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An Apartheid of Souls:

Dutch and Afrikaner Colonialism and its Aftermath in Indonesia and South Africa – an Introduction

DEBORAH JAMES & ALBERT SCHRAUWERS

South Africa and Indonesia are countries whose postcolonial trajectory has been characterised by racial, ethnic and religious tensions: tensions whose roots lie in their shared colonial past.¹ Whether simmering and subdued, or overt and necessitating international intervention, these tensions demand a renewed critical perspective by academics who, until now, have made little attempt to transcend the two, previously discrete, arenas of scholarship. This volume aims to initiate a comparative study of the 'Greater Netherlands', which has been widely recognised as long overdue.² Our aim in this volume is to delineate the distinctive governmental and cultural processes which currently shape the emergent democratisation of these two states, and to establish how far these owe something to Dutch (and related European) influence.

At first glance, such a comparison might appear spurious. South Africa was a 'settler society', and a British colony. Dutch colonial control was non-existent, and investment minimal compared to British interests. South Africa's inclusion in the 'Greater Netherlands' was predicated upon the supposed cultural relatedness of the Boers, degenerate remnants of an earlier Dutch diaspora during a 'Golden Age' of Dutch commercial hegemony. The Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), in contrast, was a *wingebied*, a directly controlled colony to be exploited for the profit of the mother country. Dutch settlement there was explicitly limited, and its peoples (including a large mestizo class) denied cultural and racial kinship. Given these differences, on what basis can South Africa and Indonesia be compared?

We underscore that this is not a comparative study of Dutch colonialism in South Africa and Indonesia. Rather, it compares Dutch 'Ethical imperialism' in Indonesia with what has been called the 'internal colonialism' of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa. That is, we begin from the supposed cultural relatedness of the Dutch and of Afrikaners, examine how this relatedness was constructed and reinforced at the turn of the century, and analyse the implications this had for their respective colonial ventures. We examine to what degree the Dutch and Afrikaners came to share a common 'colonial culture', the means by which it was transmitted, and the way in which these commonalities

and differences played out in emergent nationalist movements and the inter-ethnic relations they spawned.

Dutch churches and their missions were critical to the creation of this colonial culture. New scholarship has pointed to the central role played by the institution of the *volkskerk* (lit. people's or national church) in the Netherlands in shaping colonial policy.³ The *volkskerk*, with its justification for the creation of separate religious/ethnic communities, created an unusual but shared political formation in South Africa and Indonesia; a formation we gloss here as 'an apartheid of souls'. Earlier scholarship, largely by Dutch political scientists, had viewed this religious, political and cultural process as a strictly political phenomenon linked to democratisation. As Indonesia lurched towards military rule in the 1960s, exploration of the continuities between the Netherlands and Indonesia ceased. Scholars failed to recognise the multitude of ways in which these cultural processes could be used to illuminate contemporary social realities in rural and urban Indonesia, through investigating these in fine-grained ethnographic detail, or combining historical with anthropological insights.⁴ Now, as Indonesia again experiments with democratic reforms, the older pattern of religious nationalism is re-emerging in a manner which demands historical and ethnographic contextualisation.⁵

Scholars writing on apartheid in South Africa have also shown relatively little interest in its cultural and theological underpinnings. They have underplayed the role of Dutch and other European Church missions in shaping the ideas and practices about 'separateness' – in particular the idea of the *volkskerk* – which came to play such a prominent role in apartheid's project of social engineering. This neglect of Dutch influence is surprising given the considerable interest shown in the role of the English mission churches after the publication of John and Jean Comaroffs' two-volume study of the London Missionary Society's (LMS) non-conformist mission to the Tswana.⁶

