# Liberty and independence: the Shelley–Byron circle and the state(s) of Europe

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## Introduction

How did Byron, the Shelleys and their circle react to the political reconstruction of Europe following Napoleon's final defeat in 1815? How did they understand the 'state' or 'condition' of Europe after twenty-six years of ideological and military conflict? This article investigates how the Shelleys, Byron and John Cam Hobhouse analyse the European political situation in the eighteen months immediately following Waterloo. In particular, it discusses how they interpret European politics through use of the words 'freedom' and 'liberty'. Sometimes this language of freedom constructs a transnational European community, in which states are connected by their shared commitment to 'free' government. Complicating this, however, the circle also associate 'freedom' with ideas of state independence; that is, a Europe divided into rival states independent from one another and not necessarily unified by any common tradition. In this respect, the idea of 'freedom' both evokes and challenges notions of a common European identity. These different usages might appear to be straightforwardly contradictory, but they can be connected, I want to suggest, using the argument of William Hazlitt's essay 'On Patriotism' (1814), which argues for a patriotic politics that can legitimise transnational collective identity.

## The European Tradition of Freedom

In 1815 and 1816, the Shelley–Byron circle produced a number of texts which, directly and indirectly, reflect on the current 'state' of European politics. This includes the third Canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, which Byron wrote between May and September 1816 as he travelled to Switzerland;[1] Hobhouse's published work on Napoleon's downfall, based on his experiences in Paris in mid-1815; and the Shelleys' writings immediately following Waterloo and on their own excursion to Switzerland in 1816, particularly the *History of a Six Weeks' Tour*. These texts, as I suggest below, attempt to delineate a 'tradition of freedom': a shared trajectory for European countries which identifies both a common history and the prospect of future unity. In doing this, however, they follow established lines of thought about the relationship between 'Europe' and 'freedom'. In order to understand the Shelley–Byron circle's distinctive contributions to this idea, I would first like to note its common currency in eighteenth-century works.

Many eighteenth-century reference books devote considerable space to defining and outlining a European tradition of 'free' government. For example, William Guthrie, a best-selling historian and geographer whose

*Geographical, Historical and Commercial Grammar* (1770) ran to twenty-four editions by 1827, describes Europe as 'unrestrained' in commerce, government and religion, especially when compared to the 'tyrannical' regimes of Asia.[2] This difference between European and Asian governmental traditions is explained in terms of environmental factors: Guthrie's *New System of Modern Geography* (1792) suggests that the spread of despotism is prevented in Europe by the varied land-surface forming 'natural barriers which check the progress of conquest'. In Asian countries, the large extent of land makes despotism inevitable, since only one individual ruling by force can keep the country in order. In Europe, however, 'the barren rocks and mountains are more favourable for exciting human industry and invention, than the natural unsolicited luxuriancy of more fertile soils'. For this reason, ancient Greece is where the human mind 'began to avail itself of its strength' and where European 'industry and invention' began, because it is the most variable and broken of territories. Greece's development epitomises Europe's: it is an exemplar of 'equity of laws and the freedom of political constitution'.[3] Some eighteenth-century reference books even define the word 'Europe' itself in terms of freedom. According to the anonymous *Complete System of Geography* (1747), as well as a large number of other sources, Europe 'is called [...] "Alfrank" by the Turks; "Frankoba" by Georgians; and "Frankistan" by Asian peoples'.[4] This is particularly interesting given that the word 'frank' has etymological associations with 'free' and 'freedom': according to the *OED*, 'frank' can mean 'free in condition; not in serfdom or slavery'; 'released from captivity'; 'free from restraint or impediment'.[5] Of course, it is not entirely clear whether non-Europeans genuinely saw Europe as the 'land of the free', or whether this was how Europeans imagined that others saw them.[6] Nevertheless, the idea of Europe is being constructed through association with 'freedom' and by contrast with the decadent tyrannies of Asia.

