries, under the Treaty of Rome, are bound to ensure and maintain the adoption of equal pay conditions for women. In these ways, it is a disgrace that Britain is lagging behind other industrial countries."[68]

Members of the government found themselves under increasing pressure to defend Britain's ratification record: Lord Chalfont, for instance, noted that "only seven countries in the world are party to more… Human Rights Conventions than we are."[69] However, noting that 54 countries had ratified C100, Edith Summerskill confronted him with the question: "If it is possible for 54

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[66] Black and Brooke 1997, 444. When, in 1941, Edith Summerskill remarked in a House of Commons debate that even Ernest Bevin admitted "my figures [on pay inequality between men and women] are right", Bevin retorted, "I think your figure's perfect." Cited by Henig and Henig 2001, 19.

[67] Hansard HL Deb 19 June 1963 vol 250 cc1282-96

[68] Hansard HC Deb 23 June 1965 vol 714 cc1904-12

[69] Hansard HL Deb 18 December 1967 vol 287 cc1261-4

countries to find it economically possible to give equal pay, why is it that Great Britain, with a Labour Government, fails to do so?"[70] In condemning those countries that only paid lip service to ILO principles but failed to honor them, she stated: "I am ashamed to think that Britain is included among these countries."[71] She also dismissed arguments based on national specificities in industrial relations: "Many countries with an employment structure no less complex than our own have ratified the Convention. Among them are Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway and Sweden. If they have been able to ratify it, why does this country, with a Labour Government, find it impossible to do so?"[72] Similarly, Shirley Summerskill complained that "We in this country have always lagged behind advanced western countries in this matter, and certainly behind the Common Market countries. This was a shameful situation, because the way a society treats its women is an indication of its civilisation and progress."[73]

The persistence of Edith Summerskill, Shirley Summerskill and other advocates of equal rights legislation paid off in late 1969, when the British government finally agreed to submit equal pay legislation to Parliament. To a significant extent, this legislative innovation was due to the efforts of another prominent woman politician, Barbara Castle, who at the time was Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity in Harold Wilson's Labour Party cabinet. The immediate impetus for the policy change came when Labour women MPs, led by Lena

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[70] Hansard HL Deb 18 December 1967 vol 287 cc1261-4

[71] Hansard HL Deb 22 January 1969 vol 298 cc954-1020

[72] Hansard HL Deb 18 June 1969 vol 302 cc1026-96

[73] Hansard HC Deb 09 February 1970 vol 795 cc913-1038

Jeger, tabled an equal pay amendment to a government's prices and incomes bill, which helped Castle to overcome the Chancellor of the Exchequer's opposition and announce an equal pay bill.[74] In justifying the proposed bill to her cabinet colleagues, Castle wrote that "Legislation on the lines I have suggested would enable us to ratify ILO Convention 100 and we should do so when the legislation was passed. The introduction of equal pay on these lines would bring us into line with the developing practice in the European Economic Community countries…"[75] Castle's efforts succeeded, the Equal Pay Act was passed by Parliament in 1970 and C100 was ratified one year later.

The British case highlights two aspects. First, ratification of C100 and adoption of equal pay legislation was a highly contentious issue in the political arena, and it pitted predominantly female politicians and activists against predominantly male politicians, trade unionists and employers. As Castle commented on the legislative episode that triggered the policy change in her memoirs, "[o]nce again it was the women who made the running".[76] Similarly, Edith Summerskill remarked that it was only because the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity was a woman that there was an equal pay act at all.[77] Second, references to the ratification of C100 and other international legal instruments on equal pay by socially close countries constituted a recurring component of the argumentative strategies of the supporters of policy change in Britain. Faced with objections to equal pay framed mainly in terms of

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[74] Perkins 2003, 329.

[75] United Kingdom Cabinet 1969.

[76] Castle 1993, 427.

[77] Meehan 1985, 54.

economic cost, supporters sometimes used foreign ratifications to undermine such economic arguments, as in Edith Summerskill's speech quoted earlier; but most often used the gap between Britain and its peers as a basis of moral condemnation, as shown by the language of "civilization", "disgrace" and "shame" employed in the speeches quoted above.

A hypothesis on the interaction between foreign and domestic processes

The UK case prompts us to formulate the following general conjecture: ratification by social peers can "tip the balance" in the domestic contest between supporters and opponents of ratification, by providing argumentative ammunition to former and potentially extending the pro-ratification coalition to include actors interested in the "good standing" of their state in international forums in addition to (or sometimes instead of) the consequences of the ratification on domestic labor markets.

It has sometimes been noted that international law can help shift domestic balances of power on contentious policy issues.[78] Our argument differs from this scenario in that the focus is not on how international treaties already ratified by a state empower certain actors within that state, but on how treaty ratification *by other states* helps certain actors to speed up ratification by their own state. The processes are distinct, but clearly compatible. Indeed, we can easily imagine the same groups first using foreign ratifications to press for domestic ratification, and then use domestic ratification to press for change in domestic labor practices. As an examination of the second step would be beyond the scope of this paper, in the following we focus on the first step.

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[78] For instance, Simmons 2009 provides an extensive discussion of this effect.

In order to assess the conjecture stated above, we can formulate a more directly testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: ratification of ILO conventions by social peers will have the clearest impact on states where the coalition in favor of ratification is neither very weak nor very strong relatively to anti-ratification groups.

The rationale underpinning this hypothesis is that, according to our "tipping-the-balance" argument, foreign examples of ratification should play a role where the coalition in favor of ratification is strong enough to make effective use of them, but not so strong to be able to obtain ratification regardless of what other states do.

