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Do jurisdictions compete on taxes? A meta-regression analysis

Costa-Font, Joan ORCID: 0000-0001-7174-7919, De-Albuquerque, Filipe and Doucouliagos, Hristos (2014) Do jurisdictions compete on taxes? A meta-regression analysis. Public Choice, 161 (3-4). pp. 451-470. ISSN 0048-5829

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11127-014-0170-6


A sizable empirical literature examines government fiscal interactions. However, the empirical evidence is very mixed. We apply meta-regression analysis to quantify the size of inter-jurisdictional fiscal interactions and to explain the heterogeneity in empirical estimates. Several robust results emerge. While there are significant country differences, tax interactions exist in all countries studied and they are strongest in terms of total tax and weakest in terms of income tax. Interactions differ according to level of government: compared to the municipal level, horizontal tax competition is stronger when the jurisdiction is a county or a nation. We show that tax competition has actually not grown over time and that econometric specifications and estimation strategies influence reported fiscal interactions.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Divisions: Social Policy
Centre for Economic Performance
Health Policy
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2014 13:34
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 02:09

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