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Power struggles and the natural resource curse

Caselli, Francesco (2006) Power struggles and the natural resource curse. . Francesco Caselli.

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Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that the natural-resource curse operates through the behavior of the political elite, yet there are few models that convincingly illustrate the mechanism at work. I present a model where natural-resource abundance generates power struggles, thereby increasing the effective discount rate of the governing group. As a result, the elite makes fewer investments in the long-run development of the country.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2006 the author
Divisions: Centre for Economic Performance
Economics
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Departments > Economics
Date Deposited: 20 May 2008 13:34
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2019 00:03
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4926

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