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Introduction: Mapping Global Democracy

Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archipugi and Raffaele Marchetti


Until twenty years ago, very few international relations textbooks paid any attention to the problem of democracy across borders. If the word ‘democracy’ was mentioned at all (and sometimes it was not), it referred to how domestic regimes could affect national foreign policy behaviour, rather than the possibility of shaping global society or even international organizations in accordance with the values and rules of democracy. When IR scholars started to be interested in the European Community, they usually saw it as a peculiar international organization and neglected its embryonic democratic aspects. With rare exceptions, treatises on democratic theory mirrored this lack of interest and largely ignored the international dimensions of democracy. It is notable that even David Held, who played such a key role in placing the relationship between globalization and democracy on the intellectual agenda of the 1990s, had not yet addressed the issue in the first edition (1987) of his widely read Models of Democracy. In sum, the possibility of globalizing democracy was debated among people involved in political advocacy, such as the world federalists, but it attracted little scholarly attention.

Over the past twenty years, the intellectual landscape has changed considerably. Of course, many remain unconvinced that democracy can be applied beyond states, and regard the idea of a global democracy as an unachievable dream (Dahl 1999) or, worse, think that its advocates are barking to the moon (Dahrendorf 2001). But in spite of harsh dismissals by some authoritative democratic theorists, the issue can no longer be ignored. The seeds planted by scholars such as Richard Falk, David Held, Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck have grown. Many recent handbooks in international relations and democratic theory discuss the
issue of democracy beyond borders, and a new generation of scholars has developed the theme of democracy beyond borders in imaginative and sophisticated ways.

There are several good historical reasons that explain why the intellectual mood has changed so much and in a relatively short period of time. On the one hand, democracy has become widely accepted as the only way to legitimize political power; on the other hand, people around the world have become increasingly sensitive to global interdependencies – ‘globalization’ has become a ubiquitous catchword. Many supporters of democracy are increasingly keen and often optimistic about the possibility of extending their preferred system of governance to the global level. As it has often been said, the completion of the decolonization process, the end of the Cold War, and democratization processes in central and eastern Europe and in many countries of the global South, have all been historical events that provided a new impetus to the search for new and more progressive political scenarios.

The justification, form, possibility and limits of a democratically organized global order are now studied by scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, especially normative political theory, international law, and empirical social sciences. Philosophers and political theorists focus on the justifiability of global democracy and on the institutional implications of fundamental values. Political scientists and international relations specialists, on the other hand, examine to what extent global politics is moving beyond the so-called Westphalian model and what forces may be promoting or hindering the emergence of more democratic forms of international and transnational governance. In principle, normative theorists may acknowledge that work on empirical conditions is relevant to their aims, and empirically oriented scholars may acknowledge that exploring the reasons for democratic transformations of current international structures is an important task. But, in practice, normative and empirical scholars are often unaware of each other’s work.

This book presents new scholarship on the theme of global democracy. It aims to be a bridge between different research communities and a vehicle for advancing the research programme on global democracy through cross-disciplinary dialogue. It consists of chapters that focus on normative questions and institutional models related to global democracy as well as chapters that examine the conditions of and paths to global democracy, including the exploration of embryonic forms of global democratic governance. In this introduction we provide a general background to the debate, we map various forms of global democracy considered by a number of scholars, we give a brief overview of various political, legal and
social processes that may, or already do, contribute to the development of democratic governance beyond individual states, and provide an overview of the rest of the volume.

**The relationship between supranational governance and democracy**

Advocacy of global democracy is based on the premise that forms of supranational governance can be combined with forms of democracy. However, the relationship between supranational governance and democracy has been tense in theory as well as in practice. Among political thinkers, both support for democracy and support for some kind of supranational union experienced a marked increase since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the two political projects did not always coexist harmoniously. Authors such as Emeric Crucé (1590-1648) and the abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743), for instance, argued that the elimination of war required a supranational authority to which states could appeal and envisaged a union with coercive powers provided by an international army composed of forces supplied by the member states. According to Crucé and Saint-Pierre, such a union would not only have guaranteed peace between states, but also reinforced the power that sovereigns had on their subjects. It can be said that they proposed to achieve peace at the expense of democracy (Archibugi 1992, 299). On the other hand, many of the growing number of advocates of democracy were wary of forms of supranational political organization. This attitude was to a significant extent due to the belief that democracy could flourish only at a small scale. Jean-Jacques Rousseau not only maintained that ‘the larger the State, the less the liberty’ (Rousseau 1762/1987), but he also argued that, from a democratic perspective, ‘the union of several towns in a single city is always bad, and that, if we wish to make such a union, we should not expect to avoid its natural disadvantages. It is useless to bring up abuses that belong to great States against one who desires to see only small ones’ (Rousseau 1762/1987). Riley (Riley 1973, 11) points out that, even if Rousseau took seriously projects to establish national and international federations, ‘his affection for the