By the early nineteenth century therefore, the ideological association between Europe and freedom had become well established. The author of the 1824 *Supplement to the [...] Encyclopaedia Britannica* summarises these current ideas by defining European liberty more precisely. He speaks of the freedom to worship as one pleases, freedom to trade, freedom to formulate one's own laws, freedom from tyrannous government: advantages which are only found, he claims, in European states. Most importantly, he traces this European freedom throughout history – from 'the freedom of Grecian states' to exist independently (prior to conquest by Macedon), to 'freedom of commerce in modern day Britain'.[7] The *Supplement* uses this notion to construct a shared European historical development and identity. In other words, the idea of political and commercial 'freedom' is what connects ancient Greece, fifteenth and sixteenth-century Italian city-states and modern Britain together. 'Freedom' is what makes Renaissance Italy the successor to ancient Greece and modern Britain the heir of the Renaissance; and this 'freedom' therefore makes it meaningful to speak of a 'European' cultural tradition transmitted through different periods and societies. Indeed, for the *Supplement*, 'freedom' drives the gradual development of ever-improving governmental systems and intellectual achievement in Europe.

## The Shelley–Byron Circle and European Freedom

In 1815–16 the Shelley–Byron circle reinterpret this 'libertarian tradition' to take account of recent historical events – particularly the Allies' victory over Napoleon. In the *History of a Six Weeks' Tour* (1817), for example, Mary Shelley hopes that 'fellow feeling' for liberty can

reform all European countries after the recent victories of the monarchical powers:

> All those of every nation in Europe who have a fellow feeling with the oppressed [. . . ] cherish an unconquerable hope that the cause of liberty must at length prevail.[8]

Mary Shelley's use of 'liberty' has a distinctly radical aspect: she employs the word to signify opposition to the 'hostile garrisons' and 'detested dynasties' of monarchy. Instead, the prospect of 'free' (that is, non-monarchical) government can potentially reform the war-torn remnants of Europe, uniting the separate nations behind common governmental principles. In using 'liberty' to indicate desire for reform, Mary Shelley is tapping into a developing political vocabulary: as Michael Rossington observes, ' "liberal" in the sense of "favourable to constitutional change" [was] a recently-established English usage' which first occurred in the early nineteenth century.[9] Furthermore, the phrase 'fellow feeling' evokes Margaret Cohen and April Alliston's notion of the 'sentimental community'. For them, popular eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Germaine de Staël and others induce an 'emotional connection that transcends nations' by appealing to a wide community of readers not limited by national borders.[10] Mary Shelley gives this concept a political dimension: she suggests that 'fellow feeling' for liberty allows one to comprehend Europe in terms of transnational political principles, rather than as separate national identities. In this way, Europe's past and future are defined by 'sympathy' for libertarian causes.

Byron, however, seems less optimistic about the prospects for 'free' government. In *Childe Harold III*, he identifies a tradition of freedom under threat:

> While Waterloo with Cannae's carnage vies
> Morat and Marathon twin names shall stand,
> They were true Glory's stainless victories,
> Won by the unambitious heart and hand
> Of a proud, brotherly and civic band,
> All unbright champions in no princely cause
> Of vice-entail'd Corruption; they no land
> Doom'd to bewail the blasphemy of laws
> Making kings rights divine, by some
> Draconian clause. (608–16)

In this meditation on European history, the tradition of freedom is evident in the battles of Morat and Marathon, victories, according to Jerome McGann, 'of men fighting for their liberty' (Byron, *PW*, ii. 307n). In more recent times, the French general Marceau's service in the Revolutionary Wars contributed to the cause of liberty:

> He was Freedom's champion, one of those,
> The few in number, who had not o'erstept
> The charter to chastise which she bestows
> (549–51).

For Byron, as for Mary Shelley, Europe's achievements are defined by the liberty and common purpose associated with opposition to monarchical power. But *Childe Harold* also articulates another tradition which seeks to limit that freedom: the 'Draconian clause' which resists the efforts of the 'civic band'. Europe's history and future is thus based on conflict between advocates and opponents of freedom. Caroline Franklin argues that *Childe Harold* is 'a profound elegy for the permanent loss of political freedom in the cycles or "revolutions" of European history'. Byron's pessimism, she says, 'deconstructed the Whigs' and the radicals' view of history as progress'.[11] In fact, however, Byron understands European freedom as a concept in flux, not just inexorable decline. Although Waterloo appears to be a victory for the 'Draconian clause', hope still exists:

