Kukathas, Chandran (2013) On Sen on comparative justice. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 16 (2). pp. 196-204. ISSN 1369-8230
Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through which global ethical concerns should be approached, Amartya Sen argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a particular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative systematic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more promising foundation for a theory of global justice. But in the end Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests, then justice is not a master idea but one value among many, and it should be neither the first virtue of social institutions, nor the notion that frames all our reflections on ethical and political life.
|Additional Information:||© 2013 Taylor & Francis Group|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||K Law > K Law (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Government|
|Date Deposited:||10 May 2013 11:36|
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