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1 We define ‘governance’ broadly, as the creation and implementation of rule systems that facilitate the coordination and cooperation of social actors and determine the distribution of the costs and benefits of collective action. Governance may, but need not, be provided by a ‘government’. See Koenig-Archibugi and Zürn (2006).
small and isolated republic always overcame his federalism.’ In a similar vein, many so-called Anti-Federalists objected to the proposed Constitution of the United States mainly on the grounds that a continental government would have threatened republican liberties and self-government.

Subsequent historical experiences provided some support to the view of a tension between democracy and international organization. The German Bund, for instance, which lasted from 1815 to 1866, may have contributed to managing tensions among its member states; but its Diet’s legal authority to restore order within member states, even without a request of the government concerned, was used to put down by armed force several democratic uprisings (Forsyth 1981, 51). Various political scientists argue that institutionalized cooperation among established democratic states impairs the quality of democracy. For instance, forty years ago Karl Kaiser (Kaiser 1971, 706) noted that ‘[t]he intermeshing of decision-making across national frontiers and the growing multinationalization of formerly domestic issues are inherently incompatible with the traditional framework of democratic control’. Klaus Dieter Wolf (Wolf 1999) points out that autonomy-seeking governments may pursue a strategy of ‘de-democratization by internationalization’, which can be seen as a ‘new raison d’état’ in an era of globalization and democratic government. Empirically, it has been shown that at times governments use international institutions to gain influence in the domestic political arena and to overcome internal opposition to their preferred policies, although the democratic implications of such an outcome are open to debate (Koenig-Archibugi 2004).

The pessimistic view of the relationship between democracy and supranational governance has been countered in various ways. For instance, it has been argued that, while international organizations may occasionally be used to suppress or circumvent democracy, more often than not they help countries to establish and preserve democratic institutions. For instance, it has been shown that a country’s membership in a regional organization with mostly democratic member states increases significantly the likelihood of a successful transition to, and consolidation of, democracy in that country (Pevehouse 2005). Other authors maintain that, even in well-established democracies, multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of democratic politics, as they can help limit the power of special

2 Among modern authors, the topic of size and democracy has been discussed in most depth by Robert Dahl, whose work of the early 1970s included very valuable analysis of the extension of democracy beyond nation-state and of ‘world democracy’ (Dahl 1970; Dahl and Tufte 1973).
interests, protect individual rights, and improve the quality of democratic deliberation (Keohane et al. 2009).

Another response to the pessimistic interpretation of the relationship between democracy and supranational governance, which is particularly relevant to the topic of this volume, is that pessimism may well be justified, but only in relation to those international organizations where governments have a monopoly of representing their societies. In the pyramidal international unions advocated by authors such as Crucé and Saint-Pierre, membership is clearly limited to the sovereigns and does not include the subjects. Even in international organizations whose members are mainly or exclusively democratic states, often the model of representation still is what has been called ‘executive multilateralism’ (Zürn 2005): governments are the sole representatives of their societies in international negotiations and this gatekeeper role gives them very substantial informational and other advantages over other actors in shaping global policies. The democratic credentials of such organizations may be further weakened by the de facto or de iure ability of the more resourceful states to block the organization from taking decisions they do not like. But the key point of the ‘optimists’ is that these are not necessary consequences of supranational governance. Executive multilateralism is not the only viable model of international organization, and other models are much better suited to reconcile governance beyond individual states with effective democratic control. Indeed, some cosmopolitan theorists go as far as asserting that the establishment of a democratic form of supranational governance may be the only way to realize democracy (Marchetti 2008).

