Spain’s Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: A Quantitative Analysis Within the Conceptual Framework of First and Second Order Elections

Ozgur Erkan
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Abstract

In contrast to the attention devoted to the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty at French and Dutch referenda; the Spanish referendum, where this Treaty was ratified, remained under-researched by political scientists. This paper analyses the voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty with the use of quantitative methods and the concept of first and second-order elections. This paper finds that the Spanish referendum was a second-order referendum, because the effects of domestic political issues in Spain had a greater impact on the electoral behaviour of Spanish voters than had genuinely European issues. This finding raises doubts over the suitability of using direct democracy in the EU in order to raise the legitimacy and democratic accountability of the European project.

Keywords: Spain, EU, referendum, European Constitutional Treaty, first and second-order elections

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1. Introduction

Demise of the permissive consensus over the European project has placed pressure on European political elites to consider alternative ways for legitimizing the European political order by providing further legal and political institutionalisation. The creation of a Constitution for Europe was thus perceived as a panacea by the political elites to set out a new, incrementally more ambitious European political order, and to increase the loyalty of Europeans towards the EU (Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:21-22; Moravcsik in Meunier and McNamara 2007:37-38).

Once the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT hereafter) was completed, it had to be ratified by all EU members, in order to come into force. While some member states choose to steer the ECT through their legislative chambers; four EU members, namely Spain, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands hold a national referendum on the ECT.¹ Among these four member states, Spain was the first country to hold a referendum on the ECT, possibly because Spain has been a country with high attachment to Europe. The
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The referendum in Spain took place on 20 February 2005, only a year after a new Socialist government was formed. The turnout rate in the referendum was of 42.32%, 76.73% of Spanish voters voted in favour of the ECT, whilst 17.24% of voters expressed their opposition to the ECT (Torreblanca and Sorroza 2005: 2-3).

Unlike the referendum in Spain, subsequent referenda on the ECT in France and the Netherlands did not yield positive results, and therefore, the question that Spain raises is that of why Spain was different? What aspects of the Spanish institutional and political order made Spain different than France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg? Following this ratification crisis in France and the Netherlands, several scholars devoted their attention to analysing the electoral behaviour at the French and Dutch referenda and to investigating whether, particularly, No votes were cast based on domestic cleavages or European issues (e.g. Marthaler 2005, Harmsen 2005, Taggart 2006, Ivaldi 2006). On the other hand, cases of positive integration received less scholarly attention. While few studies were conducted to explain the electoral behaviour at the referendum in Luxembourg (Hauser 2005, Dumont and Poirier 2006a, 2006b); voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum remained relatively under-researched within the concept of first and second-order elections and formed rather part of a comparative study on electoral behaviour at all four referenda on the ECT (Glencross and Trechsel 2007). Initial descriptive analyses of the Spanish referendum (Malo de Molina and Miguel de Elias 2005, Torreblanca 2005) did not also examine the electoral behaviour at this referendum within the concept of first and second-order elections.

The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the electoral behaviour at the Spanish referendum as a case study within the framework of first and second-order elections. The main research question to answer in this study is whether
domestic cleavages or European issues had a greater impact on the positive and negative votes cast at the Spanish referendum on the ECT. In other words, this study investigates whether the Spanish referendum on the ECT was a first or second-order referendum. Through a quantitative analysis, this study finds that at the Spanish referendum on the ECT domestic cleavages had a greater impact on the electoral behaviour compared to European issues, which adds a predominantly second-order characteristic to this referendum. In obtaining this result, a quantitative methodology, namely binary logistic regression, was applied to the dataset of the post-referendum survey conducted by Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Appropriate variables within this dataset, which pertain to first and second-order characteristic of the referendum, were re-coded as appropriate and were tested together with certain socioeconomic and demographic background variables.

The remaining parts of this study are structured as follows: Section two critically reviews the previous studies, which analysed electoral behaviour at EU referenda within the conceptual framework of first and second-order elections. In addition, how this study positions itself in the debate is explained. The third section outlines the hypotheses on the Spanish referendum, which will be tested through the available dataset. The fourth section outlines the methodology used in this study and explains which variables were used as well as how these variables were re-coded. The fifth section runs the regression test and presents the results of this statistical analysis. The concluding section has two aims. Firstly, it summarises the main findings and discusses the implications of this study with regard to the existing studies conducted on direct democracy in the EU. Secondly, it demonstrates certain implications that this study may have for constitutional politics and democracy in the EU.
2. Theoretical Explanations of Voting Behaviour at EU Referenda: Domestic and European Factors in Interplay

Prior to the ECT, various member states held national referenda on their EU membership as well as on previous EU treaties. French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, Danish referenda on its EU membership, the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty and Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty are only a few examples of these.

The literature has devoted significant attention to explaining whether voters cast their votes at EU referenda based on domestic cleavages or European issues. In explaining the electoral behaviour at previous EU referenda, scholars applied the concept of first and second-order elections to EU referenda, which was originally coined by Reif and Schmitt (1980) for the analysis of electoral behaviour at European Parliament (EP hereafter) elections. In their analysis of the results of the first direct elections to the EP in 1979, Reif and Schmitt demonstrated that EP elections have a “second-order” characteristic, meaning that at these elections domestic cleavages have a greater influence on the votes than have European issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980:3).

Franklin et al. (1995) were among the first scholars to extend the framework of first and second-order elections to the analysis of EU referenda. They used this concept to analyse the electoral behaviour at national referenda on the Maastricht Treaty. Franklin et al. (1995:111) found that the national referenda on the Maastricht Treaty had a second-order characteristic, since voting behaviour was predominantly influenced by domestic factors, such as attitudes towards the government. This finding gave rise to the Franklin thesis, that national referenda were rather reflections of attitudes towards the
government, rather than being a process of issue-voting (Svensson 2002:735). Using the same concept, Svensson (2002) later analysed five Danish referenda on EU issues, ranging from the referendum on Danish entry to the EU to the one on the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998. Svensson’s findings show that, contrary to the Franklin thesis above, the five Danish EU referenda were not mainly second-order referenda, since ‘votes at these referenda also reflected Danish voters’ attitudes towards the EU and the treaties in question’ (Svensson 2002:748). More recently, Garry et al. (2005) examined the two Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty, again within the framework of first and second-order elections. Garry et al.’s finding refutes the Franklin thesis for the Irish case, as they posit that the impact of “issue-voting” (i.e. attitudes towards the EU and the Nice Treaty) outperforms the influence of “domestic factors” on the votes at both referenda (Garry et al. 2005:214). Therefore, the two Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty are shown to be “first-order” referenda, based on the findings of Garry et al.

