Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Paradoxes and failures: 'new governance' techniques and the financial crisis

Black, Julia ORCID: 0000-0002-5838-3265 (2012) Paradoxes and failures: 'new governance' techniques and the financial crisis. Modern Law Review, 75 (6). pp. 1037-1063. ISSN 0026-7961

Full text not available from this repository.

Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00936.x


This article examines the performance of four 'new governance' techniques of regulation in the period leading up to the financial crisis: principles based regulation, risk based regulation, meta-regulation and enrolment. These techniques have been advocated on the basis that they are responsive, flexible, and in enrolling others in the regulatory project thereby expand its capacity, and even its legitimacy. However, experience in the crisis revealed that in their implementation they can be out of touch or indulgent, focus heavily on auditable systems and processes, and that in enrolling others they can increase vulnerabilities and the potential for negative endogenous effects. The argument is not that there should be a return to adversarial 'command and control' regulation, rather that experience of these strategies in the crisis suggests a need to understand in greater depth the refractive effects of the organisational, technical/functional and cognitive dimensions of regulatory governance, if we are to understand and adapt its performance in different contexts.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2012 The Modern Law Review Limited
Divisions: Government
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Sets: Departments > Government
Date Deposited: 12 Nov 2012 16:28
Last Modified: 20 May 2020 02:35

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item