Goldstein, Itay, Ozdenoren, Emre and Yuan, Kathy (2010) Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment. CEPR Discussion Paper, DP7652. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
We study a model where a capital provider learns from the price of a firm's security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, where speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large shifts in prices and firms' investments. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyze the determinants of coordination among speculators and study policy measures that affect patterns of coordination to improve price informativeness and investment efficiency.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2010 Centre for Economic Policy Research|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||coordination, financial markets, heterogenous Information, learning, liquidity|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
G - Financial Economics > G0 - General
G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
|Sets:||Departments > Finance
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