These rigorous analyses of electoral behaviour at EU referenda, however, leave out one important element. These studies reveal that respective EU referenda were first or second-order referenda for the entire country, yet they do not investigate whether one can trace diverging first and second-order characteristics in voting behaviour when measured against different socioeconomic classes. Put differently, it would be interesting to know whether at a first-order referendum all classes in the society vote on European issues or whether some vote on still domestic issues. If such a diverging pattern exists, it would be interesting to decipher, which classes cast second-order votes and which classes vote on European issues.

Although previous EU referenda garnered sufficient attention from scholars, rejection of the ECT at French and Dutch referenda in 2005 has diverted the
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attention of scholars to investigating the reasons of positive and negative votes on the ECT in those countries.

Initial studies exploring the electoral behaviour at the French referendum on the ECT demonstrated the existence of a second-order characteristic of the No votes. A significant motivation behind the No votes was to punish the government and express concerns for the domestic socioeconomic situation in France (Taggart 2006:16-17). When measured against socioeconomic indicators, the second-order characteristic of No votes in France was found to be stronger among the unemployed in particular (Marrthaler 2005:234). The second-order characteristic of No votes in France was, however, a contentious point among scholars, since one other study showed that No votes at the French referendum also pertained to issue-voting, i.e. to European issues (Ivaldi 2006:58). According to Ivaldi, these European issues, that add a first-order characteristic to the referendum, were mainly the absence of a social Europe, neoliberal/free market policies of the EU, and possible Turkish EU accession (Ibid:58-59). In reality, however, it is dubious whether the aforementioned issues are genuinely European issues, because as Moravcsik posits, these three issues are predominantly reflections of national or global concerns on European issues (Moravcsik in Meunier and McNamara 2007:39). For example, while criticism of neoliberal policies in the EU actually stems from the national opposition to globalisation; the fears over the Turkish EU accession are fuelled by national concerns over considerable third-country immigration to France and Europe. Thus, it is open to debate to what extent the No votes in France carried a first-order characteristic.

With regard to the Yes votes at the French referendum, however, the picture changes slightly, compared to No votes. The study conducted by Dehousse (2006) demonstrates that the majority of Yes voters in France cast their votes
based on their attitudes towards the EU and the ECT, which adds a first-order characteristic to the Yes votes at this referendum (Ibid:156).

For the Dutch referendum on the ECT, studies have found similar results. Both Taggart (2006:19) and Harmsen (2005:10-11) demonstrated that No votes in the Netherlands reflected both first and second-order characteristics. The most frequently cited reasons for voting against the ECT in the Netherlands were lack of information on the ECT, loss of national sovereignty, opposition to national government and Europe being too expensive (Taggart 2006:19). On the other hand, positive votes were found to possess a predominantly first-order characteristic at the Dutch referendum on the ECT (Harmsen 2005:9-10).

As seen from above, scholars have placed a significant emphasis on examining the unsuccessful referenda for the ECT.³ Disproportionately less attention was, however, devoted to the analysis of electoral behaviour at successful referenda on the ECT in Luxembourg and Spain. So far Hausemer (2005) and Dumont and Poirier (2006a; 2006b) have analysed the electoral behaviour at the referendum in Luxembourg, whilst Glencross and Trechsel (2007) have for the first time conducted a comparative analysis of the referenda in France, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg. Moreover, while Torreblanca (2005) provided rather an analysis of the campaigns in the run up to the Spanish referendum on the ECT; Malo de Molina and Miguel de Elias (2005) only examined the effects of domestic issues on voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum.

Despite these analyses of the successful referenda on the ECT, there is still inadequate focus on explaining the electoral behaviour at the Spanish referendum as a case study within the conceptual framework of first and second-order elections, and this study aims to fill this gap in the literature.
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Examining the Spanish referendum as a case study has two merits. First of all, in a quantitative case study, potential cancelling out effects of different country variables are eliminated. For example, in their quantitative comparative study, Glencross and Trechsel (2007:14) find that the referenda in all four aforementioned member states were first-order referenda. Glencross and Trechsel, however, miss out on the possibility that in their pooled dataset, domestic factors in one country may be cancelling out the effects of domestic factors in another country, so that in the end domestic factors do not seem to have a significant impact on the votes. Secondly, a case study has the advantage of measuring variables that are specific to a country. In a comparative study with pooled dataset, however, the researcher will not necessarily incorporate certain explanatory variables into the analysis, which may significantly matter for one country in the dataset but not for others.


In examining the Spanish referendum within the concept of first and second-order elections, the hypotheses below will be tested with the use of a quantitative method. These hypotheses were constructed based on actual political events that took place in Spain prior to and during the campaigns on the referendum for the ECT.

The first set of hypotheses tests the second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum on the ECT:
H1: Given the paucity of a genuine European debate concerning the content of the ECT during the referendum campaigns in Spain [Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:24], it is expected that a significant amount of Spaniards have voted based on domestic political cleavages. As a result, the Spanish referendum on the ECT carries a second-order characteristic.

H1.1: Previous studies have found that in Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands pro or anti-government attitudes had an impact on the outcome of referenda [Taggart 2006, Harmsen 2005, Hausemer 2005]. It will be thus hypothesized that in Spain attitudes towards the incumbent Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and his government also had an impact on the voting behaviour of Spaniards at the referendum on the ECT. This condition also adds a second-order characteristic to the Spanish referendum.

The second set of hypotheses concerns the first-order characteristic of the referendum:

H2: In line with the hypotheses posed by Glencross and Trechsel (2007:6), it is expected that positive attitudes towards the EU and the ECT in Spain have a positive impact on the vote at the polls. This condition makes the Spanish referendum a first-order referendum, as voters cast their votes based on European issues and/or on issues pertaining to the content of the ECT.

H2.1: Medrano (1995:84) finds a statistically significant positive correlation between possessing a European identity and supporting European integration in Spain. By taking Medrano’s finding as an anchor, it will be hypothesized that possessing a European identity had a positive impact on the vote for the ECT in Spain, in order to support further integration. Since the votes cast under a strong European identity relate to attitudes towards the EU and/or the ECT, this condition also adds a first-order characteristic to the referendum.
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Finally, the positive and negative votes cast on the ECT at the Spanish referendum will be tested together with certain socioeconomic and demographic background variables. These background variables are: age, gender, level of education, economic activity, religion of the respondents and the autonomous community in which respondents live. Among these variables, the following hypothesis was posed for religion:

H3: There was significant emphasis on religious affairs during the campaigns on the ECT, both through the radically Catholic Aznar government in Spain and the lobbying of Aznar government by the Pope for including references to Christianity and God in the ECT (Closa 2004:335-337). Moreover, the conservative ABC newspaper, in particular, defended the idea of referring to Christianity and God in the constitutional text (Jiménez and Sampedro 2005:14). Despite these demands, however, the ECT did not refer to Christianity and God. Based on this fact, it will be hypothesized that Catholic voters in Spain were more likely to vote against the ECT.4

These hypotheses will be tested in section 5. Before running the statistical analysis, however, it is worth introducing the dataset and variables used in this study to test the aforementioned hypotheses, which is the focal point of the following section.