In the remainder of this section we present a test of this hypothesis with reference to the two ILO core conventions aimed at reducing gender discrimination in employment: C100 Equal Remuneration Convention and C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (the latter covers gender discrimination in addition to other forms of discrimination). We focus on these two conventions because the previous discussion of the UK case suggests a suitable proxy for the strength of the pro-ratification coalition on gender discrimination treaties: the percentage of legislators who are women. We expect that (a) women legislators should be more actively supportive of ratification than men, and (b) a higher percentage of women legislators in a state should increase the probability of ratification. In some countries, the executive has exclusive competence over ratification and in most other countries the executive is responsible for submitting treaties for ratification to the legislature. But, as we have seen in the UK case,

pro-ratification legislators can press the executive to ratify or submit for ratification, and all else being equal this pressure is likely to be stronger if more women sit in the legislative assembly. Moreover, all else being equal, an executive can be more confident that its request to ratify the treaty will be accepted by the legislature if in the latter there is a substantial presence of women. These mechanisms should not be limited to countries where legislatures are competitively elected, since "the position of parliamentarian is visible and carries prestige in all contexts, providing women with symbolic power in democracies and nondemocracies alike."[79]

Thus, Hypothesis 3 can be tested by ascertaining whether ratification of C100 and C111 by social peers is most influential when the percentage of women legislators is intermediate rather than very low or very high. For this purpose, we analyze the interaction between our variable ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and a new variable expressing the percentage of FEMALE LEGISLATORS. This variable ranges between 0 (United Arab Emirates) and 48.8 (Rwanda) with a mean of 11.2.[80]

As shown by Ai and Norton (2003), in non-linear models the significance and the sign of the interaction term are difficult to interpret. For ease of interpretation of the interaction terms, Figure 6 and 7 plot the marginal effect of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION on the probability of ratifying C100 and C111 as the natural logarithm of the percentage of FEMALE LEGISLATORS in

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[79] Paxton et al. 2007, 269.

[80] Data are from Paxton et al. (2008). The dataset extends to 2003 and contains several missing data. We improve data coverage in the following ways: 1) for countries that have the same parliament, we use the same percentage; 2) for countries that change parliament, we use the mean over the past five legislatures; 3) for the remaining missing data, we use linear interpolate values. Results do not change if we use the raw data.

parliament increases.[81] In line with our hypothesis, the slope is positive, i.e. the marginal effect of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION increases as FEMALE LEGISLATORS increases. However, such an effect is statistically significant at the conventional level only for values that lay in the middle of the FEMALE LEGISLATORS distribution. Conversely, the marginal effect of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION is not statistically significant at the conventional level for very low values and very high values of FEMALE LEGISLATORS. This provides support for our hypothesis 3.

FIGURES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE

Conclusion

Two themes have been voiced again and again by proponents of international labor standards, from the origins of the debate in the early nineteenth century, to the creation of an institutional machinery by the Treaty of Versailles and the revitalization of the ILO at the end of World War II, to recent debates about the social impact of economic globalization. The first theme is that the protection and promotion of labor standards is a normative obligation that sorts "good" from "bad" states – where goodness is, depending on the period and the ideology of the proponent, variously defined in terms of "Christian precepts", "humanitarianism", "civilization", "social justice", "human rights", or other foundational values. The second theme is that doing the right thing exposes states to the risk of suffering competitive disadvantages in international markets,

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[81] We hold the rest of the right-hand side variables constant at their median. The STATA 11 command *margins* was used to calculate these effects. Results are not sensitive to the logarithmic transformation. The results of this estimation are shown in the Web-Appendix.

and that institutionalized cooperation among potentially competing states is necessary to reduce that risk. This paper has assessed the absolute and relative importance of social and economic determinants of interdependent decisions to ratify labor rights conventions. This has allowed us to contribute to the growing body of literature that aims to explain the decision to, and timing of, ratification of international treaties by states, as well as the analysis of policy diffusion.

We based our hypotheses on two influential approaches in IR theory: rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. A duration model with spatial lags was applied to 187 countries over 62 years (1948-2009). Our findings provide strong support for the hypothesis derived from sociological institutionalism as well as the hypothesis derived from rationalist institutionalism. For six of the seven core conventions examined, we found that states are more likely to ratify a given convention if it has already been ratified by states with which it has a large number of joint IGO memberships and by states that export a similar basket of goods. This association is not only statistically significant but also substantively important.

In addition to examining *whether* foreign ratification matter for domestic ratification, we also investigated *how* they matter, i.e. we searched from the causal mechanisms that produce those effects, specifically those that operate at the domestic level. A case study of the ratification of the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention by the United Kingdom showed that foreign ratifications were used by proponents of domestic ratification to overcome the resistance of opponents of policy change, mainly by using a shaming strategy. A successive statistical test suggested that the ratification of ILO anti-discrimination conventions by social peers has the clearest impact on states where the coalition in favor of ratification, and specifically female

legislators, is strong enough to make effective use of foreign examples, but not so strong to enable them to obtain ratification regardless of what other states do. This suggests that foreign ratifications are more likely to tip the balance in favor of ratification where the balance between pro-ratification and anti-ratification groups is more even.

Our findings point at various avenues for further research. We note only two. First, our hypotheses on causal mechanisms could be empirically assessed in relation to other types of core conventions, notably those protecting union rights and prohibiting child and forced labor: what kind of actors may use their ratification by foreign states in order to tip the balance in favor of domestic ratification? Second, how does ratification by trade rivals, which our analysis have shown to matter for domestic ratification too, affect what domestic actors want and do? How do the causal mechanisms differ from the effect of ratification by social peers? Such a research agenda could provide a valuable contribution to the further integration of domestic and system-level explanations in the analysis of international policy diffusion.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	Variables	Mean	Std. deviation	Minimum	Maximum	No. Obs.
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	CONVENTION 29	1.53	1.08	0	3.73	2726
	CONVENTION 87	1.76	1.03	0	3.77	4866
	CONVENTION 98	1.85	1.08	0	3.52	4327
	CONVENTION 100	2.03	1.09	0	3.49	3799
	CONVENTION 105	2.10	1.29	0	4.22	3396
	CONVENTION 111	2.11	1.17	0	3.97	3583
	CONVENTION 138	1.93	1.20	0	4.36	4198
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	CONVENTION 29	4.05	1.72	0	6.44	2726
	CONVENTION 87	4.53	1.49	0	6.51	4866
	CONVENTION 98	4.68	1.40	0	6.66	4327
	CONVENTION 100	4.95	1.37	0	6.92	3799
	CONVENTION 105	5.02	1.69	0	7.38	3396
	CONVENTION 111	5.04	1.48	0	6.98	3583
	CONVENTION 138	4.95	1.89	0	7.94	4198
Control variables:[82]						
GDPPC		5.79	1.33	2.70	9.50	2400
REGIME		-1.65	7.23	-10	10	2294
POPULATION		12.73	3.86	2.97	20.94	2111
LEGAL TRADITION		0.27	0.44	0	1	2726
COLD WAR		0.71	0.46	0	1	2726
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES		1.44	2.14	0	10	2726
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS		2.66	1.91	0	6	2726
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS		33.00	17.62	1	92	2726

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[82] Descriptive statistics refer to C29.