This response has illustrious intellectual ancestors. On the problem of the size of the polity, for instance, James Madison famously turned the conventional wisdom on its head and argued that large republics were better equipped to resist the disintegrative effects of factions than smaller ones. Of course Madison did not suggest extend the union beyond the

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3 Claude-Henri Saint-Simon, who advocated a European-wide representative government, spelt out clearly the different implications of non-democratic and democratic forms of supranational governance: ‘The first result of the constitution of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (assuming that it were possible at all), would be to perpetuate the status quo in Europe at the moment of it was set up. Thenceforward the remnants of feudalism still in existence would become indestructible. Moreover, it would encourage the abuse of power by making the power of sovereigns more dangerous to their peoples, and depriving them of any resource against tyranny. In a word, this sham organization would be nothing but a mutual guarantee of princes to preserve their arbitrary power.’ C.-H. Saint-Simon, ‘The Reorganization of the European Community’ (1814), cited by Archibugi (1992, 12).
boundaries of the proposed United States. But several other authors developed proposals for polities that combine supranational authority structures with mechanisms of citizen representation that are not mediated by national governments, such as William Penn and John Bellers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, and Claude-Henri Saint-Simon, James Lorimer and Johann Caspar Bluntschli in the nineteenth century (Suganami 1989, Archibugi 1992). While these projects certainly displayed a certain degree of Eurocentrism, their authors often saw them as stepping stones towards global peace and sometimes even as a way to prevent unjust wars waged by Christians against non-Christians (Aksu 2008).

In the twentieth century, various intellectual and political movements have advocated democratic forms of global governance from a cosmopolitan standpoint: the World Federalist movement that was especially active in the United States during and after World War II (for a history see Wooley 1988), the work by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn on World Peace Through World Law (1958), the World Order Models Project developed by Saul H. Mendlovitz, Richard Falk, Rajni Kothari and others, the International Network for a United Nations Second Assembly (INFUSA), the Conferences for A More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN), the ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ project (Held 1995, Archibugi and Held 1995, Archibugi, et al. 1998), recent calls for ‘global stakeholder democracy’ (Macdonald 2008), to mention only some of the most prominent. To be sure, such intellectual and political projects were and are based on conceptions of global democracy that differed on very substantial grounds. Some of these differences are examined in the next section.

Forms of global democracy

What is common to all conceptions of global democracy is the vision of a system of global governance that is responsive and accountable to the preferences of the world’s citizens and works to reduce political inequalities among them. This ‘thin’ understanding encompasses a wide range of more specific conceptions, blueprints and models. It is important to think systematically about the differences between these conceptions, as judgements of normative desirability, estimates of empirical feasibility and recommendations for political strategy may depend crucially on which conception is envisaged. Falk, for

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4 Also the growing interest in international ethics since the 1970s (Beitz 1979) played an important role in stimulating debates about the extension of democracy beyond individual states. The relationship between global democracy and global distributive justice is examined by Caney (2004).
instance, warned against the ‘fallacy of premature specificity’ with the regard to the institutional features of new world order arrangements, and urged not to shift the focus from ‘transitional processes’ to the contemplation of a ‘terminal model’. But he also noted that ‘a proposed world order model requires a certain amount of concreteness to elicit support and facilitate understanding of what is being recommended’ (Falk 1975, 152), and thus he presented a rather detailed plan for global institutions. Most discussions of global democracy either elaborate on the basic institutional features that are being envisaged or at least make implicit assumptions about them. Our mapping exercise is meant to facilitate the comparison of various conceptions, without any ambition to capture everything that is important about them.

We argue that most conceptions of global democracy differ principally in how close or distant they are from three ideal types, as shown in Figure 1.1.

*Figure 1.1 Ideal-typical forms of global democracy: confederalism, federalism and polycentrism*

The first ideal type is close to what authors have called confederation (Archibugi 2008, 102-7), intergovernmental democratic multilateralism (Marchetti 2008, 135), ‘fair voluntary association among democratic states’ (Christiano, in this volume), or ‘international democracy based on the communitarian principle’ (Bienen, et al. 1998). Here we will call it democratic confederalism. Recently a variant of this type has gained political prominence in
the form of calls for a ‘league of democracies’ or ‘concert of democracies’ (Carothers 2008). The key features of democratic confederalism are: the constituent units are states that are democratically governed whose governments enjoy internal democratic legitimacy; these governments have exclusive rights to represent their citizens vis-à-vis other governments and the confederation as a whole, and citizens have no direct access to confederal institutions; member states participate in the confederation voluntarily and maintain the unilateral right to withdraw from it; decisions either require unanimity among all member states or, if votes are taken, they are based on the ‘one state, one vote’ principle (on ‘state majoritarianism’ see Buchanan 2004, 316-319); the confederation has no power of coercion of its own.

