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The Third Way and Social Welfare: The myth of post-emotionalism

Hartley Dean

Abstract: The ‘passive’ welfare state was accused of promoting a dependency culture. ‘Active’ welfare and the ‘what works?’ approach of Britain’s New Labour government is allegedly implicated in an age of post-emotionalism, in which people are largely indifferent to the needs of others and committed primarily to their personal well-being. This paper seeks first, to extend recent debates about agency and motivation in social policy and relate them to the notion of post-emotionalism. Second, it draws on a recent empirical study of popular and welfare provider discourses, which suggests that popular opinion can accommodate an appreciation of human interdependency, while welfare providers remain committed to a public service ethos. None the less, Third Way thinking is associated with a narrowing of solidaristic responsibilities. The problem for the future of health, social care and state welfare policies lies not with the imagined consequences of post-emotionalism, so much as with an ideological context that perpetuates a distorted ethic of responsibility.

Key words: Social Welfare; Third Way; New Labour; Dependency Culture; Post-emotionalism

Introduction

What the New Right and the Third Way have had in common is a belief that the classic welfare state bred dependence and fostered a ‘dependency culture’ (Moore 1987; DSS 1998). However, whereas governments of the New Right attempted (and failed) to ‘roll back’ the welfare state, governments of the Third way are seeking, in their terms, to ‘modernise’ it (Blackman and Palmer 1999).

For the New Right the problem was the very ethos of the classic welfare state. The welfare state had been founded on a solidaristic ethic that conflicted with the
New Right’s essentially Hobbesian view of the social firmament. It had contributed to a process of social ‘demoralisation’ (Himmelfarb 1995) as people ceased to observe the moral norms that are necessary for the social order upon which the functioning of free markets supposedly depends. And so the New Right governments of Reagan and Thatcher had sought to bring back moral obligation and obedience. For the Third Way (Giddens 1998; Blair and Schroder 1999) the problem with the classic welfare state is that it was ‘passive’, rather than ‘active’. It encouraged clientalism and inhibited prudentialism and enterprise. It offered those in need a handout, not a hand up. And so Third Way governments – and particularly Britain’s New Labour government – have been seeking to restore civic duty and to foster a new ethic of self-governance (Bauman 1993; Rose 1996).

At the same time, while the New Right and the Third Way have had quite different ideas of what ‘responsibility’ might entail, they have been equally implicated in a move away from the idea that the welfare state fulfils the demands of a collective social conscience (Higgins 1981) or an individual need to express altruism (Titmuss 1970). Inglehart (1990) has characterised the changes that have overtaken post-industrial society in terms of ‘postmaterialism’; an excessive form of self-seeking individualism made possible, in part, precisely because the classic welfare state had largely succeeded in abolishing material scarcity. But it is not just that people supposedly behave differently, presumably they feel differently. Certainly, there is evidence, for example, that over the past quarter of a century people in Britain have come to see personal relationships ‘less in terms of social responsibilities and obligations and more in terms of personal resources and fulfilment’ (Ferri et al. 2003), while trade union membership – that most traditional expression of class solidarity – has almost halved (Machin 2000).

It has been suggested that we live increasingly in an amoral, ‘post-emotional’ age (e.g. Rodger 2000: ch.7; 2003), in which people’s emotional responses have ceased to be aesthetic or authentic and their goals are informed by a self-centred form of survivalism. The consumer culture to which the inhabitants of Western societies are subject leads to a ‘Disneyfication’ of the emotions. Though people can express or ‘perform’ emotions, they are trumped by rational self-interest (see also Fevre 2000). Britain’s National Lottery, instituted in 1994, captures the sense in which, at best, a shallow, residual kind of caring for others though support for ‘good causes’ is married to a self-preoccupied desire for personal wealth through the chance of winning the
jackpot. Rodger draws the concept of post-emotionalism from Metsrovic (1997) but also links it to the phenomenon of ‘amoral familism’ (cf. Barrett and McIntosh 1982). Post-emotionalism entails a hollowed out form of compassion for others and a distinctively apolitical preoccupation with one’s own interests and well-being, or those of one’s most immediate family. It is ostensibly consonant with a Third Way approach to social policy that regards the welfare functions of the state no longer in terms of meeting needs, but of managing risks (Giddens 1994). It is reflected in new managerialist doctrines (e.g. Clarke and Newman 1997), which regard the recipients of welfare provision no longer as social members or citizens, but as autonomous individuals or consumers.