Table 2. Determinants of ratification of Convention 29

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.953***		0.894***				
	(0.208)		(0.213)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.393***		0.349***			
		(0.097)		(0.103)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.565***		
					(0.141)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						0.583***	
						(0.163)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							0.373***
							(0.088)
GDPPC	-0.032	-0.072	0.134	0.086	0.130	0.119	0.122
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.096)
REGIME	0.011	0.007	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
POPULATION			-0.105**	-0.119**	-0.080*	-0.089**	-0.120***
			(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)
LEGAL TRADITION			0.294	0.260	0.232	0.279	0.328
			(0.339)	(0.358)	(0.363)	(0.346)	(0.354)
COLD WAR			0.356	0.740*	0.548	0.845**	0.844**
			(0.390)	(0.424)	(0.388)	(0.396)	(0.425)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			-0.076	-0.080	-0.077	-0.075	-0.108*
			(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.064)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			0.666***	0.710***	0.687***	0.698***	0.710***
			(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.085)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			-0.014	-0.017	-0.018	-0.018	-0.024*
			(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
No. of countries	118	118	114	114	114	114	114
No. of ratifications	85	85	80	80	80	80	80
Observations	2,105	2,105	1,865	1,865	1,865	1,865	1,865

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3. Determinants of ratification of Convention 87

VARIABLES	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.495***		0.391**				
	(0.146)		(0.165)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.243***		0.280***			
		(0.083)		(0.106)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.273**		
					(0.108)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						0.213***	
						(0.080)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							0.209*
							(0.110)
GDPPC	-0.128	-0.148*	-0.378**	-0.402***	-0.400***	-0.379**	-0.400***
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.148)
REGIME	0.035**	0.036**	0.071***	0.073***	0.073***	0.074***	0.076***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
POPULATION			-0.212***	-0.229***	-0.209***	-0.207***	-0.211***
			(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)
LEGAL TRADITION			-0.675*	-0.728**	-0.740**	-0.705*	-0.741**
			(0.361)	(0.368)	(0.368)	(0.366)	(0.366)
COLD WAR			2.246***	2.501***	2.332***	2.356***	2.430***
			(0.401)	(0.444)	(0.413)	(0.416)	(0.448)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			0.098*	0.108**	0.098*	0.087*	0.103*
			(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			1.099***	1.096***	1.113***	1.119***	1.107***
			(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.135)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	-0.004
			(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
No. of countries	159	159	157	157	157	157	157
No. of ratifications	93	93	90	90	90	90	90
Observations	4,022	4,022	3,762	3,762	3,762	3,762	3,762

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4. Determinants of ratification of Convention 98

VARIABLES	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.558***		0.372**				
	(0.162)		(0.189)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.231*		0.055			
		(0.123)		(0.140)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.336		
					(0.211)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						0.192	
						(0.180)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							-0.071
							(0.088)
GDPPC	-0.093	-0.120	-0.392**	-0.388**	-0.383**	-0.385**	-0.391**
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.171)
REGIME	0.019	0.020	0.052**	0.055**	0.052**	0.053**	0.053**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
POPULATION			-0.218***	-0.204***	-0.208***	-0.209***	-0.195***
			(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)
LEGAL TRADITION			-0.300	-0.334	-0.372	-0.342	-0.297
			(0.400)	(0.403)	(0.406)	(0.403)	(0.397)
COLD WAR			2.402***	2.364***	2.419***	2.447***	2.222***
			(0.420)	(0.431)	(0.419)	(0.438)	(0.437)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			0.165***	0.156***	0.163***	0.161***	0.150***
			(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			1.175***	1.197***	1.180***	1.185***	1.229***
			(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.090)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			-0.009	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.009
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
No. of countries	159	159	157	157	157	157	157
No. of ratifications	102	102	97	97	97	97	97
Observations	3,560	3,560	3,229	3,229	3,229	3,229	3,229

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Determinants of ratification of Convention 100

VARIABLES	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.642***		0.294*				
	(0.138)		(0.164)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.564***		0.227**			
		(0.147)		(0.115)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.049		
					(0.191)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						-0.090	
						(0.141)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							0.066
							(0.124)
GDP$_{PC}$	-0.051	-0.064	-0.088	-0.076	-0.079	-0.086	-0.076
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.126)
REGIME	0.009	0.006	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
POPULATION			-0.066*	-0.067*	-0.075**	-0.072*	-0.075**
			(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)
LEGAL TRADITION			-0.317	-0.346	-0.351	-0.335	-0.346
			(0.266)	(0.275)	(0.280)	(0.279)	(0.275)
COLD WAR			0.039	0.151	0.117	0.045	0.141
			(0.282)	(0.311)	(0.283)	(0.290)	(0.287)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			0.081	0.085	0.080	0.076	0.084
			(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.061)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			0.976***	0.968***	0.983***	0.994***	0.975***
			(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.071)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.003	-0.007
			(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
No. of countries	159	159	159	159	159	159	159
No. of ratifications	128	128	125	125	125	125	125
Observations	3,061	3,061	2,783	2,783	2,638	2,638	2,638

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Determinants of ratification of Convention 105

VARIABLES	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.307***		0.222*				
	(0.097)		(0.124)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.287***		0.256***			
		(0.075)		(0.090)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.115		
					(0.114)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						0.155	
						(0.118)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							0.042
							(0.098)
GDPPC	-0.005	-0.015	0.164	0.167	0.153	0.157	0.145
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)
REGIME	0.035***	0.031**	0.023	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
POPULATION			-0.052	-0.066**	-0.076**	-0.078**	-0.075**
			(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
LEGAL TRADITION			1.318***	1.324***	1.241***	1.245***	1.240***
			(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.283)	(0.281)
COLD WAR			-0.484	-0.303	-0.253	-0.188	-0.238
			(0.305)	(0.311)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.317)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			0.024	0.042	0.038	0.044	0.030
			(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			0.871***	0.861***	0.866***	0.863***	0.865***
			(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			-0.010	-0.013	-0.010	-0.011	-0.010
			(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
No. of countries	160	160	158	158	158	158	158
No. of ratifications	125	125	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	2,825	2,825	2,559	2,559	2,481	2,481	2,481

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 7. Determinants of ratification of Convention 111

