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Europeanization and the
Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties:
How Europe Matters

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Abstract
The paper seeks to investigate the EU effect on the Turkish-Cypriot political parties via a) the prospects for EU integration as part of a united Cyprus and b) the recently commenced Brussels-northern Nicosia interaction. In doing so, the paper engages with the discussion on ‘Europeanization’ and argues that the EU has affected the Turkish-Cypriot party competition and its outcome. This process of Europeanization is importantly mediated by two specificities of the Turkish-Cypriot case: the centrality of the Cyprus problem in the public debate as well as the international non-recognition and isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots.

Keywords: European Union, Europeanization, political parties, Turkish-Cypriot community

Introduction
The Cyprus problem, which casts its shadow over the entire socio-political life in Cyprus, constitutes the most diachronic cleavage of the Turkish-Cypriot (TC) party competition. Based on their stance towards solution to the Greek-Cypriot (GC)-TC dispute, TC political parties can be divided between those that support a solution based on a formula of a federate state (moderates) and those who favor a less compromising settlement (hard-
In recent years, the issue of the Cyprus problem has been associated to the prospects of European Union (EU) integration for the TCs: solution to the Cyprus issue has meant the inclusion of the TCs in the EU environment, as partners of a bi-communal state, which would replace the GC-controlled Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the process of EU integration. As a result, moderates have generally advocated federative solution and the EU, while the hard-liners have been more sceptical. This division between pro-EU moderates and eurosceptic hardliners is reinforced by the recently commenced EU-TC relations, which, during the period of our research (2002-10), have been led by the moderate governing elites. Initially, the engagement with the EU resulted in a triumph of the moderates (2003, 2005) but recent elections (2009, 2010) saw the return of the hard-liners to the TC leadership, also as a result of their pro-EU profile.

This increased EU relevance for the domestic TC matters present us with the task to explore the EU effect on the TC political parties and their competition, via two main channels: a) the linkage of the Cyprus problem to the EU future of the TCs as well as b) the fresh EU-TC interaction. In pursuing this objective, the paper engages with the literature on Europeanization, which seeks to explore the process through which the EU impacts domestic politics. It is posited that the process of Europeanization of the TC political parties is importantly mediated by a) the Cyprus problem, as a domestic matter of paramount importance and b) the international non-recognition and isolation of the TC community, in the administrative face of self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In this context, this paper offers important empirical knowledge for the TC political scene in recent years but also useful insight into the stimuli or limitations of the EU to affect domestic politics.
The article is structured in five parts. Firstly, the conceptual framework of Europeanization is introduced. The second and third parts discuss the EU effect on TC political parties. The period of research (2002-10) is divided in two eras: before and after the year 2006, which saw the intensification of EU-TC interaction. This distinction is very important for the channels (i.e. prospects for EU integration and post-2006 EU-TC interaction) via which the EU effect has taken place. The fourth part links the empirical findings to the conceptual discussion, before a series of conclusive remarks, in the final fifth section. The article draws on extensive qualitative research of policy papers and public discourse and a wide range of interviews with TC and EU elites.

**Europeanization: A Review**

Although ‘many faces of Europeanization’ have been suggested (Olsen 2002), the majority of the literature has approached the phenomenon as a process whereby the EU impacts on the national level, and, more specifically, domestic politics, policy and polity (Ladrech 1994, Borzel 1999, Wallace 2000, Goetz and Hix 2001, Buller and Gamble 2002, Töller 2010). In an accommodating definition, Radaelli (2000, 4) has termed Europeanization as a

process of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.
With regards to how Europeanization takes place, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) have proposed three mechanisms via which change is produced at the domestic setting:

a) *Institutional compliance*, whereby EU’s prescription of specific institutional models results in domestic alterations;

b) *Change of domestic opportunity structures*, whereby change occurs as a result of redistribution of power among domestic actors;

c) *Framing of domestic beliefs and expectations*, which, ultimately, result in domestic changes.

This work is only concerned with the two latter (b, c) mechanisms proposed.

