Green Citizenship

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Abstract:

This paper firstly describes the influence that environmentalism and ecologism have had upon thinking about citizenship before secondly, moving on to discuss conventional models of citizenship and potential models of Green citizenship. The discussion focuses on the competing moral discourses that inform our understanding of citizenship and concludes by arguing in favour of an eco-socialist citizenship model that would embrace, on the one hand, an ethic of co-responsibility by which collectively to achieve the just distribution of scarce resources and, on the other, an ethic of care through which to negotiate the basis for human interdependency.

Key words:

care, citizenship, ecologism, environment, humanity, responsibility

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There is something rather elusive about the idea of Green citizenship. Though references in the literature to environmental or ecological citizenship – which are not necessarily the same thing (cf. Dobson 1995) – crop up quite regularly, the concepts are never too clearly defined. In part, I would suggest, this is because Green thinking has impacted on thinking about citizenship in a number of rather disparate ways. In part it is because some strands of Green thinking are actually inimical to the concept of citizenship. In this article I shall attempt firstly to identify the different ways in which environmentalism and ecologism have influenced debates about citizenship, before moving on to develop a conceptual model that characterises the ways in which

competing moral discourses might construct a Green perspective on citizenship. Finally, I shall expand upon and advance the normative case for just one of those moral discourses, namely eco-socialism. If it is to become more than a discursive artefact or ideological fiction, 'citizenship' must define substantive principles by which to defend social humanity against the dual threats of global capitalism and ecological crisis.

The greening of citizenship

Citizenship is an ancient concept dating back some two and a half thousand years to the days of the Athenian city-state. Modern concepts of citizenship emerged from the seventeenth century onwards and evolved as the nation-state developed as the predominant unit of civil society and political administration. In the twentieth century the nations of the capitalist world became welfare states and so, according to T.H. Marshall (1950), consolidated the concept of citizenship by adding to it a *social* dimension.

However, political and popular understandings of citizenship are complex, multifaceted and often contradictory (Dean with Melrose 1999). While the evolution of modern citizenship has been closely associated with the development of capitalism, Bryan Turner has pointed out that the concept has also been fashioned by other influences – by war, migration and a variety of social movements (Turner 1986); and it is a concept that is capable of being either imposed by rulers from above or seized by the people from below (Turner 1990). With this in mind it may be observed that, in recent times, Green thinking has impacted on our understandings of citizenship in at least three different ways. First, environmental concerns have entered our understanding of the rights we enjoy as citizens. Secondly, the enhanced level of global awareness associated with ecological thinking has helped to broaden our understanding of the potential scope of citizenship. Thirdly, emergent ecological concerns have added fuel to a complex debate about the responsibilities that attach to citizenship.

Environmentalism

The rights-based conception of citizenship espoused by T.H. Marshall can quite readily be extended to accommodate the idea of environmental citizenship. Marshall's account of citizenship encompasses the development of civil rights (to civil liberties and legal protection), political rights (to democratic participation) and social rights (to basic welfare provision). It has been suggested that, with the coming of the contemporary environmental movement, Marshall himself would not have hesitated to add a fourth dimension to his concept of citizenship, namely environmental rights that provide for the protection of the individual against the effects of pollution and environmental degradation (e.g. Newby 1996, van Steenbergen 1994). In fact the environmental movement can be traced back beyond recent times to Victorian preoccupations with public health and, for example, the preservation of the nation's natural and cultural 'heritage' (Newby 1996). What might be defined as environmental rights of citizenship were fist realised in the British context with the enactment of the early Public Health Acts of the mid-nineteenth century and, later, such measures as the Town and Country Planning Act of 1946 (Thane 1982).

Pre-occupation with arrangements for sanitation and water supply, the prevention of food contamination, the control of industrial effluent and public health hazards, and the regulation of the building and land use have long been a part and parcel of social and public policy and have given rise to a range of enforceable rights (Dean 1996). The heightened level of environmental awareness that characterised the last decades of the twentieth century brought new emphasis to bear upon such measures as was reflected, for example, in the discursive reframing of 'Public Health' legislation as 'Environmental Protection' legislation. In so far that social rights cater for such basic human needs as clean water, it is possible to reclassify certain social rights as environmental rights especially in the context of the climatic and geophysical constraints experienced in some developing countries. The language of environmentalism has entered policy discourse in a variety of ways. A kind of environmentalism is also reflected in the developed world through increased public demands – of a somewhat parochial character – for enhanced protection of wildlife and the countryside and the 'right' of citizens to access and enjoy such amenities. However, despite the prominence of wider concerns about environmental global sustainability (e.g. Brundtland 1987) and such scares as the Chernobyl disaster and the BSE crisis, demands for new kinds of substantive environmental rights – rather

than for the extension and enforcement of existing kinds of civil liberties and social protection – have been virtually absent.

