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Why does performance pay de-motivate: financial incentives versus performance appraisal

French, Stephen, Kubo, Katsuyuki and Marsden, David (2002) Why does performance pay de-motivate: financial incentives versus performance appraisal. In: Hanami, Tadashi, (ed.) Universal Wisdom Through Globalisation: Selected Papers From the 12th Iira World Congress, Tokyo. Japan Institute of Labour Report (9). Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo, Japan.

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The sheer scale and speed of the shift of payment system from time-based salaries to performance-related pay, PRP, in the British public services provides a unique opportunity to test the effects of incentive pay schemes. This study is based on the first large scale survey designed to measure the effects of performance related pay on employee motivation and work behaviour across the British public services. While there is evidence of a clear incentive effect for those gaining above average PRP, it is likely that it is offset by a more widespread demotivating effect arising from difficulties of measuring performance fairly. Organisational commitment appears to offset some of the negative effects of PRP.

Item Type: Book Section
Additional Information: © 2002 Japan Institute of Labour
Divisions: Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Date Deposited: 21 Apr 2008 12:30
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 04:50

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