4. Data and Methodology

4.1. Dataset

The dataset used for testing the hypotheses in the previous section stems from the post referendum survey of Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), entitled Estudio CIS no.2595 – Postreferendum sobre la Constitución Europea. Main features of this dataset are presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1: CIS Survey no. 2595 - Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample size (N)</th>
<th>2487</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fieldwork date</td>
<td>26 February – 4 March 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error of the survey</td>
<td>± 2% at 95.5% confidence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area covered by the survey</td>
<td>166 municipalities and 17 provinces in 17 Spanish autonomous communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the CIS survey 2595, there is a second dataset available on the Spanish referendum, namely Flash Euro-barometer 168 (Flash EB-168 hereafter). In this study, however, CIS survey was preferred to Flash EB-168 for two reasons: Firstly, the CIS survey places weight on the beliefs of respondents, unlike Flash EB-168, which was an influential socio-demographic factor during the referendum campaigns, due to the debate over whether there should be any references to Christianity and God in the European Constitution [Closa 2004:335-337]. Since religious factors mattered during the campaigns, incorporating this variable into the analysis can have an impact on the results. Secondly, compared to Flash EB-168, CIS dataset includes more than one measure of attitudes towards the EU, both through the evaluation of European identity and the reaction of Spaniards, in case the EU dissolved tomorrow. The existence of more than one variable on attitudes towards the EU gives the researcher ample opportunity to measure the first-order characteristic of the referendum from different perspectives.
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4.2. Variables used in the Regression Analysis

4.2.a. Response Variable

The response variable used in this study reflects Spanish voters’ choice on the ECT. The original survey question asks the respondents how they voted on the ECT and it has four possible choices: Voting in favour of the ECT, voting against the ECT, blank vote and don’t know. Since this analysis aims to find out whether Spaniards voted in favour of or against the ECT based on domestic or European issues, blank votes and don’t know answers were excluded from the analysis. The response variable was named voting constitution and recoded into a dichotomous variable with 1= voting in favour of the ECT and 0= voting against the ECT.

4.2.b. Explanatory variables

Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables

The dataset includes socioeconomic and demographic variables, such as education, gender, age, economic activity and religious affiliation of the respondents, which were incorporated into this study. The reason for making use of these variables in this study is the significance of some of these factors in explaining EU-related votes, as propounded by Anderson and Reichert (in Glencross and Trechsel 2007:8).

The socioeconomic and demographic factors used in this study are:

**Age:** continuous variable, with a range of values between 18 and 93
**Gender**: dichotomous variable, recoded as gender(1) = males and gender(0) = females. The reference category was taken here as gender(0), which was thus not demonstrated on Table 2 in section 5.

**Education**: categorical variable, demonstrating respondents’ completed level of education. The original variable consists of eleven categories, yet to be able to analyse this variable, it was clustered into five categories and recoded as follows: Education(1) = less than five years of schooling, Education(2) = primary school education, Education(3) = secondary school education, Education(4) = occupational training, and Education(5) = tertiary education. “Don’t know” and “no comment” answers were excluded and Education(5) was taken as the reference category.

**Religion**: dichotomous variable, reflecting the Catholicity of respondents. The original survey question asked the respondents which religion they belong to, and comprised five categories. The variable was re-coded here into a dummy variable with Religion(0) = the respondent is a Catholic, Religion(1) = the respondent either belongs to another religion or does not believe in God. Religion(0) was taken as the reference category here.5

**Autonomous Community**: categorical variable, indicating the autonomous community a respondent resides in. The variable had originally seventeen categories, i.e. each community being a category. To be able to analyse this variable, however, it was clustered into the following three categories, based on the level of positive and negative votes cast on the ECT at each autonomous community: Autonomous Community(1) = Communities where less than 70% of the residents voted in favour of the ECT. The communities in the first category are Navarra, the Basque Country and Catalonia. Autonomous Community(2) = Communities where more than 70% but less than 75% of the residents voted in favour of the ECT, i.e. Madrid. Autonomous Community(3) =
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all other communities with the highest level of votes in favour of the ECT, where the level of Yes votes did not fall below 76.5%. The autonomous communities in this category are Aragón, Andalucía, Asturias, Balearics, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-la-Mancha, Castile-and-León, Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, Rioja and Valencia. *Autonomous Community(3)* was taken here as the reference category.

**Economic activity:** categorical variable, indicating the occupational status of the respondents. The variable included initially nine categories, yet the “other situation” and “no comment” categories were expunged from the analysis. The variable was then recoded into the following five categories: *Economic Activity (1)= Employed; Economic Activity (2)= Retired; Economic Activity(3)= Unemployed; Economic Activity (4)=Student; Economic Activity (5)= Housework (unpaid). Economic Activity(5) was taken as the reference category.*

**Variables on the First-Order Dimension**

**Identity:** categorical variable, measuring whether the respondents possess only European, only Spanish or dual (i.e. both European and Spanish) identity. The survey question encompassed six possible choices, yet “don’t know” and “no comment” choices were excluded and the variable was recoded into the following categories: *Identity(1)= only European identity; Identity(2)= only Spanish identity; Identity(3)= dual identity; Identity(4)= any other identity not mentioned above. Identity (4) was taken as the reference category here. Since the first and third categories of this variable pertain to European issues; it was taken as a variable on the first-order dimension.*

**EUphile:** categorical variable, indicating the level of support for European integration in Spain. The question in the survey asks the respondents how
they would react if the EU dissolved tomorrow and did not exist anymore. The variable had originally seven categories, yet “no comment” answers were expunged. The categories of having “no opinion” and “being indifferent to the dissolution of the EU” were clustered together as one category and the variable was re-coded as follows: $EU_{phile}(1)$ = Being happy about the dissolution of the EU tomorrow; $EU_{phile}(2)$ = Disapproving of the dissolution of the EU tomorrow; $EU_{phile}(3)$ = Being indifferent on this issue. $EU_{phile}(3)$ was accepted as the reference category.

**Constitutionphile:** categorical variable, measuring the respondents’ attitude towards the ECT. The variable had initially seven categories, yet the categories with “indifferent” and “no opinion” answers were clustered together and the variable was re-coded into the following categories: $Constitution_{phile}(1)$ = The ECT is a bad thing for Europe; $Constitution_{phile}(2)$ = The ECT is a good thing for Europe; $Constitution_{phile}(3)$ = Being indifferent to the ECT, which is also the reference category here.