> We do not curse thee Waterloo!
> Though Freedom's blood thy plain bedew;
> There 'twas shed, but is not sunk –
> Rising from each gory trunk,

> Like the water-spout from ocean,
> With a strong and growing motion –
> It soars and mingles in the air. ('Ode (from the French)', 1–7)[12]

The poem seems to suggest that cause of freedom has been set back by Napoleon's defeat. And yet Napoleon himself is described both as 'Freedom's son' (27), and as a proud, monarch, a hero who 'sank into a King' (33) – meaning that his downfall simultaneously marks the defeat of both 'free' government and kingly arrogance. This ambiguous presentation of Napoleon expresses uncertainty over Europe's direction: does Napoleon's deposition indicate a continuation of or a disruption in the tradition of freedom? As the poem continues, the speaker strives to answer this question, eventually claiming that 'Freedom rejoices' (73) because 'France hath twice been too well taught / The 'moral lesson' clearly bought – / Her safety sits not on a throne [. . . ] / But in equal rights and laws' (77–81). This freedom can be found, not in the competition of nations (Pouring nations' blood like water, / In imperial seas of slaughter! [89–90]), but in European 'fellow feeling': where 'the heart and mind, / And the voice of mankind, / Shall arise in communion' (91–3). Despite the apparent victory of the Allied monarchies, Waterloo ultimately confirms the potential development of European liberty.

In *The Siege of Corinth* (also published in early 1816), Byron is similarly concerned for the loss, and possible recovery, of freedom. The speaker laments how 'Venice ceased to be / Her ancient civic boast – "the Free"' (84–5), before tracing the history (and future prospects) of that 'freedom' back to Christianity and ancient Greece, now overrun with oriental despotism: "Till Christian hands to Greece restore / The freedom Venice gave of yore' (104–5). Like the *Supplement to* [. . . ] *Britannica*, the poem uses 'freedom' to connect different periods and locations as part of a discernable tradition, but unlike the reference book, it also discusses manifest threats to that freedom, mainly from 'the Moslem's sway' (107). The use of Venice is particularly important here. Malcolm Kelsall suggests that, for Byron, Venice was not only 'the meeting place of Occident and Orient in a direct imperial and religious conflict', but also signifies the 'transition of a former imperial power to colonial status', particularly after Napoleon conquered and abolished the Venetian Republic in 1797.[13] In this respect, Venice represents the intricate constructions and tensions of European history: empire and colony, Christianity and Islam, freedom and tyranny. Byron's awareness of these complex interactions makes him cynical about unthinkingly optimistic ideas of progress, but this scepticism does not, I would suggest, define his conception of post-Napoleonic Europe and its potential for 'free' government.

John Cam Hobhouse, Byron's friend and travelling companion, also muses on the complexities of the libertarian tradition: 'it cannot be concealed, there is in the flight of Napoleon a precipitancy which nothing can escape; and we must sigh as Montesquieu did over the suicide of Brutus, to see the cause of liberty so easily abandoned'.[14] Hobhouse identifies Napoleon with a tradition of freedom that extends deep into history, beyond the *philosophes* and back to the classical world. Like Byron, though, he is preoccupied by the prospective failure of that tradition. Indeed, Napoleon seems to embody both the possibility of greater liberty and the disappointments of its dissipation. If here he is the banished emblem of freedom, later his presence, rather than his absence, hinders liberty's progress: 'France would have now been free had not Napoleon come back' (*Recollections*, ii. 3). In *Letters Written During the Last Reign of the Emperor Napoleon* (1816), Hobhouse elaborates further on exactly what he means by 'freedom'. He identifies a 'proper' tradition of monarchy which should operate uniformly throughout

Europe, but at present exists only in England – where 'the rights of the citizen' are respected and 'the desire of freedom has made the capital [. . . ] affluent in money and men, so their wealth gave them the ability to defend and confirm their independence'.[15] Despite this stress on British 'independence', Hobhouse envisages this as a European-wide ideal, proposing that all states should strive for this condition. As an Empire, France had drawn closer to this model system, for despite 'the tyranny of Napoleon', 'the circumstances of his elevation [. . . ] confirm the notions of the power of individual exertion, and the original equality of man' (*Last Reign*, i. 218). By contrast, Castlereagh's political objective – to restore the 'ancient social system' of monarchies – completely betrays the notion of European liberty by supporting despotic regimes and refusing to acknowledge that other states should be free to govern themselves (i. 222). There is an inconsistency here: Hobhouse opposes Britain being 'the arbitress of Europe' (i. 225), but still upholds the British governmental system as the ideal model for the realisation of European freedom. This leads him into slightly self-contradictory territory, arguing that both Britain and Napoleon's France alternately represent and prevent the development of liberty.