Academic commentators, including, social policy academics like Twine (1994), have rightly focused on the link between environmental interdependence and the social rights of citizenship. If we accept that environmental considerations and the finite limitations of natural resources impose limits to economic growth (Meadows et al 1974; 1992) this means first, that we can no longer attempt to promote social justice by distributing the proceeds of economic growth: to the extent that a redistribution of resources is desirable or necessary – whether within or between the nations of the world – this can no longer be achieved other than at the expense of the privileged. Secondly, the social rights of future generations must now depend upon a reappraisal of the welfare entitlements of current generations. This means that we must rethink the nature of our social rights, but it need not of itself require us to define a distinctive set of environmental rights.

Global awareness

Broader ecological concerns with the sustainability of the planet have contributed or added salience to attempts both to widen and deepen our concept of citizenship. Falk (1994) has suggested that the 'ecological imperative' is just one of several grounds upon which it is possible to conceive or advocate forms of global citizenship. The other grounds relate to longstanding aspirational demands for global peace and justice; the consequences of economic globalisation; and emergent modes of transnational political mobilisation arising both from regional movements and new social movements. These grounds are intimately interconnected and at least as pressing as any other is the argument that '[f]or the sake of human survival ... some forms of effective global citizenship are required to redesign political choices on the basis of an ecological sense of natural viabilities, and thereby to transform established forms of political behaviour' (Falk 1994: 132).

Although such a vision of global citizenship is far from being realised, general thinking about citizenship has been changing at two distinct levels. It is necessary to recall that citizenship can be understood both as a status and as a practice (Lister 1997). It relates both to the way in which the individual is constructed in the context of the public sphere and to normative expectations as to her/his private as well as

public conduct. The celebrated Green slogan or aphorism ‘think globally, act locally’ implies a similar distinction between conceptualising human individuals in their global context on the one hand, but on the other endorsing or demanding particular kinds of individual behaviour at the everyday local level. The immanent logic that informs recent empirical and normative accounts of citizenship reflects this distinction. It also points to a tension that any form of Green citizenship would have to resolve.

First, at the level of global context, Soysal (1994) has demonstrated how the institution and meaning of citizenship is changing as the role of the nation-state is, in part at least, superseded (cf. Horsman and Marshall 1994). Soysal argues that two institutionalised principles of the global system – namely, national sovereignty and universal human rights – have collided (cf. Turner 1993). The concept of human rights is more global than that of citizenship in so far that it encompasses notions of entitlement that transcend considerations of nationality. Soysal illustrates how one consequence of this is to be observed in the rights that are begrudgingly afforded by developed nations to foreign guestworkers. None the less, to the extent that it is the developed nation-states that are accorded responsibility for maintaining human rights, paradoxically this can also fortify their authority and even justify humanitarian or military intervention in other parts of the world. Soysal implies that as our concepts of rights become globalised they become abstracted and detached from our sense of local belonging or identity; from our capacity to regulate our own lives.

Secondly, at the level of everyday experience and practice, writers like Clarke (1996) argue not for a widening, but a deepening of citizenship. Clarke’s notion of ‘deep citizenship’ focuses on the citizen-self whose civic virtues cross the divide between the spheres of the public and the private and engage with a range of concerns about self, others and the world, including ‘environmental issues, economic issues and other issues that impact on the world’ (ibid: 119). Embracing the idea that the personal is political, Clarke argues that deep citizenship entails a sort of (re)negotiation or ‘discovery of the relation between the categories of citizen and human’ (ibid: 123). His argument is that ‘human’ is no less a social and political construct than ‘citizen’ and, he contends, is of more recent historical provenance. It is citizen rights that provide the model for human rights and not the other way round. States, whether they are city-states, nation-states or supranational states, are artificial

entities, whereas deep citizenship entails a multiplicity of politicised identities and, potentially, an infinite variety of associations.