**Variables on the Second-Order Dimension**

**Support for Zapatero:** dichotomous variable, displaying confidence in the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and his government. The variable had originally six categories. The variable was re-coded into a dummy variable by clustering the positive answers of “great confidence” and “enough confidence” into one category and the negative responses of “little confidence” and “very low confidence” into another category. As before, “don’t know” and “no answer” options were left out. Of these two categories, $Support_{for\;Zapatero}(1)$ shows low confidence in Zapatero and his government; whilst $Support_{for\;Zapatero}(0)$ indicates high confidence in Zapatero and his government, which was also defined as the reference category.
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**Party Politics:** categorical variable, demonstrating the political party respondents voted for at the general elections of 14 March 2004. The variable initially comprised seventeen categories; yet “blank votes” at March 2004 elections, as well as “don’t know” and “no comment” answers were excluded. The political parties were then recoded into the following three categories based on their attitude towards the ECT: *Party Politics*(1)= parties strongly in favour of the ECT, i.e. PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), CC (Canary Coalition); *Party Politics*(2)= parties officially in favour of the ECT, albeit experiencing internal fragmentations regarding the content of the ECT, i.e. PP (People’s Party), CiU (Convergence and Union), PNV (Basque Nationalist Party); *Party Politics*(3)= parties strongly against the ECT, i.e. IU (United Left), ERC (Catalonian Republican Left), EA (Basque Solidarity), BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc), Naforra-Bai (Navarra Yes) and CHA-Aragon (Aragonese Council) [Malo de Molina and Miguel de Elias 2005:78; Torreblanca and Sorroza 2006:1]. *Party Politics*(3) was taken as the reference category.

**Left-Right Politics:** categorical variable, which measures the self-positioning of voters on the left-right political space with regard to domestic politics. The variable was re-coded into five categories as follows: *Left-Right Politics*(1)= far-left voters; *Left-Right Politics*(2)= centre-left voters; *Left-Right Politics*(3)= voters at the centre; *Left-Right Politics*(4)= centre-right voters; *Left-Right Politics*(5)= far-right voters. *Left-Right Politics*(5) was taken as the reference category here.

4.3. Methodology

Given that the response variable (*voting constitution*) is a dichotomous variable, a binary logistic regression was used in this analysis, which was computed using the SPSS software. In line with other regression tests, firstly a partial model was constructed, which encompasses the following
socioeconomic, demographic background variables as well as variables on the second-order dimension: age, autonomous community, economic activity, education level, gender, religion a respondent is attached to, left-right politics, party politics, and support for Zapatero. The partial model was then developed into a full model by adding the following explanatory variables on the first-order dimension: identity, constitutionophile, and EUphile.

The effects on the response variable of all aforementioned explanatory variables were measured based on their respective reference categories and by taking into account the statistically accepted significance levels. Moreover, the Nagelkerke $R^2$ and the -2log likelihood values were closely observed throughout the analysis, to confirm the capability of both the partial and the full model in explaining the variations of the response variable.

To also control for the effects of multicollinearity in the full model, bivariate correlations for all explanatory variables were computed on a crosstab, which were kept in sight throughout the analysis. The issues which may arise with regard to the effects of multicollinearity will be addressed towards the end of the next section.

5. Results of the Data Analysis

The results obtained through the test of the available dataset are presented in Table 2 below. The data test was conducted in two steps, as explained at the end of the last section. Firstly, a partial model was constructed, which contains socioeconomic and demographic background factors as well as second-order variables. Thereafter, this model was improved through the addition of first-order variables, which leads to the full model.
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**Table 2: Partial and Full Models (with regression coefficients) for Explaining Electoral Behaviour at the Spanish Referendum on the ECT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Partial Model</th>
<th>Full Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td><strong>0.030</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.039</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Community (1)</td>
<td><strong>-1.203</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>-1.120</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Community (2)</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td>(0.487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Activity (1)</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>-0.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
<td>(0.643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Activity (2)</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td>(0.764)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Activity (3)</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.677)</td>
<td>(0.904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Activity (4)</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>-0.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.665)</td>
<td>(0.910)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1)</td>
<td>1.336</td>
<td>4.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.273)</td>
<td>(2.751)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (2)</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (3)</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td><strong>0.661</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (4)</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
<td>(0.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Coefficient 1</td>
<td>Coefficient 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1)</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (1)</td>
<td>-1.011***</td>
<td>-0.659*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Politics (1)</td>
<td>2.744***</td>
<td>3.445***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
<td>(1.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Politics (2)</td>
<td>2.769***</td>
<td>3.280***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.810)</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Politics (3)</td>
<td>3.157***</td>
<td>3.509**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.724)</td>
<td>(1.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Politics (4)</td>
<td>3.101***</td>
<td>3.424**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(1.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Politics (1)</td>
<td>2.900***</td>
<td>2.823***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.459)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Politics (2)</td>
<td>2.199***</td>
<td>2.772***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(0.680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Zapatero (1)</td>
<td>-1.317***</td>
<td>-1.432***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td>(0.454)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity (1)</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity (2)</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity (3)</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19
Spain's Referendum

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.544)</td>
<td>-1.976**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionphile (1)</td>
<td>(0.879)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionphile (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.719***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUphile (1)</td>
<td>(0.560)</td>
<td>-1.228**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUphile (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.048***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(1.087)</td>
<td>(1.708)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3.572***</td>
<td>-6.935***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.500 (50%)</td>
<td>0.714 (71.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2Log Likelihood</td>
<td>471.930</td>
<td>297.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid cases (N)</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are indicated in brackets below each coefficient.

* = p<0.1 (significant at 10% level); ** = p<0.05 (significant at 5% level); *** = p<0.01 (significant at 1% level)
5.1. Results of the Partial Model

An initial review of the partial model shows that among the background variables used; *age, religion* and the first category of *Autonomous Community* have a statistically significant effect on the response variable, i.e. the vote cast at the referendum for the ECT. *Gender, economic activity, education,* and the second category of *Autonomous Community,* however, are not found to have a statistically significant impact on the response variable under the partial model.

Of the aforementioned background variables, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of *age* yields that at the Spanish referendum older voters were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT than younger voters, holding other explanatory variables constant. This finding may seem surprising, as it contradicts the well-established Inglehart thesis, that younger cohorts are more supportive of EU integration than older people (Hix 2005:162). However, similar studies done on analysing the electoral behaviour at referenda on the ECT reached the same conclusion. Ivaldi (2006:61) demonstrates that at the French referendum, voters aged 60 and over were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT, compared to younger voters. Similarly, Glencross and Trechsel (2007:9) found in all four EU members they analysed that voting in favour of the ECT was likely to increase with rising age. As will be elaborated in the conclusion, further research could shed light on the reasons of this interesting pattern found at national referenda on the ECT.