VARIABLES	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.718***		0.490***				
	(0.133)		(0.152)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.450***		0.277**			
		(0.127)		(0.110)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.340***		
					(0.120)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						0.350***	
						(0.124)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							0.173
							(0.106)
GDPPC	0.053	0.035	0.096	0.106	0.106	0.114	0.107
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.131)
REGIME	-0.011	-0.013	-0.015	-0.016	-0.017	-0.017	-0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
POPULATION			0.026	0.026	0.030	0.022	0.056
			(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.045)
LEGAL TRADITION			0.118	0.124	0.096	0.110	0.176
			(0.300)	(0.299)	(0.301)	(0.298)	(0.303)
COLD WAR			-0.929***	-0.855***	-0.911***	-0.767**	-1.060***
			(0.292)	(0.301)	(0.291)	(0.309)	(0.287)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			-0.063	-0.067	-0.068	-0.067	-0.089
			(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.067)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			0.936***	0.941***	0.945***	0.938***	0.952***
			(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.079)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			-0.020*	-0.026**	-0.025**	-0.025**	-0.030***
			(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
No. of countries	160	160	159	159	159	159	159
No. of ratifications	128	128	123	123	123	123	123
Observations	2,923	2,923	2,648	2,648	2,648	2,648	2,648

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. Determinants of ratification of Convention 138

VARIABLES	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.140		-0.127				
	(0.129)		(0.081)				
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION		0.536***		0.353*			
		(0.129)		(0.192)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)					0.462*		
					(0.247)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)						0.324	
						(0.206)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)							-0.098
							(0.204)
GDPPC	0.021	0.021	0.292***	0.289***	0.283***	0.288***	0.281***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)
REGIME	0.027**	0.021*	-0.002	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.000
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
POPULATION			0.130**	0.126**	0.138**	0.128**	0.125*
			(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.065)
LEGAL TRADITION			-0.236	-0.203	-0.216	-0.196	-0.228
			(0.294)	(0.298)	(0.299)	(0.300)	(0.291)
COLD WAR			-3.243***	-2.442***	-2.463***	-2.550***	-3.268***
			(0.600)	(0.734)	(0.729)	(0.724)	(0.633)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES			-0.067	-0.043	-0.044	-0.048	-0.070
			(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.051)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS			0.948***	0.944***	0.949***	0.942***	0.943***
			(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.128)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS			-0.021***	-0.025***	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.019*
			(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
No. of countries	162	162	157	157	157	157	157
No. of ratifications	125	125	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	3,486	3,486	3,249	3,249	3,249	3,249	3,249

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9. Overview of sign and statistical significance of main variables

ILO Convention	COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)
C29	+***	+***	+***	+***	+***
C87	+**	+***	+*	+***	+**
C98	+**	+	-	+	+
C100	+*	+**	+	-	+
C105	+*	+***	+	+	+
C111	+***	+**	+	+***	+***
C138	-	+*	-	+	+*

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1. Survival rates of the seven core conventions.

Figures 2a, b. Ratification of Convention 29: survival estimates for different levels of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION.

Figures 3a, b. Ratification of Convention 87: survival estimates for different levels of COMPETITORS'

RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION.

Figures 4a, b. Ratification of Convention 111: survival estimates for different levels of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION.

Figure 5. Convention 100: values of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION for the United Kingdom between 1953 (year after first ratification) and 1971 (year of UK ratification).

Figure 6. Marginal effect of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION at different levels of FEMALE LEGISLATORS, Convention 100.

Figure 7. Marginal effect of ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION at different levels of FEMALE LEGISLATORS, Convention 111.

Why do states commit to international labor standards?

The importance of "rivalry" and "friendship"

Web-Appendix

Contents

A. PH Test

Table A1 shows the test of the proportional hazard assumption based on the scaled Schoenfeld residuals, in relation to Convention 29. The output from the test is non-significant, indicating the absence of evidence contradicting the proportionality assumption. Results are similar for models that include ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION, and for other conventions.

Table A1. PH Test (Model 1), Convention 29.

Variables	Rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.00	0.00	1	0.99
GDPPC	0.07	0.45	1	0.50
POPULATION	0.16	2.26	1	0.13
LEGAL TRADITION	0.21	2.42	1	0.12
COLD WAR	-0.18	2.29	1	0.13
REGIME	-0.16	1.96	1	0.16
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES	-0.04	0.17	1	0.68
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS	0.07	0.20	1	0.66
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS	0.11	0.66	1	0.42
Global test		10.96	9	0.28

B. Excerpts from connectivity matrices

To help the reader visualize the two spatial variables, Table A2 and Table A3 present a section of the connectivity matrices for both COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION.

Table A2. First eight countries in the connectivity matrix related to COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION, 1980.

	AFG	AGO	ALB	ARE	ARG	AUS	AUT	BDI
AFG	0.00	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.11	0.11	0.23	0.03
AGO	0.01	0.00	0.42	0.96	0.13	0.07	0.03	0.16
ALB	0.14	0.42	0.00	0.45	0.18	0.30	0.13	0.02
ARE	0.01	0.96	0.45	0.00	0.16	0.14	0.10	0.04
ARG	0.11	0.13	0.18	0.16	0.00	0.56	0.22	0.06
AUS	0.11	0.07	0.30	0.14	0.56	0.00	0.36	0.12
AUT	0.23	0.03	0.13	0.10	0.22	0.36	0.00	0.12
BDI	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.12	0.12	0.00

Table A3. First eight countries of the connectivity matrix related to ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION, 1980.

	AFG	AGO	ALB	ARE	ARG	AUS	AUT	BDI	BEL
AFG	0	11	9	20	20	21	20	15	20
AGO	11	0	7	12	12	11	11	12	12
ALB	9	7	0	9	10	12	12	9	12
ARE	20	12	9	0	24	23	23	18	23
ARG	20	12	10	24	0	37	37	21	39
AUS	21	11	12	23	37	0	44	20	47
AUT	20	11	12	23	37	44	0	20	59
BDI	15	12	9	18	21	20	20	0	21
BEL	20	12	12	23	39	47	59	21	0

C. Survival estimates for conventions 98, 100, 105 and 138

Figures A1. Ratification of Convention 98: survival estimates at different levels of COMPETITORS'
RATIFICATION.

Cox proportional hazards regression

Figures A2a, b. Ratification of Convention 100: survival estimates at different levels of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION.