Dahrendorf (1994: 18) has archly concluded that 'I am not sure whether one can stipulate an entitlement for all of us as world citizens to a liveable habitat, and thus to actions that sustain it, but something of this kind may well belong on the agenda of citizenship'. Dahrendorf's diffidence would be justified if indeed the ecological imperative of which Falk speaks were to become stranded between a conception of global citizenship founded on abstract universal rights and a conception founded on a multiplicity of citizen-selves.

Discourses of responsibility

A possible, if ambiguous, resolution to this tension is provided by commentators who advocate a shift from an understanding of citizenship based on rights to an understanding of citizenship that is based on duties or responsibilities. Roche (1992), for example, has contended that since the crisis of the welfare state in the 1970s the 'dominant paradigm' of social citizenship has come under attack from across the political spectrum as a 'discourse of duty' as well as rights has emerged. This discourse has taken several forms, ranging from New Right and neo-conservative claims that welfare rights undermine the responsibilities of citizens to sustain themselves through work and provide for each other through the family, through to the challenges posed by new social movements, including the ecology movement. Roche credits the ecology movement with having forced onto the agenda the question of the responsibilities that human beings owe towards other species, the environment, the Earth itself, as well as to future human generations. Though Roche opposes the New Right's rejection of social rights, he accepts the case for rethinking the absolute priority that he believes has been given to social rights and urges a need 'to reconsider the moral and ideological claims of personal responsibility, of parental and ecological obligations, of corporate and inter-generational obligations, and so on.' (1992: 246).

To an extent, such arguments prefigured those that occurred within the British Labour Party in the mid 1990s and the principles eventually advanced by the New Labour government. The Labour Party went so far as to revise its constitution so as to declare itself in favour of a society in which 'the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe' (Labour Party 1995) and nowhere has this been more clearly reflected than in

the New Labour government's welfare reforms which have been built on the premise that those who can work and provide for themselves and their families have a responsibility to do so (DSS 1998). However, notions of responsibility have not extended very far in relation to environmental matters and, although New Labour's commitment to global sustainability is ostensibly less tokenistic than that of previous British governments, its initiatives on transport policy, for example, have not gone far enough to challenge the dominant consumerist ethos (Cahill 1999).

While ecological considerations may have percolated political rhetoric and discourses of responsibility, ecologically informed notions of a 'new politics of obligation' are largely confined to academic texts (e.g. Smith 1998). We noted above that an environmentalist approach to rights, does not necessarily require a separate category of environmental rights, but an ecological approach to responsibility plainly does demand responsibilities on the part of the human subject to protect the natural environment: responsibilities for which there can be no directly correlative rights. Once again, aspects of Green thinking have influenced mainstream debates about the nature of citizenship, but without radically transforming them.

Modelling citizenship

Citizenship remains a complex and contested idea and is conceptualised in several different ways. Similarly, Green thinking contains several disparate strands. In recent work (Dean with Melrose 1999; Dean 1998, 1999, 2001) I have sought to develop a heuristic model or taxonomy in order to delineate the discursive moral repertoires that underpin or make possible competing conceptions of citizenship. In this article, I shall model a similar account of Green moral repertoires, each with a competing perspective on citizenship.

Conventional moral discourses

First, therefore, I shall recount the basic elements of the model of those moral discourses that inform 'conventional' ideas of citizenship. It is a model that can be made to resonate in quite complex ways with cultural theory, post-structuralist analyses and historical accounts of class formation. For the purposes of this article,

however, I shall distinguish only the essential 'moral repertoires' (cf. Offe 1993) that may be drawn upon to justify four distinctive conceptions of citizenship. The moral repertoires stem from classic Enlightenment ideals once encapsulated in the revolutionary slogan '*liberte, egalite, fraternite*', or liberty, equality and solidarity; ideals that in practice conflict. The model is schematically illustrated in Figure 1 in which the two axes represent two normative conceptual continua.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

The horizontal axis relates to the fundamental distinction between contractarian and solidaristic prescriptions for social order. These two prescriptions reflect what are commonly described as the liberal and the civic-republican traditions of citizenship respectively (e.g. Oldfield 1990; Lister 1997). The contractarian prescription is informed by a commitment to liberty and the idea that to have *freedom* an individual must enter a contract with society and exchange some element of her/his sovereignty in return for a guarantee of social order. The solidaristic prescription is informed by a commitment to solidarity and the idea that to have *security* an individual must pool her/his sovereignty with the rest of the society to which s/he belongs, since social order depends on social cohesion. The vertical axis in Figure 1 relates to the distinction between egalitarian and hierarchical prescriptions for the relationship between individuals within a society. The egalitarian prescription is informed by a commitment to equality – albeit that equality may be interpreted in different ways. The hierarchical prescription is informed by a commitment to established social traditions – albeit that the relations of power by which such traditions are established may be quite differently conceived. The intersection of the continua represented by the axes define four distinctive moral discourses:

