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Coalition formation under power relations

Piccione, Michele and Razin, Ronny (2009) Coalition formation under power relations. Theoretical Economics, 4 (1). pp. 1-15. ISSN 1555-7561

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Abstract

We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order, which incorporates a notion of robustness to variable power relations. We provide a complete characterization of strongly stable social orders.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://econtheory.org/
Additional Information: © 2009 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Sets: Departments > Economics
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 08 Apr 2011 11:35
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35434/

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