Faguet, Jean-Paul (2011) Decentralization and governance. Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers, EOPP 027. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (196Kb) | Preview
The most important theoretical argument concerning decentralization is that it can improve governance by making government more accountable and responsive to the governed. Improving governance is also central to the motivations of real-world reformers, who bear risks and costs in the interest of devolution. But the literature has mostly focused instead on policy-relevant outcomes, such as education and health services, public investment, and fiscal deficits. This paper examines how decentralization affects governance, in particular how it might increase political competition, improve public accountability, reduce political instability, and impose incentive-compatible limits on government power, but also threaten fiscal sustainability.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2011 the author|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||decentralization, governance, local government, political competition, accountability, instability|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory
J Political Science > JS Local government Municipal government
|Sets:||Departments > International Development
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
|Identification Number:||EOPP 027|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|