The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy:  
A literature review  

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1. Introduction

This work reviews part of the literature on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. It covers mainly studies published in English. It concentrates on the foreign policy of Greece, although it does refer to other areas whenever necessary. It is a pilot-study in that there is yet to be a thorough investigation of that particular aspect of Europeanisation. Moreover, on the theoretical side, a review of the literature shows that ‘Europeanisation’ is a term that is often used in the academic world but that there is no common definition of what it actually means.

A very simple example of this confusion can be seen in the existing lack of agreement about its correct spelling. With an ‘s’ or with a ‘z’? It is interesting to note that most UK-based academic used the version with an ‘s’, whereas others, mainly from a US-background prefer a ‘z’. Computer-based spell-checks tend to prefer the American spelling, even when they are set under ‘English/UK’ language.

Europeanisation, whichever way it is spelt, includes a number of possible definitions. Some stem from the wider considerations of globalization, Westernization, or even simply Americanization to take a more French-biased approach. This is a rather more traditional and historical approach to the problem of what Europeanisation actually means (see Olsen 2002: 17-19). With due respect to historians, this is not a very useful approach for a study on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy which concentrates on the years after Greece joined the European Union (EU, formerly the EEC). The historical approach does however have the merit of putting more recent events into a wider perspective. This is important for Greece, not only as it has a long history, but also

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because of the fact that until very recently it has held a rather ambivalent towards Europe and the West widely defined (see Ioakimidis 1995).

A more traditional approach of what Europeanisation means comes from comparative politics, and in particular research on public policy. It examines the impact of the process of integration in Europe (until very recently meaning exclusively Western Europe) on the various national political systems of EU member states. It is important at this stage to differentiate between integration (and in particular European integration) and Europeanisation. This study will not enter a theoretical discussion about this distinction (see Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a), but it is important to bear it in mind because in terms of chronological development research on the impact of integration has a longer tradition than that on Europeanisation (on integration theory see Chryssochoou, Tsinisizelis, Stavridis, Ifantis 2003: pp 1-40). It is fair to add that work on the latter has now become dominant in a number of academic studies, such as comparative public policy (for instance see the Queen's Papers Series on Europeanisation published by the Institute of European Studies at Queen's University of Belfast and available on the web²).

One important distinction has been made between ‘politics’, ‘polity’ and ‘policy’ (as reported in Vaquer 2001:3). This distinction is important not only per se, but also because it allows for the additional use of international relations theory in general, and more particularly FPA (foreign policy analysis). Even more specifically the ‘domestic sources of foreign policy’ dimension of FPA is relevant to a study on the Europeanisation of foreign policy. Thus, a combination of these three approaches (Europeanisation, FPA and domestic sources) is vital for a comprehensive study on the Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy.

The current work is informed by studies on the Europeanisation of Greek FP (Ioakimidis 2000; Ioakimidis 2001; Kouveliotis 2001), but also by other relevant studies on the Europeanisation of the foreign policies of other EU member states (whether this approach has been the main focus of these works -Featherstone and Kazamias 2001a; Closa 2001; Tonra 2001- or not (Manners and Whitman 2000)).

² http://netec.mcc.ac.uk/WoPEc/data/erpqueens.html.
In terms of Greek foreign policy, the emphasis to date (see Ioakimidis 2000) has rightly been on the Europeanisation of its decision-making process and on its ‘style’, that is to say on its general approach to what is usually known as ethnika themata (issues of national importance). Traditionally these have included East-West relations (during the Cold War), the Middle East, but mainly, Turkey, Cyprus, and the Balkans.

There has been considerable work on the way Greece, by now a full EU member state, handled the violent collapse of the Yugoslav Federation in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. Greece’s idiosyncrasies were best highlighted by the ‘Macedonian Question’, or better said, the ‘New Macedonian Question’ (see Veremis 1995; Tziampiris 2000; Pettifer 1992; Economides 1993). Most studies criticized the heavy-handed and unilateral use of sanctions against FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 1994, once many Western states had recognised this new state despite previous sustained Greek efforts to the contrary. It is said that the then Prime Minister, the charismatic but populist Andreas Papandreou, decided to impose the embargo against the advice of many a Greek diplomat (see Ioakimidis 1999).

Other geographical areas deserve attention as well. As do developments in the way Greek foreign policy is made in more general terms, that is to say now that the traditional personal approach to foreign policy (Ioakimidis 1999) has been replaced by a more institutionalised form of decision-making. Work on Greek-Turkish relations is also very important because it shows a rather important discrepancy between the current (since 1996 at least) governmental elites and public opinion in general. It is important to pay some particular attention to that aspect of the question nowadays, not only to show if there has been a Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy in that respect (and in relation to a solution to the Cyprus Problem), but also because of the failure of the Annan Plan in early 2003 (see Xenakis 2003; Theophanous 2003) which followed chronologically the success of Cyprus’ accession to the EU, as confirmed by the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council.

This paper consists of two sections:

- The first section (Section 2) discusses the theoretical debate about what constitutes ‘Europeanisation’. It concentrates on the use of the concept in the literature on foreign policies.
• The second section (Section 3) assesses the application of the concept of Europeanisation for Greece in general and for Greek foreign policy in particular.

2. The theoretical debate on ‘Europeanisation’

2.1 Europeanisation

There is plenty of existing literature on the subject and it is growing (for a recent review, see Olsen 2002). Its main focus deals with the structures of a state, i.e. with the ‘internalising’ of EU ‘habits’ (as expressed in EU decision and policy making structures). The literature on the theorizing of what Europeanisation means also gains from each of the empirical studies that are carried out. It is indeed common practice for each author of an empirical study to:

- select their preferred definition of what is understood by the term ‘Europeanisation’ at the beginning of their work, and then
- apply it to a concrete case-study.