The second ideal type is what most authors would call a world government or a world federation (Archibugi 2008, 107-9, Marchetti 2008, 149-69). The key features of democratic federalism are: there are several layers of state or state-like authority and citizens have a direct relationship of democratic authorization and accountability with each of them; elections to and decisions in federal institutions are guided by the principle ‘one person, one vote’, although this ‘democratic’ principle may be combined with ‘federal’ principles such as supermajority requirements and the overrepresentation of citizens from smaller constituent units; the federal level of authority (executive, legislative or judicial) usually has the final say on jurisdictional questions and has access to coercive power; secession from the federation is possible only in accordance with precise constitutional rules and often subject to approval by federal institutions.

The third ideal type is more difficult to define. It is close to what has been variously identified as ‘global governance’ (Marchetti 2008, 139-42) ‘global stakeholder democracy’ (Macdonald 2008), democracy under conditions of polycentric governance (Scholte 2008). We will call it democratic polycentrism. The key features of democratic polycentrism are the following. In today’s global space power is exercised not only by states but also by a myriad of non-state actors, such as companies, business associations, specialized international organizations, NGOs, social movements, and networks of experts; these actors and sites of power can democratized directly by linking them, through mechanisms of authorization and accountability, to those whose interests are more intensely affected by their activities; these mechanisms of authorization and accountability can be specific to particular non-state actors

5 The ‘transnational discursive democracy’ advocated by Dryzek may be considered an extreme variant of this type, as it unfolds in the communicative realm rather than in institutions and ‘lacks formalized connection to binding collective decisions’ (Dryzek 2006: 158).
and sectoral networks rather than to overarching state-like political structures; these mechanisms do not need to take the form of electoral authorization and accountability, as long as effective control by the relevant stakeholder groups is ensured.

Apart for a general commitment to democratic principles, the commonalities between the proponents of different ideal types of global democracy are to a large extent based on what they tend to reject, on grounds of normatively desirability or empirical feasibility. ‘Confederalists’ and ‘federalists’ tend to ignore or reject ‘non-state’ political authority. Confederalists and ‘polycentrists’ reject global concentration of power. Federalists and polycentrists reject traditional state sovereignty.

What we have presented are ideal types, and it should be emphasised that the forms of global democracy defended, criticised, and/or empirically assessed by various authors working on these topics are usually more nuanced and complex. But confederalism, federalism and polycentrism delineate a conceptual space in which many of those more specific forms can be located. For instance, a prominent model of global democracy, ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held 1995, Archibugi 2008), combines federal and confederal elements in an original synthesis. And Gould (2004, and in this volume) emphasises the role of regional supranational unions and nonterritorial communities, which represents a combination of federal, confederal and polycentric dimensions.

Pathways to global democracy

Participants in the debate on global democracy are not interested only in its nature, its forms and its justification, but also in the question of how to get from here to there. This is not surprising, as many of the contributors to the intellectual debate on global democracy, including some of the contributors to this volume, also actively participate in various campaigns to promote its implementation in real life. But the question of which actors and processes do or may promote global democracy does not concern only its proponents. Critics of global democracy belong to various categories, such as those who think that it would be undesirable, those who think that trying to realize it would produce dangerous unintended consequences, and those who think that in all likelihood it would merely be a façade for the overwhelming power of the strongest states and groups. Unless they believe that no step
towards global democracy is empirically possible,\textsuperscript{6} such critics have no less reason to be aware of the forces and strategies that may promote it than its proponents.

In the following we discuss some of the processes that may increase the democratic quality of global politics. The first two sets of processes, social mobilization from below and the reform of international organizations, have attracted much attention in recent years and are discussed in several chapters in this volume. The other two sets of processes are discussed less often in relation to global democratization, but deserve to be explored further: the expansion of supranational judiciary power, and ‘cosmopolitan’ changes within states.

