

Population mobility and service provision



A report for London Councils



THE LONDON SCHOOL
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Population Mobility and Service Provision

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Contents

Executive Summary

1. Introduction: migration and mobility in London
2. The Framework of Analysis
3. Research Findings
4. Implications for Public Services
5. Social Cohesion
6. Implications for Resource Allocation
7. Conclusions

Bibliography

Appendices

- A. Selective Literature Review
- B. List of interviewees
- C. Questionnaire

Executive summary

This project has examined, and sought to measure, a number of the impacts of population mobility and transience on London boroughs. It has done this by examining (i) the scale of recent migration and other mobility affecting the capital; (ii) existing sources of research into the costs and consequences of population mobility; (iii) boroughs' own experiences of mobility and the impacts this generates; (iv) estimates of some of the costs of mobility for boroughs; (v) a description of some of the service consequences of population movement, eg, for housing; (vi) the implications of mobility for local government finance and (vii) evidence about the relationship between transience and social cohesion.

The **key findings** of the project are as follows:

Extent of mobility

- There has been a substantial increase in international migration to London within the past decade. There is now a net increase in the overseas-born population of about 100,000 per year. However, the turnover of people moving in and out of the city (excluding within-London moves) is – officially – approaching 250,000 per annum. Unofficial (and uncounted) mobility will almost certainly add to this number.
- London has higher levels of inter-regional mobility than most other regions. This has long been true, though there has been some increase in outward mobility to surrounding regions in recent years.
- London has some boroughs where population mobility is greater than 35% per annum, and where the private rented sector is the largest tenure. This has also been true for many years. What has changed is the nature of the population that is moving. In particular, many arrive in the capital with significant needs for public service support. There is powerful evidence that a number of boroughs act as an 'escalator' for people, investing heavily in them when they first arrive (for example with language skills and housing) before those individuals move on and are then replaced by new ones who require councils to start afresh in building them into the city's economic and social life.

The costs to services

- Apart from the European Commission-funded URBACT study, and work undertaken for the Association of London Government on schools, there is little London-specific (or indeed other) quantitative research about the impact of population mobility on services. Indeed, there is surprisingly little official interest in the subject despite the rapid increase in immigration in recent years, and the stated need for initiatives to enhance social cohesion among new groups within the population.

- Even though there is a commonsense understanding of the costs and consequences deriving from high levels of mobility in a city such as London, it is not always easy to measure whether mobility ‘above trend’ means that costs become disproportionate to that level of mobility, or to separate out mobility impacts from other cost-drivers within the complex services provided in the capital. But this difficulty does not mean such costs do not exist.
- In particular, it is not clear whether it is the fact that mobility occurs, the nature of the population moving, the extent of churn both within the area and for individuals, or all three - that impacts on costs and social cohesion.
- A number of boroughs have commissioned research about migration and minority ethnic residents, though few have looked specifically at mobility impacts and costs.
- Borough officers can, in some cases, give examples of additional costs arising from high levels of mobility. Such costs include:

- Translation and other costs associated with integration

A rapid turnover of new migrants to a borough, many of whom then move on to other areas, creates a demand for language training and translation services. The number of ‘origin’ countries has grown significantly within the last decade, adding significantly to many boroughs’ costs. Eastern European languages; Turkish; Spanish; and a number of African languages have become more prevalent. Compared with earlier waves of migration to the UK, which were predominantly from English-speaking countries, new migrants are more likely to arrive from non-English nations.

- Housing administration and maintenance costs

New migration has increased the demand for social housing, particularly in boroughs where larger families have arrived. Temporarily-housed households will often move on and thus generate higher administrative costs. Families will, on occasions, have members with special needs that will mean the need for adaptation of homes – possibly temporarily. Homes that are vacated often need to be refurbished. Mobility above previous trends thus generates higher housing costs. Equally, increased demand for housing, especially from transient and lower income households, increases the demand for Houses in Multiple Occupation and

increases associated regulatory and social service costs.

- Electoral registration turnover costs

The research suggested measurable additional costs as people move into, out of, and within boroughs. Senior officers are unanimous that (a) population is often under-recorded and (b) there are a number of growing pressures on electoral registration of which mobility is significant. Boroughs have in some cases have had (or are about) to take on between 1 and 5 additional staff each to cope.

- Council tax registration costs

In common with electoral registration, council tax registration has increased as more people move in and out of boroughs. Many buildings are now multiply-occupied in complex ways. It is not always clear to people what constitutes a 'household' or property. New migrants may have no experience of this kind of local taxation and will need to have the rules explained to them. More staff have had to be taken on.

- Costs of planning law contraventions

Pressure on properties as a result of mobility and rising occupation levels has, in some boroughs, led to contraventions of building requirements which the authority must then address. This may take planning officers time in terms of inspection, serving papers and then checking changes have been made. There needs to be sensitivity in dealing with such issues where people simply do not understand local planning rules.

- Public assistance costs of migrants with no other means of support

Local authorities are required, by law, to provide resources to residents who have no other means of support. Many such individuals and families are transient. London boroughs are, in some cases, spending over £1.2 million a year on this kind of provision.

- Homelessness provision and administration

Some 65,000 households in London are officially categorised as homeless. Mobility has increased the

number of homeless households within many boroughs, because of the scale of migration and the changing nature of the population. This increase also puts pressure on the administration of the service.

- Social services

There are disproportionately high numbers of children in need, and looked after children, in and around London. The high level of movement in London, within and between boroughs, for schooling and other statutory and non-statutory services produces costs. A recent study for DfES and the Government Office for London has accepted this as an issue.

Impact on social cohesion

There is general recognition that mobility and diversity can test the social cohesion of neighbourhoods. However there is also recognition that incomers may help to improve services and bring increased opportunities to the area. A number of boroughs noted in particular that the increasingly diverse nature of in-migrants across London helped to reduce tensions as compared to some areas with concentrations of particular migrant groups.

Concerns about cohesion can often be directly related back to issues about access to services and the priority sometimes given to new migrants. In this context, rapid turnover of new migrants can lead to a need for political management of public expectations and opinion. Of broader concern is the possibility that rapid turnover of residents, and indeed employees such as teachers, in some parts of London undermines the social capital and liveability of places.

Some boroughs believe that a particular issue generating higher mobility and lower social cohesion is the increasing importance of 'buy to let' housing. In part this is because some of this housing is used to house homeless households; in part because new types of housing bring in new types of more transient households.

Funding issues

The Revenue Support Grant (RSG) needs-equalisation formula attempts to measure such factors as the costs of 'sparsity' despite the lack of any significant research base to measure the costs of servicing sparsely-populated areas. There is no equivalent measure in the formula for population mobility or transience. Indeed, there appears to be a perception within government that mobility is too difficult to measure and thus cannot be fed into formula grant calculations – implicitly giving these costs a zero weighting.

The RSG has in recent years become less flexible and less capable of reflecting new spending needs. Indeed, the formula used to measure spending need is frozen and changes in grant from year to year are subjected to 'floors'. Education funding has recently used 'last year plus a fixed percentage' grant allocations. If Whitehall

allocations of resources to councils are to reflect the costs of mobility, either the RSG formula will have to change and/or new specific grants will have to be paid to authorities experiencing high levels of population mobility.

England's local government funding system is so centralised that local authorities have little or no freedom to benefit from any growth in their tax base as a result of increased population or economic activity resulting from mobility and migration. The most usual response to significant pressures – eg in terms of language teaching and A8 rooflessness - is for central government to provide highly targeted, and often short term, grants which cannot address structural issues effectively.

In looking for a way forward, it should be recognised that many mobile and transient households impose few costs on their local area and make no negative impact on social cohesion. On the other hand, there are a number of service areas identified in this report, where there are clearly disproportionate costs associated with mobility that should be taken into account. Moreover, in education in particular, there are extremely good data about mobility in schools that would offer a basis for research about the costs associated with mobility. Somewhat similar information is available with respect to housing, particularly with respect to homeless and roofless households.

Conclusions

The report's authors conclude that the issues involved in mobility are not always about mobility as such – there are many situations where mobile populations impose little or no additional costs and are readily integrated into the locality. Indeed many transient households use fewer local services and make few demands on the locality. Equally, there are many examples of mobility and migration benefiting services.

There are, however, many types of mobility that do impose additional costs normally associated with the needs of particular households – these vary from the need for translation services, to specialist support for the homeless.

Measurement of, and resource funding for, population mobility will always present central and local government with challenges. New spending needs and populations concentrated in a small number of areas are difficult for a centralised system of funding to respond to quickly. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty about national and local population totals.

London boroughs are at the cutting edge in enabling Britain to manage international in-migration in a politically acceptable and orderly way. They are not alone in this – there are authorities both close to London, and in other cities, that face similar issues. Local authorities will only be able to continue to address these issues effectively if their quality of management, local services, and resources fully reflect the profound challenge presented by mobility and migration. There is, at present, a risk that as migration and mobility continue at high levels year after year, London may find it increasingly difficult to cope with the costs and consequences of such impacts.

1. Introduction: migration and mobility in London

1.1 Mobility within the London population: an established phenomenon

London is one of the world's most cosmopolitan cities. Its history as an international trading centre has ensured that people from all over the world have moved through the ports, finance houses and trading enterprises that have flourished since the Romans settled Londinium. As the capital grew, different kinds of mobility emerged. There continued to be movement in and out from the rest of the world. But, in addition, a pattern of within-UK mobility evolved: young people moved to London at the start of their working lives, while later in life a proportion of the population moved out to the suburbs and beyond. There is also a substantial amount of mobility within the city, encouraged by London's perennially active housing market, the large numbers of population with no settled homes, and the scale of the private rented sector. Thus, at least three kinds of mobility can be observed in London: to and from overseas; to and from the rest of the UK and within the capital itself.

Table 1 below shows the trend in international in- and out-migration to the capital during the past decade or so. There has been a sharp rise in the numbers of people moving from overseas countries to London, with an apparently settled pattern of around 200,000 people arriving from overseas each year and about 100,000 leaving to go abroad. There is, thus, a net inflow of about 100,000 per year, albeit the 'churn' of international migrants is significantly bigger than this number suggests.

Table 1: Inflow and outflow of migrants from overseas, London, 1990 to 2004, (thousands)

	Inflow	Outflow	Net change
1990	121.8	68.2	+53.6
1991	113.0	77.2	+35.8
1992	92.1	65.3	+28.8
1993	88.9	69.1	+19.8
1994	107.0	72.9	+34.1
1995	130.8	65.2	+65.6
1996	126.6	72.0	+54.6
1997	135.2	89.6	+45.6
1998	174.6	87.9	+86.7
1999	214.5	101.1	+113.4
2000	222.9	102.5	+120.4
2001	199.2	94.8	+104.4
2002	202.0	107.1	+94.9
2003	173.0	102.2	+70.8
2004	217.7	92.3	+125.4

(Sources: (i) *International Migration Series MN No 26*, Office for National Statistics, Table 2.8; (ii) *International Migration Series MN No 31*, Office for National Statistics, Table 2.8

There is some evidence that the surveys that record international in-migration may under-record the scale of movement. Some individuals may understate the length of their intended stay and thus not be recorded as in-migrants. Many are not identified as leaving. The accuracy of the UK's international migration data is currently the subject of an official inquiry.

Not all migrants are the same of course, though most will be drawn to London for economic reasons. Some are affluent individuals and families moving to work in financial and business services. Others will be temporary workers, such as young

people coming from countries such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, who will work in the capital for a year or two before moving on. However, there is evidence that the largest proportion of the overall figure will be poorer economic migrants who, in most cases, will come to stay.

Mobility within the United Kingdom is shown in Table 2. This analysis, a standard feature in the Office for National Statistics' *Regional Trends* publication, shows the numbers of people moving from each region of the UK to each other region within a year. The table makes it clear there is a major movement, both in and out, of people within London each year, with 155,000 moving into the capital during 2004 and 260,000 leaving. Only the South East has a similar level of inter-regional population movement, followed by the East and the South West. Movement in and out of the northern regions is generally less pronounced, though the different total population of each region means the proportionate differences are rather smaller than the absolute ones.

Comparing 2004 with 1991 shows relatively few significant changes in the extent of inter-regional mobility within the UK, except that of out-migration from the capital to the rest of the country. Some regions, notably the South East, the South West and the East, have seen a modest rise in in-migration as people have left London.

Table 2: Inter-regional mobility within the United Kingdom, 1991 and 2004 (thousands)

	Inflow		Outflow	
	1991	2004	1991	2004
North East	40	41	41	39
North West	96	105	105	104
Yorkshire & the Humber	85	98	85	92
East Midlands	90	112	81	97
West Midlands	83	95	88	101
East	122	146	113	128
London	149	155	202	260
South East	198	223	185	208
South West	121	139	99	108
England	96	97	112	122
Wales	51	60	47	49
Scotland	56	57	47	45
Northern Ireland	12	12	9	10

(Source: Office for National Statistics, *Regional Trends 39*, Table 3.12, London: TSO)

Overall, 15 per cent of London's households had been at their current address for less than a year, compared to a national average of only 11 per cent. The next highest region was the South, at 12 per cent according to the Survey of English Housing (2004/05 Table S223). This amounted to 474,000 moving households in London. They formed 21 per cent of England's total movers.

Two major reasons for this scale of movement are: the large proportion of Londoners living with family and friends, and the scale of the private rented sector where the majority of very mobile households are located. London accounts for one third of all private rented dwellings – ie private renting is twice as usual in London than in the country as a whole. On the other hand, mobility in the social sector and in owner-

occupation is lower in London than the rest of the country because of housing market pressures (Cho and Whitehead, 2005).

London's small geographical size means that the physical impacts of such mobility, coupled with the international movement suggested in Table 1, will be far more geographically concentrated than if they occurred in a sparsely-populated region. Moreover, the complex make-up of the international in-movers will mean that the 'churn' in London's population will be of a different kind to that in other regions.

