de Grauwe, Paul (2010) A mechanism of self-destruction of the eurozone. CEPS commentaries, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium.Full text not available from this repository.
Drawing an analogy with the ill-fated Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the pre-eurozone era, Paul De Grauwe argues in a new CEPS Commentary that the creation of a sovereign debt default mechanism is a very bad decision that will make the eurozone more fragile by making financial crises an endemic feature.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Other)|
|Additional Information:||© 2010 Centre for European Policy Studies|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance
J Political Science > JZ International relations
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects)
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt; Debt Management
|Sets:||Departments > European Institute
Collections > Economists Online
|Date Deposited:||08 Oct 2012 09:48|
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