However, the term 'freedom' is not merely used by radical thinkers like Mary Shelley, Byron and Hobhouse. The conservative scholar T. H. Horne, writing in 1816, rejoices that Napoleon's downfall has 'gladdened the heart of every lover of freedom', since his usurpation was an offence to Europe's ancient traditions. He calls the Napoleonic Wars 'The Campaign of the Liberties of Europe', suggesting that a 'free' Europe is one which replicates the pre-1789 status quo.[16] Castlereagh himself even employs this terminology to justify British government policy: 'the powers of Europe', he says, treating the sub-continent as a totality, 'have been compelled, in vindication of their own liberties, and for the settlement of the world, to invade France'.[17] This language recalls William Robertson's use of 'liberty' in the 1760s. In his *View of the Progress of Society in Europe*, Robertson refers to the balance of power in terms of liberty: 'the method of preventing any monarch from rising to such a degree of power, as was inconsistent with the general liberty'.[18] This associates the word with 'stability', a usage which contrasts with liberal and radical writers who employ 'freedom' and 'liberty' to refer to changes in governmental organisation. For the anti-establishment political writer George Ensor, whose *On the State of Europe* appeared in 1816, 'free nations' are to be contrasted with 'the abyss of monarchy'. Alluding to the precedent of ancient Athens, he asserts that monarchy, not Revolutionary France, is an aberration from the proper order of things.[19] These writers base their understandings of European history and futurity upon different notions of freedom, using various interpretations of the libertarian tradition to analyse contemporary politics and to construct teleologies of what Europe should be like, based on a conception of its 'free' past.

Percy Shelley, however, directly challenges the concept of a free tradition particular to European states. In a fragment known to editors as 'The Elysian Fields' and written either in 1815 or 1816, the speaker says that:

> the English nation does not, as has been imagined, inherit freedom from its ancestors. Public opinion rather than private institution maintains it in whatever portion it may now possess [. . . ] As yet the gradation [by] which this freedom has advanced has been contested step by step.[20]

These sentences make 'freedom' iconoclastic, opposed to institutions and continually re-imagined by each generation, not passed on in an identifiable tradition or progression. Moreover, because Shelley emphasises both the

Englishness and the locality of the 'public opinion' which defines this freedom, his suggestions stand against the more general 'European liberty' identified by Byron and Hobhouse, which extends from ancient Greece to the Revolution as part of abstract tradition. This idea treats freedom as a progress theory, sometimes hindered, but gradually developing in a single direction. Instead, Shelley emphasises the multiplicity of possible futures: how a momentary popular reassessment of freedom, disconnected from previous interpretations, can abruptly change society, or literally free it from its past.

## Liberty and the State of Independence

'Liberty', then, often evokes a common European ideal – a notion of how Europe can be shaped through the alleged liberation of the Revolution or (for conservative writers) the freedoms of the 'ancient social system'. However, liberty is also associated with ideas of state independence: that is, a Europe divided into rival national blocs with no shared tradition. Byron's friend James Wedderburne Webster employs 'freedom' in a strictly patriotic context in his poem 'Waterloo' (1816), asserting the supremacy of England over its enemies: Wellington's victory 'Hath swell'd his Country's Harp of fame' and subdued French tyranny by protecting 'the free'.[21] The struggle for freedom and the struggle for state self-assertion are thus connected. Mary Shelley makes a similar point when she observes that the Swiss could 'make a brave defence against any invader of their freedom'. In other words, they can best defend their liberty by preserving independence and self-government (*Six Weeks' Tour*, 50).