International in-migration to London has long been a feature of the city's population. There have been immigrants in the city for two thousand years. However, successive waves of international in-migration since the late 1940s have brought about a radical transformation in the ethnic make-up of the population.

In 1951, the UK's ethnic minority population (which would not have been referred to in these terms) is estimated to have been less than 50,000 (London Research Centre, 1997). During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a significant growth in immigration from the New Commonwealth. By 1961, the number of London residents born in the 'New Commonwealth' was 242,000, providing a broad approximation of the overall level of the 'ethnic minority' population. This number grew to 583,000 by 1971 and 945,000 by 1981. The 'non-white' population in 1991 was about 1.4 million, increasing to about 2 million in 2001.

Particularly since 2004, there has been an additional surge of migration from new European Union accession countries such as Poland and the Baltic States. The scale of long-term net migration to the UK as a result of this political decision cannot yet be fully understood. But there is evidence that the overall level of migration to the UK as the result of the 2004 enlargement of the EU may have been as great as 600,000 – though a proportion of these migrants may already have returned home. London, in common with the rest of the country, has experienced a significant increase in migrants from these new EU members.

Many of the earlier migrants have assumed British nationality and their children have been born British citizens. A number of minority ethnic populations are now an established part of London – with relatively low mobility. The increase in immigration since the mid-1990s has brought another, new, group of overseas-born people to the capital. While a proportion of this new migrant population are from the same New Commonwealth countries that provided most of the earlier immigrants, a larger share of the total now come from other countries, resulting in far more diverse communities.

1.2 Why recent changes to immigration occurred and likely consequences

Little is known about the true scale and nature of international in-migration to London – or, indeed, to Britain more generally. Although, as the earlier paragraphs show, there have been earlier waves of migration to the UK, the net inflow of around 100,000 per annum in each year since 1998-99 is unprecedented. Moreover, new migrants are not evenly spread across either the country or within the capital.

The fact that London's population has experienced (and continues to experience) rapid international in-migration has presented national politics with a problem. On the one hand, the Home Office and Treasury have commissioned research that suggests migrants add to the country's attractiveness and GDP (Treasury, 2006 para A34; Home Office, 2001). But there are also complex political concerns about the level of migration and asylum seekers that have led national politicians of all parties to conduct a vigorous debate about the future of migration and a number of related issues.

The very immediacy of an unexpected surge in in-migration has led to additional problems. In October 2006, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, stated: "We just do not know how big the population of the UK is. Because the comparisons and the split between different groups of workers — young and old, migrant and ordinarily resident — has changed in recent years, the statistics may not be that accurate." (King, 2006). If the Bank has this kind of difficulty at the UK level, it is inevitable that individual councils' data will, in a number of cases, be even worse. Evidence from interviewees certainly suggested this. Yet — as will be discussed below — in a centrally-run system of public finance, the availability of accurate and up-to-date demographic statistics is a pre-requisite of good government. London boroughs must currently operate in an environment where these data are of (at best) unknown accuracy and suggest a significant under recording particularly in areas with high minority ethnic populations.

Because of the centralised nature of political decision-making and resource control in Britain, it is impossible for individual local authorities to tackle one-off or disproportionate public service issues and costs. Virtually all tax and spending decisions are taken in Whitehall and based on long standing formulae which take account of particular attributes — but not mobility as such. Central government will also inevitably be expected to address one-off surges in the demand for services. This issue is considered in more detail below.

In a wider sense, the surge of migration to London, and a number of other places within Britain, has produced a number of little-understood and under-researched consequences. It will take a number of years for official statistics and the research community to catch up with the changes. Thus, for example, we know a significant amount about the minority ethnic population in Britain — because it has been established for over 50 years. But the consequences of a sudden increase in international migration are, as yet, little analysed. This report seeks to throw light on one aspect of this increase: the way mobility may affect public service costs.

1.3 London within the national context

This study has been commissioned by London Councils and has taken the London boroughs as its research base. Of course, the impacts of migration and mobility costs are not only to be found in the capital. Indeed, the most recent wave of international in-migration has produced evidence of a number of migrants moving to cities and counties outside the South East of England, though the main pressure remains in and around the capital (House of Commons, 2007). Local authorities in regions experiencing low housing demand in the 1990s saw higher mobility within the social housing stock, with a minority of households moving very frequently which led to

knock on costs to housing departments and other services (Richardson and Corbishley, 1999). A number of local authorities outside London experience what the SEU termed ‘medium in, medium out’ levels of mobility (SEU, 2006).

However, evidence from the Greater London Authority’s Data Management and Analysis Group suggests that in each year since 1998-99 London’s population has moved from being British-born to overseas-born at the rate of about 100,000 per year (Office for National Statistics, 2006). This trend continues. No other region is changing – in terms of the place of birth of residents – at this speed. This factor alone implies that London is likely to be affected by population mobility rather more than any other region within the UK.

Tables 3 and 4 below show (Table 3) the increase in population between 1991 and 2001 for the ‘top ten’ London boroughs in terms of rising population, and (Table 4) the ‘top ten’ in terms of the proportion of the 2001 population born outside the UK. In each case, the rank within England & Wales is shown for comparative purposes.

Table 3: Average percentage change in population, 1991-2001, top 10 London boroughs

	% change	Rank
City of London	+34.0	1
Tower Hamlets	+17.9	3
Newham	+12.8	13
Kensington & Chelsea	+10.6	32
Hackney	+ 9.7	44
Camden	+ 9.6	45
Brent	+ 9.4	46
Kingston	+ 8.2	60
Southwark	+ 7.8	66
Redbridge	+ 7.5	67
		(of 376)

(Source: Census, 2001, Office for National Statistics,
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/rank/ewwhite.asp>)

Table 4: Percentage of population born outside UK, 2001, top 10 London boroughs

	%	Rank
Brent	46.6	1
Kensington & Chelsea	44.6	2
Westminster	44.5	3
Newham	38.2	4
Ealing	37.3	5
Haringey	37.1	6
Camden	36.8	7
Tower Hamlets	34.7	8
Hackney	34.5	9
Hammersmith & Fulham	33.6	10
		(of 376)

(Source: Census, 2001, Office for National Statistics,
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/rank/ewuk.asp>)

London boroughs saw, in many cases, relatively large population increases between 1991 and 2001. These trends appear to have continued subsequently according to mid-year estimates. In terms of ‘population born outside the UK’, London boroughs

occupy the top ten places in the country. Subsequent international immigration will almost certainly have increased most of the figures shown in Table 4 by between three and six percentage points. Moreover, the 2001 Census showed that a number of London boroughs now have a population that is more than 50 per cent 'non-White' including those born in the UK. The rate at which new migrants are arriving in the city means that it is already home to just under half of all the country's minority ethnic population.

1.4 Implications of mobility and transience: costs and savings

There have been few previous efforts to assess the implications of population mobility on public service costs. Indeed, the question of how best to define the 'churn' of residents within an area and the consequent additional costs to public service provision can itself prove awkward. After all, every council will experience a turnover within its population as people move from property to property or because of factors such as death and cross-boundary movements.

But the extent of national and international migration within London is, as the numbers in Table 1 suggest, of a different magnitude and type to the usual mobility experienced by public services. The major factors that would appear to be relevant in determining additional costs include:

- the overall rate of population 'turnover', compared with the national average;
- the extent to which the in-migrant population is, in terms of demographic and social make-up, like or unlike the existing population – this may affect service costs (such as the need for language provision) or political management costs;
- the public service needs of in-migrants that result directly from their move into the authority;
- the background and attributes of in-migrants (such as the need to cope with people fleeing from persecution, war or other problems; issues associated with homelessness, and the particular issues relating child migrants who enter the country on their own); and
- the extent to which migrants have any connections with the area or impact on others' sense of belonging.

Moving households tend to differ from the average in ways that may generate need for services. Lone parent households with dependent children and multi-adult households have higher level of mobility, for example. (Survey of English Housing 2004/05 S221). 17 per cent of households that moved in the last year had incomes under £100 a week, compared to 5 per cent overall, and 27 per cent had incomes under £200 a week, compared to 23% overall (Survey of English Housing 2004/05 S236, S113). On the other hand, many migrants may be young employed people who have little need to use local services and may not even register their address.

In terms of costs, the following factors are likely to be particularly relevant:

- Costs of registering new arrivals to addresses in the local authority for their obligations eg electoral roll, taxes or for services available to them as residents eg social housing lettings, library membership;
- Costs of recognising and dealing with people who have moved to other addresses, whether inside or outside the borough who have an obligation to the local authority or to whom the local authority has any obligation eg chasing rent, tax, fines; updating records (removing 'deadwood'); tracing social services cases, school students;
- Costs arising from the specific attributes of migrants, or from changing population characteristics brought about by mobility eg changing ethnic or language make-up, orientation of international arrivals, political management;
- Costs arising from the interaction of migrants with the established population and the extent to which this impacts adversely on social cohesion.

As is immediately clear, there will be difficulties in creating a precise distinction between the costs attributed to 'mobility' and all other expenditure pressures. If there is a sudden and sustained rise in the number of electoral registrations above a long-established trend, it is reasonable to attribute the higher costs of above-trend turnover to the costs of mobility. But if, say, a new family moves into a borough from overseas, it may be clear that the costs of managing an above-trend turnover in housing stock is a consequence of mobility. However, if their child has a requirement for the special adaptation of a council [or temporary] property, is this cost the result of mobility or simply the normal cost of providing social housing?

Moreover, authorities do not routinely keep data about changes in costs directly attributable to 'mobility'. This study is an attempt to identify the local public services where there are believed to be mobility-driven costs and then to make some estimates of the likely additional cost per unit.

It has not been possible to provide a comprehensive analysis of the overall impacts and costs of mobility to London boroughs. The difficulty of generating such information in the absence of an existing research base means our conclusions are inevitably tentative.

1.5 Mobility: resource allocation and the system of public finance

England's local government funding arrangements are among the most centralised and complex in the world (Loughlin and Martin, 2005). London boroughs and the Greater London Authority receive the bulk of their financial resources from national sources. If, as this paper shows, the make-up of the capital's population is changing rapidly, while there has also been a growth in mobility and transience, there will inevitably be higher public service costs.

As new migrants and a rising population generate economic benefits (according to Home Office research), it might be expected that tax revenues would increase, both for national and local government. However, because 95 per cent of the taxation paid in the UK is collected by the Exchequer, there is little opportunity for councils to

benefit from rising tax incomes. Moreover, equalisation arrangements reduce the gains that might otherwise flow to local government.

Higher costs associated with rising and more complex populations should, in theory, be reflected in the complex system of spending need support built into the local government grant arrangements. But for reasons that will be explained later in this paper, London councils are very unlikely to derive pound-for-pound increases in their general government support to match higher spending needs.

The poor quality data, and grant system inflexibility, that are increasing features of the English local government funding system are therefore a key element in understanding why the higher costs and social cohesion issues identified in this paper are of direct relevance to London boroughs.

2. The Framework of Analysis

2.1 Identifying the movers and types of move

There are a number of factors which are likely to be relevant to assessing the cost of moving populations to both local services and social cohesion. In many contexts these are seen as being generated on the one hand by international and national migration and on the other by issues associated with ethnicity. Actuality is far more complex than this and needs at least to be broken down in principle in order to understand the nature of the costs and problems. Some of the factors affecting the costs of movement are as follows:

- The distance moved: distinguishing between short distance moves, which may not involve much change in service except those related to the dwelling and longer distance moves where people must move between services such as health and social services. Costs associated with moving home will affect all types of mover; but if the move crosses administrative boundaries costs will normally be higher the further the move.
- Household type, including in particular the number of people in the household and their age structure as this affects the number of services involved. If there are children in the household there will clearly be a wider range of services involved. The size of the household may also be relevant – single people may have more limited support mechanisms while larger households have more varied needs.
- Employment status of the household: whether members of the household are employed and the household overall is economically sustainable, and therefore whether members of the household are likely to use the local employment and training facilities.
- Cultural factors: notably language in that if household members are not first language English speakers there are direct costs of translation, but also broader based costs of ensuring people can use services and are meeting their responsibilities and facilitating integration. Many of these costs will be associated with international migrants – but many will not.
- The reasons for moving: in the main any differential outcome will be related to factors covered above. Again the most important separable reason here will be homelessness or inappropriate housing and moves associated with vulnerability – notably asylum seekers.

The factors above relate to individual behaviour. There are then issues arising from the aggregation of these moving households to determine overall levels of mobility in the neighbourhood and in the authority. Neighbourhood impacts relate to social cohesion and the cost of locally based services such as neighbourhood management, and possibly waste collection and policing. At this stage any variation in costs are likely to be associated with the extent of social exclusion and deprivation.

Local authority level costs are associated with the scale of activity linked to mobility and transience, and the cost implications of this service provision. They are also

related to the tenure structure of households both because of variations in mobility between tenures – with the private rented sector housing by far the most mobile - and producing the highest costs associated with homelessness and housing in multiple occupation.

Finally, there are potential issues related to how often people move – which is often seen to be the most important aspect of social cohesion – both in terms of the individual and the local mobility rate. In this context, rapid mobility of households who remain within the authority, often moving because their housing conditions are unsuitable, is seen as an important indicator of increased costs not only to services such as housing and education but to the social cohesion of neighbourhoods (CRESR, 2005).

2.2 Identifying the costs to mobility and transience

From the point of view of local authorities, the most important distinction to be made with respect to costs is between:

- proportional costs: in which the higher the mobility rate the higher the cost, while the cost per move remains constant;
- disproportional costs: associated first with the type of move and mover, and second with the overall level of movement.