Interestingly, these authors begin the introduction to the first volume of their study with a poignant series of vignettes describing Tshidi resistance to the building of a Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) in their capital town, Mafikeng.⁷ After a brief mention of this church, which has been closely associated with the Afrikaner ideology underpinning apartheid, the discussion quickly changes focus to British nonconformist missions. It is in that context that they emphasise the contingency of the motives of colonisers and colonised. The authors argue against the crude evaluation of missionaries in terms of their political role, narrowly conceived: a type of evaluation which gave rise to the so-called 'missionary imperialist thesis'.⁸

Certainly, if one were to concentrate on overt relationships between church and state, one might at first glance imagine that the charge of 'missionary imperialism' was rather stronger against the Dutch Reformed Church, which provided the ideological armoury for apartheid, than it is against the liberal non-conformist missionaries of the LMS. Although a closer knowledge of the precise historical context in which these various mission endeavours operated renders such a supposition problematic, it is nevertheless intriguing to specu-

late about why European/Calvinist mission activity and its relationship to colonial processes in South Africa and Indonesia has been so little researched. In the workshop on which this volume is based, the authors sought to extend such a research agenda, to examine the complex motives, ideologies, and practices of Dutch, German and Afrikaner missionaries and their structural implications in a comparative context, while keeping in mind the contingency and cross purposes to which these missionaries worked.⁹

By beginning with the diversity of European interests within colonial societies, we hope to widen our analytic focus from the colonial state to wider issues of 'colonial culture'. That is, rather than concentrate upon the imperial state and its administration, we draw attention to the diffuse, historically contextualised techniques of colonial control which share a 'governmental' logic, if not a common institutional cohesion.¹⁰ Such cultures are predicated upon diverse interests and political processes. Indeed, one thesis explored in this volume is that the unitary voice with which colonisers are presumed to speak is itself a product of essentialising nationalist discourses which assume a cultural homogeneity, an 'occidentalism' of the West (and the Dutch in particular), to match the imagined 'orientalism' of the Other.¹¹ As Stoler has cogently argued:

Even where we have probed the nature of colonial discourse and the politics of its language, the texts are often assumed to express a shared European mentality, the sentiments of a unified conquering elite [...] Even when we have attended to concrete capitalist relations of production and exchange, we have taken colonialism and its European agents as an abstract force, as a structure imposed on local practice [...] The makers of metropole policy become conflated with its local practitioners [...] In South Africa, and in white settler communities more generally, where conflicts between imperial design and local European interests are overt, such glosses are less frequent, but these communities are rarely the objects of our ethnographies [...] As a result, colonisers and their communities are frequently treated as diverse but unproblematic, viewed as unified in a fashion that would disturb our ethnographic sensibilities if applied to ruling elites of the colonised.¹²

The shift in emphasis from the colonial state to multiply inflected colonial cultures is one productive strand resulting from Michel Foucault's work on 'governmentality'.¹³ Foucault rejected descriptions of the state in merely repressive terms, and underscored how governmental power was diffused throughout the semi-autonomous institutions of civil society, such as the clinic, the poor-house and asylum. Each of these institutions was not simply a tool of repression and constraint, but also a creator of a 'Regime of Truth' by which its subjects were known and managed. Colonial institutions creatively shaped ethnic, religious and class subjectivities in ways which have had long-lasting postcolonial implications.¹⁴ Foucault's argument thus:

shifts an investigation of the object of rule from the state onto techniques of control that are clearly at once discursive, practical and localised rather than socially pervasive [...] The interest is not in state power as a unitary function, but in the proliferation of operations that have a logic or episteme but not a point of institutional cohesion in common.¹⁵

Our analysis in this volume centres on such an episteme, a governmental logic, which permeated particular Dutch, European-inspired, and Afrikaner colonial institutions such as the Dutch Reformed Church, nationalist political organisations, and the emergent academic discipline of anthropology or *volkenkunde*. This shift in focus from the state to larger issues of governmentality is crucial for a successful comparison of South Africa and Indonesia. A comparison of the role of the Dutch state would limit us to the early period in which both colonies were ruled by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC). While such a comparison might be illuminating in itself, it would predispose us towards those now discounted arguments which essentialise current racial and religious subjectivities (such as the Calvinist ethos of Afrikaners) in some stagnant originary moment.¹⁶

