Ferreira, Daniel and Rezende, Marcelo (2007) Corporate strategy and information disclosure. RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (1). pp. 164-184. ISSN 0741-6261
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy-specific investments.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.rje.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 RAND |
| Divisions: | Finance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Nov 2011 10:48 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Apr 2024 21:18 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/39402 |
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