\textit{Social mobilization from below.} Global democracy involves greater political participation of individuals beyond the confines of their own states. The activities carried out by non-governmental organizations and other groups of activists are often independent from the agenda pursued by states (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Kaldor 2003). The participation of citizens can take different forms and motivations. Citizens may be mobilized because: (i) they have a sense of solidarity in relation to situations that are detached by their own life, as it happens in campaigns aimed to the protection of human rights in other parts of the world; (ii) They feel that they have some common interests that are not faithfully represented by their governments and that transcend states’ borders, as in the case of campaigns for environmental protection; (iii) they perceive that there are specific problems that are better addressed by creating linkages across political communities; this may be the case when they organize specific interests that involve individuals on the basis of non-territorial affiliations (for example, because they have common diseases, or because they are employed by the same multinational corporation, or because they are linked by a direct user-producer relationship). Non-governmental organizations active in these three domains have grown in importance and have become more authoritative in global politics.

The participation of individuals in global politics can take a variety of forms. In principle, it could be fully organized and institutionalized, replicating at the world level the same channels of political representation existing in democratic states, in line with the federal view of global governance. In practice, it is usually voluntary and carried out by individuals without direct authorization or contact from their own states, in line with the polycentric view of global governance. According to proponents of global stakeholder democracy, NGOs and other non-state actors can be subject to mechanisms of democratic control and thus establish

\textsuperscript{6} This position is addressed by Koenig-Archibugi (2010a).
Reforming international organizations. Several campaigns for the democratization of global politics target international organizations (IOs) and aim at triggering institutional reform. These campaigns have had some limited successes so far. IOs may be seen as promising starting points for global democracy because they incorporate in their own structure at least three core norms of democracy: the existence of formal treaties and charters, the publicity of acts, and formal equality among members. However, these norms do not allow us to regard existing IOs as democratic institutions, since they lack other fundamental features of democracy. This leads to two opposite views. On the one hand, there are those who argue that fundamental reasons prevent IOs from embodying basic norms of democracy (Dahl 1999; Christiano, in this volume); on the other hand, there are those who argue that appropriate reforms may lead IOs to become democratic or, at least, more democratic (Held 1995, Archibugi 2008, Murithi, in this volume). In what way would the reform of IOs contribute to the emergence of global democracy?

From the point of view of a confederal interpretation of global democracy, IOs can be democratic provided that its member countries are democratic. If there is a democratic deficit, this is not necessarily associated to the structure of IOs, but rather to the nature of its members. Global democracy is therefore more an internal problem than a problem of IOs. This confederal perspective may suggest that there is a contradiction between inclusiveness and democracy: as long as IOs include despotic as well as democratic countries, they can never be fully democratic.

An alternative view suggests that an IO could become more democratic even if it has autocratic as well as democratic member states (Archibugi 2008). This argument is based on the view that the internal regime does not necessarily condition the foreign behaviour of countries: democracies have often opposed progressive reforms in the UN and in other IOs, while non-democratic governments sometimes are open to introduce in the UN the democratic accountability that they are denying to their subjects at home. Proponents of this view maintain, for instance, that Cuba has often expressed its support for a direct participation of individuals to UN institutions, while the United States have preferred to maintain the current confederal arrangements. Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy argue that allowing a direct representation to the citizens of the world inside IOs will contribute to democratization in two ways (see Archibugi 2008). On the one hand, it would make the
operation of these IOs more transparent, more accountable and more responsive to the needs of citizens. On the other hand, it would act as a powerful incentive towards democratization in those member countries that still have despotic governments. The most active ongoing campaign in favour of global democracy aims to create a new directly elected world parliamentary assembly (Strauss 2007, Archibugi 2008, Marchetti, 2008). Such an assembly would fit neither with confederalism (since it would be aimed at providing a voice to individuals independently from their own governments) nor with federalism (since it would lack sufficient powers to control executive and judicial powers in world politics).

While increased mobilization by activists and citizens and the reform of international organizations are often discussed as routes towards global democratization, other processes may offer a significant contribution as well. We would like to mention only two of them.

Global judicial power. A new climate favourable to an active participation of citizens beyond their borders is also shaped by a rising global judicial power. A global judicial power is still in its infancy and it is far from uniform (Slaughter 2004). Two major components can be singled out. The first is the activity of national judges which are more active in terms of investigating cases beyond the boundaries of their own countries. Globalization is shaping crime, amongst many other things, and national judges investigate more frequently trans-border financial frauds and mafia organizations. But national judges have also become bolder in addressing issues that were traditionally the prerogatives of governments, such as genocide and major violations of human rights. While in several cases there are significant trans-border collaboration in investigation and prosecution, in other cases national judges act using legal procedures that interfere with national sovereignty.