In addition to *age,* the coefficient of the first category of *Autonomous Communities* also comes out as statistically significant. The statistical significance of this coefficient bears two important interpretations: Firstly, the coefficient of the first category of *Autonomous Communities* implies that ethnic
Spain’s Referendum

nationalism played a role at the referendum. As can be seen, after holding all other variables constant, autonomous communities with the highest level of ethnic nationalism, i.e. Navarra, the Basque Country and Catalonia were on the whole more inclined to vote against the ECT, compared to autonomous communities in the third category (i.e. the reference category). This finding supports the argument of Torreblanca that the ‘territorial question pulled down the level of Yes votes at the Spanish referendum on the ECT’ (Torreblanca 2005:1).

Secondly, a closer review of the third category of the variable Autonomous Communities yields that, of the thirteen communities in that category except Rioja, Aragón and Balearics, all were Objective 1 regions under the Structural Fund Regulations of the EU Regional Policy at the time of the referendum (European Union 2005). This tends to promote the fact that residing in an autonomous community, which receives further financial support from the EU through the EU Regional Policy, makes the residents of this autonomous community more likely to support European integration and thus vote in favour of the ECT. This conclusion can be drawn in comparison to the autonomous communities in the first category of this variable, which were also among the four richest Spanish autonomous communities in terms GDP per capita by 2006 and which therefore do not qualify as Objective 1 regions. This interpretation also buttresses the ‘utilitarian support’ argument of Medrano (1995). Medrano finds that support for further European integration in Spain is conditional on direct financial transfers from the EU and the economic development brought through European integration (Medrano 1995:51), making Spaniards’ endorsement for further integration a utilitarian support.

The final statistically significant background variable under the partial model is religion. It can be inferred from the coefficient of religion that, controlling for
all other explanatory variables, members of other religions or non-believers were less likely to endorse the ECT, compared to Catholic voters. Contrary to the expectations, this statistically significant finding refutes our hypothesis H3 (Catholic voters would be more inclined to reject the ECT, given the absence of references to Christianity in the constitutional text).

The partial model also yields statistically significant results for variables on the second-order dimension. A reassessment of the hypotheses on second-order variables demonstrates that the results under the partial model confirm hypotheses H1 and H1.1.

Firstly, the statistically significant coefficients of *left-right politics* imply that self-positioning of a voter in the left-right ideological space with regard to domestic cleavages helps explain the electoral behaviour of that voter at the Spanish referendum on the ECT. This finding provides evidence for hypothesis H1 (the referendum had a second-order characteristic). Based on the coefficients of this variable, it can be concluded that odds of voting in favour of the ECT were 5.75 % higher for a Spanish voter at the centre of the left-right dimension than a Spanish voter on the centre-right, after controlling for other variables. Similarly, the odds of voting in favour of the ECT were 47.4 % higher for the same centrist voter compared to a Spanish voter on the centre-left.

In addition to *left-right politics*, *party-politics* is another explanatory variable on the second-order dimension that helps confirm hypothesis H1. Given the statistically significant coefficient of the first category of *party politics*, it can be concluded that, after holding all other explanatory variables constant, having voted for a party at March 2004 national elections, which strongly endorsed the ECT, increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT, compared to the voters of anti-ECT parties. Similarly, the coefficient of the second
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category of party politics asserts that having voted for a party at March 2004 general elections, which experienced internal fragmentations regarding the content of the ECT, but which nevertheless endorsed the ECT, also increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT, compared to voters of anti-ECT parties.\textsuperscript{11} This increase is, however, slightly less than the effect of the first category of party politics. It should be noted that, the results from party politics reveal one further crucial interpretation with regard to the variable Autonomous Communities. The results of the latter variable should not be interpreted as every resident in Catalonia and the Basque Country particularly, having voted against the ECT. It should be considered that supporters of PNV and CiU were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT, despite living in the Basque Country or Catalonia, compared to other residents of the Basque Country and Catalonia.

Finally, the last explanatory variable on the second-order dimension, support for Zapatero, confirms hypothesis H1.1 (attitudes towards the government have an impact on the votes at the referendum). The statistically significant coefficient of this variable implies that expressing higher confidence for Zapatero and his government increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT. The exponential of this coefficient \([\exp(-1.317)]\) yields that, holding other explanatory variables constant, voters not trusting Zapatero and his government were 73.21\% more likely to vote against the ECT, compared to voters trusting Zapatero and his government.\textsuperscript{12}

As a result, the partial model confirms the hypotheses on the second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum on the ECT. With regard to the background variables, as shown, the hypothesis on religion was not proved. Finally, the partial model found statistically significant effects for age and the first category of Autonomous Community of residence on the response variable,
yet not for the remaining background variables gender, education, economic activity and the second category of Autonomous Communities.

5.2. Results of the Full Model

One initial observation with regard to the full model is that, moving from the partial to the full model improves the model fit significantly. This tendency can be observed through two different indicators. Firstly, the -2 log likelihood ratio improves by 37.05% with the construction of the full model, as it falls from 471.930 to 297.091. Secondly, the notable increase in Nagelkerke R-square from 50% to 71.4% demonstrates the high capability of the full model in explaining the variations of the response variable, compared to the partial model.

The full model yields results with regard to background and second-order variables that are virtually identical to the ones found under the partial model. Just as under the partial model, the full model also reveals that the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT increases with rising age. Similarly, the full model also finds evidence for the tendency that Spanish autonomous communities receiving further financial benefits from the EU –through the Regional Policy of the EU- were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT than autonomous communities in the first category of the variable Autonomous Communities. Moreover, the full model also confirms the existence of a territorial dimension to the referendum through the same variable, Autonomous Communities. The effect of religion on the votes remains unchanged, although this variable has a slightly lower statistical significance under the full model. In addition to that, statistically significant coefficients of the explanatory variables left-right politics, party politics and support for Zapatero reconfirm the second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum under
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the full model. The only exception under the full model is that, whilst under the partial model all categories of *education* were statistically insignificant; under the full model, the third category of *education* comes out statistically significant at 10% significance level. Based on this finding, it can be concluded only with regard to the third category of *education* that voters with secondary education were more likely to endorse the ECT compared to voters with tertiary education, after holding all other variables constant. It should be noted, that this finding does not imply the existence of a linear relation. Put differently, based on solely one statistically significant category of *education*, it cannot be concluded that support for the ECT in Spain rises with falling level of education.