This would generally mean that the higher the level of mobility and/or the more mobility from higher cost groups, the higher the average cost per move will be. In some cases of course, per unit costs may be lower because of the type of movers that are moving (e.g. affluent, employed).

A third element of costs which could in principle be distinguished is between direct costs (whether proportionate and disproportionate) and spill over costs – affecting the behaviour and associated costs in the neighbourhood or authority.

2.3 Diversion v Additionality

In many cases there are no necessary additional costs to services other than those directly associated with movement. At the macro level it is only the net additional international migrant that matters.

However there is often a transfer of responsibility from one administrative unit to another. This can transfer the costs of providing services between authorities and may generate ‘congestion’ costs in some areas and under use of services in others. It may also involve the provision of subsidised services where the subsidy may or may not follow the household or person. This raises the issue of out-of-borough placements which clearly concerns authorities that accept homeless and other groups from other authorities. It also raises issues of compensation for net additions to the numbers using particular subsidised services, and the extent to which central government subsidy allocation and taxation systems compensate for these costs.

2.4 Impacts on social cohesion

Whether or not mobility and transience impacts on social cohesion depends upon the attributes of those moving into, and the response of those already living in, the community.

To some extent these impacts depend upon accepted definitions. The LGA/Home Office *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (LGA/Home Office, 2002) defines a cohesive community as one where:

- there is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities;
- the diversity of people's different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued;
- those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and
- strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.

In terms of the remit of this project, this relates strongly to issues about access to services and the costs of running these services, and is therefore addressed within the same framework. However the costs associated with ensuring social cohesion are even less readily measured as they include not only those directly relating to provision, but also costs of political management and social costs of failure to achieve the goals of social cohesion. In this context, indicators such as the numbers of racial incidents reported to the police; levels of anti-social behaviour; truanting; and educational achievement may be relevant but are not addressed in this report.

2.5 Methodology

The London Councils project actively involved a team of three senior researchers, a junior researcher and an administrative officer.

The main methods used in this study were as follows:

- a literature survey;
- interviews with senior officers in seven London boroughs;
- collection of materials from boroughs' own research;
- synthesis of the information gathered from literature and interviews;
- additional research of known sources of research.

In more detail, the methodology involved:

First, a detailed study of existing literature and documents provided by London boroughs has been conducted and is reported in Appendix A. Together with the review of literature, statistical data about population mobility and population turnover

in London, mainly based on ONS statistics and neighbourhood statistics, has been analysed.

In order to gather as much information as possible, the researchers, with the support of London Councils contacted all London borough chief executives by letter at the beginning of November to ask about any research that has been led by the boroughs on the topic.

The objective of this first stage of research was to identify the services, and boroughs, which are the most impacted by population churn.

We received material from a range of boroughs and organisations which have undertaken work on the population turnover theme, which helped us to understand the nature of the problems faced by boroughs – notably with respect to accurate data.

The second stage of the research focused on case studies. Case studies aimed to provide in-depth analysis of the costs and other factors associated with population mobility. Case studies have been fed in, not only by an analysis of documents provided by the boroughs and contacts with council officers, but also by interviews with key Borough officers. Interviews were held either face-to-face or by telephone (the list of interviewees is at Appendix B and the semi-structured questionnaire is provided at Appendix C). The questionnaire was produced after detailed analysis of questionnaires used in the URBACT study on population mobility.

Seven boroughs, from inner and outer London, were identified for their high rates of population turnover and other relevant attributes. They are Hounslow, Barking & Dagenham, Lewisham, Haringey, Newham, Westminster and Redbridge.

The case study boroughs have different characteristics in terms of populations moving in and out. For example, Haringey can be characterised as a gateway to London for different types of groups arriving in London. The rate of non British national migrants and placements in temporary accommodation are high compared with other boroughs. Redbridge appears as an area where people move in as the result of upgrade movements. Case study choices include boroughs located close together so that the differences or similarities of population mobility impacts can be better compared.

Other key stakeholders also interviewed were the Association of Directors of Social Services, the Institute for Community Cohesion and the National Housing Federation.

The investigation has focused particularly on three types of public services: general administration, personal social services, and education and children services. Housing has also been identified as a key area.

Using this material (the interviews with over 20 officials in the case study boroughs, the collection of boroughs' research, and other findings) the research team was able to undertake analysis and estimates looking at the costs to services and social cohesion. The last stage of the research has therefore been to analyse interview results and to quantify costs of mobility, as far as the information produced by boroughs allows. Interview findings were also compared to the data extracted from the literature. As a

result, some policy recommendations and opportunities for further research will be outlined.

3. Research findings

Our research findings are based both on documents provided by the case study areas and interviews with key informants in the seven boroughs.

Barking & Dagenham, Barnet, Enfield, Haringey, Westminster and a number of other boroughs have undertaken research about issues relating to population totals, mobility and transience. Hackney have recently published their own study of mobility (Hackney, 2006) while authorities such as Slough, with very similar characteristics to London, have undertaken research on the question. An important issue that has been addressed is the concern about the accuracy of the 2001 Census and the extent to which what data there are do not reflect the later upswing in immigration.

Further research by the boroughs has looked at the impact of mobility on electoral registration, the demand for national insurance numbers, homelessness impacts, the costs of temporary accommodation and other housing issues. There is evidence that a number of authorities, such as Hounslow, are also in the process of commissioning research about mobility-related issues.

The most detailed research is that undertaken with London Councils on the costs that mobility imposes on education. Studies (eg, Association of London Government, 2005; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006) have shown how pupil mobility and a set of wider issues affect the costs and quality of schools. This study did not seek further evidence about the impact of mobility and transience within education, but concentrated its efforts on other services which have hitherto received less attention.

In the main however, authorities had little capacity to produce detailed evidence on the costs associated with particular types of transience; although many can provide some ideas on numbers of people served. The only exceptions tended to be where cost data at the aggregate level had been brought together to enable the borough to bid for central government funding to address particular costs –notably lately on the costs of rooflessness among A8 migrants.

The LSE team interviewed over 20 officers in seven boroughs together with other stakeholders (see Appendix B). There was real evidence, among those interviewed, of a willingness to engage with and understand the issue. However, in part because the Government has shown little interest in examining the impact of population mobility, evidence across boroughs was not kept consistently.

3.1 The understanding of ‘mobility’ and transience

Most interviewees mention the diversity of in-movers to their borough. Issues concerning mobility and transience are often not seen as separate from the more traditional ones of ethnic minority status and asylum seekers. When asked about the borough’s experience of population mobility and its consequences, many officers describe the diversity of the authority’s in-migrants and/or their problems. Such issues may be an element in mobility, though they are not precisely the same issue.

Some officials observed that there are different kinds of migrant: some may generate costs for the borough, though others will bring few costs. Indeed, aspiring migrants may drive up the quality of local services which might, in the longer term, reduce the costs of their provision.

There is a strong perception that mobility has increased in recent years. Some boroughs, eg Barking & Dagenham, have commissioned studies that track the movement of people in and out of their borough. Others, eg Westminster, have undertaken significant official inquiries into population totals because of perceived failures in the 2001 Census. There is widespread belief that the Census was an imprecise measure of some boroughs' populations.

3.2 Separating 'mobility' from other issues

Some boroughs are concerned with fast-rising populations, while others are seeing much slower growth. Even where there is overall population stability, there are large numbers of people moving in and out – creating 'churn'. Much work is, it would appear, being undertaken (or is about to be commissioned) about the accuracy of official population figures (eg, in Harrow, Hounslow, Westminster and Haringey). Few boroughs believe either the Census or mid-year estimates represent an accurate assessment of their total population. There is more interest in getting these overall numbers 'right' than in the costs and consequences of mobility/transience. However, the difficulties of describing and measuring the costs of transience may inhibit consideration of the issue.

3.3 Evidence about higher costs

High costs are a feature of a number of boroughs' administrative services. One Director of Finance (of an 'outer' borough with 'inner' characteristics) stated: "when you look at the costs per claim, a lot of the difference [between his borough's costs and those of other authorities] – though not all – goes away". The implication is that turnover is a major factor in generating additional costs. Council tax collection, benefits administration, electoral registration and a number of other administrative services will be affected by such rises in transaction numbers.

Housing and homelessness services are particularly affected by mobility. As new migrants move into the city, some will qualify for local authority assistance. Any increase in migration above a long-term trend will generate an equivalent margin of higher costs. The NHS and social services are also believed to suffer significantly greater costs than would otherwise be the case as a result of mobility and transience.

One borough had done particularly detailed work on the numbers of migrants involved - in the context of council tax over 40,000 per annum, but only 14,000 for electoral registration. However in the main it is not possible to separate the costs associated with migrants as such from others with similar problems. In particular it is not possible to clarify the marginal costs of additional migrants – although there was qualitative evidence that costs per case increased with the number of cases above the borough's expected average, in part because of stress on the system.

The following tables set out the potential direct and indirect costs of mobility for different public service areas and of different types of mobility and mobile household.

Table: Potential direct and indirect costs of mobility for different public service areas

	Direct costs	Indirect costs: Higher for some groups (frequent movers, asylum seekers, ex-offenders)
Housing	Housing advice Refurbishment after departure Decorating and/or repairing empty homes Rent arrears management Administrative cost of allocation of housing to one household / individual Running hostels/ temporary accommodation Securing homes from vandals/squatters Inspecting homes, performing statutory electric checks, and; time delay until new resident starts paying rent	Special housing support Unquantifiable additional workload for social workers Indirect costs of overcrowding
General Administration	National Insurance Number registrations Voting rolls registrations Information to new residents (recycling for example) Translation services Council tax collection Planning services - Respect of planning rules and procedures – loss of the benefits of regeneration schemes	Costs induced by lack of information on the population, for example, too many people registered Waste of resources (for example in terms of waste management, bins, plastic bags) Changes of population mix – implies changes in translation needs
Schools	Registrations (administrative) School material (books/ notebooks) Additional Tutorials Language courses	Disruption to class learning path Unquantifiable additional workload for teachers
Social Services	Translation services Registrations	Specific support to homeless people, asylum seekers, women escaping violent households
Health Services	GP registrations Heavy operations (lack of regular checks) Emergency services	Mental health treatment Treatment of addictions

Table: Potential direct and indirect costs of different types of mobility and different types of mobile household

Group	Proportional cost Become higher in proportion with the rate of mobility/numbers of mobile households	Disproportionate cost Quantity and nature of service delivery, associated with the type of movers
Students	Registrations Information Administrative costs	
Households in the private rented sector	Registrations Information Administrative costs	
Households with multiple social problems	Registrations Information Administrative costs	Specific social services support Health and addiction issues Education and child welfare issues Policing
Rough sleepers	Information Administrative costs	Registrations Policing Specific support Hostel accommodation
Statutorily homeless households	Registrations Information Administrative costs	Specific support Temporary accommodation Education and child welfare issues
Asylum seekers	Registrations Information Administrative costs	Translation costs Temporary accommodation Special support services Health and addiction issues Education and child welfare issues
International migrants	Registrations Information Administrative costs	Translation costs Time necessary for service delivery

3.4 The measurement of costs

Most officers interviewed had no rigorous and reliable numbers for the additional costs generated by mobility/transience – even where they were certain there were such costs. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given that Whitehall departments and inspectors have generally shown little concern for the issue. There is a risk that councils do not measure the costs of mobility because they do not feel central departments take the issue seriously. However, some were able to supply their own estimates of the kinds of costs associated with mobility and transience.

Examples of costs included:

Electoral registration

Examples were provided by boroughs of the need for one or more additional staff post to process additional electoral registration because of population mobility. Annual cost estimated as at least c£30,000 to £35,000 to deal with c500 to c575 additional registrations. Applied uniformly across all London boroughs, this might imply an additional cost of just over £1m per annum for electoral registration

Council tax registration

Turnover of council tax registration may be up to 35 or 40 per cent per annum in some boroughs. Examples were provided of the need for up to eight additional staff posts being required to handle additional council tax registration. This is likely to be a high figure, on the basis of evidence elsewhere. But the complexity of ensuring new migrants understand issues such as the need for registration, the definition of a 'household' and the need to chase arrears (made worse, it was widely stated, by 'buy-to-let') had led to major and increased new demands on many boroughs. Even if there were only one to three additional staff in the average borough, this would imply London-wide additional costs of between £1 million and £3 million per year.

Language/Translation services

New migrants, especially those from countries where English is not widely spoken, often need translation services. Interviewees stated that the influx of people from eastern Europe had significantly increased the demand for translation services. No precise estimates of cost were available, though even modest provision involving five part-time translators would, across the capital cost millions of pounds per year. A BBC report recently estimated that translation services could cost £100 million per year across the country – a figure that was not contradicted by the government. Given the concentration of overseas born residents within London, it appears likely that up to £50 million may need to be spent by public services in London. The boroughs would be likely to fund a significant proportion of this cost.

The Audit Commission report (2007) emphasises the importance of being able to communicate with new migrants across services. It also notes the costs associated with the provision of interpretation services and the different means of providing them. They note a DWP report which suggests that professional interpretation, though costly, may often be necessary (ECOTEC 2004).

Homelessness

Homelessness budgets are probably the most hard-hit by transience. Homelessness is a form of mobility or outcome of mobility in itself, and homeless acceptance generates further mobility as people usually get temporary and then permanent accommodation. People who are in priority need, but were found to be intentionally homeless, can get housing for 28 days, again generating more mobility.

Westminster was able to provide some costs associated with non-Westminster residents who use their homelessness services. They state that in 2004, perhaps £2.77 million - some 20% of the budget for statutory homeless people was employed addressing the problems of non-Westminster residents. These are net costs borne by the General Fund.