The second component of the rising global judicial power is represented by international courts. The number of international courts is constantly increasing: according to some estimates, there are today more than 40 active international courts (Cassese 2009). Some of these courts, such as the International Court of Justice, are very old. A relatively recent one, the International Criminal Court, already has a significant impact on world politics and public opinion. Others have much more modest aims and concentrate on international arbitration or administrative issues.

The combination of national courts acting beyond their borders and international courts may represent an increasingly important constraint on the power of governments. To the extent that the rule of law and the existence of effective checks and balances are
important dimensions of democratic governance, the ‘judicialization’ of world affairs may be interpreted as a component of a broader trend towards its democratization. It should however be noted that the custodians of the rising global rule of law are not directly associated to a global demos. On the contrary, there is a growing distance between the development of a global rule of law on the one hand and of a global rule of the people on the other hand. There is a basic difference between the judicial institutions acting within state jurisdictions and the new global judicial power: within national borders, judicial power is always expected to come to terms with legislative and the executive powers and in the long term cannot evolve independently from them. In the global arena, on the contrary, judicial powers cannot rely on an executive power that will enforce their decisions, nor can it rely on democratic legislative institutions.

What is happening today in the global arena has strong resemblances with the way in which the power of the people and independent judicial institutions have evolved within states: we know that the two authorities developed in an uneven and combined way. But in the long run the evolution of the rule of law and of the rule of the people reinforced each other. The supporters of global democracy argue that a similar development is occurring today in the global arena. On the opposite, the critics argue that giving too much power to judicial institutions detached from the power of the people risks creating a new judicial despotic rule.

The machinery of these new international judicial bodies is far from uniform. Competences and procedures are very dissimilar. This makes it difficult to associate them to any single ideal-typical form of global democracy that has been presented above. In a sense, the new judicial powers are promoting polycentrism since they are adding sites of authority and legitimacy and create additional checks and balances vis-à-vis executive powers. But the existence of an independent judicial power is also an integral component of a federal system. Finally, most international judicial institutions, including the ICJ and the ICC, have been created by intergovernmental agreements that are a typical feature of confederalism.

Changes within states. Even the most fervent partisans of global democracy are aware that states are, and in all likelihood will continue to be, the most important players in the political arena. Although states act principally in defence of a territory and of their citizens, they can implement a variety of policies that may contribute or obstruct global democracy.

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7 See Goodin (2010) for a similar argument with regard to the accountability of power-holders.
Some of these actions reflect states’ foreign policy. The willingness to obey to international law and to participate in the working of international organizations contribute to a world climate that it is also conducive to expand the values and norms of democracy.

But states may contribute to global democracy in two other key dimensions. The first is by facilitating the social mobilization process that we discussed above, and specifically by allowing their own citizens to participate more directly in world politics. They can promote polycentrism, simply by allowing their citizens to form associations and networks with other citizens abroad. Or they can strengthen the democratic quality of existing confederal arrangements, for instance by allowing a greater control of parliaments over foreign policy, or through more innovative forms - some activists have for example suggested that one or two of the five ambassadors nominated by each state to the UN could be elected by the citizens (Strauss 2007).

Individual states could also contribute to global democracy by expanding the domestic franchise in line with cosmopolitan principles. The most straightforward reform consists in granting greater rights to immigrants. In all countries aliens have more duties (such as paying taxes) than rights (such as electoral franchise). There are already some significant experiments in which immigrants are granted political rights, such as voting for local governments (Cabrera 2010). These efforts could be expanded through the implementation of more friendly policies to accommodate immigrants and to enlarge their rights, generating a cosmopolitan atmosphere within their borders. A more ambitious and less likely expansion of the franchise would consist in granting to non-resident non-citizens the right to elect a number of representatives in national legislatures, on the basis that those non-resident non-citizens are affected by the decisions of the state and are entitled to some form of representation (Koenig-Archibugi 2010b).