However, just as this author has previously argued that the dependency culture allegedly fostered by the classic welfare state was a myth (Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992), so I shall now argue that the post-emotionalism fostered by Third Way social policy is probably also a myth.

**Agency, motivation and post-emotionalism**

Although the post-emotionalism thesis has little in the way of empirical foundations, it can perhaps draw some strength from the arguments of Julian Le Grand about changes in the way that human motivation and agency are perceived (1997; 2000; 2003). Le Grand’s original thesis was that the kind of reforms introduced in the spheres of education, health and social services by governments of the New Right – reforms that have for the most part been furthered in the name of the Third Way – reflected the extent to which policy makers assumed that the state administrators and professionals who provided welfare services, and the taxpayers who financed them, were not selfless or altruistic ‘knights’, but self-seeking and instrumental ‘knaves’. State welfare providers were thought to be protecting their own rather than their clients’ interests, while tax-payers would prefer not to finance the welfare of others but to keep their money to themselves. Meanwhile, the policy makers believed, the whole system had turned the recipients of state welfare into helpless ‘pawns’. The policies that both New Right and Third Way governments therefore pursued were calculated to provide incentives that would make ‘knавish’ welfare providers more accountable and ‘pawn-like’ welfare recipients less dependent.
I have previously argued (Dean 2000) that this analysis is predicated on oversimplified premises, since both popular and political discourses embody a rather more complex mixture of moral repertoires (cf. Dean 1999). They draw in quite contradictory ways on both ‘knightish’ and ‘knavish’ assumptions about the basis of the relationship between the individual and the state. People’s day-to-day survival strategies are seldom pawn-like, nor necessarily economically rational, but may draw on subtle combinations of different moral rationalities (see also Barlow et al. 2000; Dwyer 2004). In so far that the moral repertoires that inform political discourse are changing, it is not that emergent political orthodoxies supersede old ones, so much as re-inflect and re-incorporate some, while leaving others in abeyance.

More recently, however, Le Grand has extended his thesis (2003) and now presents it not only in terms of ‘knights’ and ‘knaves’, as the representatives of altruistic versus instrumental forms of motivation, but of ‘pawns’ and ‘queens’, as the representatives of passive and constrained versus active and autonomous forms of agency. His argument is that the current policy regime is affecting welfare providers by turning them from knights into knaves, and affecting welfare receivers by turning them from the powerless pawns of an overweening policy regime into the powerful queens of a free market in human services. The public service ethic of the welfare provider and the trust of the welfare recipient are giving way to entrepreneurialism and consumerism respectively. The shift that this would seem to imply for the ideological-discursive construction of people’s motivations and sense of agency would clearly fit with the notion of post-emotionalism. If the age of the classic welfare state was indeed a time for noble knights and fatalistic pawns, the post-emotional age, supposedly, is a time for calculating knaves and ruthless queens. In the event, Le Grand’s work does not offer decisive evidence to suggest that the climate of emotional feelings has been changing, since his own preoccupation is with whether the policy reforms inspired by changing assumptions will be more or less just and effective. None the less, his thesis does provide a framework in which to investigate the notion of post-emotionalism and I propose to present three critical re-interpretations: the first is concerned with the ideological-discursive repertoires of political and popular discourse; the second with the social construction through such repertoires of the recipients of welfare services; and the third with the social construction of the providers of welfare services.\(^1\)
Political and popular discourse

Le Grand (2003) illustrates his thesis diagramatically by way of two intersecting axes: the horizontal motivational axis representing a continuum of assumptions about the nature of human motivation – ranging from that of ‘knight’ to that of ‘knave’; the vertical axis representing a continuum of assumptions about the nature of human agency – ranging from that of ‘pawn’ to that of ‘queen’. The diagram is intended to relate to the assumptions that policy makers make about welfare providers in the horizontal axis and welfare recipients in the vertical axis. His argument is that social democrats had favoured knightly providers and pawn-like recipients; the New Right had favoured knavish providers and queen-like recipients; and that though the Third Way is more ambiguous it is probably closer to the New Right than the social democratic position. This, I think, is problematic. I would re-interpret Le Grand’s schema as shown in Figure 1.