We underscore the importance of the study of governmentality as an overarching comparative framework because it also provides space for the analysis of the distinctive local reinterpretations of the multiple converging strategies of colonial incorporation. In Foucauldian terms, power is not simply repressive, but productive; and relations of productive power are predicated upon resistance. We seek to account for the ways in which these broad processes played themselves out across the complex landscapes of Indonesia and South Africa. How were local elites incorporated in colonial rule, and what agency did the conflicting relationship between church and state open up for them in terms of local resistance? What are the long-term social and cultural implications of these processes of legal-religious identity formation among both the Dutch and their subordinated colonial communities? How have minority communities – religious, racial, and ethnic – been accommodated within the discourses of nationalism and the growth of legal-bureaucratic states? Have they striven to accommodate themselves within such units, or to break free of them? How have ideologues and academicians conceptualised, justified and/or denied the relationships between these emergent smaller units and the 'broader nation'?¹⁷ How, in the context of transforming regimes, has religion served either to endorse separation or to transcend narrow visions of ethnicity?

By focusing the discussion on the late nineteenth century, we underscore the particular effects of Dutch nationalism, religious 'pillarization' (*verzuiling*), and 'ethical' colonialism within the cultural sphere of the 'Greater Netherlands'¹⁸: a conception which emerged at the turn of the century as Dutch nationalists rediscovered their 'tribal' links with the Afrikaners of the Boer republics during and after the Anglo-Boer war. Such a rediscovery presaged an era of renewed cultural links, capital investment and emigration. Of particu-

lar importance was the influence on the South African Dutch Reformed churches of the theology developed by Abraham Kuyper: an influential Dutch religious minister who shaped and moulded a particular form of religious nationalism which transformed both the Netherlands and South Africa.¹⁹ As the Leader of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Kuyper's influence cannot be underestimated. Here then, we trace the roots of a particular South African phenomenon, apartheid, to its theological roots in the modern religious nationalism of the Dutch churches, and further explore the significance of these in a second colonial setting, Indonesia.

We have glossed this colonial culture 'apartheid of souls' to differentiate its racial elements from the religious techniques of control developed in the metropolis. In the Netherlands, both Protestants and Catholics committed to the pluralistic ideology of *verzuiling*, 'pillarization', and created a civil administration based on religion, in which the rights, values and separate identities of particular religious communities were to be preserved, even invented.²⁰ This plural administration – of religious school systems, hospitals, newspapers, unions, and the like – facilitated the creation of distinct groups or denominational 'pillars', each with a sense of quasi-ethnic identity. A question we asked our paper-givers to explore was whether, and how, these cultural and religious 'apartheids' were transferred to the colonial periphery, and whether these religious forms of governance had different – and unpredictable – outcomes when pressed into service to realise and legitimise the subordination of indigenous populations. Can one trace commonalities between *verzuiling* in the Netherlands and *aliran* (religious streams) in Indonesia, and apartheid (separatedness) in South Africa?

'Verzuiling' in the Netherlands

The Netherlands began the nineteenth century as a small agrarian nation with a tenuous hold on a large inherited colonial empire. Over the subsequent one hundred years, it remained an eddy in the larger currents of European history; handicapped by its small size, internal divisions, limited military might and slow industrialisation. Yet, by the end of the century, a resurgent nationalist sentiment had emerged; hoping to recapture the patina of their golden era, they collectively cast their eyes out once again to the 'Greater Netherlands' created through that earlier Dutch diaspora.²¹ Under the guise of a new 'Ethical colonial policy', the Netherlands began an imperialistic consolidation of their Asian territories with a degree of force which shocked even the most inured of their colonial allies.