On rough sleeping their figures point to an immense churn among those on the street with perhaps a quarter of those found in each count not in the one before. A third of those attending the Passage Day centre only make one visit. A major problem of transience is the amazing amount of churn and therefore set up costs associated with each vulnerable person - it is thus not just the average number supported that matters, but how rapid the turnover is within the total.

Among hostel dwellers in Westminster, nearly 20 per cent come from abroad (within which half have been asylum seekers); a further 20 per cent from outside London, and finally 50 per cent plus from outside Westminster only 8 per cent of hostel dwellers are therefore locals. Westminster does not see trend growth in these figures - which vary with the economic cycle and with policy - but the mix is changing with increasing concerns about homelessness and rough sleeping among A8 migrants.

Temporary accommodation need

London is accepted as having relatively large numbers of households who are accepted as homeless. Overall, the rate of homelessness and concealed homelessness in the capital is (according to work undertaken by Crisis and the New Policy Institute) estimated to run at broadly double the national rate. Local authority costs will include the need to fund hostel places, refuges and bed & breakfast accommodation. According to the Crisis/NPI estimates, the costs associated with these services are: Hostel place: £400 per week; Refuge place: £400 per week; Bed & breakfast place: £150 per week. The costs to councils of interviewing and processing are estimated as between £450 and £850 per place. According to the GLA, there were over 62,000 households in temporary accommodation in the London boroughs in May 2006.

Crisis also notes that the money it is calling for in the Comprehensive Spending Review (£100million a year over three years) is dwarfed by the costs of rehabilitation associated with homelessness. Tribal found that homeless households were five times as likely to need hospital treatment as the average – at £2,500 per admission and eleven times as likely to use other services at £6,000 per event. A homeless person is nearly 50 times more likely to suffer violence at a cost of £360 per occurrence. Overall the costs of homelessness are argued to be as high as £50,000 per annum.

Of course, not all are newly homeless, or 'above-trend', in terms of their mobility. Transience has long been a feature in London. However, given the rapid nature of recent population growth and mobility, a proportion of homelessness costs in London boroughs will be attributable to transience. Such a number is likely, on conservative estimates, to be several tens of millions of pounds per year, though it is impossible to be precise.

The issue of out-of-borough placements of households in temporary accommodation was also raised as a potential mobility cost for the 'receiving' authority. In this

instance, the non-housing costs are borne by the 'receiving' authority rather than the 'originating' one. Boroughs using out-of-borough placements often concentrate on accommodating local households within their own borough. This may mean that the costs of those housed elsewhere can be higher because of lack of family and other support mechanisms.

Street homelessness

In central London authorities, it has been estimated that street homelessness includes 30 to 40 people from Poland. Home Office grant of £167,000 is paid to fund provision – circa £400 to £500 per homeless person. It is not clear whether there are any additional impacts on boroughs' own costs, though this is likely. More generally, street homelessness is the most direct evidence of transience and boroughs with significant problems can be spending many millions in addressing the issues. One borough spoke of settling over 500 rough sleepers in accommodation in 2005/06 as well as providing additional services to transients over the last two years in response to a rapid increase in the numbers needing help mainly from outside the borough and often from outside the country.

Housing advice

Much of the total cost of the service due either to dealing with (forced, unwelcome) mobility or threats of loss of home, or enabling mobility (finding new homes for homeless or those threatened with homelessness).

Permanent housing need

Once new migrants move out of temporary accommodation, many will require permanent homes. Given the pre-existing shortage of such property, mobility will add marginal higher costs on the existing major cost of London housing. This issue is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report.

Social housing lettings

The cost of social housing lettings activities, as a means to, or a form of, mobility, could be all or partly seen as a cost of mobility in itself. Many London and other councils have decided on a cost-benefit basis that levels of turnover amongst the applicant population themselves mean that an annual review of the register is worthwhile. Choice Based Lettings pass some of work of maintaining the register and administering lettings policy to applicants, but in practice have not meant any reduction in local authority and RSL activity, with new roles in advertising access, and providing support to some potential applicants.

Social housing management and maintenance

Several studies of the correlates or drivers of housing management costs point to mobility or tenancy turnover rates. Balkman et al. found that costs correlated with the proportion of flats and resident deprivation (which are likely to be correlated to mobility) (1992). Another study from the same period included mobility as a key correlate, and found that the proportion of flats, average density and the number of

lettings - as an indicator of turnover and mobility - together accounted for up to 75 per cent of the variance in costs between councils (Bines et al., 1993). According to ODPM, BRE found void and re-let levels to be a significant driver of costs. Their national 'need to spend' model estimates that some 14% of total maintenance costs for all England arise simply from works to empty homes. In addition, they found that voids management and allocations account for around 15% of national total management costs (ODPM, 2003b). After this work, ODPM decided recently to add an indicator of mobility to the formulae currently used to calculate management and maintenance costs. Management costs are to be calculated from the number of relets per year and voids, as well as the built form, age and size of each authority's housing stock, repairs backlog, crime levels, and regional variations in building costs. Maintenance costs are to be calculated from the number of re-lets per year and voids rates, as well as the size of the authority and factors such as the proportion of flats. (ODPM, 2003a, 2003b).

As in the case of other local authority revenue functions, maintaining rent accounts and chasing arrears are affected by mobility. Many local authorities have specialised 'former tenants' arrears officers' which are a direct cost of (high) mobility.

Housing-related support

Most of the costs of several other specialised services provided by local authority housing departments, RSLs and social service departments could be attributed to high mobility or attempts to reduce it. These include travellers' services (this was a big issue in the selected boroughs), sustaining tenancies and floating support costs for ex-homeless or otherwise vulnerable people (borne by Local authorities, RSLs, Supporting People budgets, and voluntary organisations), specialised services for asylum seekers and refugees, and all of the costs of temporary accommodation

Houses in multiple occupation

These have, it has been reported to us, rapidly increased in number. Slough BC has estimated it costs £400 per property to investigate each one. Many London authorities are having to devote resources to this issue. Applied in the capital, the Slough numbers would suggest the need to inspect even 10 properties per borough per year would lead to overall costs of £120,000.

Housing benefit requirement (administration)

As in the previous section, 'above trend' mobility generates new housing benefit processing requirements of the kind experienced for council tax and electoral registration. No numbers were quoted by interviewees, but some higher costs are inevitable.

Asylum claim assistance

Although the numbers of asylum seekers are well down on those experienced at their peak, London boroughs remain among the main recipients of new residents who are claiming asylum. Officers will be involved in providing advice and possibly

resources (see below) to such individuals. No estimates are available, though the costs will be real.

Schools

The research cited in the literature survey, undertaken for the Association of London Government, suggested that in a primary school, enrolment of a new child, plus work with the parents and child, averaged 14½ additional hours at an estimated cost of £400 each. For secondary schools, the same process represents an average of 29 hours of additional work and estimated costs of about £800. Moreover the study also reported that pupil mobility also required difficult-to-quantify work involving teachers and others such as extra learning and teaching support staff, which has been estimated to fall within a range of zero to 62 hours per child.

Above-trend mobility and transience will add to the costs of many London schools. In some cases, the proportion of pupils arriving and leaving during the course of a year can range from a third to a half. In other parts of the country, such numbers would be very much lower.

English language training

New migrants will, in many cases, require language training to fit them out for life in Britain. Interviewees in a number of boroughs observed that they believed people move to an authority in the first instance and then, as they become more settled, move on. Some boroughs find themselves having to provide language training for an ‘escalator’ of people moving into the country. While no estimates of cost were given, even modest levels of language training for a London ‘foreign-born’ population that increases by 100,000 per annum would cost tens of millions of pounds. (20,000 people trained at a cost of £1,000 per head would lead to total costs of £20 million).

Council tax benefit requirement

As with housing benefit turnover, the demands of a mobile population will add to those that would normally be experienced in any authority. The risk that complex rules might be misunderstood, or of fraud, mean that new migrants will require a disproportionate amount of time devoted to their cases. Interviewees confirmed this issue, but no cost estimates were available.

Social services needs

The URBACT report discussed in the literature survey considered ‘transition costs’ as people moved from one status to another after they arrive in Britain. There is a need for services assisting people as they move from specialist support services to mainstream provision, and as groups such as asylum seekers move towards self-reliance. Interviewees accept this is an issue, though cost estimates were not available.

A DfES/GOL report (2006), undertaken by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and considered in the literature review (see Appendix A), concluded that many services would be affected by the consequences of mobility among the young. The government’s consultants stated: “In London, and the local authorities surrounding London which

children and young people move between, the challenge to be able to adapt is particularly high. This is because of the disproportionately high numbers of children in need and looked after children, and the high level of movement in London, within and between Boroughs for schooling and other statutory and non-statutory services”.

Destitution costs

Boroughs are, by law, responsible for support to persons from abroad with no recourse to public funds. One borough provided details of its need to spend about £1.2 million in 2005-06 on such support. Other authorities would generally need to spend rather less than this, but the overall cost across London will probably range from £10 to £20 million.

Regeneration

Efforts to regenerate boroughs must ‘run hard to stand still’ in places such as Southwark and Newham. Ambitious populations move on once they have become successful, making achievement of government targets difficult. Costs are higher because the authority is always starting again with new residents.

Planning

Planning departments have additional costs as new populations behave differently and/or make new demands on the area. Examples of new, informal, housing development were reported in one borough, though others accepted that new communities may, on occasion, use housing in innovative ways that challenge existing planning rules. Others have met costs because of need for new churches on non-traditional sites.

The NHS

Although not a borough responsibility, the NHS was widely reported by borough officers to suffer significant costs, as many new migrants do not register with GPs, so people go immediately to Accident & Emergency services. Moreover, it is hard to undertake any preventive care with many mobile/new populations. There will be knock-on cost implications for social services as a result of NHS costs.

Overall assessment

There is no way that the numbers cited above can be added together to produce a single, robust, total for ‘mobility costs’ within London. We have been clear that it is difficult to be precise even about ‘above trend’ mobility let alone disproportionate costs. Nor is it possible to draw a line between whether particular expenditure needs result from ‘transience’ or more normal factors.

What is clear is that transients and migrants fall into two main categories – those that are likely to impose lower than average costs on services because they do not need to use these services and often do not even register to do so; and those that have needs over and above the average mover – in some cases far in excess because of particular household circumstances and earlier experiences.

More generally, increased population and mobility clearly put stress on existing services and therefore increased costs – either direct or social costs - because of poorer services and unequal access. In this context it is easy to see that new entrants (whether or not they are potentially transient) will be seen as one of the causes of inadequate services -and this then leads on to difficulties – and the need for expenditure on political management and initiatives to improve social inclusion.

The figures suggested in the sub-headings above would imply annual costs to London boroughs of substantial sums that are very likely to exceed £100 million per annum and which might do so by a larger amount.

4. Implications for Public Services

The literature survey, interviews and other research conducted for this study have produced much evidence about the impact of population mobility and transience on services provided both by London boroughs and other public services. It is evident that those providing such services are, in many cases, able to point to costs, pressures on staff, and a lack of effective provision for many residents who move to or within the authority.

However, there are significant difficulties (as stated earlier) in making precise measurements of many of the impacts of mobility. It is possible to produce evidence of the kind quoted in the State of the English Cities Report which showed that both within-UK and international migration had a significantly greater impact in London than in other kinds of city, town and rural area. There appears to be a settled pattern of people moving in large numbers in and out of London, to the rest of the UK, and to and from overseas.

Many London borough officers see their authority as facing a population that is constantly changing. For those such as Barking & Dagenham, Newham, Haringey Hounslow and Lewisham (though this finding will undoubtedly apply to others such as Southwark, Hackney and even parts of Westminster) there is a strong sense that people move into the borough (generally at the very start of their time in London) and then move on to another authority.

New migrants to an authority are likely to require some or all of a number of public services. The poorer and more dependent such people are, the greater the likely cost to the authorities concerned. These costs, many of which have been discussed above, include those listed below. Potential service demands, which will not apply to all migrants, are listed in broad order they are likely to be needed.

- Temporary accommodation need
- Translation services
- Housing benefit requirement
- Asylum claim assistance
- Registration at school(s)
- English language training
- Council tax registration
- Council tax benefit requirement
- Social services needs
- Permanent housing need
- Home adaptation need
- Re-registration for council tax
- Re-registration for council tax benefit
- Planning service demands
- Environmental service demands

Thus, it is possible to imagine a stylised account of a new family arriving in a borough, such as Newham or Barking & Dagenham, who might go through the

following process of assimilation and service use. It is not likely that a single family would follow this precise path and in this order, but the general point is well made.

International migration

On first arrival, they may immediately need temporary accommodation. It may be necessary for the authority to have translation services ready to help with processing their requirements. Once accommodation has been found, there will almost certainly be a need for a housing benefit claim. Some migrants will have asylum problems that the council may need to provide advice about. If there are children in the household, it will be important to move them as quickly as possible into a local school. Both children and their parents may then require English language training. Any household that does not pay rent inclusive of council tax will have to register for council tax. Many new householders will qualify for council tax benefit. Once settled into a home and school, it is likely that some will need social services support and will then seek permanent accommodation from a social landlord. Processing such demands may be complex because of the limited availability of homes and the needs-based allocation system.

A permanent or longer-term temporary home may need adaptation for elderly or disabled members of the household. Where there is a movement from temporary to permanent (or new temporary) accommodation, it will be necessary to re-register for council tax, council tax benefit and housing benefit. New householders may then decide to change their homes, thus requiring planning services. Similarly, new residents may place additional demands on local environmental provision, especially if they are from a significantly different cultural background to that found in London.

Few new migrants to London will understand who does what and how to access services. 'The Council' will inevitably be the first reference point for virtually all cases. Although it might be argued that the stylised account above might apply to any new household moving to London, the research conducted for this report has undoubtedly suggested there has been a significant growth in mobility and thus in the kind of demands on councils suggested above. The overall international migration data shown in Table 1 of this report attest to the radical change that has occurred in international movement. Many of our interviewees believed (and could in some cases produce evidence) that population estimates were significantly under-counting international migration to London.