[insert Figure 1 about here]

In so far as policy makers seek either to mimic or to mould the perceptions of electors and taxpayers what we are concerned with here is the wider issue of the ideological-discursive repertoires that are current within political debate and that are reflected as much in social attitudes and popular beliefs as in the fashions and traditions espoused by politicians. This leads to a more extensive, and necessarily more complex, ideal typology of the ideological-discursive repertoires that are at work.

A number of consequences flow from this. First, Le Grand’s portrayal of a social democratic position as one that favours passivity on the part of welfare recipients would seem to be something of a caricature: or it is a view that plays upon the dirigiste and Fabian extremes of social democratic thinking, while ignoring its more libertarian and radical elements. The broad social democratic tradition, though it is strongly solidaristic, is committed to the active exercise of citizenship rights and can certainly accommodate the idea that individuals should participate as reflexive subjects in the democratic process. Certainly it favours knightly providers but in conjunction, I would contend, with queen-like recipients who may hold providers rigorously to account through legal and democratic processes. Support for beneficent knightly providers but loyal pawn-like recipients would seem to be more consistent...
with the Christian democratic tradition or to the social conservatism of One Nation Toryism.

Turning to Le Grand’s portrayal of the New Right, this seems to ignore the fundamental ambiguity of the New Right position, which many commentators (e.g. Gamble 1988) have recognised as a conjunction between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism; between demands for free markets, but an authoritarian state. It is, strictly speaking, the neo-liberal position that favours a free market driven by knavish but enterprising providers on the one hand and empowered queen-like recipients on the other. The neo-conservative ideal may share the belief that welfare professionals and bureaucrats are to be regulated as if they are knaves, but is anxious that they be so deployed as better to control the behaviour of lazy, unruly or immoral welfare recipients: to make recipients more pawn-like and obedient.

The similarity between the Third Way and the New Right stems from the extent to which both subscribe to neo-liberal ideological-discursive repertoires. It is neo- or economic liberalism that appears most strongly to inform Third Way assumptions about the motivations and agency of welfare providers and recipients. To follow this through, however, it is important to recognise first, that providers and recipients are equally possessed with motivation and agency; second, that motivation and agency each have several elements or components. Whether explicitly or implicitly, neo-liberal assumptions about motivation or agency construct both the recipients and the providers of welfare services in quite particular ways.

Welfare recipients

This has been illustrated in the case of welfare recipients by Doheny (2004). Building in part on this author’s taxonomy of competing discourses of responsibility (Dean 2002) Doheny has undertaken an analysis of press releases issued by Britain’s New Labour government during a period when a variety of welfare reforms were being introduced, including, for example, the introduction of stakeholder pensions (a state regulated private pension scheme intended to enable lower wage earners on a voluntary basis to supplement their basic state retirement pension). Doheny shows how different types of press release anticipate and discursively construct different types of citizen. He describes these as the ‘heroic citizen’, the ‘good citizen’, the
‘recalcitrant citizen’ and the ‘passive citizen’. A slightly adapted version of his analysis is incorporated into Figure 2.

The axes in Figure 2 are the same is in Figure 1, except that the motivational axis is concerned not with a distinction between instrumentalism and altruism, but with the distinction between risk embracing and risk averse kinds of motivation. Motivation stems as much from the way that actors apprehend uncertainty as the way they apprehend their interests. In a risk society (Beck 1992), where the state is concerned with the governance of risk (Hood et al. 2000), the issue that divides the different kinds of citizen is their attitude to risk. The Third Way approach to governance promotes responsible risk taking (Giddens 1998) and Doheny’s heroic citizens (I prefer to call them ‘heroic consumers’) are indeed responsible risk takers: they embrace the risks implied in a world where one must provide so far as possible for one’s own welfare, but they do so as autonomous, queen-like consumers – seeking out the information they require and demanding the best deal on offer.

However, not all citizens are heroic. Some citizens may be good or ‘responsible’ citizens, but they are unreconstructed; they remain risk averse. They may be capable of queen-like autonomy, but they must be cajoled into risk taking and persuaded to detach themselves from reliance on inefficient and ‘unmodernised’ state systems. Other citizens, of course, are recalcitrant or disobedient. These ‘artful dodgers’ wilfully play the short-term odds to cheat the welfare system without regard for the consequences. They undermine the authority of an overburdened welfare system and are to be disciplined or deterred. Finally, there are passive citizens (I prefer to call them ‘passive clients’) who are both pawn-like and risk averse. They must be both motivated to accept risk and empowered to be more autonomous. The government media campaign on pension reform deploys the image of a talking sheep dog as a metaphor for the state, which both protects and herds its powerless and nervous sheep-like subjects.