As a final step, insertion of the first-order variables *constitutionphile*, *EUphile* and *identity* into the full model proves the correctness of hypothesis H2 (positive attitudes towards the EU and the ECT have positive effects on the vote for the ECT). Hypothesis H2.1 can, however, be neither confirmed nor refuted as the coefficients for all categories of the variable *identity* are statistically insignificant.

One of the explanatory variables that helps verify hypothesis H2 is the variable *constitutionphile*. The statistically significant coefficient of the first category of *constitutionphile* implies that, after controlling for other variables, voters with a negative attitude towards the ECT were more likely to vote against the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral attitude towards the ECT. Similarly, the coefficient of the second category of *constitutionphile* asserts that voters with a positive attitude towards the ECT were significantly more likely to vote in favour of the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral attitude.

Another explanatory variable on the first-order dimension, *EUphile*, helps confirm hypothesis H2. The first category of *EUphile* demonstrates that, after
holding other variables constant, voters with a negative attitude towards the EU were more likely to reject the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral attitude towards European integration. Moreover, the second category of EUphile indicates that voters with a strongly positive sentiment towards the EU tended to vote more in favour of the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral attitude towards the EU. As can be seen from Table 2, both of these aforementioned findings are highly statistically significant.

Reassessing the question whether the Spanish referendum had a first-order or second-order characteristic, the findings under the full model demonstrate that the Spanish referendum possessed both first and second-order characteristics. Put differently, both domestic and European issues were found to have an impact on the votes at the Spanish referendum for the ECT. The more interesting question to ask at this stage is which of the two aforementioned factors had a greater impact on the votes cast at this referendum. In order to answer that question, fitted probabilities were calculated for each of the first and second-order explanatory variables, i.e. for EUphile, constitutionphile, identity, left-right politics, party politics, support for Zapatero, as well as for aggregated first and second-order variables. The calculated fitted probabilities for individual and aggregated first and second-order variables are presented in Table 3 below. The second column of Table 3 indicates, on the example of left-right politics, the predicted probability that a Spanish voter on the far-right (which is the reference category here) votes in favour of the ECT. The third column then yields the predicted probability of voting in favour of the ECT, if the same voter identified himself on the centre-left instead (which is the category with the highest frequency). The difference between these two values shows as a percentage the effect of a change in the explanatory variable left-right politics on voting in favour of the ECT. The
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method used for calculating the fitted probabilities is described in the endnotes.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Table 3: Fitted Probabilities for First and Second-Order Variables}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Value at dummy = 0, in %</th>
<th>Value at dummy = 1, in %</th>
<th>Change, in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Support for Zapatero}  \textsuperscript{14}</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>97.61</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Variables}</td>
<td>Value at the reference category, in %</td>
<td>Value at the category with the highest frequency, in %</td>
<td>Change, in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Left-Right Politics}</td>
<td>86.57</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>12.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Party Politics}</td>
<td>91.06</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Constitutionphile}</td>
<td>91.87</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{EUphile}</td>
<td>98.36</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Identity}</td>
<td>98.96</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{General Comparison}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Order Variables</td>
<td>68.93</td>
<td>99.42</td>
<td>30.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Order Variables</td>
<td>27.70</td>
<td>97.62</td>
<td>69.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fitted probabilities above indicate that most second-order variables had individually a greater impact on the votes for the ECT than most first-order variables. The calculations yield that the individual effects of second-order variables \textit{left-right politics} and \textit{party politics} on voting in favour of the ECT
dominate the individual effects of all first-order variables. Among the first-order variables, only the individual effects of constitutionophile on the response variable can dominate the individual effects of the second-order variable support for Zapatero. As a result, even the individual effects imply that second-order variables had a greater impact on voting in favour of the ECT than first-order variables. In order to strengthen this conclusion, however, one needs to compare the cumulative effect of all first-order variables on a positive vote at the referendum with the cumulative effect of all second-order variables.

The final two rows of Table 3 above demonstrate the results of this comparison under general comparison, which show the collective impact of first and second-order variables on the response variable separately. A comparison of the collective effect of all second-order variables on voting in favour of the ECT with the collective effect of all first-order variables implies that domestic cleavages had a far greater impact on a positive vote at the Spanish referendum than had EU issues. As can be seen from the results in Table 3, moving from the reference category to the category with the highest frequency on all first-order variables simultaneously changes the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT by 30.49%. This effect, however, more than doubles when all second-order variables move from their reference category to their category with the highest frequency (69.92%). Consequently, calculation of the fitted probabilities tends to promote that hypotheses H1 (the Spanish referendum on the ECT has a second-order characteristic) and H1.1 (attitudes towards the government have an effect on the votes at the referendum) provide the ultimate answer to the research question of this study, whether the Spanish referendum on the ECT was a first or second-order referendum. This conclusion contradicts the findings of Glencross and Trechsel (2007). As shown in section 2, Glencross and Trechsel find in their comparative study of all four EU member states, which held a referendum on
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the ECT, that in these countries, including Spain, the referenda had a first-order characteristic.

As mentioned at the end of the last section, the potential effects of multicollinearity may be a cause for concern in concluding that second-order variables had a greater impact on the response variable than first-order variables. To clear any doubts about this question, bivariate correlations between all explanatory variables were computed on a crosstab. The crosstab demonstrates that the majority of the statistically significant bivariate correlations were low, and oscillated between 0.048 and 0.25. Only three bivariate correlations exceed the 0.30 level. These are the correlations between support for Zapatero and left-right politics (-0.398), support for Zapatero and party politics (-0.443) and education and age (-0.451). It may be assumed that, since support for Zapatero is highly correlated with both left-right politics and party politics, it may be inflating the values of these two latter variables.

To test this presumption, support for Zapatero was excluded from the full model and the respective regression coefficients of left-right politics and party politics were measured again. The result indicates that despite the high correlations, support for Zapatero did not inflate the values of left-right politics and party politics. Excluding the variable support for Zapatero from the full model changes the coefficient of party politics (1), i.e. the category with the highest frequency used in the calculation of the fitted probabilities, from 2.823 to 2.814 and its standard error from 0.459 to 0.438. Under the same conditions, the coefficient of the category of left-right politics with the highest frequency, left-right politics (2), changes from 3.280 to 3.144, whilst its standard error changes from 1.145 to 1.083. These are rather small changes, where the variations do not exceed 5.4%. Moreover, even after the exclusion of support for Zapatero from the full model, the coefficients of constitutionphile(2), EUphile(2) and identity(3) are still smaller than the coefficients of left-right
politics (2) and party-politics (1). These findings imply that support for Zapatero does not inflate the effects of the aforementioned two second-order variables vis-à-vis the first-order variables in the calculation of fitted probabilities.