Mobility within London

Costs relating to mobility can occur quite independently of international migration or of any form of long distance migration. Another stylised account describes an individual or a household that may have lived in London for many years, even for the entire lives of all its members, but with frequent changes of address within the city.

For some households, frequent moves can be a symptom of multiple social problems, including poverty, mental health problems, addictions, learning difficulties, violent personal relationships, and difficulty coping with family and household responsibilities, with neighbours, or involvement in crime (Keane and Corbishley, 1999; DCLG, 2005). Households may choose to move home to get away from

problems with neighbours, from or debts, or to try to improve their situation. They may be forced to move through conflict with neighbours or debtors, rent arrears, or pressure or legal proceedings from private or social landlords, or loss of owned homes. Local authorities and other public agencies may have intense contact with these households on a reactive basis or at times of crisis. In addition to providing extra assistance to enable household members to register with standard services, such as GPs and schools, public agencies may prepare complex - and costly - packages of support or intervention for household members or the entire family, for example combining the activities of police, social services and the health service. However, the disruption of moves, particularly forced moves, may themselves add to households' problems, and will clearly derail any service plans. This creates extra costs to services, as designated resources may go unused, while staff time is spent in re-establishing links with the household. The household may have moved to another administrative area or service team, even if they are within the same borough, so that relationships between services and between the household and services have to be re-established. The household may break up, with different members in different areas yet still possibly requiring support.

Some of this high mobility is likely to be 'concealed mobility', in parallel to and linked to the phenomenon of concealed homelessness. Some studies of areas with low demand for housing have identified small numbers of households who maintained extremely high rates of mobility for extended periods (eg Richardson and Corbishley, 1999). However, the extent to which any household, particularly a multi-member household, and particularly one with child members, can continue to move like this within London's tight housing market is limited. Chaotic and frequently moving individuals may end up as rough sleepers. Chaotic and frequently moving households with children or other recognised vulnerability are likely to end up presenting to a local authority and being accepted as homeless. They may then go through the usual homelessness route, which in itself implies further, if state-sanctioned and supported, mobility. They may receive first of all very short-term temporary accommodation, followed by further temporary accommodation usually in the private rented or social sector, with a view to a secure or assured tenancy in the social rented sector in about two years. This may be in the local authority in which they made the claim, but substantial numbers will be housed further away, meaning support can only be provided once new services have become aware of their needs and new relationships are established.

At any point in this process, if there is insufficient support to enable them to maintain their accommodation, the household may lose or leave its accommodation once more, and move into another cycle of homelessness.

Some borough respondents identified small numbers of households involved in this kind of process, whose needs had a disproportionate impact on services, partly due to the costs of their mobility.

Low cost mobility

It is important to note that some mobility into and within London may work to reduce costs. Some boroughs are likely to receive new migrants, or people moving from another London borough, who are travelling up the escalator of establishing

themselves within Britain. Thus, some interviewees have pointed to highly-educated migrants from Africa who are moving into London schools and helping to raise standards. Elsewhere, there is evidence that earlier migrants to London (especially those who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s) are now, as they become more affluent, moving to boroughs such as Redbridge and Harrow where their acquired skills and attributes may make them relatively easy to settle. Of course, these boroughs themselves receive new migrants, so they will face some of the mobility costs discussed elsewhere in this report. But the overall impact of mobility and transience on a number of authorities may be less costly than for others.

The demands on services arising because of mobility will fall on a number of different council departments. What were previously education departments, personal social services, planning, environmental health, housing and central services would all have seen increased costs because of migration and transience. Evidence suggests that auditors will also have had to increase their workload to check the larger numbers of increasingly complex benefit and council tax cases. New 'children's services' departments will now bear the costs of schools and part of social services demands, while in many boroughs there have been other re-configurations of departmental structures. Nevertheless, it remains the case that a number of different departments will have to put in place staff and facilities to cope with an increasingly mobile population.

There are wider implications for London borough services than the direct impacts on departments and officials. In many authorities, there is a painful competition for scarce services and resources. The arrival of mobile populations and new migrants will intensify such competition in ways documented earlier in this report. Because the system of resource allocation, discussed in the following section, is inflexible and slow to respond, there is little doubt that at the margin there is a risk that mobility will create costs and pressures that, in turn, deny services to other local residents. This is potentially a controversial and difficult issue that will also be considered in the section on social cohesion.

A recent example of the potential knock-on impact of mobility costs has been provided by Hillingdon's need to support unaccompanied asylum seekers. These numbers are significant compared with all other local authorities (Heathrow Airport is in the borough) and, while asylum numbers are lower nationally than in recent years, they are still above the numbers that were deemed the 'trend' in the longer-term past.

Hillingdon is supporting 900 unaccompanied asylum seekers, the highest number of any council in Britain. Government grant to support such individuals has been changed, with the result that the council estimates it will have to fund £1.6m for the financial year 2004/05 which was not, at the time, planned for. It will also have to fund £4.7m for the financial year 2005/06 and there will be an estimated on-going future annual impact of £6m.

It is to be expected that a borough with the world's largest international airport would have large numbers of migrants entering it. Many will immediately pass along the Piccadilly Line into other authorities. But a proportion, particularly of groups such as asylum seekers, will stay put. The mobility of the global population shows up relatively visibly in Hillingdon.

There will be an impact both on the borough's services for asylum seekers and also, if there is insufficient government grant, on other services that will face shortfalls if resources are diverted to cover the additional costs of high levels of 'mobile' residents. This example is a particular one, given Heathrow's location, but the principle is likely to hold more generally and for less visible kinds of cost-driver.

5. Social Cohesion

‘Social cohesion’ is a concept that has been used increasingly in recent years to describe the shape and health of civil society within an area. People use the term differently from time to time. But generally the term is applied to the relationships between people living within an area, in terms of their social, economic and cultural relations. Cohesion can be strengthened or weakened by factors such as changes in the economy, demography or the physical environment.

Over the last few years the term has been used particularly in relation to issues around cultural and ethnic differences, notably in response to the riots in Northern cities as a result of which the government introduced social cohesion partnerships. In the context of mobility and transience it is important to distinguish between these rather more specific uses and the more general issue of the health of the community overall.

The *State of the English Cities* report viewed social cohesion as a “multi-faceted notion covering many different kinds of social phenomena. The different dimensions of cohesion include:

- Material conditions, such as employment, income, health, education and housing;
- Social order, safety and freedom from fear, or ‘passive social relationships’;
- Positive interactions, exchanges and networks between individuals and communities, or ‘active social relationships’
- The extent of social inclusion, or integration of people into the mainstream institutions of civil society;
- Social equality, meaning the level of fairness or disparity of access to opportunities or material circumstances (State of the English Cities, Volume 1, p109)

More recently, the new Commission on Integration and Cohesion’s terms of reference included the need to consider how local areas themselves can play a role in forging cohesive and resilient communities, by:

- “a) Examining the issues that raise tensions between different groups in different areas, and that lead to segregation and conflict;
- b) Suggesting how local community and political leadership can push further against perceived barriers to cohesion and integration;
- c) Looking at how local communities themselves can be empowered to tackle extremist ideologies;

d) Developing approaches that build local areas' own capacity to prevent problems, and ensure they have the structures in place to recover from periods of tension" (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2006a).

This latter view of social cohesion is evidently more concerned with particular aspects of migration and political extremism. The fact that it is rather different from the *State of the English Cities* view is indicative of the ways in which the term can be used by people in particular ways.

Whichever definitions or descriptions of social cohesion are used, it is almost certain that mobility will inevitably have an impact on it. Large numbers of people moving in and out of an area will potentially impact upon most aspects of both of the definitions outlined above.

There is a correlation between longevity of residence in an area and the maintenance of 'active social relationships' in the area, an element of social cohesion (eg. as in the State of the English Cities definition). Length of residence is linked to having more friends and relatives in the area, and to the availability of social support (Coulthard, 2000). There is even evidence that length of residence may have health effect, for example on the likelihood of smoking, possibly partly because people with more social support are able to lead healthier lives (Parkes and Kearns, 2004). Length of residence has also been linked to the degree of social mixing between owners and renters in areas where tenure had been diversified with the specific hope of increasing social cohesion across housing tenure and income groups (Atkinson and Kintrea, 1998). London has already been found to be the 'least neighbourly' region in England, with people least likely to know and trust their neighbours (Coulthard et al., 2002), partly because of high mobility rates.

It is local authorities that carry out and provide many of the statutory duties and services such as electoral registration, children's education, and personal social services that condition 'mainstream institutions' which all people need to be integrated into to support 'social equality' which are elements of social cohesion (eg. According to the State of the English Cities definition). As we have seen, high or increased population mobility creates extra difficulties and costs for local authorities and other service providers in integrating people into these mainstream institutions.

The additional unrecognised costs to public services resulting from high mobility could also create challenges for maintaining and building social cohesion. Where mobility is higher, people may have fewer friends and relatives in the area, and less social support, and are less likely to be involved in local organisations, which could all create greater demands on public services to perform these functions instead. In some cases, there is a direct, undesirable, link between migration/mobility and political behaviour. A 2005 study for the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (Rowntree, 2005, p15) suggested that extremist political parties were exploiting (unfounded) allegations about the priority given to new migrants in public service provision.

The Department for Communities and Local Government, in its 2006 study *Moving on: reconnecting frequent movers*, stated that frequent movers can have a number of unfortunate impacts on social cohesion:

- they create feelings of anxiety and have a destabilising effect on long-term residents;
- cause fears that community identity will change;
- give rise to perceptions of ‘special treatment’ for newcomers;
- lead to mixed feelings among communities about special services that may be offered.

This official summary of the social cohesion impacts certainly ties in the research undertaken in London for this study. The costs for political management of such impacts is impossible to measure, but real.

Evidence from interviews and other sources pointed to a number of important issues relating mobility and transience to social cohesion issues. First, a number of respondents noted that the increasingly diverse nature of in-migration to their boroughs had reduced the concentrations of particular minorities and indeed led to a situation where ‘we are all minorities now’. In some ways this was seen as easing the situation – although there were always likely to be tensions relating to the last entrants.

Secondly, the rapid rise in employment related migration was seen as generating problems of anti-social behaviour and local neighbourhood management – often simply because of the lack of leisure or adequate housing facilities which result in workers congregating on the streets.

Much of the research which has been undertaken points to concerns arising from competition for housing and the extent to which priority needs take precedence over what are seen as local entitlements . This is particularly the case in the context of overcrowding, as in most London boroughs this is increasing rapidly in the social sector resulting in long waits for rehousing even where the household is statutorily overcrowded.

More general issues were seen as arising from a simple lack of information and communication. In this context the role of the local authority is often seen to be to help organise (and indeed fund) local voluntary organisations that have more knowledge and expertise on the ground.

It is worth stressing again that many of the perceived problems come more from rapid growth in demand than from mobility as such. Also many boroughs have been used to high turnover rates and do not see that as the sore issue – rather that the attributes of migrants are changing and it is costly to develop adequately flexible systems to respond to their needs.

Finally it should be carefully noted that many respondents saw migrants as improving conditions in the area both in terms of education and of employment and local spending power. Migration and mobility are normal processes. But the rate of increase over the last few years has put particular strains on the system which can be expected to continue.

6. Implications for Resource Allocation

The English system of government, which is highly centralised by the standards of most developed countries, requires over 95 per cent of all tax revenues to be paid to the Exchequer. Council tax, the sole revenue determined beyond the centre (by local government), raises only five per cent of all government income. Moreover, because local taxation is capped, there is virtually no discretion in determining overall local taxation or expenditure levels.

As a consequence of this top-down system of control, local authorities and other public bodies receive funding either through distribution formulae or as the result of bidding systems. Because England has a diverse and complex population of 50million, the success of formulae and other allocation methods is heavily dependent upon the quality of data and other information passed from the local level to the centre. A number of funding formulae are in use within England, including separate ones for local government, schools, housing, the NHS and learning & skills.

If the allocation formulae effectively reflected the need to spend of particular services from place to place, and if the data used within the formulae are up-to-date and accurate, the costs of particular spending needs will be quickly registered and funded precisely. In effect, the national formula would react to local expenditure need and move resources to meet it in broadly the way an autonomous local government might – if it had the freedom to determine its own resources locally.

However, if the formula and/or data are out-of-date or inaccurate, there will be a mismatch between the emergence of new spending demands and the capacity to meet them. Unfortunately, there is much evidence that the local government, schools and housing funding formulae in use in England are most unlikely to react to changing demography rapidly enough to ensure new demands for services are met.

Thus, for example, the Formula Grant which is used to equalise between authorities for spending need variations (and separately for differences in the tax base) does not directly measure the costs of disproportionate transience or mobility. There are indicators within the formula that use numbers for “low achieving ethnic groups” and “children in black ethnic groups” as proxies for the higher costs deemed to be associated with some minority ethnic populations. There is a judgemental allowance for population “sparsity” in rural areas and for “area costs” in higher-cost authorities. But there is no explicit factor within the formula grant for mobility or the costs of transience or for cost-drivers such as the need for language services or political management issues.

Difficulty of measuring transience may itself make including such a measure within formulae very difficult. The research that has been undertaken for the current report suggests there are significant problems in defining mobility or transience, particularly within a city such as London where there have been significant changes in the trend of mobility. There is no systematic evidence about the costs of transience and thus it has hitherto been difficult to present methodologically robust arguments that central grants should start to reflect such costs.