Welfare providers
Applying the same logic we may see how welfare administrators and professionals are socially constituted in an age of post-emotionalism. My final reinterpretation of Le Grand’s thesis is presented in Figure 3.

The axes in Figure 3 are the same as in Figure 1, except that the agency axis is concerned not with a distinction between passivity and autonomy, but between conventionalism and reflexivity. Agency is rooted as much in actors’ understanding of their actions as in their capacity to act. Giddens (1990) has argued that under conditions of late modernity people must move away from traditional or conventional certainties and engage reflexively with a world of abstract systems. With increasing technical complexity and economic risk, the agency that is exercised by ordinary people requires more critical or elaborated interpretive codes (cf. Douglas 1978) or, put simply, a greater degree of ‘cleverness’, which Giddens and others have termed reflexivity.

The strongly neo-liberal Third Way approach to welfare provision therefore values welfare providers who are instrumentally motivated but reflexive about the nature of the roles they play. Services are best administered or delivered by ‘welfare entrepreneurs’ whose pursuit of personal rewards is harnessed to a sensitivity to the demands of welfare consumers. The now much decried classic welfare state, had been staffed in part by administrators and experts (the ‘bureau professionals’) who combined remote but knightly altruism with skill and reflexivity, but in part also by ‘principled do-gooders’, whose altruistic motivation – whether as professionals or as volunteers – was combined unquestioningly with received and misguided forms of paternalism or charitable sentiment. Finally, there is a space in this taxonomy for welfare providers who are both knavish and conventional: ‘hypocritical autocrats’, such as the mean and moralising beadle of the Dickensian workhouse or the cynically indifferent street-level bureaucrat of the modern welfare office, who combine the pursuit of their own self-interest with the exercise of arbitrary judgementalism over their clients.

Dependency, responsibility and rights
Post-emotionalism, as I understand it, characterises a world in which welfare entrepreneurs provide services for heroic consumers. It is the welfare society envisaged by the Third Way in which welfare dependency is stigmatised, personal responsibility is celebrated and social rights are strictly conditional. The author has recently completed a study of both popular and welfare provider discourses of dependency, responsibility and rights.

The original aim of the study had been to investigate the extent to which the introduction in the UK of the Human Rights Act and emergent discourses of human rights may change the ways in which the welfare state and its future are envisaged. The Human Rights Act of 1998 – implemented in 2000 – while incorporating into UK law provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, does not incorporate the provisions of ECHR’s sister document, the Council of Europe’s Social Charter. This ‘domestication’ of an international civil and political rights instrument does have implications for the formal conduct of a variety of public bodies, but it does not of itself extend the provision of substantive social rights or a rights-based approach to welfare provision. Although the government continues to make clear that it does not, for example, want the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights to be given legal force (e.g. The Independent, 27 May 2003, p. 4), it has proclaimed that it wishes Britain’s public services to adopt ‘a new human rights culture’ (Home Office 1999). The concern, quite clearly, is not with solidaristic rights to public provision, but with the procedural rights of self-seeking consumers of public services and with the further regulation of the conduct of public service providers. In our study, however, we had wanted to see how the public (as electors, taxpayers and welfare recipients), and how welfare providers themselves, might articulate discourses of rights with equally prominent discourses of responsibility, on the one hand, and with continuing preoccupations with dependency on the other. Indirectly, therefore, the findings provide certain insights into the ‘emotionalism’ – the motivations and sense of agency – of both welfare recipients and welfare providers.

The project focused principally on social security provision for working age people and social care provision for elderly and disabled people. In relation to each policy area the investigators sought to explore the feelings of the public and of welfare providers towards the rights that may result from human interdependency and the human responsibilities that go with rights. The investigation entailed two sets of extensive in-depth interviews: the first with a ‘core’ sample of 49 working age adults
with widely differing levels of income (drawn principally from three separate English locations); the second with a sample of 9 social security benefits administrators and 14 social workers.

