Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Restricting preservation: a response to Hill

Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 (2012) Restricting preservation: a response to Hill. Mind, 121 (481). pp. 147-159. ISSN 0026-4423

Full text not available from this repository.

Identification Number: 10.1093/mind/fzs038


Brian Hill argues for a restriction of the Preservation condition that is based on a notion of epistemic, as opposed to logical, consistency. In this reply I consider possible criteria for epistemic consistency and suggest that a natural candidate for one leads to a more severe restriction on the Preservation condition than Hill proposes. I also question whether his proposed restriction is either necessary or sufficient to avoid the impossibility results for the Preservation condition, suggesting that it is the way in which belief expansion is characterized within the AGM framework that is the real source of the problem. Finally, I draw on the notion of belief undermining to support a different resolution of the problem.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2012 The Author
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2012 12:41
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 01:29

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item