- The discourse of entrepreneurism is fundamentally contractarian since it envisages the contract as the moral basis for all human transactions. It denies or obscures the interdependency that is the basis of our social humanity. It is egalitarian in the formal sense: it embraces the idea of equality before the law and of individual equality of opportunity, though it is tolerant of substantive inequality and regards unequal outcomes as inevitable or even necessary. It is a discourse that is compatible with economic liberalism. It implies a form of citizenship that is, in

one sense, utilitarian, since it will admit a role for the state in underwriting an essentially economic calculus of harm and advantage; in regulating externalities and promoting efficiency.

- The discourse of survivalism is similarly contractarian, but fundamentally inegalitarian in so far that it does not necessarily accept that all competition within society is or ever can be fair: it does not question the unequal distribution of social power and resources. The imperative to which it subscribes is that of every person or family for itself. It is a discourse that is compatible with moral authoritatianism and support for 'traditional' partriarchal family values. It implies a form of citizenship that is strictly Hobbesian or what some term ‘neo-conservative’, since it will admit a role for the state in deterring certain forms of behaviour and enforcing others.
- The discourse of conformism is fundamentally solidaristic since it aspires to social integration and belonging. It is also hierarchical in that it acknowledges that the existing social order is premised on certain inequalities of social power and resources. It is a discourse that is compatible with social conservatism (characteristically, that is, with One Nation Toryism in the British context, and Christian Democracy in the continental European context). It implies a form of citizenship that is communitarian, since it will admit a role for the state in power broking within a defined community while at the same time protecting its essential integrity.
- The discourse of reformism is similarly solidaristic, but egalitarian in a substantive sense. It embraces the idea that there should be a broad measure of equality in the distribution of social power and resources. It is a discourse that is compatible with Social Democracy. It implies a form of citizenship that is morally universalist, albeit perhaps more in the Kantian than the Marxist sense of moral universalism. It will admit a role for the state in promoting universal and inclusive rights.

The model therefore accounts for the discursive moral foundations of the principal conceptions of citizenship that are currently extant, at least within existing capitalist welfare states. The discursive repertoires it defines are ideal types. Actual political discourse may therefore combine or straddle potentially conflicting repertoires,

without necessarily transcending them. For example, the liberalism of say Hobhouse (1911), Rawls (1972) or van Parijs (1995), I would argue, draws upon elements of both entrepreneurial and reformist discourse. In the context of this model, the social liberalism that has informed the development of welfare states, especially in the Anglophone tradition, emerges as an ambiguous ideology that struggles to address competing moral repertoires. Additionally, the model relates only to 'conventional' moral discourses and does not accommodate radical socialist, feminist or ecological moral discourse or the way in which they might engage with citizenship.

Ecological moral discourses

Previous attempts within Social Policy literature to classify the different moral bases on which Green thinking has developed have seldom moved very far between the distinction between 'deep greenism' and 'social ecology' (e.g. Ferris 1991). However, a somewhat more complex approach than this is required. To define the essential discursive moral repertoires that underpin different strands in Green thinking, it is possible to construct a model around a different if related set of conceptual continua or axes than those in the above analysis of conventional moral discourses. The model I propose is schematically presented in Figure 2.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

The horizontal axis in this figure relates to a fundamental distinction that I wish to draw between anti-social-humanistic and pro-social-humanistic strands of thinking[1]; between, on the one hand, prescriptive approaches that would subordinate the activities and the status of human beings to the needs of the global economy or capitalism *and/or* to the needs of the environment or the Earth, and on the other, approaches that seek to protect the interests of humanity against the effects of capitalist exploitation and the consequences of socio-economic polarisation *and/or* the effects of environmental degradation and the consequences of ecological disaster. There is an important parallel between this continuum and the contractarian-solidaristic continuum. Both the anti-social-humanistic and the contractarian prescriptions presuppose that the human subject is quintessentially competitive, calculative and self-seeking. Both the pro-social-humanistic and the solidaristic

