Rahi, Rohit and Zigrand, Jean-Pierre (2004) Strategic financial innovation in segmented markets. 4176. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
We analyse an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs play an innovation game and exploit the resulting mispricings by reaping trading profits. Since the equilibrium asset structure is not chosen by a social planner, it is chosen to maximize arbitrage profits and depends therefore realistically upon considerations such as depth, liquidity and gains from trade. In addition, the welfare properties of the resulting asset structure are studied. It is shown that the degree of inefficiency depends upon the heterogeneity of investors. The conjecture of the optimality of ‘Macro Markets’ is analysed formally in this framework.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2004 Rohit Rahi and Jean-Pierre Zigrand|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||arbitrage, asset innovation, innovation games and restricted participation|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
|Sets:||Departments > Accounting and Finance
Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG)
Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|