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Power struggles and the natural resource curse

Caselli, Francesco (2006) Power struggles and the natural resource curse. . Francesco Caselli.

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Empirical evidence suggests that the natural-resource curse operates through the behavior of the political elite, yet there are few models that convincingly illustrate the mechanism at work. I present a model where natural-resource abundance generates power struggles, thereby increasing the effective discount rate of the governing group. As a result, the elite makes fewer investments in the long-run development of the country.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 the author
Divisions: Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited: 20 May 2008 13:34
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 11:41

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