With regard to the potential multicollinearity between education and age, it was assumed that the variable age could be pulling down the effect of education and making this variable statistically insignificant. Therefore, as done above, age was excluded from the full model and the coefficients of education were measured again. The findings demonstrated that excluding age from the full model changed the statistical significance only in the second category of education, which became statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients of four categories of education vary only between 0.087% and 4.5%, when age is excluded from the full model. As a result, age neither pulls down the effect of education notably nor makes the entire variable insignificant.

The ensuing findings from this data analysis have certain implications for previous studies done on direct democracy in the EU as well as for constitutional politics and democracy in the EU. The concluding section will discuss these implications.

6. Conclusion

Scholars analysing the voting behaviour at national referenda on the ECT have left the Spanish referendum under-researched as a case study. This paper aims at correcting this anomaly by filling this gap in the literature and by bringing an insight into the question whether in Spain domestic or European factors had a greater influence on the votes at the referendum for the ECT. To answer this question, firstly the hypotheses were constructed based on the political events that took place in Spain prior to and during the
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referendum. Thereafter, these hypotheses were tested with an application of binary logistic regression to the available dataset. The test results in particular the fitted probabilities, implied that the Spanish referendum on the ECT possesses predominantly a second-order characteristic.

The finding, that the Spanish referendum on the ECT was a second-order referendum, carries certain implications for existing research done in the context of direct democracy in the EU. This finding initially displays the validity of the Franklin thesis (Franklin et al. 1995) for the Spanish case. In line with the Franklin thesis, votes cast at the Spanish referendum on the ECT reflected predominantly attitudes on domestic political issues, rather than attitudes towards the EU and the ECT. Hence, reasons for Spanish referendum outcome lies in the specific dynamics of its political cycle as compared to the other three countries where a referendum was held.

The findings of this study also lend support to the hypothesis of Hug and Scarini. Hug and Scarini assert that referenda which are non-binding, i.e. consultative, are more likely to demonstrate second-order effects (in Garry et al. 2005:204). Given that the Spanish referendum on the ECT was merely a non-binding referendum (Torreblanca 2005:3); the finding that the Spanish referendum on the ECT possesses a second-order characteristic lends support to the hypothesis of Hug and Scarini.

The second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum, on the other hand, provides evidence against the hypothesis of Crum (2007). Crum posits that in a collusive party system, where all mainstream parties take a proximate stand on the issue of the referendum, the referendum tends to possess a first-order characteristic (Crum 2007: 67). In competitive party systems, however, where the government and opposition take diverging stands on the referendum, one would expect to observe a second-order referendum (Ibid 2007:67). This is
because the votes cast at the referendum will be regarded either as a reward or punishment for the government (Ibid:67). In the case of the Spanish referendum on the ECT, one finds a “collusive party system”, based on the model of Crum. In Spain, official party lines of both the governing PSOE and the main opposition party PP endorsed the ECT. According to the hypothesis of Crum, therefore, one would anticipate the Spanish referendum to possess a first-order characteristic. Contrary to the Crum hypothesis, however, the Spanish referendum on the ECT turns out to be a second-order referendum, despite the existence of a collusive party system endorsing the ECT.

This study also carries certain implications for constitutional politics and democracy in the EU. Firstly, the second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum is closely linked to the democratic deficit in the EU. According to Føllesdal and Hix (2006:552), one facet of the democratic deficit in the EU lies in the second-order nature of electoral campaigns for the EP elections. The campaigns for EP elections, which are run by national political parties, refer to domestic political cleavages, rather than the European issues (Ibid:552). Accordingly, voters elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs hereafter) at EP elections based on domestic cleavages. Thus voter preferences on European integration are not reflected in the votes cast at EP elections (Ibid:552). At the EP, however, MEPs make decisions on issues pertaining to Europe and European integration, despite being elected on domestic cleavages. Since MEPs are not fully aware of the preferences of their citizens on European issues, their decisions at the EP will not necessarily reflect the preferences of their citizens on European integration. As a result, MEPs will not be representing the interests of European citizens, which engenders a democratic deficit at EU level.

This facet of democratic deficit in the EU can similarly be applied to second-order EU referenda, including the Spanish referendum on the ECT. Given the
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finding that the Spanish referendum possesses a second-order characteristic, Spanish voters’ preferences on European integration were not predominantly reflected in their votes at the referendum. Consequently, if the ECT were to come into force, actors and institutions at EU level, deriving their power from the European Constitution, could take actions, which would not necessarily reflect the preferences of Spaniards on European issues. Therefore, at least for Spanish citizens, this incongruence of preferences on European issues would engender a democratic deficit at EU level.

One other implication of this study can be found in the issue of increasing the legitimacy of the EU and citizens’ loyalty to the EU through a European Constitution. As shown in the introduction, an important motive for the European political elites in preparing a Constitution for Europe was to legitimise the European political order and increase the loyalty of European citizens towards the EU (Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:21-22; Moravcsik in Meunier and McNamara 2007:37-38). The ensuing second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum, however, casts a shadow on the viability of this goal. Given that Spanish votes at the referendum reflected predominantly domestic cleavages, rather than citizens’ stance on European integration or the ECT itself, the Spanish referendum did not serve to legitimate the European order for Spaniards nor did it increase the loyalty of Spaniards towards the EU. Hence, it is dubitable whether a Constitution for Europe can be an indispensable panacea to bring citizens closer to the EU, without eliminating the pattern of voting on domestic cleavages at EU referenda.

This study also bears two implications for Spain. Firstly, the results of this study confirm the strength of ethnic nationalism in Spain, as ethnic nationalism in Spain proved strong enough to pull down the level of Yes votes at an EU-level referendum. This outcome can possibly be interpreted
such that because the ECT did not significantly extend the direct representational rights of ethnic minorities at EU institutions; historic nations in EU members were distanced to the ECT. Secondly, this study demonstrates the existence of a utilitarian support for European integration in Spain. As shown through the explanatory variable *Autonomous Communities*, Spanish regions under Objective 1 of EU Regional Funds expressed a greater support for the ECT, holding other variables constant, compared to other communities. Put differently, obtaining additional financial support from the EU was found to correspond to a greater endorsement for further European integration in Spain.

Finally, the results of this study raise new questions for further research. As mentioned in the previous section, this study helps delineate the limitations of Inglehart’s thesis at national referenda on the ECT. It could be explored through further research, why older people endorsed the ECT more than younger voters, contrary to the conventional view that younger cohorts are more supportive of further EU integration (Hix 2005:162).

As shown in section 2, there is still one overlooked dimension of EU referenda. The application of first and second-order elections framework to EU referenda has so far left out the question, whether EU referenda have a first or second-order characteristic across all social classes. Put more simply, the interesting question is whether all social classes vote on domestic issues at an e.g. second-order referendum or whether some classes still vote on European issues, whilst other social classes vote on domestic issues. For example, it would be interesting to know whether there is an elite-mass gap at EU referenda, such that the more educated, wealthier citizens feel themselves closer to the EU and thus vote on European issues whereas the less educated, and those with lower incomes vote predominantly on domestic cleavages.
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Further research could identify the patterns of electoral behaviour by socioeconomic class at EU referenda.

