Nationalism and social change

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NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE

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The *methodenstreit* seems never quite to end, though it is sustained by confusion as much as by serious methodological difference. A case in point is the contrast of universalizing to particularizing sciences. This may say something about the characteristic styles of work in, say, economics and history. The social sciences have indeed been given disproportionately to the search for transhistorical generalizations. Historians by contrast have focused on their particularities of time and place. But something has been lost in the dichotomy.

Can a basic question like what produced and distinguished the modern era be understood as either "nomothetic" or "idiographic"? It is a question about social changes so fundamental that they constitute new forms of understanding, existence and action. Yet the very notion of an epochal change seems lost in the two contrasting visions of science. Both social scientists and historians are apt, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, to say that such concerns should be relegated to "unscientific" philosophers of history, particularly those of an older German sort epitomized by Hegel. But perhaps the part of Hegel's work most helpful to us in this circumstance is not the grand historical synthesis but the dialectical assertion than quantitative changes can render qualitative breaks.

Marx followed Hegel's suggestion in arguing that many gradual historical changes cumulatively produced capitalism, a radically new social formation. A crucial moment in his analysis is the discussion in *Capital* of how concrete work--something which certainly existed before capitalism--came to be constituted as labor in a new and special sense when organized through the commodity form and capitalist production relations.[1] Old categories could no longer suffice for either practical action or scholarly understanding. In the present paper, I want to focus on another basic social change that turns on a crucial abstraction, one that helps to constitute some of the basic variables of social science, the nature of modern political communities, and deep

aspects of contemporary human identity: the idea of nation. Together with its correlated and cognate terms, this idea--or more precisely, the discursive formation of which it is a part--is crucial to the way in which we make sense of and thereby construct our social world. "Nation" is not a radically new term, but it takes on a radically new and basic significance in the modern era. And along with other such innovations it is central to what makes the modern epoch distinct.

In the first part of the paper I shall briefly review some general approaches to the phenomenon of social change, situating my specific concern for categorical transformations. With this in mind, I shall then suggest why the creation of national identity and the specifically modern discourse and politics of nationalism should figure as a prime instance of such a fundamental social change. Nationalism is important in itself, thus, but also a good example for looking at what it means to take seriously the constitutive role of a discursive formation.

Varieties of Social Change

Social change is ubiquitous. Although social scientists have often treated stability as normal, and significant social change as an exceptional process deserving special explanation, scholars now expect to see some continuous level of change in all social organizations. Sharp, discontinuous changes are of course rarer, but still a normal part of social life. As Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens suggest, therefore, we need to see human social life as always structured, but incompletely so.[2] "Structuration," to use their term, is as much a process of change as a reflection of stability. Indeed, the existence of stable social patterns over long periods of time requires at least as much explanation as does social change.

Cumulative social change must be distinguished from the universal, processual aspect of all social life. Both sociologists and historians study the latter by focusing attention on those dynamic processes through which the social lives of particular in-

dividuals and groups may change, even though overall patterns remain relatively constant. Marriages and divorces are thus major changes in social relationships, but a society may have a roughly constant marriage or divorce rate for long periods of time. Likewise, markets involve a continuous flow of changes in who holds money or goods, who stands in the position of creditor or debtor, who is unemployed or unemployed, etc. These specific changes, however, generally do not alter the nature of the markets themselves. Researchers both study the form of particular transactions, and develop models to describe the dynamics of large-scale statistical aggregations of such processes.

Sometimes, however, specific processes of social life undergo long term transformations. These transformations in the nature, organization or outcomes of the processes themselves are what is usually studied under the label 'social change'. A familiar example is the so-called "fertility transition." This generalization from the history of the world's richer and more industrialized economies suggests that advances in material standards of living can produce permanent changes in mortality and fertility. As first one and then the other falls (in those settings where the model fits) this radically changes the nature of family life, the impact of childbearing on women's careers, and the familiarity children are apt to have with death.

Human social history is given its shape by such cumulative social changes. Many of these are quite basic, like the creation of the modern state; others are more minor, like the invention and spread of the handshake as a form of greeting; most, like the development of team sports, fast food restaurants and the international academic conference lie in the broad area in between. Cumulative social changes may take place on a variety of different scales, thus, from the patterns of small group life through in-

stitutions like the business corporation or church to overall societal arrangements. Significant changes tend to have widespread repercussions, however, and so it is rare that one part of social life changes dramatically without changing others.

While some important changes are basically linear--like increasing population--others are discontinuous. There are two senses of discontinuity. The first is abruptness, like the dramatic shrinkage of the European population in the wake of the plague and other calamities of the 14th century, or the occurrence of the Russian revolution after centuries of Tsarist rule and failed revolts. Secondly, some social changes alter not just the values of variables, but their relationship to each other. Thus, for much of history the military power and wealth of a ruler was directly related to the number of his subjects; growing populations meant an increasing total product from which to extract tribute, taxes or military service. With the transformation first of agriculture and then of industrial production in the early capitalist era (or just before it), this relationship was in many cases upset. Increasingly from the 16th through 18th centuries, for example, the heads of Scottish clans found that a small population raising sheep could produce more wealth than a large one farming; their attempt to maximize this advantage helped to cause the migration of Scots to Ireland and America. This process was of course linked also to growing demand for wool and the development of industrial production of textiles. These in turn involved new divisions of social labor and increased long-distance trade. At the same time, the development of industrial production and related weapons technologies reduced the military advantages of large population size by contrast to epochs when wars were generally won by the largest armies; indeed, population may even come to be inversely related to power if it impedes industrialization.

Sociologists have generally taken three approaches to studying cumulative social changes. The first is to look for generalizable patterns in how all sorts of change occur. Sociologists may thus look for characteristic phases through which any social innovation must pass--e.g. skepticism, experimentation, early diffusion among leaders and later general acceptance. William Fielding Ogburn was a pioneer in this sort of research, examining topics like the characteristic "lag" between cultural innovations and widespread adjustments to them or exploitation of their potentials.[3] For example, when improved health care and nutrition make it possible for nearly all children to survive to adulthood, it takes a generation or two before parents stop having extremely large families as "insurance policies" to provide for their support in old age. Earlier researchers often hoped to find general laws explaining the duration of such lags and accounting for other features of all processes of social change. Contemporary sociologists tend to place much more emphasis on differences among various kinds of social change and their settings. Their generalizations are accordingly more specific. Researchers might limit their studies to the patterns of innovation among business organizations, for example, recognizing that these may act quite differently from others. Or they might ask questions like why do innovations gain acceptance more rapidly in formal organizations (like businesses) than in informal, primary groups (like families), or what sorts of organizations are more likely to innovate? The changes may be very specific--like the introduction of new technologies of production--or very general, like the industrial revolution as a whole.[4] The key distinguishing feature of all these sorts of studies is that they regard changes as individual units of roughly similar sorts and aim at generalizations about them.