Moreover, changes in recent years to the operation of the Formula Grant system will have further limited the possibility that new or evolving expenditure needs could be reflected in the distribution of resources. First, the government has largely frozen the formula used. Second, damping mechanisms (technically known as ‘floors’) have been built into grant distribution to limit the scale of changes from year to year. Third, schools’ funding has been ring-fenced and is now largely allocated between authorities on the basis of a near-flat percentage increase from year to year. The extent of year-to-year differentiation in grant allocation has been significantly reduced as compared with the way the system operated in the past.

Perhaps the only hope for authorities with new or emerging spending needs is that the government will be prepared to recognise them in judgementally-determined targeted grant based on a proxy measure which replicates the characteristics of highly mobile areas. It seems less likely than in the past that formula-based grants will be made sensitive to emerging needs.

7. Conclusions

This study of mobility and transience has attempted to research the experience and knowledge of London boroughs so as to broaden the understanding of a complex set of issues. Most people would assume that an increase in population mobility and transience would produce costs and social change issues, particularly in the urban centres where it has long been recognised that a rapidly-changing population can have challenging consequences.

The research shows that London boroughs have faced a significant increase in international in-migration, a parallel rise in out-migration to the rest of the United Kingdom, and consequent changes in the resident base. No other part of the country faces anything like it in terms of scale and complexity. There is relatively little literature on the subject of mobility and even fewer quantitative studies of the issue. For example, a recent study of migration to rural areas (Commission for Rural Communities, 2007) made no estimates of the service costs of the changes shown. This absence is explained partly by the relative novelty of mass international in-migration to the UK and partly by the difficulty in finding a precise way of researching 'mobility' and 'transience'.

Mobility is not a simple issue. For a start, not all mobility drives up costs. Some new migrants demand very few services. Some, by their aspirational behaviour, improve the quality of public service outcomes and thus, at the very least reduce cost pressures. Interviewees made clear that some migrants were of this latter kind.

Moreover, mobility and transience issues are often confused with phenomena such as migration, ethnicity and asylum seeking. Any or all of these factors are likely to generate costs and/or cohesion consequences for London boroughs. But they are not, of themselves, 'mobility' costs. It may be difficult to separate out some of the public service costs of, say, new migrants from mobility as such.

Nevertheless, the research conducted strongly suggests there are costs and social cohesion consequences that flow from increased mobility to London. A more mobile population is, in many cases, likely to weaken the conditions that support cohesion. DCLG's own research has accepted this point (DCLG, 2006a).

Some services self-evidently face costs associated with mobility. Schools that face very high turnover of pupils can identify costs (some of which are cited above) that result from the regular movement of children in and out of their institutions. Housing, which is a major challenge to London, can identify costs related to homelessness, hostels, asylum and rough sleepers. A tiny proportion of the population, often highly-mobile, find themselves destitute and thus become entitled to receive limited local funds.

London boroughs face mobility costs that, though hard to measure, are real. The rapid change in the capital's population in recent years means these pressures will remain 'above trend'. Of course, there are a number of other councils in broadly similar positions, though some of them, eg Slough, adjoin London.

In a country with a highly-centralised public finance system, sensitivity to the needs, costs and cohesion questions posed by mobility will inevitably focus back on Whitehall. The relatively inflexible nature of many funding formulae, and the poor data upon which many of them are based, means that the government is likely to have to look to targeted resource streams to meet the additional needs of authorities with high mobility-related costs. The political risks involved in failing to meet the cohesion needs of areas with mobile populations could be significant.

The research base needs to be improved. The Government itself should undertake work to assess the order of magnitude of the costs that come with mobility and transience of different kinds. There would need to be an agreed way of understanding and defining these concepts.

None of this would be impossible. The British Government often says it wishes to pursue evidence-based policy. The measurement of mobility and transience, and the costs associated with delivering public services in areas challenged by rapid change, would be a good place to undertake research. London councils would provide a rich basis for study.

Appendix A: Selective Literature Survey

There are few studies that specifically focus on population mobility of turnover in London. In general, academic literature and policy documents focus on the impacts of international migration and/or ethnic minority populations on community cohesion. When documents investigate population turnover they tend to focus on particular groups, whose arrival or mobility creates specific problems for public services delivery in the boroughs, such as children, asylum seekers or homeless people.

The documents described below are some that provide information of relevance to the current research. Most of these studies do not provide any quantification of the cost of population mobility or hard evidence of the measurable impacts of the disturbance caused by impacts on local cohesion. It is not a full survey of every report that has ever been undertaken on mobility and transience. Moreover, some studies will be separately discussed in a section on housing and homelessness later in the report. But the documents considered here give a flavour of the kind of research that has been undertaken about mobility and transience in Britain.

A.1 Implications of population mobility

URBACT study: *Building Sustainable Urban Communities*, GLE, 2005

The URBACT study is the most comprehensive study of transience and population mobility achieved. It was led by a team from Greater London Enterprise (GLE) in partnership with researchers from Berlin, Brussels and the Association of London Government. The study was supported by the European Regional Development Fund through URBACT. The URBACT Programme is intended to develop exchanges of experience between European cities and organisations working within them.

The study “aims to provide an overview of the population mobility trends at the local level and provide recommendations to improve local service provision and delivery, ensuring a greater responsiveness to changing local needs” (URBACT study, p 4).

The definition of mobility used in the study was as follows: “residential mobility rate can be considered as rate of population changing their address during a fixed period of time” (URBACT study, p 7) This concept nevertheless needed to embrace a number of related factors, eg:

- churn which is described as ‘highly localised’ and related to ‘turnover’;
- migration, relating to ‘moves over a longer distance’;
- frequent mobility;
- transience defined as ‘staying or working in a place for a short time only’.

The URBACT study took as its starting point the idea that population mobility has increased in recent years due to the role of big cities as ‘magnets’ and the development of globalisation. The latter has an impact on migration to cities from surrounding regions, from other countries and also on internal mobility within a city.

The study addressed the difficulty of creating and developing sustainable communities. The research project focused specifically on deprived neighbourhoods, particularly ‘entry points’ to the cities and what is perceived as mobility leading to particular problems, notably international migration and its consequences. Problems faced by disadvantaged groups and linked to high mobility, notably in terms of access to public services, was investigated. The perceived failure of regeneration initiatives in a number of such areas is attributed by the URBACT report to population mobility. The study also identified ‘non mobility’ as a possible indicator of disadvantage for a neighbourhood.

In London, the study focused on specific groups, namely, homeless people, asylum seekers, refugees and members of BAME groups. The project was particularly concerned with the higher costs of mobility associated with such groups. It did not consider the positive benefits of population mobility.

Although there were clear differences between the three cities analysed, the methodology of the study was similar in London, Berlin and Brussels, and consisted three stages: first, analysis of statistical data, second, a survey-based analysis of local mobility patterns and factors behind them, and third the output of focus groups with key stakeholders. It also sought to identify and describe best practice in dealing with the impacts of population mobility.

The research findings underline key difficulties in measuring population mobility. In the United Kingdom it was found there was no specific or agreed measurement of population mobility in use.

The most frequently used data to track mobility in the UK, as highlighted below, may not measure frequent moves:

- the population Census (Office for National Statistics): registers up to one move in the year preceding the census;
- GPs record new registrations with doctors;
- Housing Needs Survey: examining housing requirements (needs, aspirations and demands) in 27 of the London boroughs;
- Survey of English Housing: quantifies households which have been in their current address for less than 12 months;
- The Labour Force Survey: undertaken each spring quarter includes “information on whether respondents have changed their place of residence in the past 12 months”;
- council tax turnover data.

Records of population mobility involving individuals or families who need two or more services cannot be easily shared because of the requirements of data protection legislation. In the other two countries, a population register is held: registration of newcomers to local authority areas is compulsory, but nevertheless imperfect.

The results of the study are afterwards summarised, city-by-city for Berlin, Brussels and London. General conclusions can be drawn from the city studies in terms of factors affecting mobility and reasons for moving. The main factors behind mobility identified in the study were: disadvantage, homelessness, international displacement

(asylum seekers), overcrowding and lone parenthood. Clearly not all of these issues are relevant only to international in-migrants.

In Berlin there is evidence people from ethnic minority backgrounds are more likely to move home. The URBACT survey identified the main reasons for moving as follows: better access to a range of shops, better accessibility, the proximity of family members and/or friends, more convenient access to a religious institution, a better socio-cultural and/or housing offer, as well as changes in household composition. A mixture of life-stage reasons (change in household composition, friends etc) and area characteristics thus appears to be the key driver of mobility. In terms of policy recommendations, the Berlin study concluded with a recommendation of a better integration of ethnic minorities. In terms of public services, the Berlin study focused on schools, the decisions to move being mostly influenced by the quality of educational services.

The Brussels study recorded increased mobility and also tended to focus on migration patterns more than on mobility as such. The impacts of the procedures of naturalisation within Belgium were quantified. Population mobility is identified as a factor that ‘destabilises the economy and labour market’: people are seen as moving to Brussels to find a job and then out of the city once they have found employment, creating problems for tax ‘flight’ as middle class and more affluent people move out of Brussels. The price of housing and a lack of rented affordable housing are also recognised as key factors resulting from population mobility. The Brussels study focuses on access to social services by disadvantaged groups and actions taken in order adapt legislation and procedures to, for example, allow people without an address to be recorded by social services providers and to encourage refugees to have better access to public services.

In London, attention was drawn to the existence of a core of frequent movers (Fordham Research, 2005) and on the positive role of a choice-based system of accommodation allocation in preventing turnover (study on Glasgow in Living in and leaving poor neighbourhood conditions in England, Kearns A., Parkes A., 2002). The URBACT study provides its own literature review about population mobility in London. The findings of the URBACT literature review were then used alongside the results of a survey of London boroughs, including focus groups.

Three types of population residential mobility were identified, on basis of the London Analytical Report (ODPM, 2003):

- students living in private rented accommodation, mostly changing from year to year;
- transient workforce spending the beginning/height of their career in London before moving on;
- asylum seekers in temporary accommodation around London and moving through London (URBACT study, p 38, citing ODPM, 2003)

URBACT recognised that the first two kinds of mobility might be considered as part of the “normal” mobility of a city. The movement of asylum seekers raises concerns

about the instability and costs that temporary households can generate for local public services (and, indeed, for the life chances of the individuals concerned). The study also considered “micro” and “macro” – personal reasons for movement or institutional/economic/social ones. The report is also clear that not all mobility is costly or problematic.

Looking at mobility and vulnerable groups, the URBACT team concluded “the experiences of residential mobility and how these link to situations of disadvantage cannot be summarised as a simple set of trends and patterns”. However, the most vulnerable among those that move most frequently were seen as being: “homeless people, asylum seekers and refugees and people from black and minority ethnic origin”. The report then discussed (URBACT study, pp 45-50) the consequences of mobility for these vulnerable groups. Some of these consequences include barriers to access and language problems. The implication of barriers of this kind is that there is pent-up demand from new migrants to London and other cities.

The impact on public services is seen as threefold: mobility impacts on the type of services that have to be provided, on the way services are provided, and on the ability of public services to meet targets. Public services on which an impact has been identified by boroughs through the URBACT survey and focus groups were the following :

- **Education**
Pupil turnover has a detrimental impact on a student’s academic achievement and cost implications for schools. Inner London averages conceal in-year mobility rates as high as 60 per cent within particular schools. Pupil mobility is worsened by use of temporary accommodation.
- **Housing**
Mobility, in some circumstances, places additional pressures on housing services and can increase demand for affordable accommodation. Out of borough placements were a seriously problematic issue, leading to social segregation and higher costs for ‘receiving’ boroughs.
- **Housing benefits**
High levels of housing turnover affects the processing of housing benefits claims.
- **Regeneration and worklessness services**
Some evidence that worklessness service provision may be affected in terms of target performance. The difference between active and inactive mobility may have reduced the overall employment rate, despite the success of programme delivery.
- **People with special needs**
The problems of finding housing stock for people with learning difficulties are compounded by mobility. Such additional need generates the need to travel to access services.

- **Elderly people**
Increased mobility and dispersal of families has reduced the unpaid care available for older people.
- **Social services**
A wide range of social services are, according to the URBACT study, “certainly” affected by population turnover. Mobility of families makes it difficult to keep track of children who are at risk of abuse and also of young offenders.
- **Tracking people**
Increased mobility makes it more likely the vulnerable will ‘fall through the net’ of different services. Some families may move to evade ‘the system’.
- **Asylum seekers**
Costs include: the need for translation services, information adapted for people from different cultural backgrounds and helping newly-arrived people overcome trauma or stress.
- **Health services**
People living in poor and/or temporary accommodation are more likely to suffer physical and/or mental health problems. Homeless households tend to be high users of accident & emergency services at hospitals.
- **Resource allocation**
Mobility affects the accuracy of population figures which are used to determine central government grants to local authorities. There may be a disproportionate need for additional spending as a result of new, mobile, residents.
- **Council tax collection**
High levels of residential turnover can lead to higher collection costs for local taxation.
- **Environmental services**
Some authorities reported increased difficulties in relation to the provision of advice and enforcement in relation to environmental matters, particularly at the lower, mobile, end of the private housing market.
- **Planning**
Planning policy was deemed to be impacted by mobility. For example, the number of single-person households had not been as large as anticipated, while the need for family homes had grown. Data about changing populations are poor.
- **‘Transition services’**
There is a need for services assisting people as they move from specialist support services to mainstream provision as groups such as asylum seekers move towards self-reliance.

- **Community cohesion**

Local people believe that transient residents are less likely to become involved in the locality. Civic engagement may indeed be low among new migrants. Some new groups are stigmatised by the media, causing local resentment. A mobile population may rapidly change the needs of an area, rendering earlier regeneration less successful than it might otherwise have been. Political management will be needed to handle these and other issues.