This resurgence could hardly have been predicted; a far more likely scenario would have seen the country eclipsed like other mercantilist early bloomers, such as Portugal. The Netherlands began the century under Napoleonic domination. Its restored monarchy was burdened with an oligarchic political system which favoured regionalist resistance to central reforms; these regionalist

tensions were most apparent in the Belgian succession, a civil war that decimated the region for a decade. Tensions were also rife between the wealthy port cities of the provinces of Holland, and the *platteland* (rural areas), the agrarian provinces to the east; and between the Protestant north and Catholic south.²² Although this political system was fundamentally transformed by a new liberal constitution in 1848, these changes were a reaction to external pressures from elsewhere, in France and Germany;²³ lacking a wide industrial base, or a large middle class, bourgeois liberalism failed to establish hegemony. Liberal reforms were effectively contested at every point by regional oligarchs, generally drawing on religious constituencies. Thus, the subsequent resurgence of the Netherlands cannot be attributed to bourgeois liberal modernity *per se*; rather, the process of state formation and political renewal of the Dutch nation was the ironic product of pluralist dissenters from the liberal program of secular nationalism, a strong central state, and universal rights. The resurgent nation, which turned its eye once more on the 'Greater Netherlands' was, unlike the liberal democracies of France and England, a pluralist state organised around religious communities. The Netherlands was *verzuild*, or 'pillarized'.

Viewed structurally, the state and civil society of a 'pillarized' nation are divided into parallel sets of administrative bodies and social organisations on a religious basis.²⁴ In the Netherlands, for example, the development of a unified national educational system able to create and sustain an homogenous citizenry was impeded by religious conservatives who sought to maintain their religious rights to control education; a system of state-funded, national, religiously-organised school systems was created instead. Similarly, social welfare organisations were organised denominationally, controlling charity, hospitals, and social housing. This social agenda was perpetuated by political parties also organised on a religious basis. And, to sustain this political culture, there were religious newspapers and magazines. Each religious community could thus ensure that its members remained within its warm embrace from cradle to grave, unthreatened by such ills of modernity as socialism, secularism, or women's emancipation.

It is a teleological mistake, however, to take the structural outcome of this social transformation, the 'pillarized' religious community, and view it as the agent which effected its own creation.²⁵ This is the typical interpretation of those church historians and religious ideologues, for example, which view *verzuiling* as the product of an 'emancipation movement' by confessional Calvinists: that is, as the political struggle by a primordial religious 'nation' for recognition by the state. There is little evidence on which to base this assumption. Although the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlands Hervormde Kerk) was initially a state church, and the Netherlands characterised as a 'Great Protestant Nation', it lacked a national organising body. Local congregations held effective control over most church matters: from appointing the minister to the organisation of the local school and poor relief. Nor can such a 'primordial' religious identity be viewed as singularly Calvinist, since the structural

process of *verzuiling* similarly 'pillarized' Catholics, Liberals and Socialists, all of whom constructed interwoven networks of institutions which isolated their members from other, equivalent, communities.²⁶ Rather than viewing these religious identities as the origin of such 'emancipation movements', we need to examine by which means the universalising nation-state-building project of other European democracies was inverted to create, instead, a number of religious 'quasi-nations' within the bureaucratic framework of the Dutch state. This combination of rational bureaucratisation and religious faith challenges the post-Enlightenment assumption that the specific 'ethic' of Protestantism was a cultural predisposition towards an enlargement of the space of civil society, a fostering of the growth of the capitalist market, and a resulting 'disenchantment' of the world as things 'religious' were increasingly separated from the mechanistic workings of the natural world.²⁷

Stuurman attributes the success of 'pillarization' in the Netherlands to a combination of factors, all of which served to weaken the development of bourgeois liberalism and secular nationalism.²⁸ One of the primary factors explaining this weakness was the very late, slow, and dispersed character of the industrial revolution in the Netherlands. Although the Dutch economy had been commodified at an early date, and a large export market in dairy products developed thanks to an extensive canal network, the country lacked sources of coal and steel. And the very success of the agricultural market also ensured that labour costs were high. The Dutch industrial revolution did not begin in earnest until the 1890s. This largely agrarian nation thus remained inured to a political ideology, liberalism, geared to an industrial political economy.

