Woodruff, David M. (2006) Understanding rules and institutions: possibilities and limits of game theory. Qualitative methods newsletter, 4 (1). pp. 13-17. ISSN 1544-8045
Examines whether the modelling of institutions as equilibrium strategies in a repeated game is effective, arguing that it can be, but only in those circumstances in which local context is unimportant. Discusses the analytic dangers that arise when susceptibility of institutions to compact game-theoretic modelling is assumed when incentives are in fact contextual.
|Additional Information:||© 2006 American Political Science Association|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Government|
|Date Deposited:||06 Apr 2008 12:45|
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