Hobhouse also connects liberty with independence by calling the Napoleonic conflicts 'the late war against national independence' – a struggle for France's self-assertion against an Alliance determined to crush its new freedoms. The success of this aggression may 'serve for a precedent fatal to our own liberties' (*Last Reign*, i. xi). Hobhouse here associates general European freedom with the capacity for states to operate independently, unmolested by other powers. This argument is clearly problematic, since it can be argued that French foreign policy before and during Napoleon's reign violated the freedoms of other 'independent' states. Nevertheless, Hobhouse advocates an idea of Europe based on 'the principles of national liberty', suggesting that greater international co-operation can be achieved by separately-operating states, because powers would be discouraged from interfering in each other's affairs. He looks forward to the moment when 'the alliance will dissolve' and 'the first decisive triumph of the principles of national liberty will be witnessed'. If this occurs, 'a new system' of Europe can develop, based on the freedom of separate states (*Last Reign*, ii. 217). Once again, there is a radical agenda here: Hobhouse hopes that this revolutionary change will 'embrace state after state', eventually encompassing 'the fairest portion of the civilised world' (*Last Reign*, ii. 217).

This association of liberty with revolution and national self-determination would become an important part of Byron's thinking as his interest in Greek independence developed in the 1820s. Before landing on the Greek mainland, he would justify his purpose using the language of nation-building – 'I did not come here to join a faction, but a nation' – and the language of freedom: 'the fruitful [. . . boughs?] of the tree of Liberty' will flourish.[22] According to his acquaintance James Kennedy (a clergyman on Cephalonia), Byron proclaimed, ' "I love the cause of liberty, which is that of the Greek nation" '.[23] Calling on the support of Edward Church, the United States consul in Geneva, Byron says: 'an American has a better right than any other to suggest to other nations – the

mode of obtaining that Liberty which is the glory of his own' (letter dated 21 June 1823, *BLJ*, x. 202). In this sense, the cause of liberty helps create both independent nationhood and a transnational movement joined in opposition to tyrannous government. A similar idea is evident in some assessments of Napoleon's defeat. The preface to the 1816 *Annual Register* says that in Germany:

> popular writers had been encouraged to arouse and create patriotic feelings by the contrast between slavish submission to a detestable foreign tyranny, and the acquiescence of freemen in a constitution.

This excites anti-Napoleonic feeling by uniting the language of liberty and nationalism. But it also moves beyond its German specificity to present an idea of Europe in which many countries are connected by their shared freedom, formed in opposition to Napoleonic hegemony. Britain's victory was partly assured by 'the liberalities of our political institutions' and other states, including Russia, have emulated this with 'openness and success'. In this last case, 'liberty' refers both to a national trait and to an idea which can potentially shape all Europe.[24]

## Patriotism Beyond the Local

Debate about what Europe is (or what it should be) thus hinges on a few key concepts – 'liberty', 'freedom', 'independence' – which can be appropriated for a variety of ideological purposes. 'Liberty' can be used to evoke a shared European tradition and a Europe of separate states asserting themselves against one another. These various usages of the term 'liberty' might seem contradictory. However, they can be connected using the argument of William Hazlitt's essay 'On Patriotism' (1814). In the essay, Hazlitt theorises a nationalism which legitimises a wider, transnational, collective identity. Love of country, he says, 'is little more than another name for the love of liberty, of independence, of peace, and social happiness'.[25] In other words, patriotism inspires, not merely a devotion to a particular state, but also a universalist social vision, an ideal for all societies. As J. G. A. Pocock observes, 'patriot' has a number of disparate meanings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It could signify devotion to the local nation, but also a person 'who loved his or her country more than its ruling family or institutions' and who professed loyalty to a common identity not represented by the national government.[26] In this sense, Hazlitt can use the word both to allude to and look beyond the nation, evoking shared principles ('liberty', 'peace') which are not solely applicable to a specific state.