Although, initially, the discussion of Europeanization concentrated on EU member states, the EU’s impact can be tracked well beyond its borders. Brussels maintain a divergent range of international relations, which offers different avenues for the EU to ‘export’ an impact on the domestic scene of its partners. Along these lines, the Europeanization debate has flourished to also cover cases of third countries (Wallace 2000, Lavenex 2004, Lavenex and Ucarer 2004). A particularly strong ‘branch’ of the Europeanization literature concerned with non-member states has been that of enlargement-driven Europeanization, which tracks the EU effect upon candidates for EU membership, through the process of accession (Lippert et. al. 2001, Grabbe 2001, Goetz 2001, Seldemeier 2006).

*Europeanization and Political Parties*

Political parties correspond to a particular aspect of domestic politics that has been at the spotlight of the Europeanization debate. Ladrech (2010) has suggested five different remits of party systems that the EU can impact on: 1) programmatic change, 2)
organizational change, 3) patterns of party competition, 4) party-government relations and 5) relations beyond the national system. In this paper, we focus on the context of the party competition (understood here as party programs and patterns of party competition). We also aim at contributing to the discussion by adding a dimension which has been largely neglected until now: the outcome of party competition, that is, the election results.

As far as the EU effect on patterns of party competition is concerned, Mair (2000) has argued that the process of EU integration limits the policy flexibility of national governments and, thus, leads to the creation of consensus among the political parties. On the contrary, scholars have proposed that the EU has often introduced a cleavage for party competition, with the British and French examples being frequently cited (Daniels 1998, Gabel 2001). Besides, a number of studies have seen the EU impact also manifested in the establishment of new political parties, which are principally informed by the debate on EU matters (Ladrech 2001, 7; Hix and Goetz 2001, 11). The emergence of consensus has also been acknowledged in the candidate countries for EU membership (Baun et al. 2006, Sedelmeier 2006, 17), while wide Euroscepticism has also been testified, especially during the EU accession process (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). This change of patterns of party competition has also a profound impact on the party programs: EU integration can offer attractive policy templates (Daniels 1998), strengthen existing policy perspectives, or, modify them (Bomberg 2002).

The focus of this article on party competition allows us to combine the discussion on the Europeanization of political parties with the Europeanization mechanisms, as introduced by Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002, see above). In trying to unveil the change of patterns of party competition and programs, the mechanism related to framing of beliefs and expectations is deployed. This helps us understand how the EU became a force of
influence on the profiles and aims of the TC political parties. In addition to that, we explore the EU effect on the outcome of party competition, by using the mechanism related to the change of domestic opportunity structures: the EU effect on the election results can be explained as a reflection of the EU-induced change of the opportunity structures of a domestic party system. In this context, by combining those two parts of the Europeanization literature, we seek to explore the EU effect on the profiles and aims of the TC political parties and the distribution of power between them.

‘A Silent Revolution’3: European Union and Political Parties in the pre-2006 Era

A central characteristic of the TC political competition has been the magnitude of the Cyprus issue within the public debate. Consequently, the political parties can be categorized in two camps, based on their views of solution: firstly, the moderate camp, which consists of political parties that support a solution in the form of a GC-TC federative state. Secondly, the hard-line camp, which includes political parties that support forms of solution that contradict, in various ways, the above commitment (e.g. co-federation, TC integration with Turkey) and are, often, typified by increased loyalty to the separate TC existence and the links with Ankara.

For the Legislative elections of 2003, the issue of solution to the Cyprus problem was linked to the issue of EU integration. With the referenda on the United Nations (UN) - proposed ‘Annan Plan’ for the resolution of Cyprus issue based on a formula of a federative state, which would then accede to the EU, set for the spring of 2004, the election campaign was polarized between the hard-line and moderate camps. The first declined the Annan Plan and renewed their commitment to the self-proclaimed TC state, while the latter supported the UN plan the consequent EU accession of a unitary Cyprus.
Therefore, the polarization of the TC political forces acquired a ‘twin’ character: political forces were divided based on their stance with regards to a) solution and b) EU integration into pro-EU moderates and eurosceptic hard-liners. In the end, the pro-EU moderates prevailed in a historic victory.