The second major sociological approach to cumulative change has been to seek an explanation for the whole pattern of cumulation. This was long the province of philosophies of history culminating in the sweeping syntheses of the 19th century. The

most important contemporary efforts are based on evolutionary theories and attempt causal explanations. Gerhard Lenski, for example, has thus argued that increases in technological capacity (including information processing as well as material production, distribution, etc.) account for most of the major changes in human social organization. In his synthesis he arranges the major forms of human societies in a hierarchy based on their technological capacity and shows how other features such as their typical patterns of religion, law, government, class inequality, or relations between the sexes are rooted in these technological differences.[5] In support of the notion that there is an overall evolutionary pattern, Lenski points to the tendency of social change to move only in one direction. Thus there are many cases of agricultural states being transformed into industrial societies, but very few (if any) of the reverse.[6] Of course, Lenski acknowledges that human evolution is not completely irreversible; he notes, however, not only that cases of reversal are relatively few but that they commonly result from some external cataclysm. Similarly, Lenski indicates that the direction of human social evolution is not strictly dictated from the start, but only channeled in certain directions. There is room for human ingenuity to determine the shape of the future through a wide range of potential differences in invention and innovation. There are a number of other important versions of the evolutionary approach to cumulative social change. Some stress different material factors, such as human adaptation to ecological constraints; others stress culture and other patterns of thought more than material conditions.[7] Some versions of marxism have attempted a similar explanation of all historical social change in terms of a few key factors--notably improvement in the means of production and class struggle.[8] Other readings of Marx suggest that his mature theory is better understood as specific to capitalism.[9]

Adherents to the third major approach to cumulative social change argue that there can be no single evolutionary explanation for all the important transitions in human history. They also stress differences as well as analogies among the particular instances of specific sorts of change. These historians and historical sociologists place their emphasis on the importance of dealing adequately with particular changes by locating them in their historical and cultural context and distinguishing them through comparison.[10] Weber was an especially important pioneer of this approach. Historical sociologists have argued that a particular sort of transformation--like the development of a capacity for industrial production--may result from different causes and hold different implications on different occasions. The original industrial revolution in 18th and 19th century Britain, thus, developed with no advance model and without competition from any established industrial powers. Countries industrializing today are influenced by both models and competition from existing industrial countries (not to mention influences from multinational corporations). The development of the modern world system, thus, fundamentally altered the conditions of future social changes, making it misleading to lump together cases of early and late industrialization for generalization.[11]

Accident and disorder, moreover, have also played crucial roles in the development of the modern world system.[12] Wallerstein shows the centrality of historical conjunctures and contingencies--the partially fortuitous relationships between different sorts of events. For example, the outcome of military battles between Spain (an old-fashioned empire) and Britain (the key industrial-capitalist pioneer) were not foregone conclusions. There was room for bravery, weather, strategy and a variety of other factors to play a role. But certain key British victories (notably in the 16th century) helped to make not only British history but world history different by creating the conditions for the modern world system to take the shape it did. Against evolutionary ex-

planation, historical sociologists also argue that different factors explain different transformations. Thus, no amount of study of the factors that brought about the rise of capitalism and industrial production would provide the necessary insight into the decline of the Roman empire and the eventual development of feudalism in Europe, or into the consolidation of China's very different regions into the world's most enduring empire and most populous state. These different kinds of events have their own different sorts of causes.

Certain basic challenges are particularly important to the study of cumulative social change today. In addition to working out a satisfactory relationship among the three main approaches, perhaps the most important challenge is to distinguish those social changes which are basic from those which are more ephemeral or less momentous. Sociologists, like historians and other scholars, need to be able to characterize broad patterns of social arrangements. This is what we do when we speak of "modernity" or "industrial society." Such characterizations involve at least implicit theoretical claims as to what are the crucial factors distinguishing these eras or forms. In the case of complex, large scale societal processes, these are hard to pin down. How much industrial capacity does a society need to have before we call it "industrial;" how small must employment in its increasingly automated industries become before we call it "postindustrial?" Is current social and economic "globalization" the continuation of a long-standing trend, or part of a fundamental transformation? Though settling such questions is hard, debating them is crucial, for we are unable to get an adequate grasp on the historical contexts of the phenomena we study if we try to limit ourselves only to studying particulars or seeking generalizations from them without seeking to understand the differences among historical epochs (however hard to define sharply) and cultures (however much these may shade into each other with contact). Particularly because of the many current contentions that we stand on the edge of a new age--

"postmodern," "postindustrial" or something else--researchers and theorists need to give strong answers to the question of what it means to claim that one epoch ends and another begins.

Many of the most prominent social theorists have treated all of modernity as a continuous era and stressed its distinction from previous (or anticipated future) forms of social organization. Emile Durkheim argued that a new, more complex, division of labor was central to a dichotomous distinction of modern (organically solidary) from premodern (mechanically solidary) society.[13] Max Weber saw Western rationalization of action and relationships as basic, and as continuing without rupture through the whole modern era.[14] Karl Marx saw the transition from feudalism to capitalism as basic, but held that no change in modernity would be fundamental unless it overthrew the processes of private capital accumulation and the commodification of labor.[15] Recent marxists, thus, argue that the social and economic changes of the last several decades mark a new phase within capitalism, but not a break with it.[16] Many sociologists would add a claim about the centrality of increasing state power as a basic, continuous process of modernity.[17] More generally, Jurgen Habermas has stressed the split between a lifeworld in which everyday interactions are organized on the basis of mutual agreement, and an increasingly prominent systemic integration through the impersonal relationships of money and power outside the reach of linguistically mediated cooperative understanding.[18] Common to all these positions is the notion that there is a general *process* (not just a static set of attributes) common to all modernity. Some would also claim to discern a causal explanation; others only point to the trends, suggesting these may have several causes but no single 'prime mover' to explain an overall pattern of evolution. All would agree that no really basic social change can be said to

have occurred until the fundamental processes which they identify have ended, been reversed or changed their relationship to other variables. Obviously, a great deal depends on what processes are taken to be fundamental.

Rather than stressing the common processes organizing all modernity, some other scholars have pointed to the disjunctures between relatively stable periods. Michel Foucault for example, has emphasized basic transformations in the way knowledge was constituted and an order ascribed to the world of things, people and ideas.[19] Renaissance culture was characterized by an emphasis on resemblances among the manifold different elements of God's single, unified creation. Knowledge of fields as diverse (to our eyes) as biology, aesthetics, theology and astronomy was thought to be unified by the matching of similar characteristics, with those in each field serving as visible signs of counterparts in the others. The 'classical' modernity of the 17th and early 18th centuries marked a radical break by treating the sign as fundamentally distinct from the thing it signified--noting, for example, that words have only arbitrary relationships to the objects they name. The study of representation thus replaced that of resemblances. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, still another rupture came with the development of the modern ideas of classification according to hidden, underlying causes (rather than superficial resemblances) and an examination of human beings as the basic source of systems of representation. Only this last period could give rise to the 'human sciences';--psychology, sociology, etc.--as we know them. Similarly, Foucault argued that the modern individual was a form of person or self, produced by an intensification of disciplining power and surveillance.[20] Where most theories of social change emphasize processes, Foucault's "archaeology of knowledge" emphasizes the internal coherence of relatively stable cultural configurations and the ruptures between them.[21]

Foucault's work has recently been taken as support for the claim (which was not his ownat the modern era has ended. Theories of 'postmodernity' commonly argue that at some point the modern era gave way to a successor.[22] Generally, they hold that where modernity was rigid, linear and focused on universality, postmodernity is flexible, fluidly multidirectional and focused on difference. Some postmodernist theories emphasize the impact of new production technologies (especially computer assisted flexible automation), while others are more exclusively cultural. The label 'postmodernity' has often been applied rather casually to point to interesting features of the present period without clearly indicating why they should be taken as revealing a basic discontinuous shift between eras.

At stake in debates over the periodization of social change is not just the labeling of eras, but the analysis of what factors are most fundamentally constitutive of social organization. Should ecology and politics be seen as determinative over, equal to or derivative of the economy? Is either demography or technological capacity prior to the other? What gives capitalism, feudalism, a kinship system or any other social order its temporary and relative stability? Such questions must be approached not just in terms of manifest influence at any one point in time or during specific events, but also in terms of the way particular factors figure in long term processes of cumulative social change.

