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Fair social orderings

Fleurbaey, Marc and Maniquet, F. (2007) Fair social orderings. Economic Theory, 34 (1). pp. 25-45. ISSN 0938-2259

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

Abstract

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://link.springer.com/journal/199
Additional Information: © 2006 Springer-Verlag
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Date Deposited: 06 Aug 2013 13:44
Last Modified: 20 May 2019 00:54
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/51473

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