The Hard-Line Camp

National Unity Party (UBP) has been the biggest hard-line party and monopolized the TC establishment, until recently (Table 1). The party is characterized by devotion to the self-declared TC state and the links with Ankara and an inflexible position with regards to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. For the elections of 2003, the party continued to support the separate TC existence with its leader, and PM at that time, Derviş Eroğlu, stating that

this election will be one that will determine the fate of our state (i.e. TRNC- emphasis added) and the future of our people (Turkish Daily News 2003).

This position of the UBP was outside the spirit of the Annan Plan, which foresaw a reunification of the two communities under a federal state, which would then accede to the EU. In 2003, for the first time in history, the UBP lost the elections (Table 1).

The second most popular hard-line party (Table 1) was the Democratic Party (DP). The DP also rejected the Annan Plan and supported the hard-liner President Rauf Denktaş as a negotiator on the ongoing GC –TC talks (BBC Monitoring International Reports 2003). The hard-line camp also included the newly formed Nationalist Peace Party (MBP) and Cyprus Justice Party (KAP), which both advocated TC integration into Turkey (Çarkoglu & Sözen 2004) but failed to reach the parliament and did not return to the 2005 elections.
In the Legislative elections two years later, TC politics were considerably altered. In April 2004, the TCs approved the Annan Plan and EU membership of a united Cyprus. In light of those events, the UBP tried to attract the majority that voted in favor of the UN Plan. The party started to back a more compromising solution for the Cyprus issue while, at the same time, continued to suggest the self-declared state as an alternative (Sözen 2005, 468). The election results found UBP’s power further decreased (Table 1). The DP, which remained in the third place, also displayed greater flexibility with regards to the resolution of the Cyprus problem, by supporting the UN mediation and often attacking the GC side for intransigence (Halkin Sesi 2005). For the 2005 elections, the hard-line camp also saw the emergence of the Nationalist Justice Party (MAP), which, after a poor performance, did not come back in the 2009 elections. With regards to the Presidential elections of the same year, the hard-line camp gave two main competitors: the leader of the UBP Dervis Eroğlu and DP’s Mustafa Arabacıoğlu, who came second and third respectively (Table 2).

The Moderate Camp

On the other side, the moderate camp supported EU membership and the Annan Plan and gained sizeable ground among the electorate. The Republican Turkish Party (CTP) had been one of the main opposition parties throughout the TC history (Table 1). For the elections of 2003, the CTP underwent a ‘make over’. The party was renamed to CTP-‘United Forces’ and opened its lists to include a ‘new blood’ of candidates, who shared a commitment to solution and EU membership. In the declaration, the party advocated solution based on the Annan Plan and EU accession of a united Cyprus. Among CTP’s programmatic aims was the development of the TC people, based on the adoption of EU law:
we (i.e. the CTP) are going to implement a program seeking to adapt the political and economic setup of our community to the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria and ensure the full harmonization with European Union (Cyprusive 2003).

At the same time, the text underlined the competence of the party to negotiate solution and EU during the GC-TC talks, which had collapsed due to the intransigence of President Denktas’ (BBC News 2003). Top member of the CTP underlines that the embrace of the EU scope resulted in a profound modification of the rhetoric of the once socialist and eurosceptic CTP (Soyer interviewed by the author 2009). This is most indicative of the extended EU impact on the beliefs and expectations of TC political parties (for more discussion, see next section). CTP won the 2003 elections but failed short of a majority, which led to a two year -long coalition with the DP.