Featherstone and Kazamias take Europeanisation to mean ‘adaptation to the (west) European norms and practices’ (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001b: 4). They argue that it is more than just ‘integration’ and stress that although originally not confined to Europe, ‘the hijack is complete’ (p.5) as it is now used ‘largely as a description of the EU’s own processes and impacts’ (Ibid). They identify 3 key dimensions:

- the increase and expansion of institutionalization at the EU level;
- the relevant adjustment at the level of the member states;
- other similar adjustments in non-member states.

Whereas their edited volume concentrates on the last two dimensions, it is useful not only because of both its comparative dimension (Southern periphery: Italy, Catalonia, Portugal, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Malta) and its thematic approach (mainly focused on institutional and economic developments), but also because of its use of the literature on ‘institutionalism’. The editors conclude that, far from comforting the claim of ‘executive empowerment’, the empirical examples show rather a diffusion of executive power in what has been described as a ‘multi-level governance’ framework (p.10). This dimension is particularly important when it is linked to Ioakimidis’ study of the Greek
case in the same volume (see below). In broader terms, it brings in a link between the process of integration and the issue of a democratic deficit in the EU. This approach deserves further investigation. As for the wider implications of the Featherstone/Kazamias volume, they offer a number of conceptual definitions of what Europeanisation means (pp. 13-15), but they stress the need for more empirical studies (which their own volume is all about). They present (pp 15-16) the following 6 dimensions as necessary for any good analysis of Europeanisation:

- institutional adaptation within government;
- transformation in the structural power of domestic actors;
- adjustment of domestic macroeconomic regime;
- new dynamic with the domestic party system;
- pressure to redefine national identity;
- a strategic tool in the pursuit of FP interests.

The first two points are ‘easily’ identifiable and thus most research has concentrated on them, and the last two are particularly important for the current study. Under ‘transformation in the structural power of domestic actors’, it is important to note that the various contributors to the Featherstone/Kazamias volume differentiate between, on the one hand, empowerment of executive/technocratic actors and, on the other, that of sub-national actors and institutions, and, also between those two and the strengthening of civil society. In their introductory comments, the two editors describe well the richness and variety of what is meant by Europeanisation.

Olsen (2002) reviews the current literature and wonders if, despite it being ‘fashionable’, Europeanisation is a ‘useful’ term. His analysis of the ‘what, how and why’ of this process is wide-ranging. ‘What’ refers to what is changing, ‘how’ assesses the changes involved, and ‘why’ deals with the reasons and factors behind such changes. He identifies 5 different uses of the concept of Europeanisation:

- changes to external territorial boundaries;
- development of institutions of governance at the EU level;
- penetration of national and sub-national levels of governance;
- exporting forms of political governance and organisation that are peculiar to the EU beyond its own territory;
- a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.
Clearly the existing literature on the impact of Europeanisation on foreign policies falls under his third use. Although it does overlap slightly with his second definition, as any impact on the way national foreign policy decisions are taken due to Europeanisation will also have an impact on the EU foreign policy process level. There are other limits to Olsen’s exercise, which stem mainly from the fact that his is a research proposal introduction. But it is useful because it shows how many different meanings of the term there exist. It is equally useful when Olsen suggests that the way forward is to try and integrate all the various approaches but also to make them ‘accessible to empirical tests’ (2002: 24).

Thus, a vast range of different and differing interpretations of what the concept of Europeanisation means. The same is true when it is applied to foreign policy alone. I turn to this question now.

2.2 Europeanisation and foreign policy

I begin with a brief reference to the question of what constitutes Foreign Policy but also what is European foreign policy. A recent comparative study is very useful in that respect not only because it deals with the latter but also because it assesses the impact of Europeanisation on national EU foreign policy even if it does not explicitly use this term (Manners and Whitman 2000). Although the study adopts

‘a narrow enough definition of foreign policy so that the study remains manageable … [it must also be] broad enough to be valuable and not exclude the most interesting elements of foreign policy activity’ (p.2).

The editors refer to a number of definitions of FP:

- relations between states
- governmental activity
- external relations.

With regard to EU foreign policy, there is still some debate (see Peterson and Sjursen 1998) about what it is:

- the external activities of the European Community (Pillar One in the post-Maastricht parlance),
- the CFSP,
- the national foreign policies of the Member states,
- aid and development policies (at the national or at the EU level),
- defence issues (national, NATO or the emerging ESDP).

Since the early days of integration in (West) Europe, these issues dictated the pace and scope of progress, be it in 1950-54 with the EDC (European Defence Community), the 1960s (Fouchet Plans), or the 1970-80s with EPC (European Political Cooperation). The creation of the EPC indeed referred explicitly to foreign policy cooperation as one side of political unification (for details see Chryssochoou, Tsinisizelis, Stavridis and Ifantis 2003: pp 152-195).

As for the methodological approach taken in the Manners/Whitman comparative study, all contributors were asked to answer six specific questions:
- adaptation through EU membership
- socialization of FP makers
- domestic factors in process
- bureaucratic factors
- the EU context as a constriction or as an opportunity
- special relations and interests at the national level.

It is useful to summarize some of their findings. I leave the chapter on Greece for the following sub-section. It is important to mention at this stage that of the ‘relationships and issues [that] might have a negative as well as a positive context to them’, the editors list

‘German relations with Turkey, Greek relations with FYROM/Macedonia, Finnish relations with Russia, and the issues of Gibraltar and Northern Ireland’ (p.11).

