Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé
Annexations and alliances : when are blocs advantageous a priori?
Social choice and welfare, 19
For any simple voting game (SVG), we consider the question posed in the title from two different points of view as to what voting power means. We also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily, and present some general theoretical results concerning these notions. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy SVGs and the Qualified Majority Voting rule of the Council of Ministers of the European Community (CMEC). We show that when voting power is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if its voting power is greater than that sum.
||The authors gratefully acknowledge that work on this paper was partly supported by the Leverhulme Trust (Grant F/07-004m). Published 2002 © Springer. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.
|Library of Congress subject classification:
||J Political Science > JC Political theory
||22 Dec 2005
Actions (login required)
||Record administration - authorised staff only