The second moderate party that entered the TC parliament in 2003 was the freshly formed Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH), which included candidates from the left Communal Liberation Party (TKP) as well as the newly founded United Cyprus Party (BKP). All those candidates came under the umbrella of solution and the EU (Akinci interviewed by the author 2009) and the party program drew legitimization from the EU membership potential. The founding declaration called for the support of an EU member united Cyprus, which would provide TCs with a series of benefits. Again, the ability of the party to form a capable team to negotiate in EU circles was highlighted:

*BDH has been formed [to make] possible for the pro-solution and pro-European Union forces to act together, win the elections and reach the objectives of peace and European Union with a pro-solution negotiating team (Cyprusive 2003b)*
Finally, the moderate camp also included the new Solution and EU Party (ÇABP), for which EU membership based on the Annan plan was the sole purpose of being (Halkin Sesi 2003, Erel interviewed by the author 2009). Indeed, after failing to reach the parliament, the party ceased to exist.

For the elections of 2005, the positions of the moderate parties did not change profoundly. CTP, that now secured the parliament’s majority, placed again solution and the EU at the very heart of its campaign. In addition, the party claimed that the gradually improving international image of the TCs was a result of the CTP policies and its actors, such as the then PM Mehmet Ali Talat (Sözen 2005, 467). BDH’s campaign also displayed a renewed commitment to solution and the EU (NTV 2005). Two more moderate political parties entered the battle for votes in 2005: firstly, TKP-BKP party coalition, which in 2003 went under the BDH lists, came back as a separate alliance and, secondly, the New Party (YP) (Vatan 2004). Both parties failed to reach the parliament but gave two competitors for the Presidential elections of 2005: TKP’s Hüseyin Angolemli and YP’s Nuri Çevikel, who both did rather poorly (Table 2). The ballot declared winner the PM Talat, who became the second President, on what he himself described as a TC ‘silent revolution’ (New York Times 2005). The victory of Talat marked the complete prevalence of the moderates in both the TC government and Presidency, which showcases the important EU effect on the domestic power distribution (for more discussion, see next section).

Game Over?⁵ : European Union and Political Parties in the Post-2006 Era
The day after the Annan Plan referenda and the EU accession of a divided Cyprus in 2004, Brussels were posed with a contradiction: despite being in favor of solution and EU membership, TCs were, practically, left outside the EU environment and its benefits. Although the entire island entered the EU, the EU law has not been administrated in the north Cyprus territories, which are considered to fall outside the effective control of the GC-led government of RoC (Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty), which represents the administration of the EU member state Cyprus. To address this situation, the EU has taken a series of initiatives that aim at the assistance of the TCs and the preparation for a future resolution and full TC integration into the EU. Political parties, and especially the governing ones, enjoy an important degree of participation in these activities. This adds to the polarization that exists between pro-EU moderates and Eurosceptic hard-liners and provides an additional channel of EU effect on the domestic mosaic (in addition to the EU integration prospects that continue to exist). Although the role of the EU in this era is not as profound as before 2006, the continuous TC disengagement with the EU appears to have a toll on the electoral power of the moderate parties.

Political Parties and the European Union-Turkish Cypriot Relations

European Commission has two main instruments to help its role in north Cyprus. The first is the Financial Aid Regulation (European Council 2006), which aims at development and preparation for application of the EU law. For the implementation of this Regulation, the Commission has frequent interaction with the TC administration that, during our research (2002-10), has been monopolized by the CTP government and President Talat. As a result, the governing moderates enjoyed greater interaction with the EU than the rest of political parties. Secondly, the Green Line Regulation (European Council 2005) has been set as a framework for the trade between TCs and GCs.
Interestingly, the engagement of the governing political elites in this EU activity is limited. As also indicated by high-ranked EU official (Anonymous interviewed by the author 2009), given the fact that the TC administration is not diplomatically recognized, the EU preferred to avoid any direct interaction with the TC authorities and delegated a significant deal of the Regulation’s responsibilities to the TC Chamber of Commerce (European Commission 2004), which does not bare strong correlations to the TC self-declared state.

