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No escape? The co-ordination problem in heritage preservation

Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. and Holman, Nancy (2013) No escape? The co-ordination problem in heritage preservation. SERC discussion papers, SERCDP0145. Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC), London, UK.

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Abstract

Conservation areas (CAs) are among the most restrictive English planning policies. Designation implies a significant limitation of owners’ control over the shape and appearance of their properties. The policy, however, can also be argued to solve a sort of ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, in which it might be collectively rationale to preserve the character of an area, but an individual homeowner may be tempted to inappropriately alter their property, thus free-riding on nearby properties’ character. The net-benefit of the policy depends largely on the existence of positive ‘heritage effects’ and acknowledgement from homeowners that policy contributes to neighbourhood stability and the preservation of these positive effects. Our results of a mixed-method analysis of close to 1 million property transactions near to about 8000 CAs and 111 interviews with residents in nine representative CAs in Greater London suggest that positive heritage externalities exist and that residents in CAs tend to value their local environments, acknowledge the need for planning control and execute their right to object to neighbour’s planning request.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/SERC/about/defau...
Additional Information: © 2013 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD100 Land Use
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
R - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics > R5 - Regional Government Analysis > R52 - Land Use and Other Regulations
Sets: Departments > Geography and Environment
Research centres and groups > Spatial Economics Research Centre
Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Identification Number: SERCDP0145
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2013 16:27
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53936/

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