Having catalogued the services that are likely to be affected by population mobility, the URBACT researchers did not put any costs to them. In fairness, the project was not intended to achieve such an outcome. The report did conclude “Existing research on the impact of population mobility on local authorities and the services they provide is still at an infant stage”. Moreover a “lack of research may be the consequence of the difficulty in measuring population mobility”...”Faced with the lack of own measurements, boroughs use alternative ways to track mobility such as looking at new council tax accounts or GP registers”. However, even sources such as these are unreliable. Later in the URBACT study, the authors conclude “The direct costs of population mobility should be further evaluated and taken into consideration in the planning of services”.

URBACT provided a good, generalised, summary of the kinds of mobility-related costs that affect London. But it did not venture into the more complex territory of attempting to put numbers to such costs. Indeed, our literature study – like URBACT’s – has not yielded much detailed quantitative information on the subject of services apart from some work completed about schools.

Crossing Borders, Audit Commission, 2007

The latest study by the public services section of the Audit commission examines the local challenges arising from the rapid growth of work related migrants. It notes that at the national scale foreign workers now make up 6% of the workforce as opposed to 3.5 % only a decade ago. It also notes that most of these workers are young and bring no dependents – and therefore tend to use local services only where a crisis occurs. This is more costly per unit – eg a visit to the Accident and Emergency Department rather than the GP – but overall generates well below average costs.

While recognising both the direct costs incurred and concerns about potential social tensions – notably from lack of leisure opportunities and lack of knowledge on the part of local inhabitants – the report provides not costing. What it does do is stress the range of local services that need to be involved, linked to employment, health, education, housing, law and order, and local nuisance and community entitlement and the challenges facing authorities across the country in recognising and addressing these issues.

The Commission also stressed the importance of voluntary and faith organisations in supporting migrants and in addressing problems particularly those of social cohesion.

A.2 Migration and Sustainable Cities

The State of the English Cities report, ODPM, 2006

The State of English Cities report did not include a specific study of population turnover and mobility in London. However, it did include data and information on mobility to/from cities and the UK (including London) and provided an overview of population change patterns and trends in the past 20 years.

A dynamic view of international migration, described in the report, shows that the volume of international migration to Britain has grown considerably in recent years and that the pattern and volume of immigration have therefore been radically modified since the early 1990s. A table in Volume 1 of the report contrasted the flows of migrants within the UK and from outside the UK to different kinds of areas. The results clearly show London's far greater levels of migration than those experienced in other cities or, indeed, less urban areas.

Table 1 Within UK and international components of total net migration, 2002-03

	Net flows		Rate (% population 2002)			
	Within UK	International	Total	Within UK	International	Total
England	-22542	145668	123126	-0.05	0.29	0.25
<i>South and east</i>						
London	-112521	77226	-35295	-1.31	0.90	0.41
Large cities	-10543	13605	3062	-0.30	0.38	0.09
Small cities	-4642	10760	6118	-0.13	0.31	0.18
Large towns	16477	5902	22379	0.35	0.12	0.47
Small towns & rural	82378	3825	86203	0.86	0.04	0.90
<i>North and west</i>						
Metropolitans	-28165	23822	-4343	-0.40	0.34	0.06
Large cities	-7452	7064	-388	-0.23	0.22	0.01
Small cities	5749	3977	9726	0.19	0.13	0.33
Large towns	11598	1768	13366	0.38	0.06	0.44
Small towns & rural	24579	-2281	22298	0.74	-0.07	0.67

(Source: *State of the English Cities* report, Table 3.6, ODPM)

The *State of the English Cities* report included this table because it made a point about the components of population change. But it also shows very clearly the different level of migration impact in London as compared to all other kinds of area within England. The 'turnover' rate implied by migration within the UK (a net outflow) is

significantly higher than for any other area. For example, within-UK migration in London was equivalent to 1.31 per cent of the total population, compared with 0.4 per cent of the population in the other metropolitan areas – less than a third the level. International migration was equivalent to 0.9 per cent of the population in London, compared with less than 0.1 per cent in small towns and rural areas throughout England. The ‘churn’ caused by migration will have increased substantially in the period up to 2002-03 as migration in and out of London from the rest of the UK and to and from the rest of the world has grown.

The main outputs of the *State of the English Cities* report did not examine the impacts of mobility. The authors of these volumes were not concerned with such issues as public service costs. It does, however, consider the evidence on social cohesion, concluding: “There has been improvement in social cohesion in most cities in recent years. This reflects better national performance in spheres such as employment, health and education.....However.....cities still face challenges of social exclusion and inequality.....Cities in the north and west face bigger challenges than those in the south and east” (SEC, Volume 1, page 154)

Many other volumes of evidence have been published under the banner of the *State of the English Cities*, including six new detailed research reports at the end of November 2006. Towards the end of a detailed examination of social cohesion, the authors conclude that “the dynamics of social cohesion are indeed complex and reflect a mixture of local and external forces that interact in ways that can be difficult to disentangle fully, let alone identify appropriate policy interventions”. At the very end of the study of social cohesion, the researchers state: “More substantial support is often required for localities struggling to cope with the special needs of asylum seekers, refugees and other new arrivals. Central government does sometimes not appear to respond quickly enough, or to be sufficiently sympathetic to the extra demands new residents make of local services, including schools, social care, housing and health, especially where English is not the first language and cultural backgrounds differ markedly. Where existing communities are already vulnerable and experiencing economic distress, the arrival of new communities can exacerbate social tensions and generate simmering discontent” (*State of the English Cities Social Cohesion*, DCLG, 2006, page 280)

Although the *State of the English Cities* suite of reports and research did not directly address the impact of mobility on public services, they did publish a number of useful data and conclusions that add weight to the research base about the scale of mobility in London and its likely impacts.

A.3 Schools

Moving Home and Changing School, Widening the analysis of pupil mobility, David Ewens, DMAG Briefing 2005/32, November 2005

Statistics of Schools in London: Key Facts 2001-2005, Karen Osborne, DMAG Briefing 2005/41, November 2005, ISSN 1479-7879

The DMAG documents – published by the Greater London Authority – provide an in-depth analysis of the impact on pupils of moving schools and home. The publications

are thus focused more on the impact on pupils themselves than on the impact on schools and other public institutions. Nevertheless, studies of this kind can provide valuable general information about why pupils that move regularly can be more challenging and expensive to educate (thus increasing institutional costs) than pupils who rarely or never move. The study uses information from the 2002 and 2003 National Pupil Dataset, the annual pupil census.

The definition of mobility used was thus: “pupil mobility is generally understood as the movement of pupils between schools other than at standard times” (URBACT study p1). Research conducted in London has focused on children moving schools as it appears that “young Londoners are more likely to be involved in moving home than in changing schools at non standard times”. Studying the educational impact of children moving home is thus likely to produce evidence about the additional costs of mobility.

The key findings of the study confirmed that there “seems to be a relationship between educational achievements and children either moving home or changing schools” . Of the pupils studied (in the academic year 2002-03), pupils who did not change either home or schools were more likely to attain nationally expected levels of outcome than pupils whose both home and school changed during the year. However, moving home, even without changing school, does by itself have an impact on educational attainment. “The association between moving home and lower educational attainment may operate independently of the experience of schooling”.

Moreover the study confirmed that most household mobility within London, at least for families with children, takes place within borough boundaries or from/to outside London. The study also confirmed that even if some moves are aspirational, population turnover might in part be driven by social disadvantage. Indeed: “pupils who are entitled to school meals are more likely than other pupils to experience either or both domestic or school mobility”. In addition, “Pupils for whom English is not the first language are more likely to experience either or both domestic or school mobility”.

The study argued for more research on pupil mobility and its impacts on educational attainment, deprivation and the ways in which the operation of the housing market may interact with these issues.

Breaking Point: Examining disruption caused by pupil mobility, Association of London Government, 2005

The former ALG (now London Councils) published a study that provided information and analysis about the impact of pupil mobility on public services in London.

According to the study, the impact of pupil mobility was twofold. First, mobility caused additional administrative costs for registering new children at non-standard times and for building links with parents. These administration costs were quantified by the study. In a primary school, enrolment of a new child, plus work with the parents and child averaged 14½ additional hours at an estimated cost of £400 each. For secondary schools, the same process represents an average of 29 hours of additional work and estimated costs of about £800. Moreover the study also reported

that pupil mobility also required unquantifiable work involving teachers and others such as extra learning and teaching support staff, which has been estimated to fall within a range of zero to 62 hours per child. Maintaining a record of the educational progress of a child is likely to prove difficult if the pupil has frequently moved and/or comes from abroad. The report also pointed out that co-ordination between services of different boroughs, notably where people live and work in different parts of the city, was also problematic and generated costs.

Second, mobility created disruption within the class, often as the result of a lack of language skills among newcomers or difficulties for disadvantaged children facing the National Curriculum. Children who had recently moved, or moved frequently, were more likely to truant. “Just under half of parents in the survey [of homeless households in temporary accommodation] said that one or more of their children had missed school because of their housing circumstances. The average amount of school time missed by an individual child was 55 days” (p25). Some of the children who changed school were also likely to be pupils who were at risk of exclusion from their previous school and may have moved to avoid such a penalty. These young people were disproportionately likely to cause disruption in classes.

This twofold impact was found to limit the ability of schools to attain national objectives and targets set by central government. Moreover pupil mobility was concentrated in some schools and some parts of the city, which were usually the schools which already had the most significant problems and which could not refuse to register new children because they had places available. A school teacher from East London, for example, was quoted as saying that “during the course of the year, one class admitted 12 new pupils in a class of 30. There was a special needs pupil who was placed in that class and within the space of two weeks that class took in six new pupils, most of whom had never been to school before” (p20).

By undertaking research about pupil mobility caused by families moving within the temporary accommodation sub-sector, the study also shed light on the unique nature of mobility linked to this specific group, which is heavily concentrated in particular neighbourhoods and boroughs in London.

A.4 Health

Millett C, *Population Mobility: characteristics of people registering with general practices*, Public Health (2005) 119, pp 632-638

The study examined characteristics of people joining general practitioner lists in six London practices. The most striking findings were that nearly 40 per cent of participants took longer than six months to re-register with a GP after a change of address. About 13 per cent of participants took longer than one year and seven per cent took longer than 3 years to register.

These findings suggested that mobility had a significant impact on access to health services, and an impact on health service delivery. Moreover the article reported a lack of research on the difficulties of ensuring access to health services to “discrete mobile groups such as patients experiencing acute mental health episodes, the homeless and asylum seekers” (p 637). Moreover “coverage statistics for childhood

vaccinations, immunization against influenza and breast/cervical screening are much lower in London than in other parts of the country” (p637).

A.5 Housing, Homeless people and asylum seekers

Literature and statistics reviews give us more information on possible costs implications for public services when it comes to the transience of specific groups. Specifically, many studies have examined the reasons for moving and the sources of unwanted mobility and underlined the costs and implications of homelessness, and of the accommodation of asylum seekers.

Rossi (1955) argued that mobility was not pathological but was largely a normal process enabling adjustment to household circumstances. As such it is unlikely to add disproportionately to costs of services. Kendig (1984) described the decision making process in more detail classifying moves by whether they were made by ‘adjustors’ or whether they were forced. This second type of move is far more likely to involve local services and to impose disproportionate costs. The most extreme form of forced move are those that involve homelessness or rooflessness.

Most studies reveal the poor quality of life for homeless people in temporary accommodation and hostels, which on a long term basis, tends to increase the costs to society compared to good accommodation conditions. Particularly, bad life conditions such as distance from a desired location, affect costs for sectors such as mental and physical health, or the ability to maintain employment. Costs of hidden homelessness (overcrowding particularly) and their implications for social and health care costs are clear but not quantified.

For example the Communities and Local Government report, ‘Places of Change - Tackling homelessness through the Hostels Capital Improvement Programme’ quotes: “We found that too many people are staying in the hostel system for too long. Poor physical conditions and services that don’t motivate people to address their needs can reinforce rather than break the cycle of homelessness. Also many more people have been leaving hostels for negative reasons – like eviction or abandonment – than for positive ones – like finding employment and a settled home”. (p 2)

Do my kids have to live like that forever? The lives of homeless children and families in London, John Reacroft, December 2005.

Barnardo’s published, in December 2005, a report that similarly calls attention to the poor conditions of life in hostels and temporary accommodation, particularly denouncing their consequences for homeless families and children. The document, through seven interviews, gives examples of poor conditions such as overcrowding, distance from desired neighbourhood and school, lack of privacy and protection for women escaping violent partners, or even on the lack of support to homeless people that increases the mental and health problems of many homeless people – and therefore costs.

The analysis states that the problem is specifically concentrated in London: ‘The number of statutorily homeless households in England rose above 100,000 for the first time in 2004, compared with 41,000 in 1997. Unfortunately, this figure is the tip of

the iceberg. Many families with children who live in unsuitable and insecure temporary accommodation are not included in the statistics. The problem is much worse in London, with 62% of all statutorily homeless households in England being in the capital.’ (p5)

Comune di Roma Ufficio Immigrazione, Greater London Authority and Berlin Senate and funded by the European refugee fund, *Europe, Land of Asylum*,

This comparative report examines three European cities, and gives specific information on asylum seekers and their accommodation in London. It points out the problem of hidden homelessness and hidden housing needs.

GLA, *Destitution by design, Withdrawal of support from in-country asylum applicants: An impact assessment for London, Feb 2004*

The GLA report on asylum seekers also draws attention to the connections between homelessness and new legal framework and duties for the accommodation of asylum seekers “London has the highest levels of homelessness and concentration of families living in bed and breakfast hotels in the country. In 2001/2 over 30,000 households were accepted by London boroughs as unintentionally homeless and in priority need – around a quarter of all homelessness acceptances in England”.

