Caselli, Francesco and Coleman II, Wilbur John (2006) On the theory of ethnic conflict. 732. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy’s resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2006 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights
Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Departments > Economics
|Date Deposited:||28 Feb 2008|
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