In different theories, a variety of societal transformations appear as definitive of epochs. Perhaps the most basic of all notions of epoch, however, is the idea of 'modernity' itself. This is not the place to consider all the different forms and theoretical contexts in which the notion of a modern era has been invoked. Rather, I shall illustrate my argument about how certain social changes force us to rethink our very theoretical categories by examining the distinctively modern discourse of national identity and nationalism.

THE DISCOURSE OF NATIONALISM

The idea of nation is basic to modern political and cultural discourse (whether or not evoked by that specific word). Claims to sovereignty, for example, are almost always grounded in reference to a putatively self-organizing and bounded nation--the collective "self" of terms like "self-determination". At the same time, a wide variety of social movements, state policies, and other forms of practical activity are labeled (and label themselves) "national" or "nationalist." Social scientists have studied various such instances of "nationalism" in search of general explanations. Tilly, for example, has looked at nationalism as a centrist, unificationist ideology associated with the building of consolidated states in various Western European countries.[23] Hechter has studied nationalist movements as separatist responses to unequal economic development on the part of those at the periphery of an integrated economy and state.[24] Greenfeld has seen nationalism as an ideology produced by the *ressentiment* of new elites against either older elites or other countries.[25] Though these and other studies often illuminate particular cases or aspects of nationalism, they do not cumulate in a general theory of nationalism (or a satisfactory placement of nationalism in the context of a general theory of something else). This is so, first and foremost, because such studies do not work with the same understanding of what nationalism is. Indeed, they cannot do so because at the level of concrete movements, policies, and conflicts, nationalism is not a single phenomenon amenable to a single explanation. By attempting to treat nationalism as a single phenomenon, rather than a cluster of heterogeneous phenomena linked mainly by discursive form, Tilly, Hechter and Greenfeld (along with many other scholars) are led to introduce a reductionism into their accounts, and to treat nationalism much more narrowly that the range of appearances it makes in the practical discourse of modern politics.

There are many diverse nationalisms; they are joined by "family resemblances" rather than united by a crucial explanatory variable--such as state-building, unequal economic development, or *ressentiment*. Specific explanations of each case must draw on at least partially different variables. What is general is the *discourse* of nationalism. This discourse is itself politically and socially influential by shaping the way in which an otherwise diverse array of movements, policies and conflicts are understood. It does not explain any specific such activity or event, but it helps to constitute each through cultural framing.

Nationalism, is not simply an attribute of discourse, it is productive of discourse (and thereby of knowledge, imagination and social action--all of which are in turn shaped by the discursive conditions of their production). In this sense, it is what Foucault called a "discursive formation."[26] Nationalist discourse is generative. Its characteristic ideas--of nation, of obligation to one's nation, that nations are indivisible, that individuals belong directly and unequivocably to nations, that the world is divided into nations--are not simply stable descriptions of material or cultural conditions but ways of thinking that are essentially contested, that provoke actions and struggles and more and more discourse.[27] When we speak of nationalism, thus, we speak both of a manner of making and understanding claims to identity and sovereignty or other political rights and of a way of thinking that keeps such claims recurrently problematic. The continuing prominence of nationalist discourse is partly produced by other factors including material and geopolitical conditions that make nationalist agitation and movements seem to some actors to be in their interests. But the discourse cannot be explained solely by such external factors. It has an internal logic and set of tensions that is itself productive of more discourse.

It is not possible to specify neatly the boundaries within which this rhetoric is in use and beyond which it is not. It is common, for example, for nationalist claims to be brought forward on behalf of populations putatively possessing the size and capacity to be self-sustaining, but we cannot rule out *a priori* the use of the rhetoric by populations that do not make such a claim (and still less determine objectively which populations are indeed potentially "self-sustaining" and exclude others from study). The discourse of nationalism has been employed by movements for ethnic secession, both popular and top-down mobilizations linked to state-building, resistance to colonialism, hostility to immigrants, etc.--each reflecting a different mix of underlying factors and specific local conditions, each influenced by previous examples of its kind and previous use of the discourse. The specific movements and activities in which the discourse of nationalism is used are shaped by many heterogeneous factors besides that discourse.

The rhetoric of nationalism has several characteristic tropes: claims to sovereignty and/or governmental legitimacy in the name of the people of a nation; claims that the people have arisen *en masse*; claims that the unity of a people is due to their perduring common culture; claims that the individuals of a population cannot realize their personal freedom unless the population is "free" in the sense of political self-determination; demands that the members of a putative nation adhere to some common standard of behavior; demands that a posited nation be treated as an equal to all others. None of these characteristic tropes is decisive as a criterion of definition.[28]

By the same token it is not particularly relevant to the present argument to try to adjudicate claims as to whether nationalism originated in the tensions that led to the English Civil War,[29] in Latin American independence movements,[30] in the French Revolution,[31] or in German reaction and Romanticism.[32] It suffices to indicate that by the end of the 18th century the discursive formation was fully in play; how much sooner this was so is subject to dispute, though before the modern era there was no point

where most of these dimensions were simultaneously important. Each dimension of course has an older history of its own; indeed, the very term nation and many notions of national identity have histories before their use was reshaped by situation in the modern discourse of nationalism. And of course, some specific nations have histories before the discourse of nationalism.[33]

NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND HISTORY

Claims to nationhood often invoke presumptions of pre-existing national identity. The members of the nation, it is asserted, are one people by virtue of race, common culture or shared social institutions. Even the so-called "political" nationalism identified stereotypically with France rests in part on a substratum of such "ethnic" claims, however attenuated and qualified. Such claims are implicitly essentialist and always problematic. The difficulty lies not in acknowledging some manner of "ethnic" interconnections, but in establishing why any particular definitions and boundaries of these should be seen as stable and primary.

Constructed Primordiality

Hobsbawm and Ranger have argued that because the "traditions" of nationalism are "invented" they are somehow less real and valid.[34] It is not clear why this should be so. Hobsbawm and Ranger seem to accept the notion that long-standing, "primordial" tradition would somehow count as legitimate, and then assert by contrast that various nationalist traditions are of recent and perhaps manipulative creation. This seems doubly fallacious. First, all traditions are "created"; none are truly primordial.[35] All such creations also are potentially contested and subject to continual reshaping, whether explicit or hidden. What gives tradition (or culture generally) its force is not its antiquity but its immediacy and givenness. Various concrete ideas of nation, thus,

seem very real as aspects of lived experience and bases for action. They are taken as unconscious presuppositions by people when they consciously consider the options open to them.[36] Other claims about nationality, by contrast, may fail to persuade because they are too manifestly manipulated by creators, or because the myth that is being proffered does not speak to the circumstances and practical commitments of the people in question. It is impossible to differentiate among even the post-colonial African states on which Hobsbawm and Ranger focus by showing some to be created and others not, but it is indeed possible to show that some have proved more persuasive than others and more capable of becoming a part of citizens' immediate basis for action and their unquestioned (or hard to question) transmission of culture. Conversely, however, when circumstances and practical projects change, even seemingly settled traditions are subject to disruption and alternation. Thus Indian nationalists from the 19th century through Nehru were able to make a meaningful (though hardly seamless or uncontested) unity of the welter of sub-continental identities as part of their struggle against the British. The departure of the British from India changed the meaning of Congress nationalism, however, as this became the program of an Indian state, not of those outside official politics who resisted an alien regime. Among other effects of this, a rhetorical space was opened up for "communal" and other sectional claims that were less readily brought forward in the colonial period.[37] The opposition between primordiality and "mere invention" leaves open a very wide range of historicities within which national and other traditions can exert real force.

