Craig Calhoun
Book review: the uncertainties of knowledge.
by Immanuel Wallerstein. Philadelphia:

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a taste of formal analysis, which will stimulate further reading. There could be no better advertisement for rational choice.


Craig Calhoun
*New York University*

Immanuel Wallerstein tells a fairly clear story in this book. Massive changes in the larger world are shaping changes in the social sciences (and, for good measure, the natural sciences too). The changes in the larger world are major because they signal a growing “bifurcation”—that is, sufficient contradiction among the implications of different processes that there is no single equilibrium or developmental path to which to return, but rather an unstable system that must make a more or less unpredictable “choice” between radically disparate alternative futures. Wallerstein’s chosen language for describing this situation is not dialectical materialism (at least not in familiar Marxist forms) but the complexity theory of Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian physical chemist who won a Nobel prize for the analysis of dissipative structures.

The changes in the social sciences are signaled by a growing number of anomalies in the established theories and by the inclination of leading researchers to roam across the boundaries of traditional disciplines. These disciplines were established in the 19th century around certain constitutive axes of differentiation that reflected the then basic organization of the social world and the projects of dominant powers within it: past versus present, West versus rest of the world, and market versus state and civil society. The disciplines that resulted make less and less intellectual sense today, and are likely to be replaced by some new division of academic labor. Wallerstein notes that reasons for resistance to this trend are numerous and powerful, most rooted in the self-interest of scholars with disciplinary positions and reputations at stake. But he notes also that there are important material pressures for change coming both from a loss of public confidence in social science (not insignificant when it comes to getting the public to pay for it) and from the need for deans and provosts to rationalize academic production within universities. The likely outcome, Wallerstein thinks, is a reorganization around three dimensions of the social science project: quantification (which somewhat surprisingly he more or less equates with mathematicization) in pursuit of universal or at least very *longue durée* laws; idiographic interests in particular places, peoples, and cases; and historical social science concerned with the processes of systemic transformation over moderately long durations.

Throughout the book Wallerstein suggests that the famous *Methodenstreit* of the late 19th century was a specious argument and set social
science on a problematic course. Yet, the first two branches of the reorganized social science he envisions basically reproduce the poles of the Methodenstreit. Wallerstein somewhat surprisingly accepts the distinction of universalizing from particularizing inquiries, but demands that these be complemented by large-scale comparative historical analyses of systemic transformations.

The last of these, Wallerstein suggests, has the most potential for (re)integrating social science with natural science. It is not our putatively universal facts, nor certainly our case studies, but our models of systemic transformations that will establish a common ground with those who are pushing the limits of knowledge in biological and physical sciences. This is partly so because the exciting issues in all cases involve uncertainty and deep changes, rather than deterministic processes. By trying to adapt to earlier deterministic models of natural processes, social scientists were at the very least not playing to their strength. In other words, “determinism was conjoined with linearity, equilibrium, and reversibility to add up to a set of minimal criteria for calling theoretical explanations ‘scientific’” (p. 38). But this underestimates the intrinsic uncertainty and dynamism of the social world.

Alongside this main argument, Wallerstein develops other themes. Some have to do with practical issues in the organization of intellectual work, and here he is right that more sociological inquiry into the conditions of knowledge formation is needed. It is not just a possible source of epistemic gain, it is a crucial source of insight into the institutional bases that make possible, but also structure, our work. And these are indeed under enormous pressure. One symptom that Wallerstein stresses is the “creeping flight of scholars, especially the most prestigious ones, to positions outside the university system” (p. 31). This is perhaps less visible in social science because there are fewer opportunities outside the university system than, for example, in biotechnology. But it is happening nonetheless, and not just with senior scholars seeking think tanks, but with talented graduate students deciding academia is not for them.

I suggested that there is a clear storyline. It is not developed cumulatively throughout the book, for this is a collection of occasional essays and lectures that revisit similar themes with considerable overlap and some differentiation of specific focus. Wallerstein focuses sometimes on knowledge-producing institutions, sometimes on the challenges of overcoming the differentiation of perspectives that constituted economics, politics, and sociology as different disciplines. The link between the two is the effort to develop world-systems analysis as a transcendence of the opposition, not in theory, but in comparative historical research. Braudel is Wallerstein’s symbolically favorite ancestor, but the story is largely Wallerstein’s own. As he writes:

By now I was also writing a large series of articles, published all over the place. If one wishes in an article (or talk) both to argue the case for world-systems analysis and to discuss a specific issue, one has to balance the
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presentation between fundamental premises and particulars of the case. I tried to make each important article say at least something worth saying that I had not said before. But I had of course also to repeat much of what I had already said, or the audience/readers might not be able to follow my reasoning. Grouping these articles together in collections had the virtue not merely of making them more available but of elaborating the theoretical skein. (p. 96)

Quite so.

After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology. By Tia DeNora. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xv+176. $65.00 (cloth); $23.00 (paper).

Peter Weeks
St. Thomas University

The title of this book encapsulates its being both an homage to the work on the music sociology of Theodor Adorno on the centenary of his birth and also moving beyond it in both being critical and making his arguments amenable to empirical investigation. Tia DeNora notes that Adorno is the first theorist of modern times to take seriously the issue of music’s causative properties. This is in sharp contrast with current music sociology, which DeNora characterizes as being “a sociology of music” concerned with how musical activity (composition, performance, distribution, and reception) is socially shaped. Thus, music tends to be viewed as a social product, and what is ignored is the way in which the music itself is a dynamic medium in social life. After all, the numerous attempts in the history of Western music either to enlist or censure music’s powers presupposes the importance of the latter. The music’s specific musical properties and how they may act on people need to be investigated in their empirical detail, including their effects on people—their bodily responses, moods, and activities. Thus, music is not merely a structural reflection of the social, but also is constitutive of it.

Adorno’s music sociology—which is most accessible in his Introduction to the Sociology of Music [Seabury Press, 1976] and Essays on Music [University of California Press, 2002]—essentially argues that music’s formal properties evince modes of praxis that inculcate modes of consciousness. For him, music not only evokes emotions and bodily responses, but is also potentially a means of knowledge formation. Adorno argues that music has the potential of either raising critical awareness of the society in general, or of serving as an agent of control through the dulling of consciousness, as in advertising and marketing or the mindless repetitiveness and standardization of popular music. Further, he argues that the composer (subject) is understood in dialectic relationship to the musical material (object) or the tradition of musical conventions at his disposal,