The European Parliament (EP) is also involved in north Cyprus. In 2006, the ‘High Level Contact Group for the Relations with the TC Community in the Northern Part of Cyprus’ (hereinafter CYTR) was founded in order to ‘establish contact with the political representatives […] (and) elected representatives’ (CYTR 2009). CYTR has been paying frequent visits to the island, within which governing political elites have held a prominent role. President Talat, his advisor and Special Representative for relations with the EU and UN, Özdil Nami as well as the PM at that time Ferdi Sabit Soyer (all front-line members of the CTP) are some examples of the most frequently contacted actors (European Parliament 2007; 2007b 2008; 2008b, 2009, 2010). Nevertheless, the participation of other political parties has been, comparatively, weaker. Particularly the representation of hard-liners has been considerably limited, largely as a result of their eurosceptic stance (Anonymous c interviewed by the author 2009). This increased interaction of the moderate political parties with the EU offered them a series of advantages, which, ultimately, have increased their domestic power, despite the fact that this empowerment is not always translated to direct voting gains (more discussion in the next section).

*The Elections of 2009/2010*
In the most recent Legislative elections of 2009 and Presidential elections of 2010, the interrelated issues of EU and solution were again part of the political agenda and, consequently, affected the party competition (although not to the extend that they did in the pre-2006 era). In spring 2008, direct negotiations between GCs and TCs resumed. The issues of solution to the Cyprus problem and the EU integration were, again, connected, as the reunification of the island would mean the full integration of the TCs into the EU, as partners of the new federal state of Cyprus, which would replace the RoC in the structures of the EU. As a result, the EU played a role -yet, not as big as previously- in the context and outcome of the political competition. In the end, hard-liners were restored both in the government and Presidency (Table 1, 2).

The political parties’ positions with regards to the EU and solution did not change much. The UBP, that won the Legislative elections, supported a model of loose federation (Kathimerini 2009) and continued to be largely adhered to its hard-line politics, which were incompatible with the basis of the ongoing negotiations and the EU future of the TCs. The DP continued with a rather inflexible stance, often directly attacking the EU (Star Kibris 2009) and, finally, came third after the CTP. Lastly, the hard-line camp saw the emergence of the Politics for the People Party (HISP) which, devoted to the self-declared state and pessimistic with regards to the prospects of solution (Kibris 2008), did not manage to enter the TC parliament. In the Presidential elections of next year, UBP’s leader and PM at that time Dervis Eroğlu, won by a thin margin (Table 2).

On the moderate side, the CTP continued to be largely in favor of EU and solution (Yeni Duzen 2009) and achieved a runner-up position. Communal Democracy Party (TDP), which was the result of the BDH and TKP merge, followed a pro-solution stance along
with a continuous support of the EU and came fourth. The newly founded Freedom and Reform Party (ORP) was also in favor of the EU and a compromised solution while, at the same time, supported the self-declared TRNC and especially its greater international engagement (Sozcu 2008). The ORP was the fifth and last party to enter the parliament as the United Cyprus Party (BKP), defined by a deep pro-solution stance (Afrika 2009), failed to join the TC Legislature body. As far as the Presidential elections are concerned, Talat’s failure to keep the Presidency (Table 2) completed the short, but important, break of the moderates in the lead of the community. For this failure of the moderates, domestic matters, such as economic problems and corruption scandals (Capital gr. 2009) played a very important role. At the same time, the EU constituted an additional factor, as it appears that the continuous disengagement with the EU led the TC electorate to withdraw their support to the moderates, who continue to be more associated with Brussels (for more discussion see following session).

Unpacking the European Union Effect

After years of complete lack of domestic relevance, the EU has become a new point of reference for the TC political parties, presenting us with a very interesting case of Europeanization. To begin with, the EU has affected the TC political parties through the framing of their beliefs and expectations, which, mostly, refers to the context (patterns of party competition and party programs) of the party competition. Certain policies (support of a compromised solution) of political parties have been assisted by the EU, in a similar way to what has been documented in other examples of Europeanization. Besides, the EU has offered added substance to the programs of the moderate parties, which lacked a strong policy agenda, in contrast to the hard-line forces that, for years, monopolized the administration and developed a better knowledge about domestic
governance. This EU-generated provision of policy templates is not new for the Europeanization literature. Finally, examples of the extended EU effect on the profile of the political parties include the re-launch of the CTP or the establishment of the ÇABP, based on largely EU-inspired manifestos.

