Bandiera, Oriana and Levy, Gilat (2010) Diversity and the power of the elites in democratic societies: a model and a test. CEPR discussion papers , 7985. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor- agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy elites’ influence on policy choices is endogenously higher when there is diversity in preferences among the poor. In line with the theoretical predictions, the pattern of public good provision by local governments in Indonesia reveals that when individuals have different preferences —here due to different ethnicities— democratic policy outcomes are closer to the preferences of the elites, rather than the preferences of the poor majority.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2010 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
|Sets:||Departments > Economics
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