Hazlitt's arguments about liberty and patriotism rework some of Richard Price's ideas in *Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (1789). Hazlitt was well acquainted with Price's thinking: Price corresponded with Hazlitt's father, and Hazlitt's own letters record detailed engagement with his works.[27] It is therefore likely that Hazlitt had read the *Discourse*, especially given its heightened public prominence (even notoriety) following Burke's attack on the text in *Reflections on the Revolution* (1790).[28] Indeed, Hazlitt alludes to Burke's disagreement with Price in *The Eloquence of the British Senate* (1807), when he mentions the 'theories of Mr Burke and Dr Price on the subject [of revolution]'.[29] In the *Discourse*, Price interprets the Revolution in terms of 'liberty':

> I have lived to see nations panting for liberty which seemed to have no idea of it.
> I have lived to see thirty millions of people demanding liberty with an irresistible voice, their King led in triumph, and an arbitrary monarch surrendering himself to his subjects.[30]

Price celebrates the specific triumph of the French state in freeing itself from despotic rule. This is the 'liberty' of a state discovering its independence, freeing itself from the weight of past tradition and the disapproval of neighbouring countries. In this respect, the French Revolution has helped legitimise specific new national identities: 'Liberty is the [. . . ] object of patriotic zeal [as] an enlightened country must be a free country' (p. 19). However, Price also suggests that this 'freedom' has implications for the whole of Europe:

> I see the ardour for liberty catching and spreading a general amendment in human affairs; the dominion of kings changed for the dominion of laws, and the dominion of priests giving way to the dominion of reason and conscience. (p. 50)

The blaze of Revolution 'lays despotism in ashes, and warms and illuminates Europe!' (p. 50). 'Freedom' establishes a patriotic identity, marking the uniqueness of France, but it also creates collective hopes for 'Europe' based on the shared principles of law, reason and opposition to despotism. For Price, as for Hazlitt, patriotism inspires not merely a devotion to a particular state, but also a universalist social vision, an ideal for all societies. Hazlitt's patriotism, associated with (revolutionary) social change, therefore has both national and transnational implications. This is patriotism beyond the 'local', which hopes for universal 'common liberties' extending across all Europe and beyond.

These arguments provide a useful framework to understand Percy Shelley's comments about 'freedom' in 1816. Writing to Thomas Peacock, he connects freedom with national specificity whilst purporting to question precisely that connection:

> You live in a free country where you may act without restraint & possess that which you possess in security; for as long as the name of *country* & the selfish conceptions which it included shall subsist England I am persuaded, is the most free and refined. (Percy Shelley, *Letters*, i. 474–5)

Shelley identifies and seeks to move beyond a particularly English freedom: while declaring his patriotic attachment to 'England, my country dear to me for ever', he also critiques the limited experiences available to one 'who has never passed the limits of his native land' (*Letters*, i. 475). Percy Shelley advocates what might be called a 'cosmopolitan patriotism', which predicates itself on experience and appreciation of other countries. In celebrating and seeking to overcome the separations between European states, Price similarly exhorted listeners to: 'explain the duty we owe to our country, and the nature, foundation, and proper expressions of that love to it', but also warns against 'contempt of other countries, and forming men into combinations and factions against their common rights and liberties' (*Discourse*, 1–2, 5). When they rail against despotism in France, Turkey or Russia, Price and Shelley patriotically assert Britain's superiority, but also regret that 'common. . . liberties', a cosmopolitan notion of shared 'rights', have not extended there.

For Price, Hazlitt and Shelley therefore, 'liberty' has a parochial meaning related to state independence and a transnational meaning signifying the collective development of all Europe. More importantly, these meanings are not necessarily incompatible. For all three writers, it is perfectly possible to be patriotic, to defend local independence, and to hope for a 'liberty' which unifies states across Europe under a common system. This is because the key tenets of radical 'liberty' – opposition to despotism, to monarchical or religious privilege – are both national and transnational causes. That is to say, the independence of a specific country and the establishment of common 'freedom' in Europe are part of the same radical project. The true patriot desires reform at home and abroad; he wishes to

celebrate success in his own country and to instigate changes based on common principles across all Europe. It is therefore possible to be both a patriot and a cosmopolitan simultaneously, because 'love of one's country' and the desire for international co-operation are based on commitment to the same radical principles. For the Shelley–Byron circle, ideas of state independence and common European liberty are not as disconnected as might first appear, since both are founded in a radical vision of the ideal society.