Europeanization of the TC political parties took also the form of change of domestic opportunity structures. Here, the effect is mostly related to the outcome of the political competition, that is, the elections results. By providing moderates with competitive policy suggestions, the EU increased their appeal in the electorate and affected the distribution of power among political parties. In the pre-2006 period, the ‘carrot’ of EU membership offered people the incentives to pursue resolution as the only way to safeguard their inclusion in the EU family, which would bring series of economical, social and political privileges that the community was lacking, due to the long-standing international non-recognition and isolation. As a result of this pro-solution/EU movement, the moderate parties were importantly empowered. The EU’s impact on the outcome of the party competition was also apparent in the post-2006 era (yet not as strong as before), but shaped power constellations in an opposite way. By the elections of 2009, the positive climate with regards to the EU had considerably decreased among the TCs: while in 2005, 71 per cent considered EU membership a good thing (European Commission 2005), in late 2008 this percentage had dropped to 53 (European Commission 2008c). The failure of the EU to match the TC hopes for ending their international isolation and for quick, first-hand benefits has been the main reason behind this TC change of attitude. Thus, although the failure of the CTP and Talat was also due to domestic matters, the loss of EU popularity among TCs appears to have played a role too, as reconfirmed by series of political elites (Circakli, Denktaş, Erçin and Nami, all interviewed by the author 2009) and by the overall decrease of electoral
performance of the moderate/EU camp (Figure 1). Consequently, moderate political parties, directly associated to the EU, are gradually depending on the latter's image in north Cyprus.

Besides, the degree of affiliation and interaction of the political parties with the EU also affected the domestic opportunity structures. Pre-2006, in contrast to the hard-liners that followed a rather defensive stance towards the EU, the moderate camp emphasized their EU fondness and knowledge and projected themselves as more suitable to negotiate the solution to the Cyprus problem and handle the EU matters, based on their greater expertise and their pro-solution views, which were more welcome internationally. Besides, Brussels, even before the outcome of the Annan Plan referenda, built some reluctant bridges with the moderate parties (NTV 2003, Euractiv 2004) and further assisted their image as respected international agents. Indeed, for the elections of 2005, the governing party CTP and its leader Talat successfully claimed that the improving international image of the TCs was a result of their party policies.

A difference of the post-2006 era is that, now, the EU has developed direct interaction with the TC political parties, which offers an additional canal for impact on domestic matters. Moderate political parties, and especially the governing CTP, have enjoyed greater interaction with the EU for two reasons: firstly, moderates, during the time of research, were at the head of the TC administration and, consequently, the dealings with the EU (Anonymous c interviewed by the author 2009). Secondly, the EU itself favors the moderate parties, by linking the success of its programs to the prevalence of pro-solution politics (European Commission 2008b). At the same time, members of the CYTR have testified that among their main goals has been the support of the moderates (Kibris 2006). The case of the DP is also indicative of the comparatively bigger role that
certain parties enjoy within the interaction with Brussels, due to their pro-EU profile: despite partner of a coalition government for considerable period of time (December 2003-September 2006), the party did not participate in the dealings with the EU, which, often boycotted. This greater interaction of moderates and the CTP with the EU gives the former a series of EU-related advantages. Firstly, due to the fact that the EU’s presence in the area is so recent, the CTP is the only actor at the helm of the administration to have managed the EU and international interaction. This has led to a deeper knowledge of the international matters which can be (and has been) capitalized in domestic politics. Furthermore, despite not always producing positive results in the electoral game, this greater engagement with the EU has advanced moderate political parties, which have become more relevant for the overall TC politics. Their leading role at the pro-EU/Annan Plan movement along with their increased electoral power provided them with the credentials of a group of highly respected and influential TC actors.