It is useful to also note that a similar approach is taken by a number of more recent studies, thus confirming to a certain extent that the controversy of a foreign policy issue leads to interest in finding out if it has been Europeanised or not. In their summary of the findings, the editors conclude (pp. 243-273) that the overall picture remains one of diversities but also one with similarities:
- national EU FPs are separable but no longer separate from the EU context,
- there is some socialization effect but not complete (UK, France, Germany and Greece are pointed out as more difficult cases),
- domestic, European and foreign policies have become more difficult to differentiate in this multi-level political system that the EU now represents,
- there is plenty of coordination nowadays in all ministries, not only the foreign ministries
- but there remains differences mainly due history, tradition, culture and bureaucratic politics.

Tonra distinguishes between ‘complex interdependence’ and ‘polity formation’ (1999: 151-153; see also Tonra 2001). Polity formation can involve as advanced a level of integration as one of ‘fusion’, to use the now well-known description by Wolfgang Wessels. Both definitions are of a dynamic kind. The main difference between the two is that in the former the EU (and its institutions) only acts as forum, whereas in the latter the European dimension is part of the whole. That is to say that the process of Europeanisation represents more than just the sum of its constituent parts. Tonra also stresses that Europeanisation in foreign policy requires the abandonment (or overcoming or surpassing) of past national FP priorities. His work on Irish, Danish and Dutch foreign policies is particularly relevant for research on Greek foreign policy (Tonra 2001; see also Tonra 1999) as there are many similarities as well as many differences between all these case-studies.

In his study, Vaquer (2001) takes a more traditional FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis) approach to the concept of Europeanisation and foreign policy. He refers to the now vast literature on European Foreign Policy, which dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when EPC (European Political Cooperation) was first set up. EPC was replaced in 1993 by the CFSP/Common Foreign and Security Policy (for details see Nuttall 1992 and Nuttall 2000). He then concentrates on the more theoretical approach taken by the famous Carlsnaes and Smith edited volume in 1994. Building on subsequent works (mainly Hill 1996, Manners and Whitman 2000) but also a number of studies on Europeanisation per se, Vaquer concludes that there are at least three ways of considering this concept:
- Europeanisation as a process;
- Europeanisation as a cause;
- Europeanisation as an effect.
He rightly points out that from a public policy analysis perspective, the concept of Europeanisation has often been confused with the process of Globalisation, that comparative politics analysis tools are not always adequate because they do not take into consideration the fact that FP is at the interface of both domestic and international levels of analysis, and that the overwhelming and unquestioned legacy of functionalism in integration theory often stifles analysis.

Vaquer then uses traditional FPA tools of analysis to differentiate between the domestic sphere and the international sphere. Such a distinction possesses the double advantage of bringing in FPA, but also to facilitate an important distinction between, on the one hand, the internal (or domestic) decision-making process and, on the other, the role of international politics. All this creates new constraints but also new instruments. The constraints are both formal and informal in nature and relate to the levels of competencies that exist in the EU. The instruments allow for a comparison between the efficiency of national levels and that of the EU, for an assessment of the role of EU institutions, and finally for a wider and more comprehensive analysis of the overall impact of an EU foreign policy and the way it is carried out. I do not continue with Vaquer's analysis because he then brings in not only traditional integration theory perspectives but also wider IR theoretical debates. He basically ends up with the well-known European challenge to FPA as defined by White in 1999 (White 1999).

What I draw from the above for the current study is that the process of Europeanisation affects the domestic level of decision-making and that in turn the domestic level affects EU decisions as well.

3. Europeanisation: the case of Greek foreign policy

The initial interest that was shown in the way Greece was being influenced by its accession to the EC(EU) in 1981 concentrated on the ‘impact of membership’. Thus, I split this section into two sub-parts each including a further two sub-sections division. I begin with a consideration of the impact of EC membership approach and then turn to the question of Europeanisation.
3.1: the early stages

Impact of EC membership on Greece

As a result of the huge literature on the subject that exists, especially in Greek, I can only be selective here. The initial academic interest on the impact of EC membership on Greece concentrated on a number of specific policy areas. The main concern at the time was to assess the impact of membership on national priorities, orientations and policy-making in Greece following its accession to the (then) EC in 1981. This was not an isolated effort as all member states came under similar scrutiny. The overall project led to a series of individual studies known as the ‘Membership Evaluated’ studies, which were published throughout the 1990s.

In the case of Greece, it is useful to report the introductory comments that the co-editors of the volume on Greece made at the time, as well as their main conclusions. Professors Kazakos and Ioakimidis began in their preface by highlighting that:

‘[n]o doubt Greece stands as a unique case among the member states of the European Community/European Union in practically every respect’ (Kazakos and Ioakimidis 1994: x).

Then they list the reasons why this was the case. It is important to repeat them here in a telegraphic style because they show how ‘special’ the case of Greece has been from the very start:

- a peripheral country (geographically, with no common borders with other EC/EU states);
- situated in a turbulent region;
- under an external threat (Turkey), thus spending 7% of GDP on military expenditure;
- a different historical and political development pattern;
- a Christian Orthodox religion and culture;

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3 Coordinated by Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, The University of Bonn and published by Pinter in London and St Martin’s Press in New York. Professor Schweitzer was also the coordinator of the ‘Europe-12: Action and Research Committee on the EC’ which grouped eminent politicians and academics.

4 Down to 5% in 2002. The current figure is now at 3.5%. Defence Minister Yannis Papandoniou interview, ‘The Papahelas “Files” (Fakeloi)’, MEGA TV, 24-25 June 2003.
• economically weak;
• EC accession remained a controversial issue for some time.