**Overview of this book**

The volume begins with a critical review of three dominant models of global democracy, as they emerge from current debates and from several contributions to this book. Raffaele Marchetti argues that the delimitation of political agency - the so-called issue of the (global) demos – is crucial and preliminary to any discussion about global democracy. He shows that the three models differ in their answers to this fundamental question, adopting the
principles of political community, stakeholdership, and all-inclusion respectively, and that they differ with regard to the institutional designs that they envisage, supporting regional/universal multilateralism, hybrid networks, and federal integration respectively. Marchetti concludes that the cosmo-federalist model of global democracy is the most consistent with the principle of political participation.

The chapter by Terry Macdonald addresses a criticism that Marchetti and others have raised against her vision of a global stakeholder democracy: that it violates the principle of political equality that is central to the democratic project, since it makes participatory entitlements dependent on being ‘affected’ by particular decisions rather than on membership in an inclusive political community. Macdonald counters such criticisms by changing the premise on which they are based: instead of asking which democratic framework is the most just one, she asks which democratic framework is the most legitimate one. In her approach to the question, what makes claims legitimate is not whether they conform to a philosophical theory, but whether they are made by actually-existing political actors against other actually-existing political actors. Macdonald argues that the political exclusions permitted by global stakeholder democracy qualify as legitimate in this sense, as exclusions do not violate egalitarian legitimacy when they do not result from denying actually-voiced political demands for inclusion.

The chapter by Thomas Christiano identifies some of the problems arising from the application of democratic standards to international institutions. Christiano examines two kinds of institutional system that might be thought to have democratic legitimacy: one based on the idea of a fair voluntary association of democratic states and the other based on global democratic institutions of the kind supported by Marchetti and other contributors to this volume. Christiano argues that neither system is attainable for the foreseeable future, and finds there is no reasonable solution yet to the normative impasse he has identified.

Andreas Follesdal addresses some of these concerns in his criticism of arguments that the democratization of multi-level governance is impossible and/or unnecessary. Follesdal makes an argument in favour of democratic, majoritarian decision-making procedures, by drawing in part on the debate about the alleged need for a more democratic European Union. He also considers some of the weaknesses of alternatives to majoritarian electoral democracy, namely ‘networks’ and ‘participatory’ democratic arrangements.

Like Follesdal, Carol Gould stresses the important role of the EU and other regional experiments. She highlights some problems with unitary conceptions of global democracy,
such as the one proposed by Marchetti in this volume, and shows why theorists of transnational democracy need to consider more carefully the regional dimension as well as the domains formed by transnational communities that crisscross territorial boundaries and by non-state actors such as transnational corporations.

The global implications of regional experiences play an important role also in the next chapter. Drawing on the historical examples represented by the European Union and the African Union, Tim Murithi suggests the application of similar integration model to the United Nations. Noting the growing irrelevance of the UN in core issues of world politics, he proposes an ambitious set of reforms that go well beyond the proposals that are currently discussed by governments in diplomatic forums. Drawing on federalist blueprints for global reform, Murithi argues for a World Federation of Nations with a variety of reformed and new organs, and explores the possibility of introducing such reforms by changing the UN Charter.

The chapter by Bruno Frey examines the other domain stressed by Gould, i.e. the web of transnational communities that crisscross territorial boundaries. Frey argues that the development of such non-territorial communities should be promoted and accelerated. In his chapter he formulates two wide-ranging proposals. The first aims at creating flexible political units in which citizens can participate voluntarily and jointly finance the provision of public goods they care most about. In this vision, political units would no longer be constrained geographically. The second proposal aims to introduce and promote flexible forms of citizenship, which entails on the one hand the introduction of temporary, multiple and partial forms of national citizenship and on the other hand the creation and strengthening of citizenship in various types of organizations apart from states, such as the associations discussed by Kate Macdonald later in this volume.

The chapters mentioned so far present an array of institutional blueprints, which are variously inspired by federal, confederal or polycentric design principles. The next set of chapters focus on the possibility that such institutional changes could be realized. The chapter by Mathias Koenig-Archibugi is especially relevant to federal blueprints such as those defended by Marchetti and Murithi, but also the cases of regional integration considered by Gould and Follesdal, as it examines how experiences of democratization at the level of individual states can help understand the empirical conditions for, and possible paths towards, global democratization. He notes that scepticism about the possibility of global democracy can be based on the belief that the world as a whole lacks the conditions that have allowed democracy to emerge in some states, notably cultural heterogeneity, economic development,
relatively low levels of inequality, small or moderate size of the polity, and established statehood. Koenig-Archibugi applies fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to 126 cases of democratic transition within states between 1945 and 2009, and finds that none of those conditions were necessary for democracy to emerge. He concludes by sketching some of the paths through which democracy could emerge at the transnational level.

