Ghatak, Maitreesh and Mueller, Hannes (2011) Thanks for nothing?: not-for-profits and motivated agents. Journal of Public Economics, 95 (1-2). pp. 94-105. ISSN 0047-2727
Abstract
We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier B.V. |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Sets: | Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2011 15:47 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33373/ |
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