Adams, Renee B. and Ferreira, Daniel
(2008)
Do directors perform for pay?
Journal of accounting and economics, 46
(1).
pp. 154-171.
ISSN 0165-4101
Full text not available from this repository.
Abstract
Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board
meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in
publicly-listed firms for the period 1996–2003, we provide robust evidence that
directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board
meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,000,
represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in
our sample. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial
rewards.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Official URL: |
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-accoun... |
| Additional Information: |
© 2008 Elsevier |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
directors, executive compensation, incentives, attendance, board meetings |
| Library of Congress subject classification: |
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: |
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues) |
| Sets: |
Departments > Finance
Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: |
http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: |
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39400/ |
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