Dietrich, Franz and Spiekermann, Kai (2010) Epistemic democracy with defensible premises. Working papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises - voter independence - is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem’s misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2010 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
|Sets:||Departments > Government|
|Projects:||The LSE Choice Group|
|Date Deposited:||13 Dec 2010 13:15|
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