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The role of information in different bargaining protocols

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and Nagel, Rosemarie (2013) The role of information in different bargaining protocols. Experimental Economics, 16 (1). pp. 88-113. ISSN 1386-4157

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s10683-012-9328-6


We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts "gains from trade" inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete information in the efficiency achieved by this new mechanism and by unconstrained negotiation. We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both bargaining parties are common knowledge. Instead, the newly proposed mechanism does best in a situation with incomplete information. The sources of inefficiencies in each of the two cases arise from the different strategic use of the available information.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2012 Economic Science Association
Divisions: Government
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Sets: Departments > Government
Date Deposited: 27 Feb 2013 16:54
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2020 04:54
Projects: ECO2008-01768
Funders: British Academy, Generalitat de Catalunya

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