However, and this is important, both editors agreed that:

‘Greece is the member state which, by virtue of its classical cultural heritage, feels that it is entitled more than anyone else to the name ‘European’. After all, the name Europe is a Greek one’ (Ibid).

From the above and from the study itself, three important conclusions can be drawn:

• the political nature of Greek membership (to consolidate democracy and as a security guarantee),
• its controversial nature (it took some time for the appearance of a consensus among all important political and social forces), and
• the importance of international factors (turbulent and threatening neighbourhoods).

Thus, foreign policy and security issues have always been high on the agenda of Greece’s application and membership of the EC/EU. I do not enter here the findings about economic, social and other developments in Greece due to EU membership, but I still need to mention how important EC funds have been for the economic growth of the country. What is of interest to this study however is the fact that, as the editors highlight in their concluding chapter:

‘[f]oreign policy is another critical sector which comes out of this assessment with a clear record of advantages and benefits obtained from EC membership’ (Ibid.: 300).

I now turn to the question of FP as analyzed in the same edited volume on Greek membership evaluated.

Impact of EC membership on Greek FP

Professor Couloumbis’ contribution stressed that ‘EC membership in the 1981-1993 period served Greece both as a diplomatic lever and as a restraining mechanism’ (Couloumbis 1994: 191). A view shared by another contributor this time assessing

5 I remember attending a conference at Kings College London in 1992-93 entitled ‘Greece: between the Balkans and the Middle East’ which summed up well Greece’s difficult geo-strategic position. It is not a coincidence that Featherstone and Ifantis sub-titled their 1996 edited work on Greece in Europe ‘between European integration and Balkan disintegration?’ (Featherstone and Ifantis 1996).
defence and security policy (Valinakis 1994). Although one must stress that the latter’s analysis goes deep into internal Greek politics and criticizes in no uncertain terms how the PASOK governments of Andreas Papandreou (especially the first PASOK government during 1981-1985) took a rather third-worldist and divisive view of EC foreign policy cohesion. Valinakis pinned his hopes for a better European support of Greek security and defence concerns on the then newly-created CFSP.

There is now consensus that, slowly, all the important Greek political parties, be they in power or in opposition, have adopted a more constructive line on foreign and defence policies. But most observers agree that the real change when some ‘Europeanisation’ became evident was with the coming to power of Costas Simitis in 1996. Today only the Communist Party continues to produce anti-EU rhetoric as it continues to believe that the Union is just another expression of world capitalism⁶.

One might also want to qualify Couloumbis’ overall assessment in light of the 1994 embargo against FYROM but also the long road to Cyprus membership, and, more importantly, the lack of progress on its reunification, there clearly was some optimism on the impact of EU membership on Greek foreign and defence policy. All of the above means that:

- EU membership remained a controversial issue for some time,
- there is a continuation of past ‘ghosts’ which can be best summed up as the ‘negative role of foreign powers syndrome’
- this is particularly true for Greek public opinion, which is highly politicized but very poorly informed on the whole.

This leads to unconvincing conspiracy theories and an inferiority/superiority complex. As a result there is a tendency to support any underdog⁷, irrespective of his/her own actions, provided there is some close (e.g. Serbs) or vague (e.g. Arabs) link with Greece and that it is mainly directed against the USA. Anti-Americanism is also very common, even among elites (mainly on the Left because of the Greek Civil Wars and the Cold War), and among most Greeks because of the support that the Americans gave the

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⁶ One should however note that other small parties also tend to use this rhetoric when there is an international crisis be it of an economic, social, political or security type.

⁷ See Featherstone and Kazamias (2001b: 13) and Stefanidis (2001: 14-15) who both refer to the extensive work of Professor Nikiforos Diamandouros on that particular question.
Greek junta (1967-1974), their role in the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and generally speaking their pro-Turkish stance over the years. Since the end of the Cold War, and in particular since the 11 September 2001 mega-terrorist attacks and the 2003 war on Iraq, there is a clear anti-American wave that has swept –and is sweeping (at the time of writing in the summer of 2003) through Greece’s elites and people alike.

Towards the end of the 1990s a new term was coined to describe the impact of EU membership on member states: Europeanisation. The same academic process that had previously occurred with the ‘membership impact’ studies also occurred with this new phenomenon. Again, I can only be selective here, especially as a result of the huge literature on the subject that already exists on the subject. I turn now to the application of the ‘Europeanisation’ concept to the case of Greece in general and on Greek foreign policy in particular.

3.2. the current developments

**Greece and Europeanisation**

Beginning with the idiosyncrasies of the Greek situation, Stefanidis (2001) notes the importance of:

- a classical Greek heritage;
- its late independence;
- the role of the State;
- the role of the Church;
- the absence of a civil society;
- late irredentist claims⁸ and the existence of a worldwide Greek diaspora;
- and the importance of ‘clientelism’ in political life, which brings in the importance of personalities (‘charismatic leaders’⁹).

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⁸ This term refers to developments that followed the ‘War of Independence’ (1821-1830), with other wars and the gradual reintegration of Greek cities, islands and regions, including Thessaloniki in 1912. This process culminated with the return to Greece of other Greek-populated islands by 1948.