Evidence from the core sample (see Dean and Rogers 2004a) suggests that popular discourse, while generally attaching negative connotations to dependency, accepts by and large that interdependency is an inevitable feature of the human life-course: even when people deny their own dependency, they may celebrate their dependability for others. Though sometimes recognising the social context in which individual self-reliance must be exercised, popular discourse tends to be narrowly individualistic in its interpretation of responsibility and does not accommodate notions of collective responsibility. While usually recognising that there are certain human rights that are inalienable, popular discourse tends to insist that social or welfare rights are different and should be conditional – upon the contribution(s) a person has made and/or on her/his behaviour – rather than universal. In so far as there is some measure of support for social or welfare rights as a species of human rights, this is clearly related to, but is limited by, the extent of people’s tolerance of others’ dependency. Because their sense of agency is shackled to individualistic rather than solidaristic notions of responsibility there are limits to people’s compassion for or commitment to others, including and particularly distant strangers (of whom asylum seekers were often held up as the iconic example).

Evidence from the welfare provider samples (see Ellis and Rogers 2004; Dean and Rogers 2004 b) suggests that their discourses are not so very different from popular discourse. None the less, welfare providers may be rather more likely to acknowledge the inevitability of human interdependency. Benefits administrators may be even more individualistic in their approach to responsibility and social workers rather less so: the former appear to have been drawn into a managerially regulated ‘customer service’ culture, the latter to an essentially paternalistic professional tradition. As a result of their commitment to a public service ethos, welfare providers appear to be more supportive of state provision than the public themselves, but because of the threat that human rights are perceived to pose to their own administrative or professional autonomy they seem to be even less supportive of the idea that social/welfare rights may count as human rights. In Le Grand’s terms, the welfare providers were knights more than they were knaves, but they wanted their clients/’customers’ to be pawns more than queens.
From this small-scale qualitative study it would appear that popular and welfare provider discourses may, if anything, be better disposed than prevailing Third Way political discourse to acknowledge the necessity of human interdependency and the inalienability of certain rights, but they tend to share an individualistic approach to human responsibility. It is a moralistic rather than an ethical discourse of responsibility, the effect of which is to inhibit the translation of popular understandings of human interdependency into wider support for a human rights approach to social welfare provision. This picture, as we shall see, does not wholly square with the post-emotionalism thesis.

The picture is consistent with previous research (Dean 1999) which had suggested that a multiplicity of moral or ideological-discursive repertoires are present in popular discourse, although it indicates that it is primarily in relation to concepts of responsibility that the Third Way may be generating some measure of hegemonic consensus. It is a concept of responsibility that is closely linked to notions of agency and, in particular, the ideal of queen-like autonomy. However, this is not necessarily the self-serving autonomy of post-emotionalism. Certainly, only a small minority within our sample continued to support social democratic notions of universal social rights. Far more important is that the majority – in spite of the prevalence of popular prejudices against welfare dependency – acknowledged that they themselves were at least potentially dependent beings (and/or that other people depended on them); and that there are at least certain things to which all human beings are or should be entitled. This was not inauthentic compassion, but an awareness of the nature of the human condition: an awareness that is at least as capable of sustaining a knightly commitment to greater universalism as a knavish commitment to self-provision. The impediment is not a lack of authentic emotions, but the ascendancy of narrowly individualistic discourses of responsibility.

With regard to the welfare providers, our evidence – limited though it is – suggests very strongly that a knightly public service ethos prevails in spite of attempts by policy makers to inflect them towards a more entrepreneurial approach. In fact, reforms introduced by New Right and/or Third Way governments risked turning welfare providers not from bureau professionals into welfare entrepreneurs, but into hypocritical autocrats (cf. Lipsky 1980). In the case of the benefits administrators, though they had, for example, absorbed the language and principles of a departmental Customer Charter, this could be applied so as to constrain rather than open up the
administrative process; to hold claimants strictly to their prescribed responsibilities, while delimiting the duties accepted by administrators. In the case of the social workers, the philosophy of risk management (Hood et al. 2000; Schwer 2001) could be applied in defensive ways that inhibited social workers from acting proactively as advocates for their clients. The public service ethos is under threat, but not necessarily for want of emotional commitment on the part of welfare providers.