Perhaps more basically, the notion of nation commonly involves the claim that some specific ethnic identity should be a "trump" over all other forms of identity, including those of community, family, class, political preference, and alternative ethnic allegiances.[38] Such claims are made not just by nationalists and others engaged in ethnic politics, but implicitly by a whole range of common usages in Western social

science--for our intellectual heritage has been shaped by nationalist ideology and the experience of nation-building. Thus we habitually refer to ethnic groups, races, tribes, and languages as though they were objective units, only occasionally recalling to ourselves the ambiguity of their definitions, the porousness of their boundaries, and the situational dependency of their use in practice. The point is not that such categorical identities are not real, any more than that nations are not real; it is, rather, that they are not fixed but both fluid and manipulable. Cultural and physical differences exist, but their discreteness, their identification, and their invocation are all variable. Even more, the relationship of such cultural and physical differences to social groups is complex and problematic. Ethnic identity is constituted, maintained and invoked in social processes that involve diverse intentions, constructions of meaning, and conflicts.[39] Not only are there claims from competing possible collective allegiances, there are competing claims as to just what any particular ethnic or other identity means. In short, the various similarities and solidarities termed "ethnic" may well predispose people to nationalist claims, and may even predispose others to recognize those claims. But it is difficult to see ethnicity as a "substance" which directly gives rise to and explains nationality or nationalism.

The attraction of a claimed ethnic foundation to nations lies largely in the implication that nationhood is in some sense primordial and natural. Nationalists typically claim that their nations are simply given and immutable rather than constructions of recent historical action or tendentious contemporary claims. Much early scholarly writing on nations and nationalism shared in this view and sought to discover which were the "true" ethnic foundations of nationhood.[40] As ideology, the claim is no doubt effective that a nation has existed since time immemorial or that its traditions have been passed down in tact from heroic founders. Sociologically, however, what matters is not the antiquity of the contents of tradition, but the efficacy of the process by which

tradition constitutes certain beliefs and understandings as unquestioned, immediate knowledge. It is best to focus not simply on the stuff of tradition, its relatively fixed contents, but on the reproduction of culture, the process of passing on that is the literal meaning of tradition.[41] Ethnicity or cultural traditions are bases for nationalism because they effectively constitute historical memory, because they inculcate it as "prejudice," not because the historical origins they claim are accurate.[42] The translation of ethnicity into nationalism is partly a matter of converting the cultural traditions of everyday life into more specific historical claims. This is true not just of the contents of tradition, as folklore gives way simultaneously to "scientific history" and national myth, but of the very medium. The historicizing approach to language of the early modern era was such a reconstitution of an aspect of the everyday cultural means of social life as part of a historical/ethnic claim to nationhood.

History and the Discourse of Nationalism

Particularly in Germany, language was given a central status from Fichte and Herder on.[43] In stressing the "originality" of the German language and the "truly primal" nature of the German character, Fichte, for example, claimed a supra-historical status for German nationality.[44] Historically formed national characters were inferior, he argued, to the true metaphysical national spirits which were based on something more primal than common historical experience. This does not mean that Fichte and others of similar orientation saw glory only in the past. On the contrary, they envisaged a dramatic break with many aspects of the past and a national self-realization in what Fichte called a new history. The old history was not one properly self-made, not the product of the self-conscious action of the nation as historical actor. This conception was distinctively a product of the Enlightenment and especially the French Revolution. As Steiner has put it:

> In ways which no preceding historical phenomenon had accomplished, the French Revolution mobilized historicity itself, seeing itself as historical, as transformative of the basic conditions of human possibility, as invasive of the individual person.[45]

This new idea of historical action was carried forward vitally in nationalism, and in many cases coupled with a distinctive notion of national destiny, a new teleology of history. Such conceptions were not limited (as stereotype sometimes suggests) to German "ethnic" nationalism. Think of France's *mission civilatrix* and ideas of "manifest destiny" and being "a city on a hill" in United States history.

Nationalism has a complex relationship to history. On the one hand, nationalism commonly encourages the production of historical accounts of the nation. Indeed, the modern discipline of history is very deeply shaped by the tradition of producing national histories designed to give readers and students a sense of their collective identity. On the other hand, however, nationalists are prone, at the very least, to the production of Whig histories, favorable accounts of "how we came to be who we are." A nationalist history, like Nehru's *The Discovery of India*, is a construction of the nation.[46] The point is not just that such a history is not neutral. By its nature, nationalist historiography--that which tells the story of the nation, whether or not it is overtly bellicose or ethnocentric--embeds actors and events as moments in the history of the nation whether or not they had any conception of that nation. *The Discovery of India* not only transforms both Dravidians and Mughals into Indians, it gives them narrative significance as actors constructing and reconstructing a common and putatively perduring phenomenon, India. Both victors and vanquished in dynastic wars and invasions become part of the story of India.[47]

The same process is at work in the narratives of Western national histories. The very "War between the States" helps to constitute a common American history for descendants of those killed on both sides of that bloody conflict (as well as for Americans whose ancestors arrived later or kept their distance). This is one reason why the theme of fratricide is so prominent in narratives of the war. That brother fought brother helps to establish that both sides were really members of one family.[48] In perhaps the most famous essay ever written on nationalism, Ernst Renan grasped the importance of the tensions masked in nationalist invocations of history:

> Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality.[49]

The "brutality" Renan has in mind is exemplified by the massacres of Protestants and putative heretics by Catholics in France, but the cultural or symbolic violence involved in forging unity could also be brutal.[50] The eradication of once quasi-autonomous cultures, or their reduction to mere regional dialects or local customs is continually echoed in the subordination of once vital (and perhaps still important) differences in the construction of national histories. Anderson summarizes one English version:

> English history textbooks offer the diverting spectacle of a great Founding Father whom every schoolchild is taught to call William the Conqueror. The same child is not informed that William spoke no English, indeed could not have done so, since the English language did not exist in his epoch; nor is he or

she told 'Conqueror of what?'. For the only intelligible modern answer would have to be 'Conqueror of the English,' which would turn the old Norman predator into a more successful precursor of Napoleon and Hitler.[51]

Ironically, the writing of linear historical narratives of national development and the claim to primordial national identity often proceed hand in hand. Indeed, the writing of national historical narratives is so embedded in the discourse of nationalism that it almost always depends rhetorically on the presumption of some kind of pre-existing national identity in order to give the story a beginning. Atlantic crossings thus make Englishmen into Americans whether or not they ever thought themselves part of an autonomous American nation. A claim to primordial national identity is, in fact, a version of nationalist historical narrative. The common contrast between France and Germany, thus, is between two different styles of invoking history and ethnicity, not radically between non-ethnic and ethnic claims. French schoolchildren learn that their commonality is not merely ethnic but achieved in the collective action of the Revolution. Yet they learn also to claim as French a history stretching back a thousand years before that revolution, for French unity was forged by military conquest and administrative centralization before the Revolution consecrated the product as the nation. French nationalist historians help the school children forget that events like the massacre of Huguenots known as Saint-Barthelemy helped unify France even while they claim them as moments in French history. German nationalist historians put forward stronger claims for the primacy of common culture and ethnicity partly because their narratives must help schoolchildren "forget" that Germans spent most of their history as members of separate polities (often combative and not all very uniform culturally), even while they celebrate the roles of Bismark and others in unifying Germany.