Figures A3a, b. Ratification of Convention 105: survival estimates at different levels of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION.

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Figures A4. Ratification of Convention 138 survival estimates at different levels of Associates'
ratification.

D. Model fit

Figures A.3a,b show that there are no concerns of lack of fit by comparing the jagged line to the
reference line. When plotting the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimator for Cox-Snell
residuals, the right-hand tail shows some variability that is caused by the reduced effective
sample produced by prior failures and censoring. Problems of prior failures and censoring are
particularly severe in case of C29, since the vast majority of countries ratified this convention
before 1990. This is the reason why there is some variability in the right-hand tail of Figure A.3.

Figures A.3a, b. Goodness of fit: Convention 29 and Convention 138.

E. The control variable RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

In the main text, we noted that the analysis of ratification of ILO core conventions should control for the propensity of states to commit to human rights norms in general. To capture this propensity, created a variable – RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – that counts how many core international human rights treaties a state ratified in previous years. The treaties included are (1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (2) its first optional protocol, (3) its second optional protocol, (4) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (5) the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, (6) its provisions on individual petition, (7) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, (8) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (9) its optional protocol, (10) the Convention on the Rights of the Child, (11) the International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Ratification information is from UCL's *Nominal Commitment to Human Rights* project. [83]

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[83] See Çali et al. 2009.

F. Robustness checks: a different measure of economic competition

We checked whether and how our findings change by using the measure of export similarity developed by Polillo and Guillén instead of the measure developed by Elkins, Guzman and Simmons.[84] In this indicator trade data are disaggregated at product level (two-digit level classification) yielding 77 product vectors. Data come from United Nations Global Common Database. Again, we used (rescaled) Pearson correlation coefficients between product vectors for countries i and j in year t-1 to obtain this second indicator of export similarity. We label this variable EXPORT SIMILARITY 2. We constructed a variable labeled COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2 using the same procedure that yielded COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION (see main text), but on the basis of EXPORT SIMILARITY 2 instead of EXPORT SIMILARITY. We found that COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2 has a positive and statistically significant effect on the ratification of C29, C87 and C111, as COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION does. The effect of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2 on the ratification of C98, C100 and C105 is still positive but, contrary to COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Its effect on the ratification of C138 has also the expected sign but is not statistically significant.

G. Robustness checks: additional control variables

The analysis presented in the main text section found support for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 with regard to six of the seven core conventions. This section considers whether these findings are robust to the inclusion of a range of additional control variables. First, we control for the presence of CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES to the ratification of international treaties.[85] This variable should be treated with the utmost caution as we have only one value per country for the whole period under consideration, hence we included it in only one model for each of our three main independent variables. Second, given the possible role played by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in promoting commitment to human rights norms, we control for the NUMBER OF INGOs with members in the country[86]. Third, we include a variable

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[84] Polillo and Guillén 2005.

[85] Simmons 2009.

[86] Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005.

that counts the number of countries that had ratified each convention in previous years (CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS). This variable is never statistically significant, a result that is important for two reasons. First, it shows that diffusion is *not* merely driven by the increasing number of countries ratifying ILO conventions, a finding that would contradict our argument. Second,, including CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS allows us to check for potential endogeneity resulting from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in our model.[87] Fourth, we add GDPpc squared, since previous studies suggested that the relationship between economic development and ratification of ILO conventions is not linear.[88] Fifth, we include an additional spatial term that we call NEIGHBORS' RATIFICATION, which indicates the effect of ratification by countries that are geographically close. We do this in order to ensure that our variables ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION capture the functioning of the mechanisms hypothesized by rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, and not simply a mechanism of emulation among close neighbors. NEIGHBORS' RATIFICATION is obtained by multiplying the reciprocal of distance with the number of ILO conventions that the other country ratified within the past five years.[89]

As shown in Tables A4 and A5, the inclusion of these additional control variables confirms the importance of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION for the ratification of C29. Similarly, after including the same set of additional control variables, ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION continue to have a positive and statistically significant effect also with regard to the other conventions, which confirms the findings of the main analysis. The main difference with the analysis reported in the main text concerns C98, where COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION loses statistical significance when NEIGHBORS' RATIFICATION is included.

Following Boockmann and Horny et al.,[90] we considered the possibility that ratification of a convention may be less costly for states that already ratified "predecessor" conventions, i.e. past conventions that are explicitly cited and revised by the convention under consideration. Of our seven core conventions, only C138 has predecessor conventions. We created a variable counting

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[87] See Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 425.

[88] Horny et al. 2008.

[89] Data on distance are from the *GeoDist* database. See Meyer and Zignago 2011.

[90] Boockmann 2001 and Horny et al. 2008.

how many of the ten conventions cited in C138 had been previously ratified by a state, but the variable is not statistically significant at the conventional level (not shown in table).

Finally, we tried to identify measures of the bargaining power of labor in the domestic economy, but all proxies that we considered were either too detached from the underlying concept or available only for a small subset of countries and years. We encountered similar data limitation problems in relation to measures of the partisan (left/right) composition of executives.

Table A4. Determinants of the ratification of Convention 29: COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION with additional control variables.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	`(5)	(6)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	0.847***	0.902***	0.889***	0.919***	0.893***	
	(0.215)	(0.218)	(0.231)	(0.238)	(0.304)	
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION (3-YEAR LAG)						0.937***
						(0.203)
GDPPC	0.140	0.186*	0.340***	0.459***	0.465**	0.152
	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.127)	(0.161)	(0.186)	(0.095)
POPULATION	-0.107**	-0.107***	-0.022	-0.026	0.050	-0.074*
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.039)
LEGAL TRADITION	0.345	0.376	0.544*	0.593*	0.300	0.288
	(0.353)	(0.347)	(0.321)	(0.316)	(0.377)	(0.314)
COLD WAR	0.320	0.040	-1.685**	-1.619**	-2.447***	0.135
	(0.397)	(0.410)	(0.767)	(0.768)	(0.923)	(0.413)
REGIME	0.002	-0.016	-0.022	-0.027	-0.017	0.005
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES	-0.063	-0.069	-0.116*	-0.122**	-0.090	-0.058
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.101)	(0.060)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS	-0.015	-0.019	-0.032**	-0.030*	-0.029*	-0.019
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS	0.682***	0.649***	0.746***	0.725***	0.726***	0.680***
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.081)
CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES	-0.155					
	(0.240)					
NUMBER OF INGOS		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS			-0.030***	-0.028**	-0.032***	
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
GDPPC2				-0.000	-0.000	
				(0.000)	(0.000)	
NEIGHBORS' RATIFICATION					-0.002	
					(0.081)	
No. of countries	108	106	106	106	106	114
No. of ratifications	77	77	77	77	77	80
Observations	1,756	1,717	1,717	1,717	1,573	1,859