Of equal importance to the slow pace of industrial transformation was the oligarchic political system, which allowed regional elites successfully to contest the centralising efforts of the post-Napoleonic state. Each of the provinces had its own elected chamber, which jealously guarded its own prerogatives. Both national and regional assemblies were dominated by the aristocracy, although this noble class was not homogenous. Large areas of the Netherlands had never had an entrenched feudal nobility; many of the rich merchant bankers of Amsterdam had been elevated to the nobility by the restored House of Orange. The aristocracy was thus weakened by internal Liberal leanings, which precluded the development of a strong conservative tradition vested in a landed aristocracy as in England.²⁹ A mass conservative movement resisting the centralising imperatives of the state had little other possible ideological basis than religion.

The 'pillarization' of the Netherlands was not, then, a conscious strategy pursued by a religious 'nation' seeking its own emancipation. Rather, 'pillarization' emerged out of a series of politicised struggles in which regional elites resisted central reforms by drawing on the symbolic capital of religion to create alliances that, over time, acquired a more or less permanent character. A political identity based on the religious ideology of a 'Great Protestant Nation' had been important since the Dutch revolt against Spain in the sixteenth century, although the unity implied by the slogan was never representative of

reality; more than half the population remained Catholic, Lutheran or Anabaptist. The Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church (DRC, *Hervormde Kerk*) was, however, the only church recognised by the state; the city magistrates and members of the church council were frequently the same people. As the state church (*volkskerk*), the DRC was to ensure the accessibility of religious rites such as marriage and baptism to all. However, this inclusive conception of the already fragile *volkskerk* was transformed during the nineteenth century when the DRC was disestablished, and fractured by a series of successions which emphasised the voluntarist nature of belief. Conservative politician Groen van Prinsterer was critical to the reconception of this new nationalist *volkskerk* ideal.

Groen van Prinsterer was a participant in the pietistic religious revival which swept the Dutch aristocracy in Amsterdam and Den Haag at mid-century, as Liberal reforms of the state were taking shape. Groen van Prinsterer was the ideologue who formed the Anti-Revolutionary Party as a means of combating these Liberal ('revolutionary') reforms, drawing on the revivalists for his constituency. Faced with an increasingly plural and fractured society, Groen van Prinsterer revised the concept of a 'Great Protestant Nation' in juridico-confessional terms; a Christian-Nationalist conception which sought recognition of the governmental role of the church in civil society, and vested the national identity of its congregants in the church, rather than the state.³⁰ As P. van Rooden notes, the 'originality' of this conception was that it eclipsed 'the notion of the nation as the supreme moral community' in a way that, for example, socialism never could.³¹ Groen van Prinsterer thus sought to combat the atomism of bourgeois Liberalism by positing a series of intermediate corporate bodies, including the church, municipalities and territories, each of which had 'independence in its own sphere' from state control. Groen van Prinsterer thus encouraged a pluralist and corporatist vision of the nation. A series of religiously polarised political debates throughout the second half of the nineteenth century brought this social vision to life. It was only after these sociological divisions of Dutch society took shape that they became subject to later elite manipulation to maintain their boundaries for electoral purposes. This process has been described by A. Lijphart for the twentieth century.³²