Invoking national history and primordial ethnicity are both ways of responding to problems in contemporary claims to nationhood. Indian nationalists, for example, were faced not only with the material problem of British colonial rule, which backed with force its denial of Indian claims to nationhood. They were faced also with difficulties in casting as a singular nation the manifest diversity of groups (including polities) on the subcontinent. Yet this is what the discourse of nationalism demanded of them. As we have seen, Nehru's *The Discovery of India* is a paradigmatic use of history-writing to respond to these challenges. Nehru sought to show that India was one country against the British suggestion that without the alien Raj disunity and conflict would reign amongst its many contending peoples. Yet at almost the same time, other Indian nationalists responded to the same challenges with accounts that placed a greater stress on ethnicity. They sought to show that the unitary country, India, was essentially Hindu, not Muslim (and thus among other things constituted "indigenously" rather than by previous imperial invasions). Ghandi's Hindu nationalist opponent, Savarkar thus was also influenced by the demands of nationalist discourse when he felt compelled to argue that "verily the Hindus as a people differ most markedly from any other people in the world than they differ amongst themselves. All tests whatsoever of a common country, race, religion, and language that go to entitle a people to form a nation, entitle the Hindus with greater emphasis to that claim."[52]

"Ethnic" and "Political" Claims to Citizenship

In eighteenth-century Europe and especially France, it was perhaps easier to be both cosmopolitan and nationalist, not seeing the problems that competing claims to national identity or sovereignty would pose.[53] The Enlightenment had been quintessentially cosmopolitan in intellectual orientation; multilinguality had been one of the

hallmarks of the scholar and of that novel creation, the intellectual. The cosmopolitan ideal of being a citizen of the world was not simply opposed to nationalism, however, but helped to give rise to it.[54] The abstraction 'nation' gave specific form and shape to such citizenship. Nationalism was a claim of "peoples" as against dynasties, and hence not only of the domestic against the foreign but of citizens against illegitimate rulers. The cosmopolitan ideal came to be enshrined in a notion of nation as polity--a paradigmatically French notion--and to be challenged by those who like Fichte wished to conceptualize the nation in terms of ethnicity, primordial culture or race.[55] The latter sort of claim became especially common where the comparisons or competitions among putative nations were at issue, rather than between nations and dynastic rulers.

With the spreading critique of absolute monarchy and the rise of republican ideology, concern for the definition of the political community grew rapidly. The citizen of the world had also to be a citizen of someplace in particular. This was a continuing focus of social contract theory, and with Rousseau a much stronger notion of community was added to arguments about the choices of free individuals. Rousseau was also deeply interested in the origins and impact of language as the basis for that community, and an advocate (in *Emile*) of better teaching of the 'natural' language. In general, however, late eighteenth-century France did not focus the attention on language that became characteristic of Germany. There was growing demand for the use of vernacular French (instead of Latin and Greek), and some push towards linguistic standardization (though as Weber has shown this process was far from complete in the mid-nineteenth century).[56] But the French did not rush to equate French nationality with speaking French. Not only did various local dialects remain strong, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century College de France did not even have a professorship of French language.[57]

In Germany, by contrast, language and other ethnic criteria gained enormous importance in the definition of German nationality and the struggle for unification. Where Rousseau had sought the process by which natural autonomy was transmuted into national societies and subjected to corrupting sovereignty, the German Romantics (more influenced by Rousseau's more communitarian side) argued that every person belonged by nature to a nation. Despite political fragmentation, the German language was spoken with more commonality throughout the German states than was French in politically centralized France. In the writings of scholars like Herder, Schliermacher, and Fichte, language was described as the distinctive expression of a particular form of life, developed by it to enable its unique experience and contribution to history. Original, primitive languages were superior, thus, to composite, derived languages because they directly reflected the spirit of the people who spoke them. Borrowings were corruptions. Language, thus, was the key test of the existence of a nation.[58] It was joined, moreover, with ideas of race, culture and in general ethnicity to signal that the nation was primordial and membership in it immutable.

The contrast between France and Germany has been enduring, and has resulted in very different understandings of citizenship. France has been much more willing, for example, to use legal mechanisms to grant immigrants French citizenship, while Germany--equally open to immigration in numerical terms--generally refuses its immigrants German citizenship unless they are already ethnic Germans.[59] We should not take the contrast too far, however, for as Smith has remarked, "all nations bear the impress of both territorial and ethnic principles and components, and represent an uneasy confluence of a more recent 'civic' and a more ancient 'genealogical' model of social cultural organization."[60] The definition of nation, in other words, is subject to contest

and struggle. The ethnic conception of *la patrie* stood behind much of the attack on Dreyfus; Maurras sought to define a true French nation free of Jews, Protestants, Freemasons and other foreigners.[61] Aspects of this heritage remain important in contemporary debates over immigration.[62]

Most prominent twentieth-century analysts of nationalism have sought to challenge accounts of nationalism emphasizing ethnicity. Kohn and Seton-Watson have stressed the crucial role of modern politics, especially the idea of sovereignty.[63] Hayes has argued for seeing nationalism as a sort of religion.[64] Kedourie has debunked nationalism by showing the untenability of the German Romantic claims.[65] More recently, Gellner has placed emphasis on the number of cases of failed or absent nationalisms: ethnic groups which mounted either little or no attempt to become nations in the modern senses.[66] This suggests that even if ethnicity plays a role it cannot be a sufficient explanation (though one imagines the nineteenth-century German Romantics would simply reply that there are strong, historic nations and weak ones destined to fade from the historic stage). Hobsbawm has largely treated nationalism as a kind of second-order political movement based on a false consciousness which ethnicity helps to produce but cannot explain because the deeper roots lie in political economy not culture.[67] In their different ways, all these thinkers have sought to debunk the common claims of nationalists themselves make to long-established ethnic identities. They have also sought to challenge the notion that nationalism can be *explained* by pre-existing ethnicity. Most have wished to substitute an alternative master variable.

Against this backdrop, Anthony Smith has tried to show that nationalism has stronger roots in premodern ethnicity than others have accepted.[68] He acknowledges that nations cannot be seen as primordial or natural, but nonetheless argues that they are rooted in relatively ancient histories and in perduring ethnic consciousnesses. Smith argues that the origins of modern nationalism lie in the successful bureaucratiza-

tion of aristocratic *ethnie*, which were able to transform themselves into genuine nations only in the West. In the West, territorial centralization and consolidation went hand in hand with a growing cultural standardization.

Nations, Smith thus suggests, are long-term processes, continually re-enacted and reconstructed; they require ethnic cores, homelands, heroes and golden ages if they are to survive. "Modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments."[69]

The ethnic similarities and bonds that contribute to the formation of nations may certainly be important and long standing, but they do not fully constitute either particular nations or the modern idea of nation. This is what the many critics of ethnicist explanations of nationalism mean by asserting that nations are created by nationalism, not merely passively present and awaiting the contingent address of nationalists.[70] It is not, however, feasible to dispense altogether with discussion of ethnicity in attempting to understand nationalism. This is because the discourse of nationalism itself seems to depend on claims to pre-established peoplehood. "Ethnic" and "historical" versions of these claims figure more comparably in this discourse than their common opposition suggests. An emphasis on pre-existing ethnicity, however, is unable to shed much light on why so many modern movements, policies, ideologies and conflicts are constituted within the discourse of nationalism. Indeed, as Gellner has suggested, the very self-recognition of ethnicities or cultures as defining identities is distinctively modern.[71] Nationalist discourse is needed to invoke (and evoke) ethnicity in such a way. To understand the modernity of nationalist discourse, we need to turn to four of its other dimensions. While none of these explains the discourse, each of them is crucial to its operation and to its distinctive historical occurrence.

THE CONTINUED PRODUCTION OF NATIONALISMS

Since the era of World War I, social scientists and political analysts have recurrently suggested that nationalism was at an end. In 1945, for example, E.H. Carr entitled his otherwise useful little book on the subject, *Nationalism and After*.[72] But nationalism has not vanished; it is not a throwback to some earlier era; modernity will not free us from nationalism because it is a vital part of what we know as the modern era. This is not simply a matter of definition or of temporal association. Several other core dimensions of modernity help to support and occasion nationalism. None of these factors "explains" nationalism, but each is part of the explanation of its continued reproduction and salience.

