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Social choice and just institutions: new perspectives

Fleurbaey, Marc (2007) Social choice and just institutions: new perspectives. Economics and Philosophy, 23 (01). p. 15. ISSN 0266-2671

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Identification Number: 10.1017/S0266267107001204

Abstract

It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in the absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was thought to require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In particular, this approach turns out to be especially suitable for the application of recent philosophical theories of justice formulated in terms of fairness, such as equality of resources.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information: © 2007 Cambridge University Press
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Date Deposited: 06 Aug 2013 13:04
Last Modified: 12 Mar 2014 12:43
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/51470

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