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5. Determinants of the ratification of Convention 29: ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION with additional control variables

VARIABLES	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	0.310***	0.349***	0.359***	0.369***	0.299**	
	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.119)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (3-YEAR LAG)						0.508***
						(0.132)
GDPPC	0.090	0.130	0.317***	0.413***	0.380**	0.119
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.123)	(0.148)	(0.168)	(0.097)
POPULATION	-0.117**	-0.121**	-0.029	-0.033	-0.007	-0.104**
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.049)
LEGAL TRADITION	0.300	0.346	0.549*	0.568*	0.263	0.287
	(0.372)	(0.362)	(0.332)	(0.323)	(0.390)	(0.354)
COLD WAR	0.669	0.474	-1.541**	-1.470*	-2.295***	0.805**
	(0.435)	(0.432)	(0.763)	(0.759)	(0.776)	(0.405)
REGIME	0.000	-0.017	-0.024	-0.029	-0.020	-0.003
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES	-0.069	-0.075	-0.131**	-0.136**	-0.145	-0.064
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.109)	(0.061)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS	-0.017	-0.022	-0.038**	-0.037**	-0.029*	-0.020
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS	0.726***	0.692***	0.787***	0.774***	0.777***	0.694***
	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.101)	(0.088)
CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES	-0.184					
	(0.230)					
NUMBER OF INGOS		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
CUMULATIVE RATIFICATIONS			-0.033***	-0.031***	-0.032***	
			(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
GDPPC2				-0.000	-0.000	
				(0.000)	(0.000)	
NEIGHBORS' RATIFICATION					0.068	
					(0.076)	
No. of countries	108	106	106	106	106	114
No. of ratifications	77	77	77	77	77	80
Observations	1,756	1,717	1,717	1,717	1,717	1,865

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

H. Robustness checks: subsamples of IGOs

We checked if splitting the sample of IGOs into those that Jason Beckfield classifies as "prominent" in 2000 and all the others alters our results.[91] We found little evidence that joint membership in prominent IGOs has a stronger effect than joint membership in non-prominent IGOs. Furthermore, we excluded from the sample of IGOs those organizations that Ingram, Robinson and Busch coded as "industry-specific",[92] in order to reduce the correlation between ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION (since members of industry-specific IGOs are likely to have higher levels of export similarity). Our main results do not change. Table A6 presents the outcome of these analyses with regard to C29.

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[91] Beckfield 2010.

[92] Ingram et al. 2005.

Table A6. Ratification of Convention 29: ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION with subsamples of IGOs (non-prominent and not industry-specific).

VARIABLES	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (PROMINENT)	0.808***			
	(0.175)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (NON-PROMINENT)		0.007***		
		(0.001)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (PROMINENT - NOT INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC)			0.057***	
			(0.008)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCTURED - NOT INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC)				0.007***
				(0.001)
GDPPC	0.170*	0.133	0.149	0.163*
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.108)	(0.099)
REGIME	0.006	-0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
POPULATION	-0.045	-0.106***	-0.029	-0.068*
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)
LEGAL TRADITION	0.372	0.352	0.323	0.213
	(0.329)	(0.340)	(0.318)	(0.343)
COLD WAR	0.693*	1.190***	0.750*	0.822**
	(0.394)	(0.448)	(0.384)	(0.394)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES	-0.051	-0.064	-0.068	-0.049
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.060)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS	0.690***	0.685***	0.676***	0.677***
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.090)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS	-0.023	-0.029**	-0.020	-0.025*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
No. of countries	114	114	114	114
No. of ratifications	80	80	80	80
Observations	1,865	1,865	1,865	1,865

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I. Other robustness checks

In order to assess whether the five-year cut-off point for the effect of the lagged dependent variable influences the results we lagged the dependent variable by three years. Column No. 6 in table A4 and column No. 12 in Table A5 show the outcome of this analysis. Lagging the dependent variable by only three years mitigates endogeneity concerns; in other words, we can be confident that our results are not driven by the lagged dependent variable on the right hand-side of the equation.

We also checked whether our results are similar if we do *not* employ a logarithmic transformation. Table A7 reports sign and significance of our main covariates for each convention.[93] The main differences are for C105, whose spatial terms lose statistical significance, and C138, whose spatial terms turn negative and, in the case of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION, significant. Thus, there is evidence that few outliers are driving the results for C105 and C138 if the logarithmic transformation is not in place.[94]

Table A7. Overview of sign and statistical significance of main variables, logarithmic transformation omitted

ILO Convention	COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (MINIM.)	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (STRUCT.)	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION (INTERV.)
C29	+***	+***	+***	+***	+***
C87	+***	+***	+**	+**	+**
C98	+**	+*	+	+**	+***
C100	+*	+**	+*	+	+
C105	+	-	-	+	+
C111	+***	+***	+*	+***	+***
C138	-**	-	-	-	-

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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[93] Full results are available upon request.

[94] For instance, the United States did not ratify C138, though their COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION covariates score very high values.

Finally, we include COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION in the same model. States with similar export profiles are likely to join the same international institutions,[95] which in turn provide socialization opportunities to those states. Thus, while the effects hypothesized in the main text can be considered as logically distinct at the most abstract level, we expect there to be some overlap at the level of the general indicators chosen to express economic competition and socialization opportunities, i.e. export similarity and shared IGO memberships. Consequently, also COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION can be expected to be correlated to some extent. Empirically, we found that COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2 is less correlated with ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION than COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION is, and so it should provide a better insight into the distinctive role played by economic competition in ratification decisions. Table A8 provides an overview of the sign and the statistical significance of the main variables when they are included in the same model, which also includes our baseline control variables GDPPC and REGIME.[96] Although the correlation between the two spatial terms is quite high, it is striking that COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2 and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION are both positive and statistically significant for C29 and C111. Importantly, whenever ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION is statistically significant in the models reported in the main text, it continues to be so after the inclusion of COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2, except in the case of C105. On the other hand, COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION loses significance in predicting ratification of conventions C100 and C105 and COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION loses the ability to predict the ratification of C87, although the signs remain positive in those cases. In sum, even though our two main variables are somewhat overlapping, we can conclude that they capture two different mechanisms of interdependent ratification of ILO conventions.[97]

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[95] Baccini and Dür 2012.