The first is the centrality of states. This is a matter both of the domestic capacity of states, which has grown throughout the modern era, and of the division and ordering of the world into a system of states. States have produced greater national integration through administrative centralization, the building of transport and communications infrastructures, the standardization of educational institutions and to some extent language. At the same time, the old pattern of frontiers between empires and monarchs has given way to sharply drawn borders. Just as state power no longer declines as a function of distance from court or capital, so interstate conflicts are no longer fought primarily on less populated perimeters.

In the mid-19th century "springtime of peoples," it was widely thought that some eventual sound and stable alignment of nations with states was possible, that eventually each true people would have its state and each state its proper people.[73] The still-contemporary rhetoric of self-determination continues to reflect this faith. But the experience of the last hundred years suggests that while democratic choices about political regimes may be as desirable as ever, there are not always easy answers as to the ap-

propriate boundaries of the political communities within which such democratic choices are to be made. Nonetheless, nationalism discourse has been established as the primary for questions of sovereignty.

It is occasionally suggested that the era of the nation-state is passing. Multinational corporations, global trade, internationalization of culture and media are all offered as both evidence and causes. These are important phenomena, but we ought to be cautious both about seeing them as radically novel and about predicting the end of the state and with it nationalism. The reach of trade and capitalist economic institutions had been expanding throughout the modern era; this is not something new to the present age or a harbinger of postmodernity. Similarly, while it is plausible to argue that the "nationalization" of culture was distinctively new to modernity (replacing, for example, the international culture of latin Christendom), it is also true that innovations from the printing press to the cinema helping bring internationalization of culture long before television. Looking only at Europe, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Modernism were all products of an international culture. So was nationalism. And colonization set in motion internationalization of culture including the use of the international discourse of nationalism long before the postcolonial diasporas and recent trends in cultural production.

At the same time, against the implication that increasing international organization will diminish nationalism by undermining state power we need to recall that nationalist discourse arises largely from the ambiguous fit of nations to states and from the tensions among states that are occasioned largely by international economic and other activity. The rhetoric of nationalism often becomes most important precisely where people feel weak--or feel their state to be weak--in relation to international forces.

The other side of state power and the world system of states, thus, is interstate conflict. In part, precisely because the world is organized into a system of states with sharp boundaries, a wide variety of local aspirations are apt to be couched in the rhetoric of nationalism, to be constructed as nationalisms. The very image of the world as a map with demarcated and differently colored countries encourages everyone to locate themselves in nationalist terms. If the unit on the map does not correspond well to various identities, practical projects or desires, the image of the map becomes an image of bondage and the world's refusal of proper recognition. In other cases--like that of much popular Arab (and less clearly Islamic) sentiment--the lines on the map appear as so many arbitrary divisions imposed by imperialists and domestic elites on a people who ought to be unified.

European imperialism is a basic historical factor behind much of the problematic fit of state boundaries. It is crucial, however, to realize both that the problematic heritage of colonialism is not just unwisely drawn boundaries but the very idea of the nation-state that necessitates those boundaries.[74] There is not necessarily any "right" answer to the question of where such boundaries should go. Moreover, what creates nationalist conflicts is not just old boundary troubles any more than it is simply old ethnic identities. It is the new opportunities for recognition opened by the international world system (and expanded recurrently--as for example in recent years by the ways in which the rest of the world tried to deal with the collapse of communist power). It is also, as noted above, the continued expansion of global, interstate and cross-cultural capitalism. Not least of all, it is also the problems left behind by each previous conflict and attempted resolution, creating new tensions in a dialectic without any apparent teleological conclusion. Moreover, war itself is not just a too common result of nationalism, but a force productive of more. Armies are now commonly

raised and indoctrinated as bodies of citizens. Wars--especially civil wars--are often fought on people's homelands, mobilizing the attachments of everyday life for purposes of immediate collective survival.

States, wars and capitalism offer powerful practical reasons for the continued production of nationalisms. But of course these practical reasons are not the whole story. I said at the outset that the ideas of nation and national identity were among the abstractions both characteristic and constitutive of the modern era. But the discourse of nationalism is also linked to and supported by other characteristic abstractions. Perhaps the most important travel under the label individualism.

The discourse of nationalism is doubly linked to that of individualism. First, nations are represented as super-individuals. They are understood quite literally as indivisible and in a range of metaphors as having a personality of their own, a holistic character, an integral being. However paradoxical it has seemed to later analysts, Rousseau captures something basic to the discourse of nationalism in asserting simultaneously the indivisibility of the individual person and of the whole community, and in claiming the possibility of an immediate relationship between the two. Fichte too advanced individualism and nationalism simultaneously with his notion of self-recognition, the idea that identity is available to nations and individuals who see themselves as though in a mirror and exclaim, "I am I."[75]

In other words, just as individuals exist in and of themselves, in the main modern Western view, so too nations are self-sufficient, self-contained and self-moving. The reality of international embeddedness and interdependence tends thus always to be suppressed by nationalist rhetoric.

As Anderson has indicated, the unitary conception of the nation involves a special sense of time as the history through which the nation passes.[76] This renders the nation a perduring and singular being rather than one with a differentiable internal history. Marx's contemporary, Friedrich List, "pronounced nations to be 'eternal,' to constitute a unity both in space and time."[77] Yet List also thought that modern nations made themselves--a kind of collective *bildungsprozess* that produces true individuality out of heterogeneous constituents and influences.

To be a "historical nation," in Fichte's phrase, was to succeed in this process of individuation and to achieve a distinctive character, mission and destiny. Other nations lacked sufficient vigor or national character; they were destined to be failures and consigned to the backwaters of history. Not surprisingly, this is typically how dominant or majority populations thought of minorities and others subordinated within their dominions. This showed another side to the Springtime of Peoples. It was the period when France took on its *mission civilatrice*, Germany found its historical destiny and Poles crystallized their Romantic conception of the martyr-nation.[78] Each nation had a distinct experience and character, something special to offer the world and something special to express for itself. "Nations are individualities with particular talents and the possibilities of exploiting those talents."[79]

Individualism is important not just metaphorically, but as the basis for the central notion that individuals are directly members of the nation, that it marks each of them as an intrinsic identity and they commune with it immediately and as a whole. In the discourse of nationalism, one is simply Chinese, French or Eritrean. The individual does not require the mediations of family, community, region, or class to be a member of the nation. Nationality is understood precisely as an attribute of the individual, not of the intermediate associations. This way of thinking reinforces the idea of nationality as a sort of trump card in the game of identity. While it does not preclude other self-

understandings, within most nationalist ideologies it is held to override them at least in times of national crisis and need. In Foucault's sense, therefore, nationality is understood as inscribed in the very body of the modern individual.[80] A person without a country must therefore be understood to lack not only a place in the external world but a proper self.[81]

The discourse of nationalism not only encourages seeing identity as inscribed in and coterminous with the individual body; it also encourages seeing individuals as linked through their membership in sets of equivalents--classes, races, genders, etc.--rather than their participation in interpersonal relationships.[82] It promotes categorical identities over relational ones. This is partly because nationalist discourse addresses large-scale collectivities in which most people could not conceivably enter into face-to-face relationships with most others. The increasing reliance on categorical identities manifest in nationalism reverses, at least to some extent, the weight of competing loyalties from the premodern era (and those contemporary settings where social integration is accomplished more through directly interpersonal relationships). National identity, thus, in its main Western ideological form, is precisely the opposite of the reckoning of identity and loyalty outward from the family. Where the segmentary lineage system suggests "I against my brothers; I and my brothers against my cousins; I, my brothers and my cousins against the world," the discourse of nationalism suggests that membership in the category of the whole nation is prior to, more basic than any such web of relationships.[83] This suggests also a different notion of moral commitment from previous modes of understanding existence. The discourse of nationalism offers the chilling potential for children to inform on their parents' infractions against the nation precisely because each individual is understood to derive his or her identity in such

direct and basic ways from membership in the nation. This is sharply different from the discourse of kinship and the ideology of honor of the lineage. There children derive their membership in the whole only through their relationships to their parents.

