Frantz, Pascal and Instefjord, Norvald (2012) Debt overhang and debt restructuring. Social Science Research Network.
This paper analyzes how debt forgiveness and exchange offers resolve inefficiencies associated with debt overhang in a dynamic setting. In a static model debt forgiveness and exchange offers are equivalent -- in a dynamic model they are not. Debt forgiveness is feasible as a means to restructure debt when the firm expands into a competitive market, whereas exchange offers are necessary to eliminate the inefficiency of expansion into uncompetitive markets. We discuss the model in the light of existing empirical evidence and the empirical implications of the model.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2012 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
|Sets:||Departments > Accounting
Collections > Economists Online
|Date Deposited:||10 Aug 2012 10:39|
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