prescriptions presuppose that the human subject is potentially co-operative, vulnerable and redeemable. The vertical axis in Figure 2 relates to the distinction between emancipatory and defensive prescriptions for change, a distinction drawn directly from that made by Habermas (1987) between different kinds of social movement, but one that can also be applied within the Green movement. Once again, there is a parallel to be drawn – this time, between the emancipatory-defensive continuum and the egalitarian-hierarchical continuum. Both the emancipatory and the egalitarian prescriptions advocate changes that are seen as 'progressive' and envision a transformation of the future. Both the defensive and the hierarchical prescriptions oppose changes that are seen as destructive of supposedly 'natural' equilibria or may seek to recapture or rehabilitate achievements of the past. The intersection of the continua represented by the axes define four distinctive moral discourses:

- The discourse of ecological modernisation (see Dryzek 1997; Christoff 1996; Hajer 1995)[2], though it is plainly anthropocentric, is also anti-social-humanistic in the sense that it places economic imperatives by implication above social ones. It is emancipatory in the sense that its objective is to save the capitalist order from capitalism's ecological consequences; to liberate economic actors from ecological constraints. It is a discourse that accommodates a notion of citizenship appropriate to the global capitalist (cf van Steenbergen 1994: 148). By taking on the management of environmental concerns it is, strictly speaking, an environmentalist rather than an ecological discourse. It is premised on the imperative of continued economic growth, the necessity for a technological fix for all environmental obstacles to such growth, and indeed the possibility of an economic payback from such new environmentally friendly technologies. The discourse has its parallel in the entrepreneurial moral repertoire of conventional discourse.
- The discourse of deep ecology (e.g. Naess 1973; Fox 1984) is profoundly anti-social-humanistic in the sense that it relegates the interests of the human species to those of other species, the environment and of the Earth itself. It is quintessentially defensive in the sense that its objective is to preserve the Earth. This discourse is inimical to any concept of citizenship since it rejects the anthropocentric ethic upon which citizenship is based. Its alternative, an

ecocentric ethic, is capable of sustaining anti-democratic and authoritarian 'Earth First' tenets, extending to Malthusian beliefs regarding population control and punitive, even lethal, forms of direct action against human beings. The discourse has its parallel – albeit a partial one – in the survivalist moral repertoire of conventional discourse.

- The discourse of green communitarianism is pro-social-humanistic in the sense that it celebrates the place of the human species in Nature. It is defensive in the sense that its objective is to maintain ecologically sustainable human societies. This discourse accommodates a notion of citizenship that is close to that described by van Steenbergen (1994: 150) as that of the earth citizen: certainly it would accept that the natural self-regulating mechanisms of the eco-system may provide a model by which humans might construct a form of citizenship. The discourse is capable of being inflected towards more romantic, mystical or spiritual ideas about 'oneness with Nature' and the ascendancy of feeling over reason, but arguably it is also inherently conservative in the nature of its trans-generational perspective (which implies that future sustainability requires the replication of social relations from the past), its mistrust of individual human agency and its aversion to risk (see Gray 1993). The discourse has its clear parallel in the conformist repertoire of conventional discourse.
- The discourse of eco-socialism is profoundly pro-social-humanistic in the sense that it is epistemologically founded in the human project. It is quintessentially emancipatory in the sense that its objective is to realise the full potential of social humanity within an ecological context. This discourse accommodates a notion of citizenship appropriate to what van Steenbergen (1994: 149) has – too dismissively perhaps – defined as the global reformer. The discourse starts from the premise that human exploitation of the Earth has stemmed from humans' exploitation of other humans and that human emancipation is therefore a condition precedent for the emancipation of the Earth (Bookchin 1991). In particular, the discourse stresses the need for an anti-productivist ethic as the basis for any citizenship settlement (cf. Offe 1992; Fitzpatrick 1998) and it is therefore as much opposed to Stalinist forms of state socialism as to capitalism. The discourse has a parallel in the reformist repertoire of conventional discourse, though it is

necessarily more radical: it is commensurate with democratic socialism rather than social democracy.