[96] Full results are available upon request.

[97] As suggested by Heagerty and Zheng (2005), we calculate ROC curves from the survival model to assess the predictive accuracy of our models with COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION for each convention. We find that there is no difference between model with COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION and models with ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION, suggesting that these two variables have similar explanatory power. Results are available upon request.

Table A8. Overview of sign and statistical significance of the main variables when included in the same model.

ILO Convention	COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION in model with ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2 in model with ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION in model with COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION	ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION in model with COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION 2
C29	+**	+***	+	+***
C87	+*	+	-	+*
C98	+**	+	-	+
C100	+	+	+**	+***
C105	+	+	+**	+
C111	+***	+**	+	+**
C138	-	+	+***	+***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

J. Interdependence among ILO conventions

In our main analysis we considered each convention separately, although we controlled for the number of core ILO conventions ratified by country i before time t. However, it is possible that the ratification of a core convention x by country i might influence the probability that country j ratifies a core convention other than x. This may be due to the fact that the core conventions are sometimes bundled together as expression of a comprehensive commitment to the protection of basic rights at work, not least by the ILO itself in its promotional activities. For instance, by 1998 Indonesia had ratified four core conventions and, in announcing the government's intention to ratify the remaining three, the Indonesian Manpower Minister declared that "There are seven main conventions, and the countries which have ratified them are considered democratic."[98] After ratification, the ILO Director-General publicly congratulated Indonesia on

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[98] "Indonesia Has Ratified Four ILO Conventions" *Antara-The Indonesian National News Agency*, October 22, 1998. The Minister also declared that "By ratifying these conventions, the protection over labourers at home would

its becoming "the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to have ratified all seven of the core conventions covering fundamental principles and right at work."[99] The ILO also publicized the fact that Indonesia was the 47th of ILO's 170 member States to have ratified all seven core conventions.

This interdependence among conventions is illustrated by Figure A4, which shows the distribution of the maximum number of ILO conventions ratified in the same year by each country in the dataset. For instance, Botswana, Eritrea, and Gambia ratified all seven conventions in the same year, whereas Brunei, Bhutan, and Taiwan have ratified no conventions during the period under investigation.[100] In general, the majority of the countries ratified more than one convention per year, whereas less than 10 percent of the countries do not ratify any core conventions.

Because the ILO and governments sometimes treat core conventions as a cohesive set, states may be influenced not only by the ratification of a specific convention by others, but also by the ratification of core conventions in general. To account for this possibility, we relaxed the assumption that ratifications of core conventions are independent from one another. Specifically, we pooled six core conventions together (we left C138 out from this analysis, because this convention was ratified much later than the others and so we would lose many observations by including it). By pooling the conventions together, our dependent variable becomes the number of years before a country ratifies one of the six conventions. Thus, countries *do not* leave the dataset when they ratify a convention. In other words, we have multiple unordered failures of the same events. To correctly estimate this model, we used the Efron method and stratified observations by convention. In essence, we allowed for a different baseline hazard function for each convention.

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be clearer, while on the other hand it would also improve the Indonesian image in the international forum." "Indonesian Govt to ratify Three ILO Conventions", *Business Line*, April 8, 1999.

[99] "Indonesia ratifies core ILO conventions", *Business Line*, June 12, 1999.

[100] Brunei ratified C138 in 2011.

Figure A4. Distribution of the maximum number of ILO conventions ratified in the same year by each country in the dataset.

Table A9 shows the results of this analysis. Spatial terms capturing COMPETITORS' RATIFICATIONS for each convention are highly collinear with one another as well as the spatial terms capturing ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION. Thus, we include each spatial term in a separate model to avoid multicollinearity problems. Moreover, results for COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C29 are very similar to results for COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C87 and C98. Likewise, results for ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C29 are very similar to results for ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C87 and C98. As such, we only report estimates of models including COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C29 and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C29. The other results are available upon request.

The key insights from this test are two. First, there is evidence that both COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C29 and C100 and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C29 and C100 influence the ratification of the other conventions. Indeed, the coefficients of these variables are positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level. Second, COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C111 and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C111 are not statistically significant at the conventional level

(and the former variable has a negative coefficient). This result might be explained by the fact that C111 was ratified by countries with an average 20-year lag compared to the other conventions.

Table A9. Pooled analysis of core conventions

VARIABLES	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C29	0.457***					
	(0.052)					
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C100		0.111***				
		(0.040)				
COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C111			-0.000			
			(0.004)			
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C29				0.261***		
				(0.036)		
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C100					0.233***	
					(0.041)	
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C111						0.035
						(0.028)
GDPPC	0.013	0.001	0.007	0.010	-0.011	0.004
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
REGIME	0.008	0.015**	0.016***	0.010	0.012**	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
POPULATION	-0.053***	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.063***	-0.080***	-0.047***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
LEGAL TRADITION	0.274***	0.255***	0.256***	0.252***	0.236**	0.252***
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
COLD WAR	-0.224**	-0.184*	-0.296***	-0.017	0.025	-0.210*
	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.124)
RATIFIED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES	0.043**	0.021	0.007	0.044**	0.033*	0.015
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
RATIFIED ILO CORE CONVENTIONS	0.525***	0.559***	0.579***	0.526***	0.531***	0.567***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)
ABSOLUTE IGO MEMBERSHIPS	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.011***	-0.012***	-0.010***	-0.011***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	46,120	46,120	46,120	46,120	46,120	46,120
Number of groups	7	7	7	7	7	7

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

If we include COMPETITORS' RATIFICATION of C87, or of C98, and ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION of C87 or C98 instead of the corresponding variables for C29, we obtain similar results to those reported in Table A9: the competitor as well as the associate ratification variables have a positive and statistically significant effect on the ratification of other conventions.

K. Interaction between ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and FEMALE LEGISLATORS

Table A.10. Interaction between ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION and FEMALE LEGISLATORS, conventions 100 and 111.