The two most critical struggles through which these class alliances were constructed were over education, and the Social Question. State attempts to create a national school system – a key component in the construction of liberal citizenship – were seen as impinging on the rights of the local congregation to operate its own school.³³ In the ensuing struggle, an alliance was made between the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), a loose organisation of pietistic aristocrats in the national parliament, and the local Orthodox Calvinists who sought to resist Liberal inroads in their communities. The eventual creation of a separate, national, Orthodox Calvinist school system, including a university for the training of theologically Orthodox ministers, had other significant repercussions for the 'pillarization' of the Netherlands; it created a schism within the Dutch Reformed Church, as its Orthodox members seceded from their

modernist Liberal brethren, and it created a permanent alliance between the ARP and this new denomination, the *Gereformeerde Kerk*, and its leader, Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper further developed Groen van Prinsterer's political ideals, and sought legislatively to enact a doctrine of 'sovereignty [of church and state] in their own spheres' – that is, to ensure that 'religious' matters such as education, the family and poor relief remained under the control of the church.

The second political struggle which served to pillarise the Netherlands was the Social Question.³⁴ Although the Netherlands was slow to industrialise, its elites were acutely aware of the class divisions and their revolutionary consequences developing amongst their neighbours. The Social Question thus encompassed the issues of increasing class differentiation, unionism, and social welfare. Poverty relief had traditionally been under the control of church authorities, which successfully campaigned against the imposition of a state system of poverty relief such as those affected by the New Poor Laws of 1834 in England.³⁵ The reform of this poverty relief system again occurred under the direction of the pietistic aristocrats of the major cities. During a religious revival occurring just after the imposition of the Liberal Constitution, they were collected into groups of 'Christian Friends' by an influential minister, Ottho G. Heldring, who eventually helped consolidate the 'home missions' movement.³⁶ He (with theologian D. Chantepie de la Saussaye) was also crucial in the development of another ideological plank in the legitimisation of 'pillarization', 'Ethical Theology'.³⁷ The Christian Friends were encouraged to take up specific philanthropic projects to relieve the poor; Home Missions thus served as another link between the ARP, its pietistic aristocratic backers, and local, Orthodox Calvinist congregations.

The boundaries of the debate on the Social Question exceeded the restricted question of 'poor relief'. Socialist efforts to combat poverty through the organisation of unions proved more threatening to these regional, religious elites. The explicitly anti-religious orientation of socialism allowed for a reinterpretation of their engagement as a religious, rather than a class issue. The effectiveness of religious groups in combating the 'evil' of socialism among the working poor was increased by the formation of specifically Christian unions.³⁸ These unions included both employers and employees, and were founded on the principle of conciliation. By the turn of the century, almost half of the organised workers in the Netherlands were members of such confessional unions.

It is precisely because of their success in organising schools, poverty relief and unions – and hence the working class – that the religious political parties sought to gradually extend the electoral franchise. Universal suffrage was only granted in 1917, well after Dutch society had been successfully pillarised. Although the political roots of the religious parties lay with the aristocratic circles that organised the ARP, the Christian Friends, Home Missions, and schools, they were able successfully to organise and indoctrinate all levels of society with the confessional ideology of 'sovereignty in their own sphere'. It was thus the religious parties, not the Liberals, who were at the forefront of

mass political movements fighting to extend the franchise. The wider the vote was extended, the weaker Liberalism became as a political force.

It should be clear from this summary that religion proved a particularly potent tool in constructing the class alliances which effectively resisted secular Liberalism on the one hand, and socialism on the other. The end result of these multiple political struggles within the larger process of Dutch nation building and state formation was to create a pluralistic civil society within a limited centralised state, with a well-developed ideological legitimating for the preservation of the group rights of religious communities. The process cannot be attributed to the 'emancipation' struggles of a single denomination, nor to the confessional theology which eventually legitimated the system; as we have seen here, diverse theological streams such as Ethical theology, pietism and Orthodox Calvinism all contributed crucial planks to the particular struggles out of which the pillarised country emerged. Rather, we must underscore the contingency of the political struggles and the class alliances that developed, and note the factors which weakened both liberalism and its universal state-building project.