Nations are represented primarily as categories of similar individuals, not networks of connections among differentiated persons. This is a crucial basis for using appeals to nationalism to separate people who are in fact linked by kinship, friendship, community, economic interdependence, language and other bonds--as for example, tragically, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is also the source of a conformist pressure with nations, the basis for applying certain authoritative definitions of national identity as trump cards against appeals to sub-national or cross cutting identities--gender, class, ethnicity, etc.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism, I have argued, is one of the most important examples of a specific and basic kind of social change. This is the creation of new historical epochs through the transformation of the categories that constitute social and cultural reality. The conditions of action, the relationship among other aspects of existence, the meaning of longstanding ideas are all altered by such transformations.

Such epochal transformations are rare. While categories of understand change constantly--if usually not terribly rapidly--not every such category is equally deeply constitutive of our understanding. Some abstractions, in other words, can reasonably be seen as mere tools. They are used in the pursuit of various practical projects but their use does not either greatly alter the world or generate the indefinite production of new discourse and action. Abstractions of this sort can be addressed more easily by historians and social scientists because they lend themselves to clear descriptions and operational definitions. Not so nationalism, because it too basically constitutes the very terms of our academic discourse. Do we write of Spanish history? Does it include

Basque and Catalan and Castillian history? Is Navarre part of the Basque story or the Spanish story or one unto itself? It is all but impossible to find a point of view outside the discourse and the debate from which to offer neutral definition.

We could trace philological roots back indefinitely for the term "nation" and its cognates. But though this might be salutary and might give a reassuring sense of historical continuity, it could also be misleading. For one of the most important things to realize about nationalism is the way in which it is embedded in and constitutive of modernity. Only by recognizing the deep significance of certain such categories of understanding can we make clear what we mean by notions like modernity. We bandy them about rather casually, but taking historical social change seriously means taking seriously the difference between superficial and basic, epoch-making social changes. This will also allow us to give more serious answers than usual to questions like whether we have passed from the modern epoch into some new era of postmodernity.

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1. See Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor and Social Domination* (New York, 1993) for a helpful discussion of this aspect of Marx's work.

2. P. Bourdieu, *Le Sens Pratique* (Paris, 1980); A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley, 1986).

3. W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change with respect to Culture and Original Nature* (New York, 1950 [orig. 1922]).

4. N. J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).

5. G. Lenski, J. Lenski and P. Nolan, *Human Societies* (New York, 1990).

6. One might argue that Chinese society has alternated periods of increasing industrialization and commercialization (*fengjian*) with eras in which agriculture and military prowess figured more prominently (*junxian*). More generally, the cyclical character of Chinese history has made it an important test case for evolutionary theories and called forth a number of explanations for its failure to escape from a relatively wealthy peasant society into a more fully industrial model.

7. Materialist theories include M. Harris *Cultural Materialism*, (New York, 1979) and L. White, *The Science of Culture* (New York, 1949). Culturally oriented theories include J. Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston, 1978) and *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1984, 1988) and Parsons, T., *The Evolution of Societies* (New York, 1968).

8. E.g. F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (London, 1972 [orig. 1884]).

9. Postone, M., *Time, Labor and Necessity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

10. P. Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Ithaca, NY, 1982), T. Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in historical Sociology* (New York, 1984), C. Calhoun, "Culture, History and the Problem of Specificity in Social Theory," in S. Seidman and D. Wagner, eds.: *Postmodernism and General Social Theory* (Oxford, 1991).

11. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 3 vols. (San Diego, 1974-1988).

12. Georg Simmel, *The Problem of the Philosophy of History* (New York, 1977); Raymond Boudon, *Theories of Social Change* (Cambridge, 1986).

13. *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1976 [orig. 1893]).

14. *Economy and Society* (Berkeley, 1968 [orig. 1922]).

15. *Capital* (London, 1978 [orig. 1867]).

16. Ernst Mandel, *Late Capitalism* (London, 1974); Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*; David Harvey, *The Postmodern Condition* (Oxford, 1989).

17. E.g. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Oxford, 1990), emphasizing the distinctive form of the national state.

18. *Theory of Communicative Action.*

19. *The Order of Things* (New York, 1973).

20. *Discipline and Punish* (New York, 1977).

21. This is somewhat more true of Foucault's earlier works than of those of his last decade, including the multivolume *History of Sexuality* (New York, 1978-1986).

22. Harvey, *The Postmodern Condition*, offers an excellent critical review. Some

postmodernist thinkers (e.g. J-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, Minneapolis, 1984) have been more subtle, arguing against the implications of the very label "postmodern" that the mean not a simple historical succession but rather a recurrent internal challenge to the dominant "modernist" patterns. Though it renders the term postmodern misleading, this is a sounder approach; unfortunately it is commonly undercut (including in Lyotard's work) by a rhetoric of transcending modernity. See discussion in C. Calhoun, "Postmodernism as Pseudohistory," *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 10 (1993) #1, pp. 75-96.

23. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA, 1975); *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Oxford, 1990).

24. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley, 1975).

25. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA, 1992).

26. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York, 1969); *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York, 1977); Timonthy Brennan, "The National Longing for Form," pp. 44-70 in H. Bhabha, ed.: *Nation and Narration* (London, 1990).

27. On the notion of "essentially contested concepts," see Wilfred Gallie, *The Philosophy of History* (London, 1958).

28. On the difficulty of defining nationalism and the dissent over all definitions so far proposed, see Anthony Smith, "Nationalism," *Current Sociology*, 21 (1973): 7-128; *Theories of Nationalism* (London, 1983); Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (1978): 377-400; Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, CO, 1977); Peter Alter, *Nationalism* (London, 1989).

29. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1929); Greenfeld, *Nationalism*.

30. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso).

31. Alter, *Nationalism*, Geoffrey Best, *The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and its Legacy* (Chicago, 1988).

32. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (New York, 1960); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York, 1985).

33. The English nation, thus, is rooted in Anglo-Saxon history and shaped by the Norman Conquest. Conflicts among England, Scotland and Wales helped give each a dis-

tinctive identity. But the England (not Britain, as it happens, though both Welshmen and Scots fought) that Henry V took into war against France became an object of properly nationalist discourse with later claims on the memory of Agincourt in new political and social contexts. It was Shakespeare and later historians who made "King Harry" a nationalist, and even then incompletely.

34. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), see also Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York, 1990). Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 6, finds the same fault with Gellner: "Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'."

35. This was acknowledged, though rather weakly, even by some of the functionalists who emphasized the notion of primordiality and the "givenness" of cultural identities and traditions. See Shmuel Eisenstadt, *Modernization, Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), *Building States and Nations* (Beverly Hills, 1973); Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States* (New York, 1963); Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago, 1964).

36. In other words, they are literally prejudices in Hans-Georg Gadamer's sense, *Truth and Method* (New York, 1975), *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley, 1977).

37. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Studies in Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* (Princeton, forthcoming).

