Caselli, Francesco and Coleman II, Wilbur John (2006) On the theory of ethnic conflict. 732. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy’s resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 The Authors |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts |
| Sets: | Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) Departments > Economics |
| Identification Number: | 732 |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2008 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3561/ |
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