⁹ A more negative characterization would be ‘populist’ but it would be unfair to some, although not all, recent Greek leaders.
Stefanidis also refers to the way politicians (irrespective of their political affiliations) consistently stir up public opinion on foreign affairs and then often ‘end up hostages to their own maximalist rhetoric’ (Ibid). Another important element of Ioakimidis’ study (2001) is that he argues that an empirical study of the Greek case ‘supports the thesis that Europeanization works towards the direction of weakening the relative power, role, control and autonomy of the central state institutions, while at the same time strengthening the power and autonomy of the subnational units, actors and society as a whole’ (p.75).

In this study on Greece, Ioakimidis (2001) refers to two basic types of Europeanisation: ‘responsive Europeanisation’ and ‘intended Europeanisation’. The main difference between the two is the existence or absence of a conscious effort ‘being made by the political actors to introduce into the political system the logic, norms and dynamics of the EU’. Where this approach becomes slightly more confusing is when Ioakimidis claims that ‘intended Europeanisation stands for modernization’ (p.74). This is a general problem that the study of Europeanisation has not managed to consider in a satisfactory manner: is Europeanisation a separate phenomenon, or is it just a reflection of economic or political democratization, or even Westernization (not to mention Americanization), let alone globalization, but at the European level? In other words, is it a cause or a symptom of a wider phenomenon? A similar confusion existed in a recent conference paper where Professor Kazakos quoted from T.S. Elliott’s “Union of the European Culture” to try and explain what Europe is. It is revealing that the word ‘Western’ crept into Elliott’s definition of Europe is:

‘The Western world has its unity in this heritage, in Christianity and in the ancient civilizations of Greece, Rome and Israel, from which, owing to two thousand years of Christianity, we trace our descent’.10

However, Ioakimidis is right when he considers decentralization, de-bureaucratization, and the building of a civil society, as recent (both desirable and necessary) developments. This is mainly due to the fact that the Greek public sector is ‘a blight on the Greek economy’ (the title of a journalistic study by Agapitos in 1996 as reported by Ioakimidis, p.77). The real question is whether these developments are the result of Europeanisation or of more general historical developments. That is to say, is European integration a cause or a symptom of globalisation and the like? If it is a symptom it means that

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10 At the EKEM (Hellenic Centre for European Studies)/ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy) Seminar on ‘The Future of Europe and the Greek Presidency’ [in Greek] organised in the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens on 14 April 2003 (Gropas 2003b).
regionalisation is a result of global forces and that Europe is just another geographic example (c.f. NAFTA, ASEAN etc.). If it is a cause, then Europeanisation represents a force for change that is to a large extent unique to the European continent (peace, democracy etc.) although it is not necessarily unique as other OECD states and regions can claim the same political and economic advances. I leave this debate open. I refer to it here because I want to show that the concept of Europeanisation itself is not something that is clearly defined or definable.

Another important point is that Greece has profited from its interaction with the EU but it has yet ‘to succeed in setting up an efficient system of European policy-making and policy coordination’ (Ioakimidis 2001). The question that immediately comes to my mind is whether such a system does exist anywhere in Europe, be it at the EU institutions level or at that of the national member states. This is an ideal model and not one that exists in reality. How does one measure successful Europeanisation remains an open question because it assumes it is only a positive exercise that only refers to the ‘best practice’ being ‘internalizing’. Such an optimistic approach ignores the negative side of the same coin, that is to say the extension of ‘worst practice’ throughout the EU, with organised crime, and trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs at the top of the list. Again, I leave this debate open.

By contrast to his positive assessment of the Europeanisation of Greece (considered to be both desirable and necessary developments), Ioakimidis (2001: 90) notes that there has been no similar development with the Greek Parliament. The Βουλή has yet to show any visible interest in the EU policy-making process. This was written by Ioakimidis prior to the recent European Convention, which included a particular focus on the role of national parliaments, but he identifies an important area for future research. Indeed, in the past, Greek MPs and MEPs have consistently told me (interviews) that the current arrangement of a joint parliamentary committee meeting in Athens on Thursday evenings is not working for a number of reasons, including the simple fact that national parliamentarians need to go to their respective constituencies on Fridays and MEPs have yet to return from Brussels or Strasbourg on Thursday evenings.

It is important to repeat here that now all Greek political forces, with the notable exception of the Communist Party and other related groupings, are supporting Greece’s
EU membership. This was not always the case. It is therefore particularly relevant to refer to:

‘the metamorphosis of PASOK from fiercely anti-European movement in the 1970s and early 1980s into a pro-federalist, integrationist force in the 1990s’ (Ioakimidis 2001: 90; see also Pagoulatos 2002: 3-10).

Indeed, when Greece joined the EC in 1981, it had done so under the very pro-European Conservative government (New Democracy) of Constantine Caramanlis. Within a few months of EC entry, PASOK won the general elections of October 1981. Therefore the path to Greece’s Europeanisation took much longer than initially anticipated as the prime mover in Greek politics had to change its beliefs before any wider process of Europeanisation could materialize. This is a fact that the Conservative Party constantly recalls, especially when in opposition (which has been the case for most of the years since 1981). The most recent example took place on the first night of the European Council meeting (19-20 June 2003) by New Democracy MP Michalis Liapis (on MEGA TV programme Anatropo). Interestingly, the PASOK government in the words of the Foreign Minister himself (same TV programme) had earlier made an important, and highly symbolic, reference to the fact that Convention President Giscard d’Estaing had been flown to the Salonica/Halkidiki European Council at the end of the Greek Presidency in order to present the Draft Constitution (or more accurately Draft Constitutional Treaty) in the Greek presidential plane. George Papandreou argued that, correctly in my view, this represented a return gesture to the fact that, in 1974, Giscard, then French President, had given Constantine Caramanlis (the elder) the French presidential plane to return to Athens and restore democracy.