It also emerged from the study outlined above that political claims first popularised by the New Right that state welfare provision breeds a ‘dependency culture’ would now seem to have been widely assimilated into both popular and welfare provider discourse. This is in spite of a body of evidence that people who are dependent on state welfare clearly ascribe to the same attitudes, aspirations and, indeed, prejudices as apply in mainstream culture (e.g. Gallie and Vogler 1990; Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992; Kempson et al. 1994). Long-term social and labour market exclusion may have certain affects on people’s motivation and sense of agency, but the idea that the receipt of state welfare support fosters distinctive cultural values remains unproven. The myth of the dependency culture remains powerful, however, and – together with deliberately heightened concerns about the prevalence social security benefit fraud – has been pressed into service by the Third Way to stigmatise the receipt of state benefits (e.g. DSS 1998). The assumptions that fuel popular beliefs and the decisions of policy makers may be premised on myths, but they have real effects. In so far that the recipients of welfare services are cast in the popular imagination as either passive clients or artful dodgers, people will not embrace their own dependency on state provision. Even those who recognise the legitimacy of the role the state can play in mediating human interdependency, cannot celebrate state dependency.

Conclusion

We should not assume that the demise of the classic welfare state and the prospect of an era in which heroic consumers receive services provided by welfare entrepreneurs will succeed in generating an alternative post-emotional culture. The Third Way may be leading to a diminished sense of solidaristic responsibility, but this is precisely because dependency has been made to appear as if it were inimical to responsibility. If, in the realms of caricature, the citizens of the classic welfare state were dependent
pawns, then the terms on which the Third Way offers them their autonomy is as
individual prima donnas, not as responsible social participants. Previous research
(Dean 1999) would suggest that, by and large, people are no more attracted to the
heroic consumer identity than to a passive client identity. The more recent research
outlined above suggests that people’s sense of agency may be increasingly detached
from any solidaristic ethos, but this does not mean that either citizens or welfare
providers have entirely ceased to be capable of knightly feelings. The evidence
suggests that, from behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ as to the extent of the risks
they face, people do by and large espouse an implicit theory of social justice (cf.
Rawls 1972), but their commitment to social justice does not necessarily result solely
from the instrumental calculation of self-interest. The post emotionalism thesis is
over-pessimistic and overblown.

The issue, I would briefly conclude, is not emotionality or a failure of
compassion, but ethics and a failure to conceptualise a solidaristic basis for our social
rights. At the heart of the Third Way project is the contractarian motto ‘no rights
without responsibilities’ (Giddens 1998: 65). Responsibility, however, is variously
construed as civic duty, as moral obligation, or – failing all else – as enforced
obedience to prescribed standards of behaviour (Dean 2002). It is not construed in
terms of the kinds of responsibility that must be socially negotiated over time, within
relationships or between the generations (cf. Finch and Mason 1993); still less in
terms of any ‘ethic of co-responsibility’ (Apel 1980) through which the global
parameters of human interdependency might come to be defined. The Third Way
has argued that there are three essentials for what he calls the ethical life: love,
solidarity and rights. Love is about discovering oneself through another. Solidarity is
about respect for difference and the sharing of responsibility. Rights are about the way
we recognise each other as the bearers of claims based on needs. The posited tide of
post-emotionalism is unlikely to overcome our capacity for love. However, the Third
Way would seem to be associated with a narrowing of our social solidarities and this
in turn will diminish our acceptance of others’ rights. Post-emotionalism is probably
no more of a threat to the welfare state than the dependency culture is a threat to
capitalism. The real threat is ethical individualism, which is more a cognitive than an
emotional phenomenon.
Notes

1  The author is grateful to Julian Le Grand for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I should make clear, however, that he does not necessarily endorse the arguments that follow, the responsibility for which is entirely mine.

2  While the social democratic tradition clearly encompasses elements of what has been referred to as the ‘Titmuss Paradigm’ (which is inimical to the idea of human agency - see Deacon and Mann 1999), I would argue there is a degree of hybridity to the ‘Titmuss Paradigm’ in so far that it draws upon essentially authoritarian-conservative as well as social democratic repertoires (see Dean 2002: 59-60).

3  The Third Way also draws, at times, on all three of the other repertoires. (It is, perhaps, more of a fifth than a third way.) For example, the more coercive elements of New Labour’s welfare-to-work policy and its aggressive approach to curbing ‘anti-social behaviour’ are distinctly neo-conservative; explicitly communitarian policies for ‘civil renewal’ are strongly redolent of republican and social conservative traditions; redistribution by stealth achieved by Chancellor Gordon Brown’s ‘fairness agenda’ implies more than a vestige of social democratic commitment. However, the overwhelming pre-occupation of Third Way social policy is with labour market participation on the one hand and the ‘modernisation’ of public service delivery on the other, where the emphasis remains quintessentially neo-liberal.

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