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Gradualism in dynamic agenda formation

Levy, Gilat and Razin, Ronny (2009) Gradualism in dynamic agenda formation. Theoretical Economics Papers (TE/2009/543). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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We analyze a dynamic model of agenda formation in which players compete in each period to put their ideal policies on the agenda. In each period, with some probability, a decision maker is called upon to take an action from the agenda. We show that in any Markov equilibrium of this game, players with extreme ideal policies will always compete to be in the agenda. On the other hand, there is a positive probability that in each round a more moderate policy will arise on the agenda. Therefore, agenda formation is a gradual process which evolves to include better policies for the decision maker but at a relatively slow pace.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2009 The Authors
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models
D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
Date Deposited: 23 Feb 2012 14:05
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 11:51

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