One of the paths identified by Koenig-Archibugi is based on the mobilization of and pressure by civil society actors. The chapters by Kate Macdonald and by Jonas Tallberg and Anders Uhlin analyse the contribution of civil society actors to global democratization from two different and complementary perspectives: Macdonald examines how these actors can increase democratic accountability in ‘pluralist’ power structures and specifically global supply chains and transnational corporations, while Tallberg and Uhlin examine how they can increase democratic accountability and participation in international institutions. Macdonald argues that democracy should be defined in terms of principles of autonomy and equality and that there is a range of institutional arrangements at the global level that may be consistent with such principles. She examines how the global garment industry is organised, and finds that power structures have a ‘pluralist’ nature, as important aspects of the autonomy of workers are affected by a diffused, decentralized and heterogeneous set of actors and institutions. Her chapter shows how this pluralist power structure has generated a pluralist democratic response, which had some success in constraining corporate power through democratic mechanisms. These mechanisms enhance transparency by identifying who holds powers in global supply chains and publicly exposing abuses; they elicit and communicate the preferences of workers, mainly through intermediaries in developed countries in the context of so-called ‘international solidarity campaigns’; and they enforce standards by threatening and applying sanctions against non-complying corporate actors, notably through consumer boycotts but also through broader reputational damage to company brands. Macdonald points at the achievement of such pluralistic democratizing mechanisms, but she also analyses their limitations.

The chapter by Jonas Tallberg and Anders Uhlin performs a similar task in relation to civil society involvement in international institutions and organizations. The normative criteria for assessing this involvement are accountability and participation, and the empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. First, Tallberg and Uhlin map the involvement of civil society organizations in international institutions and how they hold both those institutions and states accountable. They find that this involvement is ‘unequal, select, circumscribed, and
shallow’. Second, they examine the democratic credentials of civil society organizations themselves, and find that they are often weak. Despite these sobering findings, Tallberg and Uhlin also note that the expanded participation and strengthened accountability over the past two decades are steps in a process of democratization and thus provide some grounds for cautious optimism.

B.S. Chimni offers a more skeptical analysis of the relationship between democracy and global capitalism than K. Macdonald, as it is based on a critique of liberal internationalism. If, as Marxists argue, democracy is a congenial political system for capitalism, will global democracy be the most appropriate political system for global capitalism? To prevent this, the global democracy programme should be substantially revised and made clearly anti-capitalist. Chimni calls for an insurgent cosmopolitanism that can take into account non-Western models of modernity. According to Chimni, progressive reforms should not diminish the role of the state which, on the contrary, will be needed to counterbalance the transnational capitalist class.

The chapter by Daniele Archibugi presents a critical perspective on another pillar of the liberal internationalist approach examined in Marchetti’s chapter: the ‘theory of democratic peace’, according to which democracies do not fight each other. Much of the debate has somehow assumed that a more satisfactory international society could be achieved through an ‘internal leverage’: an increase in the number of democratic regimes, it is argued, generates a more peaceful world. But another important leverage, the ‘external leverage’, is often ignored, namely the effects of enhanced participation in international organizations on internal regimes and on the prevention of violent conflicts. The chapter argues that a strengthened international society, in which individuals, collective players and stakeholders have access to decision-making, can have an important role in fostering democratization and democratic consolidation. At the same time, this could provide also an effective method for preventing violent conflicts.

Richard Falk, who is an undisputed pioneer in the study and advocacy of global democracy, concludes the volume by summing up the debate and issuing several warnings on the future of the global democracy idea. He points out the danger of creating ‘a utopian disconnect’ between models of global democracy and a world that is still ruled by power politics. There is need to link the analysis carried out in this book with the historical conditions of the twenty-first century, which combines impressive scientific, technological, social and political opportunities with recurrent environmental, humanitarian and military
emergencies. Falk’s appeal to apply global-democratic thought to the everyday reality of our epoch is at the same time an apt conclusion for our book and good starting point for future work on the theory and practice of global democracy.

References


