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Patent renewals and r&d incentives

Cornelli, Francesca and Schankerman, Mark (1998) Patent renewals and r&d incentives. 1917. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 1917

Abstract

In a model with moral hazard and assymmetric information, we show that it can be welfare-improving to differentiate patent lives when firms have different R&D productivities. A uniform patent life provides excessive R&D incentive to low-productivity firms, and too little to high ones. The optimally differentiated patent scheme can be implemented through a menu of patent lives (or renewals) and associated fees. We characterize the optimal mechanism, and use simulation analysis to compare it with existing patent renewal systems and to illustrate the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information: © 1998 Francesca Cornelli and Mark Schankerman
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 27 May 2008 14:28
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:54
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5090

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