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One share-one vote: the empirical evidence

Adams, Renee B. and Ferreira, Daniel (2007) One share-one vote: the empirical evidence. Review of Finance, 12 (1). pp. 51-91. ISSN 1572-3097

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Identification Number: 10.1093/rof/rfn003


We survey the empirical literature on disproportional ownership, i.e. the use of mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights in corporations. Our focus is mostly on explicit mechanisms that allow some shareholders to acquire control with less than proportional economic interest in the firm (dual-class equity structures, stock pyramids, cross-ownership, etc.), but we also briefly discuss other mechanisms, such as takeover defenses and fiduciary voting. We provide a broad overview of different areas in this literature and highlight problems of interpretation that may arise because of empirical difficulties. We outline potentially promising areas for future research.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2007 Oxford University Press
Divisions: Finance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 10:44
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2024 19:03

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