*Europeanisation and Greek FP*

As for evidence of Europeanisation in Greek FP in the late 1990s and early part of the current decade, I refer to a number of studies on the subject (e.g. Ioakimidis 2000; Kavakas 2000; Kouveliotis 2001).

Professor Ioakimidis argues that:

‘[o]ne of the most remarkable developments over the past years has been the steady progress towards the Europeanisation of Greece’s foreign and security policy’ (Ioakimidis 2000: 359).
He adds that such a development is part of a more general trend in the same direction for ‘Greece’s political system, economy and society as a whole’ (Ioakimidis 2000). Ioakimidis reminds us that this has not been a painless process, nor that it means an abandonment of national causes but rather downgrading their importance. He refers to the ‘awkward partner’ label that was commonplace in the early 1980s, and to how it has been gradually replaced by that of a ‘good pro-European’ state. He then analyses the Europeanisation process at four levels:

- EU policy;
- foreign policy objectives;
- FP instruments and style;
- FP in terms of institutions, procedures and processes.

I will concentrate on the last three elements in more detail here. But one needs to mention the first of Ioakimidis’ examples because it deals with Greek accession to the WEU in 1995. It is important because Ioakimidis presents it as a success of the Europeanisation process of Greek security and defence policy. But the length of the procedure (Greece had applied in 1987 and was ‘leapfrogged’ by both Spain and Portugal) and the removal of the automatic application of Article 5 for WEU and NATO members (read here Greece and Turkey) rather confirm the opposite view. None of the WEU members (all EU members) wanted Greek-Turkish relations to be imported into this institution when Greece joined it. The best evidence of ‘unfinished business’ in the Europeanisation of Greece’s security and defence is also highlighted in Ioakimidis’s own contribution (Ioakimidis 2000: 362-3), but not sufficiently in my own opinion. The fact remains that, throughout the EU Treaty reforms of the 1990s (Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice), Greece tried hard to have included a defence guarantee clause. It only succeeded in obtaining a general political clause to that effect (Amsterdam Treaty Article 11.1 refers to the ‘safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter’, and paragraph 2 refers to the need to enhance and develop the ‘mutual political solidarity’ of EU states. Similar phrasing has been used in the subsequent (for details, see Chryssochoou, Stavridis and Moschonas 2000: 200-201).

The point I make here is two-sided: first, in this particular aspect of security and defence policy, Greece’s objectives have not been fulfilled yet. Most of the other fourteen EU
governments have yet to accept Greece’s demand for a guarantee clause, even if the Greeks have counted with the support of both the European Commission and the European Parliament on that issue.

With regard to the other three foreign policy related areas as defined by Ioakimidis, his argument is that there have been both an institutionalisation of Greek FP towards the Balkans (Inter-Balkan Cooperation, Black Sea Economic Cooperation) and the use of a EU regional framework (Stability Pact). Thus, Greece no longer favours a bilateral approach but prefers to Europeanise its links with its Balkans neighbours. As for means and style, Ioakimidis mentions a clear shift in the discourse used by Greek foreign ministry officials who now emphasize the strengths and advantages of a Greece that belongs to the EU club. In FP making structures, he mentions as further evidence of this Europeanisation the reorganisation of the MFA realized in order to better reflect the pillar-structure of the EU (see Kavakas 2000, pp 145-146), the reorganisation of the EU foreign relations services and in particular those of the Commission during the 1990s, but also the new realities of the post-Cold War world.

Ioakimidis correctly sees all of the above as positive developments, but he does warn us that ‘[w]hat is provided on paper is not always what happens in reality’ (Ioakimidis 2000: 367). Ioakimidis assigns the success of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy (Ioakimidis 2000: 368-9) to a number of factors:

- a pro-European government since the arrival to power of PM Simitis in 1996,
- the substantial economic benefits of EU membership,
- the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR (thus, removing an alternative camp temptation for the Left),
- the success of the EMU project, and
- the forthcoming enlargement (which reaffirms the need to belong to a club and to play by the rules rather than try and be a free rider).

One should note here the importance of external factors and the lateness of the process of Europeanisation in Greece. One should also stress how important ‘unintended consequences’ of EU policies are: EC funds, and now the benefits of the euro (currency stability and low inflation rate), may have a positive impact on how to manage FP issues in a more ‘package deal’ style, which is so common in EU decision making processes.
Two more qualifying comments: if international events do have such an impact on Greek FP (‘small/ler state’ in International Relations parlance), what will be the impact of the post-11th September world and the post-2004 enlarged EU? In short, has the process of Europeanising Greece been completed?

To sum up Ioakimidis’ argument (Ioakimidis 2000; Ioakimidis 2001), he defines Europeanisation in foreign policy as:

‘de-externalizing (...) by broadening its scope and agenda and bringing new actors into the process of policy formulation and implementation’ (Ioakimidis 2001).

He therefore considers that in Greece such a process has taken place in the field of foreign policy.

Kavakas (2000) begins his study with a recapitulation of the ‘uniqueness’ of the Greek case (be it from geographical, historical, cultural or political perspectives). He considers that ‘EU membership has had a significant impact on Greek foreign policy’ (p.158). He refers to the administrative changes that took place in the Foreign ministry structure and the ‘socialization effect’ of EU membership. Still, he notes the continuation of more traditional and nationalist inputs such as those of the Church, public opinion, or the lack of bipartisanship. He thinks that some progress has been achieved mainly because the diplomatic service is not as politicized as other governmental agencies and because clientelism is less widespread. He equally refers to the small level of bureaucratization in foreign policy matters (here one should contrast it to the importance of the role of personalities as developed in Ioakimidis 1999). Kavakas does however suggest two important ‘contradictions’ in the Europeanisation process of Greek FP:

• by and large, ‘national issues’ appear to remain immune to the process, although he does identify some softening of the Greek position especially over the Macedonian question and the NATO bombing of Kosovo.

