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Justice as fairness: luck egalitarian, not Rawlsian

Otsuka, Michael (2010) Justice as fairness: luck egalitarian, not Rawlsian. Journal of Ethics, 14 (3-4). pp. 217-230. ISSN 1382-4554

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s10892-010-9081-z


I assess G. A. Cohen’s claim, which is central to his luck egalitarian account of distributive justice, that forcing others to pay for people’s expensive indulgence is inegalitarian because it amounts to their exploitation. I argue that the forced subsidy of such indulgence may well be unfair, but any such unfairness fails to ground an egalitarian complaint. I conclude that Cohen’s account of distributive justice has a non-egalitarian as well as an egalitarian aspect. Each impulse arises from an underlying commitment to fairness. Cohen’s account of distributive justice is therefore one of justice as fairness.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2010 Springer, Part of Springer Science+Business Media
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited: 07 Nov 2013 10:59
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 01:10

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