Finally, another interesting research question to analyse could be to what extent the media reporting on the ECT as well as on referendum campaigns has influenced the electoral behaviour at referenda on the ECT in Spain, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands.

Endnotes

1 Some other EU members also planned to hold a referendum on the ECT. In the Czech Republic, the referendum required constitutional amendments. Since the political polarisation rendered reaching a consensus on constitutional amendments difficult, the proposal to hold a referendum was receded in the Czech Republic (Schönlau and Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:240). Poland also planned holding a referendum, yet a referendum did not eventually take place in Poland (Ibid:241). Finally, the British and Portuguese referenda were put on hold after the ratification crisis of the ECT in France and the Netherlands (Ibid:241-242).

2 Turnout at the Spanish referendum on the ECT was low compared to national elections in Spain, albeit was close to the turnout at 2004 European Parliament elections in this country [45.14%] (Torreblanca 2005:2). Although low turnouts may create concerns on legitimacy in democracies, the causes and consequences of this low turnout at the Spanish referendum are beyond the scope of this paper and could be addressed in a separate study.

3 This trend continued with the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. Following the ratification crisis in Ireland; Holmes (2008), O’Brien (2009) and Quinlan (2009) analysed the electoral behaviour at the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, which particularly focused on explaining the motives behind No votes.

4 Given the dominance of Roman Catholics in Spain, hypothesis H3 refers to Catholics, rather than Christians in general. In selecting Catholics as a measure, the study of Montero was taken as an anchor, who examines the influence of Catholicism, rather than Christianity, on the votes in Spanish politics (Montero 1994).

5 The reason for recoding religion into a dummy variable is to test hypothesis H3 (Catholic voters expected to vote against the ECT). It could be argued that measuring the frequency at which religious voters practice could be a more appropriate way to evaluate hypothesis H3. Another
variable in the dataset, which included this measure, however, indicated the frequency of practising *both* for Catholics and believers of other religions. Hence, it would not be the appropriate variable to test hypothesis H3.

* All subsequent comparisons in section 5 are done with regard to the respective reference category of each explanatory variable.

7 In 2006, the top four Spanish regions with the highest GDP per capita were -in descending order- 1.) Navarra 2.) the Basque Country 3.) Madrid 4.) Catalonia.

8 This figure was obtained through the calculation of odd ratios as follows: The ratio of a centrist voter over a centre-right voter is Left-right politics (3)/left-right politics (4), which is equal to left-right politics(3)/reference category * reference category/left-right politics(4). The first expression is already given in SPSS output for the partial model through Exp(B) of left-right politics(3), which is 23.499. The second expression is 1/ExpB [left-right politics(4)], which is 0.0450. The multiplication of these two factors gives 23.499*0.0450 = 1.0575. As a percentage, this means (1.0575-1)*100 = 5.75%.

9 The odd ratio was calculated in an identical way as for the endnote 8 above. Only the formula changes here, which is now: Left-right politics(3)/reference category * reference category/left-right politics(2).

10 *PSOE* and *CC* had a strongly positive party line towards the ECT. In contrast, except one state-wide party, *IU*, mainly peripheral and nationalist parties had a strongly negative party line towards the ECT. These parties were *ERC*, *BNG*, *EA*, *Naforra-Bai* and *CHA-Aragon* (Malo de Molina and Miguel de Elias 2005:78; Torreblanca and Sorroza 2006:1).

11 These parties were *PP*, *PNV* and *CiU*. The PP had internal fragmentations regarding the content of the ECT, as some party members bemoaned the absence of Christian values in the ECT as well as the loss of Spanish votes at the Council compared to the formulae under the Nice Treaty (Malo de Molina and Miguel de Elias 2005:80). Despite these fragmentations, the PP decided to endorse the ECT, as it was the Spanish negotiator of the ECT at the time of Aznar government. PNV and CiU did not welcome the ECT with great enthusiasm (Eschke and Malick 2006:12), as the ECT did not promote new rights of representation for ethnic minorities at European institutions, yet the party lines were nevertheless to support the ECT.

12 This figure was obtained through the exponential of the regression coefficient: Exp(-1.317) = 0.2679. To convert that into a percentage, one calculates (1-0.2679)*100 = 73.21%.

13 The formula used for calculating the fitted probabilities is: Logit = Constant + 40*age + Education(3) * 1 + Autonomous Community(1) * 0 + Autonomous Community(2) * 0 + Left-Right Politics(2) * 1 + Party Politics(1) * 1 + Support for Zapatero(1) * 0 + Economic Activity(1) * 1 +
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Religion(1)*0 + Gender(1) * 1 + EUphile(2) * 1 + Constitutionphile (2) *1 + Identity (3) * 1. The obtained logit is fitted into the formula \[\frac{1}{1+\exp(-\text{logit})}\]*100, which gives the fitted probability in percentages.

The formula above gives the fitted probability when all explanatory variables attain the value of their category with the highest frequency. The reason for selecting the highest frequency for each variable is to render the fitted probabilities representative of the entire population. Since this formula incorporates both first and second-order variables, the calculation uses the regression coefficients from the full model.

To calculate the individual impact of first and second-order variables on voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum for the ECT, the variable in question was given the value at its reference category and inserted into the formula above. Thereafter, this variable was given the value of its category with the highest frequency, whilst holding all other variables constant at their category with the highest frequency and the calculation was run again. The difference between these two values gives the individual impact of this variable on voting behaviour.

To calculate the collective impact of aggregated first-order variables on voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum, firstly all first-order variables EUphile, Constitutionphile and Identity were allocated to their reference category and fitted into the formula above. Thereafter, all these variables were given their value with the highest frequency, whilst holding all other variables constant at their category with the highest frequency and the calculation was rerun. The difference between these two values gives the impact of all first-order variables on voting in favour of the ECT. This process was repeated to calculate the collective impact of aggregated second-order variables on the response variable.

14 Since for Support for Zapatero the reference category is also the category with the highest frequency, a special row was inserted for this variable into Table 3 with its value at 0 and 1 as a dummy variable. Therefore, in calculating the effect of Support for Zapatero on the response variable, exceptionally the change from its first category to its second category was calculated, rather than the change from its reference category to the category with the highest frequency. This exception, however, does not affect the statistical inference or interpretation.

15 This benchmark for measuring the level of bivariate correlations was borrowed from the regression analysis of Glencross and Trechsel (2007:8).
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