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NOTES

1. See Byron, *The Complete Poetical Works*, ed. Jerome J. McGann (7 vols, Oxford, 1980–93), ii. 297–300 (hereafter abbreviated to *PW*). All quotations from Byron's poetry are taken from this edition.
2. William Guthrie, *A New Geographical, Historical and Commercial Grammar; and Present State of the Several Kingdoms of the World* (London, 1770), vii. My calculation of the number of editions is based upon the listings in the British Library catalogue. Guthrie's other works include *History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to 1688* (1744–51) and *General History of the World, from the Creation to the Present Time* (1764–7). See 'Guthrie, William (1708?–1770)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb/view/article/11792> [accessed 28 March 2008].
3. Guthrie, *A New System of Modern Geography*, fifth edition (London, 1792), 59–60. These arguments appear to be influenced by Montesquieu's idea that topographical and atmospheric factors determine the construction of social systems. See *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. and trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller and Harold Stone (Cambridge, 1989), 231–333.
4. *A Complete System of Geography* (2 vols, London, 1747), i. 1. The same details are repeated in D. Fenning and J. Collyer, *A New System of Geography* (2 vols, London, 1765–6), ii. 3; Charles Middleton, *A New and Complete System of Geography* (2 vols, London, 1777) ii. 3; *The English Encyclopaedia* (10 vols, London, 1802), iii. 351; *The Imperial Encyclopaedia* (4 vols, London, [1812(?)]), ii. 341; *The Modern Encyclopaedia* (10 vols, London, [1816–1820(?)]), v. 77; *The London Encyclopaedia* (22 vols, London, 1826–9), viii. 699.
5. *The Oxford English Dictionary. Second Edition* (20 vols, Oxford, 1989), 'frank' (adj.), sense 1.
6. For a discussion of this matter see M. E. Yapp, 'Europe in the Turkish Mirror', *Past & Present*, 137 (1992), 134–55, 139.
7. *Supplement to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica*, (6 vols, Edinburgh and London, 1824), iv. 188–9.
8. Mary Shelley and Percy Shelley, *History of a Six Weeks' Tour Through a Part of France, Switzerland, Germany and Holland: With Letters Descriptive of a Sail Round the Lake of Geneva, and of the Glaciers of Chamouni* (London, 1817), 87.
9. Michael Rossington, '"The Destinies of the World": Shelley's Reception and Transmission of European News in 1820–21', *Romanticism*, 13.3 (October 2007), 233–43, 237.
10. April Alliston, 'Transnational Sympathies, Imaginary Communities', in *The Literary Channel: The Inter-national Invention of the Novel*, ed. Margaret Cohen and Carolyn Dever (Princeton, 2002), 133. See also Cohen's 'Sentimental Communities' in the same volume, 106.
11. Caroline Franklin, '"Some examples of the finest Orientalism": Byronic Philhellenism and Proto-Zionism at the time of the Congress of Vienna', in *Romanticism and Colonialism*, ed. Tim Fulford and Peter Kitson (Cambridge, 1998), 226.
12. The 'Ode' was first published in the *Morning Chronicle*, 15 March 1816. See Byron *PW*, iii. 491–2.
13. Malcolm Kelsall, '"Once she did hold the gorgeous East in fee": Byron's Venice and Oriental Empire', in *Romanticism and Colonialism*, 245–8.
14. Hobhouse, *Recollections of a Long Life with Additional Extracts from His Private Diaries*, ed. Lady Dorchester (6 vols, London, 1909–11), i. 286.
15. Hobhouse, *The Substance of Some Letters Written by an Englishman Resident at Paris During the Last Reign of the Emperor Napoleon* (2 vols, London, 1816), i. 216–17.
16. Horne, *An Illustrated Record of Important Events in the Annals of Europe, During the Last Four Years; Comprising A Series of Views of the Principal Places, Battles, etc., etc., etc., Connected with those Events. Together with a History of those Momentous Transactions, Compiled from*

*Official and Other Authentic Documents* (London, 1816), 3 and 16. Horne was a bibliographer and biblical scholar. See 'Horne, Thomas Hartwell (1780–1862)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13795> [accessed 8 February 2008].