“In March 2003 there were 58,597 homeless households in temporary accommodation including 7,262 households in bed and breakfast hotels. Approximately 61% of all households accepted as homeless in London between January and March 2003 were of black or minority ethnic origin – a disproportionately high percentage compared with London’s total ethnic population of 32%. There is an additional (but currently un-quantified) group of hidden homeless households – those ‘self placed’ in temporary accommodation or living as part of someone else’s household and requiring their own separate accommodation. ‘The Government’s national target for reducing rough sleeping by two thirds by 2002 has been achieved. But in areas of central London the number have reduced by only 48% since 1998 when there were an estimated 612 people. In June 2002, there remained an estimated 320 people sleeping rough in London.” (p48)

The report also relates homelessness and rough sleeping, and underlines the costs of letting people sleep rough for significant periods. Shelter, citing S Keyes and M Kennedy, *Sick to Death of Homelessness* (1992)/P Grenier, *Still Dying for a Home* (1996) states: “... one study into the health risks of street homelessness suggests there is a ‘three week rule’. This describes the period during which people rapidly adapt to homelessness in order to survive, and after which it much more difficult to integrate back into mainstream society. This particularly applies to young people, who tend to adapt quickly to survive the trauma of homelessness. The ‘three week rule’ suggests that after that brief period individuals are deskilled to such an extent that that they lose the interpersonal, budgeting and simple life skills to adapt readily to being rehoused. ... [and therefore] ... often require intensive support and resettlement when they are finally housed.”(p43)

The report points to the potential impacts of asylum seeking and the way people are welcomed and taken care of on community safety and cohesion. Changes in policy

towards asylum seekers can have repercussions for community safety in London – positive or negative – at three levels which are distinct though interrelated:

- public attitudes: risks of hostile action against asylum seekers and refugees, and risks of stimulating racism more generally;
- other threats to the safety and security of asylum seekers;
- risks of criminal behaviour by asylum seekers.’ (p 59)

Other examples like the one of Lambeth explain how rough sleeping endangers the individuals themselves as much as social cohesion: “Box 6: Section 55 and community tensions – Lambeth, October 2003 Statement by Deputy Borough Commander, Lambeth Borough Police, on events following the arrival locally of groups of Section 55 asylum seekers. Sleeping on the streets increases the vulnerability of the individuals concerned, many of whom speak little or no English. There are clear and obvious dangers and I am aware some of the asylum seekers have, allegedly, been verbally abused and that stones have, allegedly, been thrown at them whilst sleeping. ... We treat such allegations with seriousness – we will not tolerate any form of hate crime. ... The current situation has the potential to seriously damage community relations within Lambeth. Some members of the community are spending nights with the asylum seekers, to demonstrate their support [for] them, whilst others feel antagonistic towards them – divisive issue. Lambeth is a richly diverse Borough and I do not want to see the positive relationships, that have been built, damaged as a result of this ongoing situation”. (p 60)

How Many, How Much? Single homelessness and the question of numbers and cost published by Peter Kenway and Guy Palmer from the Crisis and New Policy Institute

This report, published in 2003, gives some quantification of single homelessness for society. Costs include, for example, housing expenditure, such as failed tenancy and temporary accommodation; support services; health services; police and criminal justice in some cases, unemployment and costs of resettlement.

“The cost of an individual’s homelessness can run to many thousands of pounds, suggesting that there may be an economic case for spending money to reduce homelessness. We would particularly draw attention to the scale and importance of recurring, time-related costs, such as the costs of temporary accommodation and the economic cost to society as a whole unemployment associated with homelessness”.

An estimate of costs ‘by category of costs associated with single homelessness’ is provided (p 22-23): The analysis first defines the categories of people who can be considered as single homeless and provides quantification by categories and a regional breakdown for 2003 (p 25).

TABLE 4.12: GROUPS OF ADULTS WITHOUT DEPENDENT CHILDREN WHO COULD BE HOMELESS: REGIONAL BREAKDOWN			
Region (grouped)	In non-permanent supported housing	In concealed households in overcrowded conditions	In concealed households where the head of the household is dissatisfied
London	0.11%	2.3%%	0.7%
Rest of the South	0.05%	0.7%	0.3%
Midlands	0.07%	1.1%	0.3%
North	0.08%	1.0%	0.4%
Total	0.07%	1.1%	0.4%

It is interesting to note that the problem is more concentrated in London than in other regions.

Categories cited are “rough sleepers, those who have been provided with supported housing for whatever reason (hostels, YMCA, shelters), Bed and Breakfast and other boarded accommodation, people at imminent risk of eviction, squatters, involuntary sharing – concealed households sharing overcrowded accommodation, involuntary sharing – concealed household sharing accommodation which is not overcrowded”. The counts of homelessness are then based on an extended definition of homelessness that includes hidden homelessness.

The study also proposes a breakdown and identification of unit costs linked with homelessness. It identifies both hard costs and soft costs. Costs of homelessness are various “Not just to local authorities, the health service or the voluntary agencies providing help and support but also to both homeless people themselves and to those who helped them” (p 36). Nevertheless only the hard costs, “the ones that mean that resources are spent or lost, and which have a direct monetary effect”, which “usually fall upon institutions in the public private and voluntary sector” have been quantified.

A.6 DfES and GOL London Child Mobility Project *Report of Findings*, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, May 2006

This commissioned report, focused on London, covered the following topics:

- How child mobility impacts on the *Every Child Matters* outcomes for children
- Types and definitions of child mobility
- Why the challenges are so great in London
- Young people’s experiences of mobility
- Service delivery issues for mobile children including:
 - Cross-cutting issues
 - Issues related to particular groups

The report cites OFSTED evidence suggesting that where mobility levels exceed 12 per cent, there is an impact on standards for all pupils. Pupil mobility rates exceed 14 per cent (on average) in inner London and can be as high as 90 per cent in some schools. 95 per cent of asylum seekers had been refused GP registration in one of the boroughs subject to analysis.

The PWC report concluded that many services would be affected by the consequences of mobility among the young:

“In London, and the local authorities surrounding London which children and young people move between, the challenge to be able to adapt is particularly high. This is because of the disproportionately high numbers of children in need and looked after children, and the high level of movement in London, within and between Boroughs for schooling and other statutory and non-statutory services”(p5).

The authors reported that:

“Linked to the lack of a consistent and agreed definition of child mobility is the lack of a consistent and pan-London dataset and data analysis covering all forms of mobility. A range of data sources were drawn to our attention through our literature review and interviews, particularly in the area of pupil mobility but, there were gaps.....” (p5).

Many examples of mobility in London were quoted, particularly from OFSTED, ODPM and the NHS. Examples of co-operation between boroughs, joint responsibility were discussed as was the cost and complexity of coping with mobility. Importantly (PWC are accountants as well as management consultants. Moreover, this report was conducted for central government), the report concluded:

“...funding from central government does not recognise mobility as a factor in funding formulae and any weighting is left to local discretion. This also has an impact on the grants available to organisations focusing on mobility issues in the voluntary and community sector” (p8).

A number of ways children and young people are likely to be affected by mobility. Some individuals would fall within more than one category. The key groups and services identified were:

- School pupils
- Asylum seekers and refugees
- Disabled children
- Homelessness and frequent moving
- Child protection
- Looked after children
- Families experiencing domestic violence
- Teenage pregnancy
- Young offenders
- Children with mental health needs.

Finally, the report made a number of recommendations for central government, ‘pan London working’ and ‘local areas’. A detailed study of patterns of mobility was proposed.

A.7 Services and community cohesion

There is an enormous literature on mobility and transience and its impact on individuals and communities and lately particularly on migration and social cohesion.

Department for Communities and Local Government, *Moving on: Reconnecting Frequent Movers*, July 2006.

This document analysed the link between frequent household movement and disadvantage. It focused on deprived areas. It aimed to put the issue of frequent movement and disadvantage “on the policy map”.

The document states that “On the whole, population mobility is desirable and positive, contributing to economic prosperity, regeneration and a flexible labour market”, it goes on to focus on a specific group of frequent movers who were usually difficult for public services to reach. This type of mobility “can be less positive, damaging life chances and causing or compounding social exclusion”. The report was thus more about people than about the impact on public services and was to be used to ‘help plan and deliver better services for people who are moving’. As such, services are “commissioned by local authorities and must be developed within the local context”, this report is particularly important for London boroughs.

The report underlined that, within the 27 areas with a very high population turnover, the highest rates were to be found in London. Nevertheless, within this turnover, the rate of repeat or frequent moves was not known. Within New Deal for Communities areas, it appeared that a high proportion of the population was moving frequently, particularly people who had applied for refugee status.

The study also gave information about the sensitivities of frequent movers. From a New Deal for Communities survey, it was shown that in comparison with non movers, frequent movers “feel less like part of the community” (just over 20 per cent for frequent movers and slightly above 40 per cent for movers), “feel less like they like they are in a place where neighbours look out for each other” (about 45 per cent and 65 per cent), “feel less trusting of health services”, “less satisfied with the police” and “are more likely to depend on benefits” (about 35 per cent and 20 per cent).

Nevertheless, drawing conclusions from these results must be attempted with care. Reactions might be related to high levels of deprivation or personal factors rather than resulting from frequent mobility. Moreover, the concept of ‘community’ is unclear and can be interpreted differently by different people, from a local neighbourhood to a much wider or alternative kind of community.

The DCLG report also made it clear that frequent movements by disadvantaged people were not necessarily out of choice, but might be the result of difficulty of finding settled accommodation. Many moves were the result of deliberate decisions taken by councils as, for example, was the case for victims of domestic violence or

gypsies and travellers. Moreover, access to services might be more difficult for frequent movers because they did not know about “services that are available or how to find them”, “difficulties in accessing a number of services and being unable to link them without help”, “finding that there are not enough services in the area” and “finding it difficult to trust services because of personal problems or previous experiences” The study concluded that education and health were the two services where the impacts of mobility were most likely to be felt. The report showed that routine, as well as preventive health care visits did not occur. Registrations with GPs were low among frequent movers.

The report gave an overview of the type of problems and additional burdens service providers might face when they are working in areas of high population turnover. Recommendations were made to improve the provision of services to help people to find stable accommodation and to give them ongoing support to help manage and sustain their tenancies. The report also highlighted a number of possible service impacts, without quantifying them. Such impacts included: (i) problems related to “records transfer and continuity of care”, and the inflexibility (and immobility) of funding streams that did not easily allow to ‘follow people across boundaries’.

Finally, possible impacts on community cohesion were considered. The study stated that mobility can “create feelings of anxiety and have a de-stabilising effect on long term residents”, “cause fears that the community identity will change”, “give rise to perceptions of ‘special treatment’ for newcomers” and “lead to mixed feeling among communities about specialist services that may be offered”.

House of Commons ODPM: Housing, Planning Local Government and the Regions Committee, *Social Cohesion* , Sixth Report session 2003/04 HC45-1

This inquiry was undertaken in the light of riots in Northern cities. While it accepts the LGA/Home Office definition it makes it clear that the most important aspects relate to ethnic minority issues and should not be seen mainly as a law and order issue.

Many of the issues raised relate to questions about the use of funds and the transparent provision of services to all groups. As such it addresses the other side of the cost coin in that competition for services in short supply can lead to tension and a breakdown in social cohesion. Others relate specifically to the problems of increasing diversity and lack of knowledge of minority needs and interests. Particular groups, such as young people and vulnerable households are seen as more difficult to integrate. However while these problems are very real they relate far more to ethnicity and immigration than to mobility as such.

Housing is seen as a key element in the social cohesion agenda – both in terms of causality because of competition for accommodation which is in short supply particularly in the social sector and shortages of adequate housing and in terms of potential ways of increasing social cohesion through the development of mixed communities (May, 1997, Robinson, 2005; Hudson et al, forthcoming). What is also clear from this literature is that issues of social cohesion are very strongly linked to the availability and therefore the costs of services especially housing services. In this sense it is not mobility or even necessarily diversity that is seen as the cause of the

problem – but simply growing demand together with issues of entitlement versus need.

Appendix B: Interviewees

The following individuals were interviewed, generally by telephone, but in one case by email, as part of this project. None of the findings or remarks cited in the report should be associated with any individual. But we are very grateful to them all for their time and, in a number of cases, for sending us materials.

Barking & Dagenham;	Ken Jones
	Jim Ripley
	John Tatam
Haringey:	Gerald Almeroth
	Hilda Bond
	Cecilia Hitchens
	Ambrose Quashie
Hounslow:	Lorelei Watson
Lewisham:	Ronan Smyth
Newham	Mary Bradley
	Claudia Shimplin
	Michelle vonAhn
	Gerry Tighe
Redbridge:	Alan Sizer
Westminster:	Nick Bell
	Damien Highwood
	Daniel McCarthy
	Martin Mitchell
	Keith Wilson
National Housing Federation :	Gavin Smart

The project has also benefited from discussions held with Rob Whiteman and senior colleagues from Barking and Dagenham, but who were not formally interviewed

Appendix C: Semi-structured Interviews, Questionnaire

We are looking to assess the extend to which Mobility (and indeed transience) adds to the costs of providing services and to the impact of mobility on community cohesion.

1. Has the LA commissioned/ carried out any research on the impact of population Mobility on the costs of delivery of particular services? If so which ones? If so, what were the findings?
2. Do you regard the population of your Borough as particularly mobile? If so, what types of mobility are especially important?
3. In your own experience are there higher or lower costs associated with a mobile population?
If so can you give examples? If so have these become greater or lesser in recent years?
4. Is it possible to give broad estimates of such costs and the number to which they apply?
5. Are there any particular groups within the mobile population who cause particular costs to the borough?
If so, which are they? Is anything done to reduce these costs?
6. Are there any good sources of information on this subject, particularly insofar they apply to services other than education?
7. Do you have any convincing anecdotes that would exemplify the issue?
8. Is there anything else that you would like to add?

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