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Graph value for cooperative games

Hellman, Ziv and Peretz, Ron (2013) Graph value for cooperative games. Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected paths within the graph. This leads to a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied here from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/maths/home.aspx
Additional Information: © 2013 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D46 - Value Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 07 May 2013 14:07
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50073/

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