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Graph value for cooperative games

Hellman, Ziv and Peretz, Ron (2013) Graph value for cooperative games. . Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected paths within the graph. This leads to a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied here from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/maths/home.aspx
Additional Information: © 2013 The Authors
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D46 - Value Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited: 07 May 2013 14:07
Last Modified: 16 Mar 2019 00:04
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/50073

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