• The official Greek government position is in favour of a ‘communitarization’ of the CFSP pillar, but he correctly refers to the continuing attachment to the right of veto and to the non-extension of majority voting to defence matters. This is a crucial weakening of the official pro-federal approach to European integration,
which is often missed by other analysts (for such an instance, see Gropas 2003a\textsuperscript{11}).

4. Conclusions

The real question that remains unanswered therefore is whether the Europeanisation process has been completed (Kavakas mentions 1996 as a key date with the arrival to power of Simitis), as it represents a rather recent phenomenon. Kavakas does not discuss if it can be reversed (risk of re-nationalisation), especially with regard to \textit{ethnika themata}, nor does he mention the crucial role still played by the USA in tense situations with Turkey (the latest being over Imia in 1996\textsuperscript{12}). The absence of an EU role remains a real problem. Not only because one would expect some sort of solidarity but more importantly because it seems more rewarding to consider Europeanisation as a two-way process. Therefore, some of the Greek views should be included in the overall EU stance. This might be the case over Cyprus (see below). But there is still not enough evidence to that effect. The same applies to an EU defence clause, something really important for Greece. This is an area where Kavakas expresses his hope that, thanks to Europeanisation, the level of divergence between Greece and its EU partners has been reduced and that Greece will eventually eliminate its ‘nationalist considerations’ (p.159). Thus, the real test of Europeanisation might be the one on the \textit{ethnika themata} after all. However, there is very little in his assessment of those issues \textit{per se}. The hidden preferences of that particular author (Kavakas’ case is probably not unique) often mislead the reader about how to solve these issues best. To criticize a given stance as ‘nationalist’ does not help us understand the pros and cons of each case, nor does it take into consideration the existence of double standards (some would say multiple standards) in the foreign policies of other EU states or of the EU as a whole (on double standards and Cyprus, see Stavridis 1999, and on the problem of consistency in the CFSP, see Nuttall 2001).

\textsuperscript{11} Gropas also fails to account why Greece still wants to hold to its own Commissioner. But to be fair to her brief analysis, the debate is still open in the Convention and there appears to be some movement within the current Greek government, as reported in \textit{Kathimerini tis Kyriakis}, 20 April 2003 (see the article by K. P. Papadohiou entitled ‘Athens shifts its position towards that of the strong members of the EU’ – my translation). Greece appears to be moving away from the ‘small states’ approach to the view of the big states, especially on the Council Presidency question, thus favouring a long-term Presidency.

\textsuperscript{12} Perhaps not an isolated event as the 2002 ‘Perejil’ incident between Spain and Morocco where US Secretary of State Colin Powell intervened once more.
In his study, Kouveliotis (2001) agrees with the thrust of the Europeanisation argument as presented among others by Ioakimidis, but he prefers to concentrate on the limits of the exercise. Which tends to strengthen the arguments mentioned at the end of my assessment of the Kavakas chapter. Kouveliotis argues that the end of what he calls ‘Europhoria’ in Greece became clear with two specific events during the Balkans crisis: the 1993-4 ‘Macedonian’ crisis and the 1999 Kosovo war (Kouveliotis 2001: 34-37 and 44). Kouveliotis thus concludes that despite the many opportunities offered by EU membership,

‘as far as foreign policy is concerned Greece used the EPC/CFSP and EPU frameworks mainly for satisfying its national interests, or when that was not possible, for stopping unpleasant developments imposed by its partners instead of using them as stages and platforms for adapting its foreign policy to the integration and Europeanisation logic’ (Kouveliotis 2001: 44).

One should finally add some comments made by Ioakimidis (1996) when he discussed the limitations of Europeanisation in Greece’s foreign policy. He notes the systemic obstacles that do exist and the autarkic nature of the exercise, by which he means that it is a process that remains still limited to the elites (p.34). He identifies the clientelistic nature of the state system (and other institutional arrangements) as major obstacles for a real Europeanisation of Greece. He also calls for political cultural changes away from ‘the syndrome of the underdog’ and that of ‘foreign protection’ to achieve full Europeanisation (pp. 45-47).

Thus, a preliminary assessment of ‘Europeanised’ Greek foreign policy areas could read as follows. *A priori*, one could claim that in the Macedonian case\(^\text{13}\), Greece (at least the elites) have moved towards the EU position, whereas in the Cyprus case (including Turkey), it is the EU that is now closer to some of the initial Greek positions.

The reasons for saying this stem from the fact that Greece has now excellent relations with FYROM, except over the issue of the name. In the meantime, all EU states use the term ‘Macedonia’. The EU institutions are ‘barred’ from doing so officially because of the Greek ‘veto’, but in practice many of its officials and most MEPs do use the term ‘Macedonia’.

\(^\text{13}\) For details, see ELIAMEP, Athens and Foundation Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Thessaloniki Conference on ‘Greek-FYROM bilateral relations during the Interim Accord 1995-2002’ [in Greek], Athens, 11 March 2003.
With regard to Cyprus\textsuperscript{14}, although there has been no solution to the division of the Island, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 (under what amounts in practice to a status reminiscent of that of divided Germany), and, perhaps as, if not more, important, the decision not to start negotiations with Turkey until it fulfils some of the Copenhagen criteria\textsuperscript{15}, and, perhaps increasingly, until there is a solution to the Cyprus Problem, is much closer to that of Greece in the past. Of course, there has also been some movement in Greece, mainly after 1990-1995 when it became clear that a solution to the Island without sustained EU pressure on Turkey would not have any chance, however remote, to materialize.

Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou have made a ‘momentous policy shift’ over Turkey (Pagoulatos 2002: 16) by making Greece the main protagonist in supporting Turkey’s European orientation, as developed since 1996, but especially since Helsinki in December 1999. But the Greek Premier has made it clear that the ‘Green Line’ that continues to divide the Cypriot capital also divides Ankara from Brussels (‘Ankara’s road to Europe passes through the eradication of the dividing lines in Cyprus’, as reported in \textit{Kathimerini}/English edition, 7.3.03). The question that remains open is whether such a shift is due to Europeanisation or to other factors or to a combination of both. By other factors, I refer to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Communism, and, more recently, a post-11 September world (international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pre-emptive interventions, but also a new international system with the International Criminal Court and other advances such as the banning of anti-personnel landmines). These are elements that need to be taken into consideration whenever an assessment of a specific problem is made. The same applies to domestic changes in the country or countries involved. All those different levels of analysis (local/national -> regional -> international) interact in a dynamic way. For a more theoretical approach to the question of ‘redirecting’ FP, see Hermann (1990).

\textsuperscript{14} For a background to Cyprus as a national issue in Greek foreign policy prior to the 1974 events, see Stefanidis (2001: 25).

\textsuperscript{15} Accession negotiations can begin if the political criteria are fulfilled and in case it is realistically expected that by the time of accession the economic criteria will also be fulfilled.
What remains clear is that once Athens and Nicosia began to coordinate their respective policies on the Cyprus Issue in the early 1990s (and more importantly when Greek governments, democratic or not, stopped undermining Cyprus independence, for details see Couloumbis, 1996), there appeared to be some progress in convincing the other EU governments and institutions. The role of the EP is particularly important here (see Stavridis 2003: 190-194 but also national parliaments Ibid.: 184-190). It also shows that Europeanisation is a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional process. Thus, the national policies of other EU member states have probably shifted on the Cyprus Issue also thanks to EP pressure. Indeed, it is now clear (see the various votes and reports on Cyprus and on Turkey especially in the 2001-2003 period) that with the exception of only a handful of MEPs (mainly UK Liberals), the Parliament in Strasbourg/Brussels is in full sink with the Greek position (here I use Greek to mean both Athens and Nicosia, Ellines and Elladites to use the Cypriot parlance16). What is even more encouraging for the future of the Cyprus Problem is that it is also now that of many Turkish Cypriots. As Afrika editor Sener Levent has argued, ‘We do not want to live under Turkish law’ (International Herald Tribune, 28 May 2003). Thus the two real problems are Denktash and the Turkish military occupation. This represents the view that has been constantly put forward by both Athens and Nicosia since the tragic events of 1974.

On the 2003 Iraq war, the debate is rather different because it does not concern one of the traditionally defined ethnika themata. But relations with Arab states and with the USA do create important reactions in Greece. Thus, on the Palestinian Question, it could be claimed that Greece played a ‘pioneering’ role in the early 1980s17. In 2003, Greek public opinion was for once in agreement with those in most of the other EU states, including those whose governments were backing the US-led attack (Italy and Spain). Perhaps a semblance of EU public opinions convergence could be discerned. This was not the case in Greece during the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo where the Greeks were in a minority of one.

16 In Greek, the term ‘Hellenic’ does not refer to a geographic entity. In Cyprus, there is a distinction between the Mainland Greeks (Elladites) and the Greek-Cypriots (Ellines). This is an issue that is difficult to explain to foreigners especially when the Greeks themselves use ‘Hellenic’ when they refer to the Greek (EU) Presidency for instance.

17 One can of course dispute the use of the term ‘pioneering’. What remains correct is however the fact that Greece does have a much more pro-Arab FP than many of its EU partners. It is also important to note, and that is the other side of the same coin, that whereas Spain established diplomatic relations before it joined the EC in 1986, Greece waited until 1990.
As for the ‘Future of Europe’ debate and more particularly the discussions about the future arrangements for the CFSP and European defence, they deserve particular mention because Greece held the 2003 Presidency during the first semester. This role has allowed the Greek government to avoid taking clear position lines on issues such as the future of the Presidency, or the proposals for a core EU defence unit following the April 2003 meeting à quatre (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg). But does have implications for the way Greece as a whole sees the future of the European integration process. Future research is needed.

Finally, as far as the theoretical dimension of the Europeanisation process is concerned, it should be noted that it has ‘a history stretching over two decades’ now and that there is an ‘acceleration of research’ in that respect (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003b: 331). It cannot therefore be considered to be a passing fad. It clearly means more than ‘integration’ or neofunctionalist developments due to EU membership. But it needs further research of a more systematic kind. As Featherstone and Radaelli note (2003b: 333), ‘Europeanization is not so much a theory as a distinct set of processes in need of explanation’.

It is equally important to note in these final remarks that a third of the focus of recent articles on Europeanisation has dealt with policy and policy process, and that 16.7% has covered ‘foreign relations’ (Featherstone 2003: 6). As noted above (Manners and Whitman 2000), there is a trend to more studies on the ‘difficult areas’ of national foreign policies and how these adapt (or not) to EU rules and practices (see also Stavridis forthcoming).

This review has presented some of the main issues discussed in the existing literature on the subject. A more systematic and comprehensive study of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy as well as a more theoretical work on the concept are still needed.
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