17. Letter from Castlereagh to Allied Ministers, 11 September 1815, in *Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1815* (London, 1816), 601.
18. Robertson, *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V with A View of the Progress of Society in Europe, from the Subversion of the Roman Empire, to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century* (3 vols, Dublin, 1769), i. 112.
19. Ensor, *On the State of Europe in January 1816* (London, 1816), 129–30. For Ensor's biography and details of his other works see 'Ensor, George (1769–1843)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8822> [accessed 8 February 2008]. Percy Shelley sent a copy of *A Proposal for Putting Reform to the Vote* to Ensor in 1817. See *The Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Frederick L. Jones (2 vols, Oxford, 1964), i. 533.
20. Percy Shelley, '[The Elysian Fields]' fragment, in *Prose Works*, ed. E. B. Murray (1 vol to date, Oxford, 1993), i, 163. For textual details and information on possible composition dates, see i. 399–400.
21. J. Wedderburne Webster, 'Waterloo', stanza XLV, in *Waterloo and Other Poems* (Paris, 1816), 25. Byron first met Webster sometime during or before 1808. Irregular contact was maintained until Byron's death: in 1823, he tried to help Webster's failing marriage by acting as a mediator. See *Byron's Letters and Journals*, ed. Leslie A. Marchand (13 vols, London, 1973–94), i. 171; x. 129. Hereafter abbreviated to *BLJ*.
22. 'Journal in Cephalonia' (28 September 1823) and letter to John Bowring, 12 May 1823, in *BLJ*, xi. 30 and 170.
23. James Kennedy, *Conversations on Religion with Lord Byron and Others, Held in Cephalonia, a Short Time Previous to his Lordship's Death* (Paris, 1830), 169.
24. *The Annual Register, or View of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1816* (London, 1817), vi–vii.
25. Hazlitt, 'On Patriotism – A Fragment', in William Hazlitt [and Leigh Hunt], *The Round Table* (2 vols, Edinburgh and London, 1817), i. 238. Although only Hazlitt's name appears on the title page, the 'Advertisement' explains that some essays were written by Hunt (see p. vi). The essay was first published in the *Morning Chronicle*, 5 January 1814. See *The Selected Writings of William Hazlitt*, ed. Duncan Wu (9 vols, London, 1998), ii. 353.
26. J. G. A. Pocock, 'Catherine Macaulay: Patriot Historian', in *Women Writers and the Early Modern British Political Tradition*, ed. Hilda L. Smith (Cambridge, 1998), 246.
27. Hazlitt's father became friendly with Price in the 1770s. See Duncan Wu, 'William Hazlitt (1737–1820), the Priestley Circle, and *The Theological Repository*: A Brief Survey and Bibliography', *The Review of English Studies*, new series, 56. 227 (2005), 758–66, 762. For the correspondence between the elder Hazlitt and Price see *The Correspondence of Richard Price*, ed. W. Bernard Peach and D. O. Thomas (3 vols, Durham, NC, and Cardiff, 1883–94), ii. 238–9 and 320–2. For letters recording the younger Hazlitt's reading of Price see *The Letters of William Hazlitt*, ed. Herschel Moreland Sikes assisted by Willard Hallam Bonner and Gerald Lahey (London and Basingstoke, 1979), 65 and 133–4.
28. In the *Reflections*, Burke makes several attacks on Price and the *Discourse*: see *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. J. C. D. Clark (Stanford, CA, 2001), 155–79, 211–13, 224–5. According to Clark, it was disagreement with Price's *Discourse* that prompted Burke to write the *Reflections* (pp. 62–3 and 424). For a similar argument, see also Tom Paulin, *The Day-Star of Liberty: William Hazlitt's Radical Style* (London, 1998), 10.
29. Hazlitt, *The Eloquence of the British Senate; or, Select Specimens from the Speeches of the Most Distinguished Speakers. From the Beginning of the Reign of Charles I to the Present Time* (1807), in *The Complete Works of William Hazlitt*, ed. P. P. Howe (21 vols, London and Toronto, 1930–4), i. 151.
30. Price, *A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, Delivered on November. 4, 1789 at the Meeting-House in the Old Jewry, to the Society for Commemorating the Revolution in Great Britain* (London, 1789), 49.

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