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Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of Public Services

Besley, Timothy and Ghatak, Maitreesh (2003) Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of Public Services. CARR Discussion Papers (DP 14). Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profit-orientated "market" model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the UK. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission, and discusses how decentralised service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non-profits. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2003 The Authors
Divisions: Centre for Analysis of Risk & Regulation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Sets: Research centres and groups > Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR)
Date Deposited: 07 Jun 2011 15:45
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2021 01:29

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