Alexander, Jason and Skyrms, Brian (1999) The (spatial) evolution of the equal split. Technical report MBS 99-07. University of California - Irvine, Irvine, USA.Full text not available from this repository.
The replicator dynamics have been used to study the evolution of a population of rational agents playing the Nash bargaining game, where an individual's "fitness" is determined by an individual's success in playing the game. In these models, a population whose initial conditions was randomly chosen from the space of population proportions converges to a state of fair division approximately 62% of the time. (Higher rates of convergence to final states of fair division can be obtained by introducing artificial correlations into the models.) Spatial models of the Nash bargaining game exhibit considerably more robust convergence properties. These properties are considered at length, and a sufficient condition for convergence to fair division is proved.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Technical Report)|
|Additional Information:||© 1999 University of California|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method|
|Identification Number:||Technical report MBS 99-07|
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