Hellman, Ziv and Peretz, Ron (2013) Graph value for cooperative games. Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected paths within the graph. This leads to a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied here from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2013 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D46 - Value Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
|Sets:||Departments > Mathematics|
|Date Deposited:||07 May 2013 14:07|
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