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The evolution of cooperative norms: evidence from a natural field experiment

Bandiera, Oriana and Barankay, Iwan and Rasul, Imran (2005) The evolution of cooperative norms: evidence from a natural field experiment. 5358. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

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Identification Number: 5358

Abstract

We document the establishment and evolution of a cooperative norm among workers using evidence from a natural field experiment on a leading UK farm. Workers are paid according to a relative incentive scheme under which increasing individual effort raises a worker's own pay but imposes a negative externality on the pay of all co-workers, thus creating a rationale for cooperation. As a counterfactual, we analyse worker behaviour when workers are paid piece rates and thus have no incentive to cooperate. We find that workers cooperate more as their exposure to the relative incentive scheme increases. We also find that individual and group exposure are substitutes, namely workers who work alongside colleagues with higher exposure cooperate more. Shocks to the workforce in the form of new worker arrivals disrupt cooperation in the short term but are then quickly integrated into the norm. Individual exposure, group exposure, and the arrival of new workers have no effect on productivity when workers and paid piece rates and there is no incentive to cooperate.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information: © 2005 Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay and Imran Rasul
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2008 09:21
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:54
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5383

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