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An empirical study of corruption in ports

Sequeira, Sandra and Djankov, Simeon (2010) An empirical study of corruption in ports. MPRA Paper, Munich Personal RePEc Archive. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

We generate an original dataset on bribe payments at two competing ports in Southern Africa that allows us to take an unusually close look at the relationship between bureaucratic organization, bribe-setting behavior and the costs corruption imposes on users of public services. We find that the way bureaucracies are organized can generate different opportunities for bureaucrats to engage in "collusive" or "coercive" types of corruption. We then observe how firms adjust their shipping and sourcing strategies in response to different types of corruption. "Collusive" corruption is cost-reducing for firms, increasing usage of the corrupt port, while "coercive" corruption is cost-increasing, reducing demand for port services. Our findings therefore suggest that firms respond to the opportunities and challenges created by different types of corruption, organizing production in a way that increases or decreases demand for the public service.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
Additional Information: © 2010 The Authors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Sets: Departments > International Development
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 11 Jan 2012 10:01
Last Modified: 15 Dec 2016 16:45
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/41301

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