Caselli, Francesco, Cunningham, Tom, Morelli, Massimo and de Barreda, Inés Moreno (2014) The incumbency effects of signalling. Economica, 81 (323). pp. 397-418. ISSN 1468-0335
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Abstract
Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 The London School of Economics and Political Science |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Sets: | Departments > Economics Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Dec 2013 08:49 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54744/ |
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