This outline amounts possibly to a somewhat controversial caricature of some complex philosophical and ideological discourses and it oversimplifies important tensions or differences within some of those discourses. As with the taxonomy of conventional moral discourses, however, the taxonomy is no more than a heuristic device. My argument is that the Green tent makes space for all these discourses, together on occasions with their related conventional discourses. It can be observed that individual exponents of Green thinking do not necessarily draw exclusively on one or other discourse but may draw upon several or even all of them, notwithstanding their mutually contradictory character. For example, a great deal of progressive Green thinking probably combines or straddles moderate versions of both eco-modernisation and eco-socialism. Nor do I contend that ecologism is merely a 'cross-cutting ideology' (Goodwin 1987: vii) that is best understood as a qualification to or variant of modernity's grand narratives: together with feminism it represents a major challenge to those narratives. The above taxonomy is intended merely to assist our understanding of what Green citizenship might mean.

The normative case for eco-socialism

I do not here propose to develop this model, other than to make some speculative remarks about the potential scope for one of the ecological moral discourses defined above, namely eco-socialism. Nor shall I traverse the established debates between ecologism and socialism (see Weston 1986; Ryle 1988; Pepper 1993). Rather I shall venture my own tentative view that an eco-socialist conception of citizenship should be founded upon two ethical premises; one relating to the distribution of scarce resources; the other to the provision of care.

Negotiating scarcity

Turner has argued that the 'focal point of citizenship' (1997: 11) is the tension between the need to moderate scarcity on the one hand and to maintain solidarity on

the other. Addressing that tension, I would argue, requires a macro-ethic that combines social justice with ecological sustainability; that can bind humanity together in a manner that enables it collectively to address its environmental predicament. The philosopher, Apel (1980; 1991), has contended that this can be achieved by the ethical principle of 'co-responsibility'[3]. Apel argues that liberalism as the dominant ideological paradigm of modernity has effectively paralysed the possibility of a macro-ethic because it separates the public sphere of scientific rationality from the private sphere of preferences and values. However, a planetary principle of co-responsibility is possible, upon three conditions.

First, it must be rational and transcend tradition. Secondly, it requires a global communication community, something made possible by cultural, technological and economic globalisation such that 'we have become members of a real communication community or, if you will, members of the crew of one boat, for example, with regard to the ecological crisis' (1991: 269). This idea has obvious resonance with Habermas' (1987) counterfactual notion of the 'ideal speech situation': a political objective through which it would be possible for human beings to engage in undistorted and uncoerced kinds of negotiation. Thirdly, says Apel, a principle of co-responsibility requires that scientific and ethical claims to truth be taken equally seriously. This idea has an obvious resonance with Beck's (1992) demand for the demonopolisation of science and a form of reflexivity based on negotiation between different epistemologies. The ethical fulcrum of such negotiation is human need:

> ... the members of the communication community (and this implies all thinking beings) are also committed to considering all the potential claims of all the potential members – and this means all human 'needs' in as much as they could be affected by norms and consequently make *claims* on their fellow human beings. As potential 'claims' that can be communicated interpersonally, all human needs are ethically *relevant*. They must be *acknowledged* if they can be justified interpersonally through arguments. (Apel 1980: 277)

If this is what Apel means by 'co-responsibility' it implies the universalisability of human needs through a form of global citizenship. It would seem to presuppose that there are certain basic human needs whose optimal satisfaction must precede the imposition of any social obligations (cf. Doyal and Gough 1991) and that it is possible

to negotiate the empirical, ontological and normative consensus that is required to translate the particular demands of diverse social movements into universalisable human rights (cf. Hewitt 1993). The importance of this is that it implies a relationship between rights and responsibilities that goes far beyond the narrow contractarian calculus of New Labour's 'Third Way' and Giddens' motto – 'no rights without responsibilities' (1998: 65) – because responsibility is by nature co-operative and negotiated, not an inherent obligation or *apriori* doctrine. It takes us beyond Kantian moral universalism towards a socialist ethic and beyond environmentalist angst towards an ethic of ecological sustainability.

The argument is admittedly abstract, but citizenship itself is an abstract construct and co-responsibility as an ideal is no less abstract than an idealised social contract. If anything, the everyday human experiences of the kinds of obligations that are socially negotiated over time, within relationships and between the generations (cf. Finch and Mason 1993) are more concrete and immediate than those obligations that arise through the legal fiction of a contract. They provide a sounder basis for conceptualising citizenship and for envisaging ways of achieving a just and sustainable distribution of resources.

