Birney, Mayling (2014) Decentralization and veiled corruption under China’s rule of mandates. World Development, 53 . pp. 55-67. ISSN 0305-750X
Abstract
This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate-serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non-implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/world-development... |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 The Author |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JS Local government Municipal government |
| Sets: | Departments > International Development Departments > Government |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2013 14:16 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54062/ |
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