Caselli, Francesco (2006) Power struggles and the natural resource curse. Francesco Caselli. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the natural-resource curse operates through the behavior of the political elite, yet there are few models that convincingly illustrate the mechanism at work. I present a model where natural-resource abundance generates power struggles, thereby increasing the effective discount rate of the governing group. As a result, the elite makes fewer investments in the long-run development of the country.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 the author |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Sets: | Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) Departments > Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 20 May 2008 13:34 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4926/ |
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