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Faliure and rescue in an interbank network

Rogers, L.C.G. and Veraart, Luitgard A. M. ORCID: 0000-0003-1183-2227 (2013) Faliure and rescue in an interbank network. Management Science, 59 (4). pp. 882-898. ISSN 0025-1909

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Identification Number: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1569


This paper is concerned with systemic risk in an interbank market, modelled as a directed graph of interbank obligations. This builds on the modelling paradigm of Eisenberg and Noe [Eisenberg L, Noe TH (2001) Systemic risk in financial systems. Management Sci. 47(2):236–249] by introducing costs of default if loans have to be called in by a failing bank. This immediately introduces novel and realistic effects. We find that, in general, many different clearing vectors can arise, among which there is a greatest clearing vector, arrived at by letting banks fail in succession until only solvent banks remain. Such a collapse should be prevented if at all possible. We then study situations in which consortia of banks may have the means and incentives to rescue failing banks. This again departs from the conclusions of the earlier work of Eisenberg and Noe, where in the absence of default losses there would be no incentive for solvent banks to rescue failing banks. We conclude with some remarks about how a rescue consortium might be constructed.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2013 INFORMS
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited: 07 Nov 2012 09:47
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 00:47
Funders: Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance, Ministry of Science, Research and Arts, Baden-Württemberg

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