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The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2010) The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation. Theory and Decision, 68 (3). pp. 281-299. ISSN 0040-5833

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11238-009-9186-7

Abstract

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. When applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is effectively dictatorial.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/...
Additional Information: © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, L.L.C.
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Sets: Departments > Government
Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 24 Jan 2011 12:37
Last Modified: 05 May 2015 10:25
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31606

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