'Aliran' in Indonesia

Since the 'pillarization' of the Netherlands itself was the product of contingent political struggles rather than being an intentional project, we cannot assume that colonial policies developed in the metropole were intended to have similar effects in the colonies; or that the application of these policies by local functionaries did not fundamentally transform them. Our discussion of the impact of the 'Ethical Policy' is thus not meant to imply that its intent was the 'pillarization' of Indonesia. Rather, we seek to explore how a governmental culture, a set of diffuse techniques of social control developed in the metropole, were deployed and reformed through confrontation with the colonial Other. We are especially interested in the intersection of the vertical process of religious pillarisation with the horizontal layering resulting from the racial politics of the colony: a conflict in basic principles that Kipp³⁹ glosses as '*bangsa* (race or nationality) goes above *agama* (religion)'. How, in other words, did a set of diverse colonial civil servants and missionaries confront the issue of 'race' and 'culture' when 'Native' was almost synonymous with 'Muslim', and 'Dutch' almost synonymous with 'Christian', notwithstanding the many Hollanders in the colony who were, at best, indifferent Christians, the wide diversity of Islamic devotion and practice, and those Natives who had become Christian or remained animist.⁴⁰

This intersection of race and religion in the colony must be approached from a number of perspectives; when examining colonial relations between the Dutch and '*inlanders*' (indigenes) a politics of race became of increasing importance over time. Whereas at one point conversion to Christianity was synonymous with 'becoming Dutch', as time progressed, other, cultural and racial factors came to outweigh commonality of religion. Race indeed, did go

above religion. But the 'bangsa Indonesia' was itself a modern conception which sought to paper over a diverse ethnic landscape of 'regional nationalisms';⁴¹ inspiring unity amongst these groups required a 'transnational' discourse, whether religious, secular nationalist or socialist. All three options were present in Indonesia. But of the three, religion appeared to have the initial edge. Shortly after achieving its independence, Indonesia came to be characterised by a religious political culture surprisingly similar to that of the Netherlands. This religious political culture was described by Geertz as comprising *aliran* (streams). These streams were:

Not merely loose conglomerates of people with similar voting habits. Rather they are social, fraternal, recreational, and religious organisations within which kinship, economic, and ideological ties coalesce to press a community of people into the support of a single set of social values which are not just concerned with the proper exercise of political power but condition behaviour in many different areas of life. To join a Moslem political party is to commit oneself to one or another of the variant interpretations of Islamic social doctrine.⁴²

Geertz's description makes no reference to the Dutch situation, and is limited specifically to the Islamic areas of Java. But it seems that one cannot convincingly account for the existence of these Islamic 'streams' without referring to colonial culture, or to ask if the same process of 'streaming' occurred amongst other religious and ethnic groups in the Netherlands East Indies such as Bali.⁴³

We seek to explore these issues with reference to the effects of a Dutch colonial culture. The transformation of the state in the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century was matched by similar changes in the colonial bureaucracy. Just as *verzuiling* was the particular form that Liberal democracy took in the Netherlands, so too it was under the Ethical Policy, formulated by the confessional government of Abraham Kuyper, that the liberal reforms of the Netherlands East Indies Government took shape in the twentieth century. The opening of the colonies to capitalist enterprises in the late nineteenth century under parliamentary Liberal guidance necessitated the creation of a rationalised legal-bureaucratic system, which would ease the operations of highly capitalised Dutch corporations.⁴⁴ Since the Dutch lacked manpower and were bogged down in an expensive war in Aceh, Sumatra, this legal-bureaucratic state apparatus was simply superimposed on earlier patterns of indirect rule. By strengthening 'traditional' elites and inventing them where none existed, the process of divide and rule continued in new guise. The rationalisation of the Netherlands East Indies state was thus predicated upon rationalising the system of indirect rule for non-Europeans, on top of which they imposed a unitary legal-bureaucratic state for the 'Dutch'.⁴⁵ The Netherlands East Indies was as pluralist as the Netherlands itself, and as subject to regionalist resistance and reinterpretation of centralising directives. What requires explanation, again, is the particularly religious nature of this resistance; it is no more

adequate to ascribe it to some essentialist feature of Islam than it is to Calvinism. We argue that Islam in the Netherlands East Indies was reactively pillarised through the same kinds of structural processes as occurred among Catholics in the Netherlands.