**Conclusion and the Difference of Being Turkish-Cypriot**

The study of the EU relevance for the TC political parties has provided rich empirical evidence for the domestic scene of the community in recent years, especially with regards to the process of EU integration and its role in the public debate. In addition, the TC example and its exceptional characteristics (i.e. the international non-recognition and isolation and the Cyprus problem) have added to the discussion on Europeanization and EU integration impact. To begin with the TC non-recognition, EU’s diplomatic stance to not recognize the TC administration has limited the engagement (and the related to it benefits) with the TC government (during our research timeframe, monopolized by the CTP). What is also interesting is that this restricted for the governing party access to EU-
associated benefits works in favor of other domestic actors, namely the civil society (Anonymous b interviewed by the author 2009), such as the TC Chamber of Commerce, who do not bear correlations to the self-declared TC state. Furthermore, as also indicated by high-ranked EU official (Anonymous interviewed by the author 2009), the EU programs are, often, compromised, due to the non-recognition of the TC authorities. In this context, this study has indicated that in similar examples of diplomatic relations, EU activities would be normally ‘slowed down’. All the same, the limited international recognition has also boosted the EU effect on political parties: firstly, the TC international isolation has increased the importance of EU integration, which equals to the begging of international existence, and has allowed for the EU to profoundly affect party competition in favor of pro-EU forces (pre-2006 era). Besides, the minor TC dealings with the international community have added to the significance of benefits, such as EU-generated informational advantages, which the moderate parties enjoy.

Besides, the linkage between EU integration prospects and the resolution of the Cyprus issue has allowed for a remarkable role of the EU both in the context and the outcome of party competition. Had not been for the connection between solution to the Cyprus problem and EU integration prospects for the TCs, the change triggered in the party scene would not have been that extended. The linkage between EU and an already dividing issue of the TC politics, which is the solution to the Cyprus problem, importantly altered the context and the outcome of the party competition, especially in the pre-2006 era, when the EU gave the moderate political parties the power to win for the first time in community’s history of almost thirty years. This testifies that, when attached to a domestically important issue, EU integration can drastically affect the party scene. Last but not least, the EU effect on the outcome of party competition, which has
been largely downplayed in the literature, has been a particularly interesting and additional insight offered by this study.

To conclude, TC political parties represent a different example of Europeanization. The EU effect on the TC political parties has been manifested through a change in the context and patterns of competition as well as a change in the outcome of this competition. The fact that the EU has become a reason for support (pre-2006) and condemnation (post-2006) of political parties is indicative of the steady influence that the EU has enjoyed in the TC party scene. The victory of Derviş Eroğlu in the Presidential elections of April 2010 marked the complete come-back of the hard-liners to the TC leadership. In this context, it is left to be seen how the EU relevance will be shaped in the forthcoming period. The ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus problem are staggering, making EU prospects for the TCs a not so clear reality and, thus, compromising the potential for the EU effect on the party scene, via anticipation of EU integration. At the same time, the position of the hard-liners at the TC government has led them to greater interaction with Brussels, which creates the conditions for potential change in their eurosceptic profile and a ‘hollow out’ of the pro-EU moderates/ eurospectic hard-liners division that exists so far. The years to come are expected to test the EU’s aptitude to affect the TC domestic mosaic as well as the precise way the EU relevance will shape the profile and competition of TC political parties.

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1 This article does not wish to engage in the debate over the legality of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the legitimacy of its governing institutions. For the sake of clarity, domestic institutions are referred to by their official name as used by the Turkish-Cypriots (e.g. President, Government etc). This should not be interpreted as a statement that the author engages in the discussion over the legality of the Turkish-Cypriot administration.

2 In addition to the ‘Green Line Regulation’ (European Council 2005), in place since 2004, the ‘Financial Aid Regulation’ (European Council 2006), the main EU instrument in the TC community, was
implemented in 2006, a year which also saw the beginning of more substantial relations between TCs and the European Parliament.

3 The leader of the moderate CTP, Mehmet Ali Talat, used the phrase ‘silent revolution’ to describe his victory in the Presidential elections of 2005.

4 Despite that, reunification was never fulfilled due to the GC rejection of the UN Plan.

5 ‘Game Over’ was UBP's campaign slogan for the Legislative elections of 2009.
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