38. This does not mean that nationalism erases the importance of all other identities (any more than that trump cards are played in every trick of a bridge game). It means that nationalist discourse exerts a powerful force against ideals such that which John Schwarzmantel ascribes to socialism: "the socialist idea of the nation is or ought to be a 'pluralistic' one, seeing national identity as one focus of loyalty among others, and rejecting the idea of the nation put forward by 'integral' nationalism, in which the nation is seen as the supreme and overriding focus of loyalty, to which all other affiliations must be totally subordinate," *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation* (Hemel Hempstead, 1991: 5). Nationalists generally accept that other affiliations may occupy the primary attention of good members of a nation much of the time, but they grant these other affiliations no right to challenge the nation in matters of basic importance.

39. Frederick Barth, ed. *Ethnic Boundaries* (Oslo, 1969).

40. See Joan S. Skurnowicz, *Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea* (New York, 1981) on Poland and Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds.: *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, 1969) on Czechoslovakia.

41. Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago, 1981).

42. Prejudice means, following Gadamer, not just prior to judgment, but constituting the condition of judgment. See *Truth and Method, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Reason in an Age of Science* (Cambridge, MA, 1981). Existence within a historical tradition opens the possibility of knowing the world, it is not just a source of narrowing or historical error; see Georgia Warnke, *Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason* (Stanford, CA, 1987). Yet equally, traditions are effective only when they are living and therefore changing; they derive their force from their efficacy in opening an understanding of the world that works in practical action, not from offering an empirically demonstrable claim to a specific original truth.

43. It is perhaps no accident that both historical approaches to language and textual hermeneutics have been particularly German academic contributions while "structural" accounts of language and the severing of texts from their origins have been distinctively popular in France. The extent to which Saussure's structuralism prospered in French thought as against German historicism is an often overlooked aspect of theoretical history. This is congruent with the fact that the French obsession with linguistic purity, so commonly noted today, is of relatively recent origin, largely as a late nineteenth century response to colonialism, recalcitrant language groups in France, and the internationalization of culture. The official enforcer of linguistic purity, the Academie Francaise, moreover, works not on etymological or historical principles but on criteria of internal fit, or elegance, a kind of implicit structuralism. (It also admits members of foreign origin on the basis of the quality of their French, something hard to imagine in Germany given the ethnic-historical construction of German linguistic consciousness.)

44. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation* (New York, 1968 [orig. 1806-7]); Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* (Princeton, 1970: 92).

45. Georg Steiner, "The French Revolution and History," in P. Best, ed.: *The French Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 150).

46. Jaharwalal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Oxford, 1949).

47. Nehru's book is hardly the only example of this, even in India, though it is one of the best. Nor is Nehru in this text making a nationalist move that Gandhi eschewed. See Mahatma K. Gandhi, "Hind Swaraj," pp. 199-288 in Raghavan Iyer, ed.: *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1966 [orig. 1939]); *Political and National Life and Affairs* (Ahmedabad, 1967) and discussion in Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis, 1986) and *The Nation and Its Fragments*.

48. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 201.

49. Ernst Renan, "What Is a Nation?" Pp. 8-22 in Homi Bhabha, ed.: *Nation and Narration* (London, 1990: 11).

50. On cultural or symbolic violence, see Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, CA, 1990) and other works.

51. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 201.

52. Samagra Savarkar, *Wangmaya*, Vol. VI (Poona, 1937: 284).

53. Indian intellectuals from the 19th century on were often equally cosmopolitan (and certainly at least as likely to be multilingual). But this could never appear as unproblematic in the context of colonial rule as it could for the European enlighteners. Many Indian nationalists (including Nehru) wrote in English and spoke it more comfortably than any "Indian" language; they helped, indeed, to make English an Indian language. But this involved a tension between English as the language of the colonizer and as the putative *lingua franca* that was to help constitute one nation by cutting across the linguistic divisions of the subcontinent. Moreover, at the same time that some nationalists appropriated English as an Indian language, others produced a renaissance of modern Indian languages like Bengali or Marathi; nationalism meant producing a new, modern literature in the vernacular language. One dimension of this was the attempt to forge a unity between the language of literature and intellectuals and that of ordinary people--since groups previously separated by language were now to be united by *national* language. A similar development was very pronounced in China; see, e.g., Chow Tse-tung, *The May 4th Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, MA, 1960).

54. Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State.*

55. Thus Renan speaks in favor of France in "What Is Nationalism?" when he distinguishes nations that are the result of the free choices of their members (a "daily plebiscite") from those whose identity and cohesion is given independent of voluntary will of their members.

56. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford, CA, 1976).

57. In both France and Britain, nineteenth-century colonial experiences reshaped attitudes toward language. The first chairs of English were established at Indian universities, but the notion soon spread to Britain itself.

58. See discussion in Kedourie, *Nationalism*: 62-73).

59. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992).

60. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Orgin of Nations* (Oxford, 1986: 149).

61. M. Sutton, *Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism: The Politics of Charles Maurras and French Catholics 1890-1914* (Cambridge, 1982).

62. Gerard Noiriel, *Le Creuset Francais* (Paris, 1988); *La Tyrannie du National* (Paris, 1991); Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*. In 1991, as protests and debates over immigration rattled French politics, conservative former President Giscard d'Estaing made a surprisingly "ethnicist" assertion about the true French identity. He was rebuked not only by the left, but by the generally more conservative former prime minister and leader of the Rassemblement pour la Republique, Jacques Chirac: "I believe that law of common descent (*sang*), *stricto sensu*, or a law essentially of blood, does not conform ... either to the republican tradition or to the historical tradition of France" (quoted in *Lea Monde*, 1 October 1991).

63. Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism* (New York, 1944); Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, CO, 1977).

64. Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931).

65. Kedourie, *Nationalism*.

66. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY, 1983).

67. Hobsbwam, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*; Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*.

68. Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London, 1983); *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*; *National Identity* (London, 1991).

69. *Ethnic Origins...*: 216.

70. See, e.g., Kedourie, *Nationalism*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationism since 1780*; Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*.

71. *Nations and Nationalism*: 8-18, 61.

72. E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London, 1945).

73. Or as Ernst Gellner has averred, "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (*Nations and Nationalism*: 1). And as Durkheim noted long before, it is usually the apparent disjunc-

tion of people and state which brings the category of nation and the phenomenon of nationalism into play (*Textes*, vol. 3., ed. V. Karady, Paris: 179-80).

74. Basil Davidson, *Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York, 1992).

75. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation.*

76. *Imagined Communities.*

77. Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx vs. Friedrich List* (New York, 1988: 115).

78. Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism*; Andrezej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland* (New York, 1982); Skurnowcz, *Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism*; Meickecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State.*

79. Fichte, quoted in Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*: 89.

80. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*; *History of Sexuality.* See also Frantz Fanon's attempt to grapple with this in *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, 1965).

81. See related discussion in William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge, 1990).

82. Craig Calhoun, "Imagined Communities and Indirect Relationships: Large-Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life," in P. Bourdieu and J.S. Coleman, eds.: *Social Theory for a Changing Society* (Boulder, CO,: 95-120).

83. As Peter Ekeh, "Social Anthropology and Two Contrasting Uses of Tribalism in Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32 (1990) #4: 660-700 has noted, there has been a move to abandon the use of tribe in social anthropology and African studies, and to replace it with "ethnic group". But this has the effect of imposing a categorical notion--a collection of individuals marked by common ethnicity--in place of a relational one. Where the notion of tribe pointed to the centrality of kin relations (all the more central, Ekeh suggests, because of weak African states from whose point of view "tribalism" is criticized) the notion of ethnic group implies that detailed, serious analysis of kinship is more or less irrelevant.