The ethic of care

This leads to the second ethical premise, one that links the macro-ethics of rights and responsibility to quotidian reality. Drawing on philosophical anthropology, Turner has argued that 'it is from a collectively held recognition of individual frailty that rights as a system of mutual protection gain their emotive force' (1993: 507). The human subject is endemically vulnerable and to survive requires collectively organised mechanisms for mutual co-operation and support: what matters, as Richard Rorty has put it, 'is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark' (cited in Doyal and Gough 1991: 19). The corollary to a system of human rights founded on the ideal of the independent citizen is a system founded on the recognition of human interdependency.

Advocates of a deeper form of citizenship identify 'care' as an essential civic virtue (e.g. Clarke 1996) and eco-feminists, like Valerie Plumwood, have articulated a form of ecological rationality that 'recognises and accommodates the denied relationships of dependency and enables us to acknowledge our debt to the sustaining

others of the Earth' (cited in Dobson 1995: 197). While some feminists remain sceptical of the essentialist claim that women are somehow closer to Nature and that caring feminine values are of an inherently higher moral order than dominating masculine ones, they none the less define an ethic of care that should become the property of men as well as women (e.g. Tronto 1993). In particular Sevenhuijsen (1998; 2000) has argued that '[a] democratic ethic of care starts from the idea that everybody needs care and is (in principle at least) capable of care giving' (2000: 15). Inclusive relationships are achieved in the context of specific social networks of care and responsibility and cannot be created by ascribing rights and responsibilities. The citizen must first be understood not as an abstract individual or 'equal rights holder', but as a 'self-in-relationship'. On the one hand, Sevenhuijsen argues, 'vulnerability is part and parcel of ordinary human subjectivity' (ibid: 19), while on the other care is a daily practice. Drawing on Nancy Hirschmann, she contends that 'we begin our understanding of human freedom from the perspective of interconnection and relatedness' (cited in Sevenhuijsen 2000: 22). This is redolent of a timeless aphorism attributed to the Xhosa people of South Africa, 'a person is a person through other persons' (see du Boulay 1988: 114). It is also a simple but profound rebuttal of the commodity fetishism that characterises the dehumanising capitalist process of production and accumulation (Marx 1867). In the meantime, Third Way policy reforms are failing properly to recognise or to value care in the context of evolving patterns of family and household life (cf. Lewis 2000).

An ethic of care – whether it is defined as a feminist or an ecological ethic – provides the crucial link between an abstract principle of co-responsibility and the substantive practice by which we continually negotiate our rights and duties. These are the ethical components that furnish a moral discourse capable of sustaining an eco-socialist form of Green citizenship.

Conclusion

It is for others to elaborate alternative accounts of Green citizenship. My own unapologetically pro-social-humanistic perspective is based on two premises. First, while it is perfectly true that we cannot save humanity unless we save the Earth, there is no purpose in saving the Earth at humanity's expense. Second, while it is perfectly true that humanity has exhibited self-destructive tendencies, there is no reason to

reject the possibility of human emancipation. I suspect we should remain sceptical of the Gaia Hypothesis (Lovelock 1979) – that the Earth itself is a self-sustaining living organism – but, if it were true, one interpretation of its meaning is that humanity's struggle is not to tame the Earth, but to ensure that the Earth does not extinguish humanity: provided of course that – through capitalism – humanity does not succeed in destroying itself. For this we require a form of Green citizenship that can equate global imperatives with our lived experiences.

Notes

1. I am grateful to John Ferris, Tony Fitzpatrick and Douglas Torgeson for challenging an earlier formulation of this model in which I failed explicitly to define my own conception of 'humanism'. It is important to distinguish Greek humanism (that sought to distinguish humanity from animals/nature), Renaissance humanism (that sought to establish autonomy for humanity from the interpreted intentions of a divine creator) and Marxist humanism (that distinguished humanity with reference to its inherent social nature). The concept on which the model here presented is premised draws essentially upon Marxist humanism and to clarify this I have elected to use the somewhat inelegant terms – 'pro-social-humanistic' and 'anti-social-humanistic'.
2. I am grateful to Caron Caldwell for guidance on the concept of ecological modernisation. However, the potentially provocative interpretation that is offered here is strictly my own.
3. I am indebted to Shane Doheny for introducing me to Apel's concept of co-responsibility.

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Figure 1 Taxonomy of conventional moral discourses



Figure 2 Taxonomy of ecological moral discourses