VARIABLES	(23)	(24)
	Convention 100	**Convention 111**
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION	0.117	0.098
	(0.075)	(0.070)
ln(FEMALE LEGISLATORS)	-0.049	0.009
	(0.213)	(0.214)
ASSOCIATES' RATIFICATION*ln(FEMALE LEGISLATORS)	0.025	0.001
	(0.039)	(0.039)
GDPPC	-0.046	-0.011
	(0.041)	(0.039)
REGIME	0.002	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	-2.156***	-2.176***
	(0.455)	(0.443)
Observations	2,916	2,790

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

L. Competition and norms in the creation of the ILO

The main text has focused on the role that economic competition and normative socialization play in the decision to ratify conventions adopted by the ILO. A separate but related question is whether the same factors – concerns about the impact of labor standards on economic

competitiveness on the one hand and promotion of reputedly universal values on the other hand – played a role in the creation of the ILO as an institution in the first place. Both rationalist and sociaological institutionalism would expect that their respective logics of action operate at both levels: the creation of the broader institutional framework as well as the commitments taken in the context of that institution. This section supports those claims by offering a brief overview of the process that led to the creation of the ILO.

Political leaders, labor unionists, social reformers and scholars have been aware of the international dimensions of labor and social legislation for at least two centuries. The French statesman and financier Jacques Necker wrote in 1788 that

> "the country which, out of barbarian ambition, would abolish the day of rest prescribed by religion, would probably attain a certain degree of superiority if it were the only country to do so; but as soon as other nations follow the lead, this advantage would be lost, and shares in sales would return to what they had been prior to the change. The same reasoning demonstrates that countries where days of rest are multiplied beyond the norm will have a disadvantage with respect to countries that have selected as days of rest only the holy days imposed by the church."[101]

Throughout the nineteenth century, opponents of legislation aimed at improving working conditions routinely invoked the harm that such measures would inflict on the international competitiveness of domestic industries.[102] From the 1830s onwards, advocates of social reform and labor legislation argued that damaging regulatory competition could be overcome by means of international treaties establishing minimum standards with regard to hours of work, days of rest, night work of women, employment of children, and other practices. The most energetic campaigner for international labor treaties was Daniel Legrand who, in an appeal addressed to the governments of all industrial countries in 1855, argued that

> "In modern industrial Europe there are certain matters that individual nations cannot regulate except in the form of an agreement between the interested powers … An international labour law is the only possible solution to the great social problem of granting moral and material well-being to the working class without working a hardship

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[101] Cited in Bairoch 1999, 161.

[102] Engerman 2003.

upon the manufacturers or upsetting the competitive balance between the industries of these countries"[103]

In the writings of Legrand and other supporters of international labor treaties, references to competitive pressures were often intertwined with appeals to the duties of governments to improve the condition of the working classes as an essential requirement of civilization, often with reference to the promotion of Christian values. For instance, Éduard Ducpétiaux, who first suggested the establishment of an international labor organization, urged in 1843: "Let nations unite for social reform instead of frustrating one another's efforts … All civilized nations should concur in this truly holy alliance which should open to humanity a new era of well-being and universal satisfaction".[104] This quotation highlights two themes that recurred in debates on international cooperation on labor issues in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the protection of core labor standards is a moral obligation for any state that wants to belong to the club of "civilized nations" (later: the community of states respecting human rights and social justice); and international cooperation is necessary to protect states fulfilling those moral obligations from economic losses.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the issue of international labor regulation moved from the pamphlets of social reformers, the resolutions of workers' associations and academic treaties onto the agenda of governments. For instance, in response to a motion brought in 1885 to the German parliament in favor of the international regulation of labor standards, Chancellor Bismarck declared that

> "A normal workday could be established for Germany alone if Germany were surrounded by a Chinese wall and were economically self-sufficient. Such is not the case. It would be necessary to establish a universal workday union analogous to the postal union, as well as a universal wage union. This would have to embrace the United States, England, and every industrial country".

Bismarck pointed out that "this is impossible in the world in which we live"[105]. However, the 1880s and 1890s witnessed the first attempts by European governments to negotiate international labor treaties and create an international labor organization. Two international

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[103] Cited in Follows 1951, 38.

[104] Cited in Follows 1951, 46.

[105] Cited in Follows 1951, 91.

labor conventions were adopted in 1906 and twenty-eight bilateral treaties on labor issues had been concluded by 1914.

The decisive breakthrough came at the end of World War I. The British government took the lead in designing the new international labor regime, as it reasoned that,

> "from the British economic point of view, it was clearly to the advantage of a country that was among the most advanced in the regulation of conditions of employment to encourage the movement to that end. Once free competition had been restored it would be very difficult to raise the general standard of wages or condition or even to maintain the present minimum in industries which depended on foreign markets, unless similar standards were applied in all competing markets".[106]

The preamble to the Constitution of the ILO, approved in 1919 as Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, summarized the reasons for regulating labor conditions through international cooperation. On the one hand, it stated that universal "peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice" and that "conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled". On the other hand, it stated that "the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries".[107] As in the nineteenth century, appeals to "social justice" and "humane" working conditions were intertwined with concerns about the loss of international competitiveness.

The contracting parties to the Treaty of Versailles decided that the plenary body of the ILO, the International Labor Conference (ILC), could adopt conventions with a two-thirds majority. There were a range of views on how conventions should become legally binding on states. Some labor unions would have preferred international regulations to become immediately applicable within member states. The Italian representatives in the commission that drafted the ILO Constitution proposed that conventions should be automatically binding, but with the right of governments to appeal to the League against decisions of the ILC. The British representatives in the commission wanted conventions to be ratified automatically within one year of adoption,

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[106] Alcock 1971, 27.

[107] 1919 version of text in Wilson 1934.

unless specifically rejected by national legislatures.[108] These proposals were rejected as too intrusive on state sovereignty, and the ILO Constitution only requires governments to submit conventions to the competent authorities (normally parliaments) within a year. As long as the competent authorities do not ratify the convention, the state has no legal obligation to implement them.

This brief overview of the emergence of the ILO as an international institution has highlighted the importance of two factors: first, appeals to shared values among states; second, international labor conventions as solution to the problem of raising potentially costly standards in a competitive international environment. As shown in the main section, these concerns also play an important role in the decision to ratify specific ILO conventions.

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[108] Alcock 1971, 28.

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