Although we cannot attribute the 'pillarization' of Indonesia to intentional policies formulated in the metropolis, these policies did have repercussions as they were interpreted by local functionaries, both Dutch and indigenous. The introduction of the Ethical Policy in 1901 was recognition of the debt of honour of the Netherlands to the East Indies.⁴⁶ The terms of this recognition, however, were paternalistic, and served to limit the rights of subject peoples as Dutch citizens. Abraham Kuyper, then leader of the Anti-Revolutionaries and the Prime Minister under whom the Ethical Policy was introduced, emphasised that the Netherlands East Indies were not an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. They were, rather, an obligation inherited from the bankrupt United East Indies Company (VOC). Subject peoples in the Netherlands East Indies were not Dutch citizens, and had no rights under the Dutch constitution. The Dutch argued, however, that they had inherited a responsibility for the archipelago, an ethical call to protect and shepherd the colony until it could take its place among the nations. This was a belated recognition of what Côté⁴⁷ refers to as a 'settler developmentalist discourse' which began with the publication of Eduard Douwes Dekker's critical novel, *Max Havelaar, or the Coffee Auctions of the Netherlands Trading Company* in 1860. The ethical responsibility of the Dutch was explicitly formulated in terms of state formation. State formation was, however, to be a Dutch prerogative, and subject to Kuyper's own doctrine of 'sovereignty [of church and state] in their own sphere'.

State formation in the Netherlands East Indies, thus equated with ethical responsibility, meant the introduction of modern liberal administrative techniques of the sort applied to the Dutch state itself, as described earlier. Direct Dutch rule was extended over the entire archipelago for the first time, establishing the *Pax Neerlandica*. This spatial extension of the state was accompanied by the expansion in the number of governmental departments and their programmes:

Education, religion, irrigation, agricultural improvements, hygiene, mineral exploitation, political surveillance – all increasingly became the business of a rapidly expanding officialdom, which unfolded more according to its inner impulses than in response to any organized extra-state demands.⁴⁸

The rapid expansion of the state apparatus raised its own problems in that the state lacked the resources to accomplish all these goals.

Given this lack of resources, these centralising drives were frequently successfully contested, as they were in the Netherlands, by regional oligarchs seeking to entrench the basis of their own power.⁴⁹ There were two potential ideological resources around which to organise opposition, 'tradition' (*adat*)

and 'religion', which frequently, but not always, were interwoven, especially in Muslim-dominated areas like Aceh. Regional oligarchs acquired their position with the colonial state through their 'traditional' status, firmly linking the concept of 'adat' with indirect rule. Religion, however, proved more difficult to contain. C. Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch Orientalist and advisor who formulated the new policy towards Islam, differentiated three arenas of potential religious influence; the spiritual arena, within which absolute freedom should be granted; the social sphere, within which the colonial state should systematically favour adat over religion but within which Islamic organisations would be given freedom to operate as in the Netherlands; and the political sphere, from which religion was to be banned.⁵⁰ This tripartite division opened up an area of contestation between 'religion' and the secular 'culture' favoured by the Dutch which allowed organised religion to invade key areas of civil society such as education, the press, social welfare and economic associations as it had in the Netherlands.

In constructing a pan-Indonesian political movement, indigenous opposition to Dutch rule in the archipelago was increasingly phrased in terms of a call for the observance of Shari'ah law. Dutch indirect rule through indigenous elites and the codification of adat or customary law was, in fact, aimed at curtailing Islam's unifying power.⁵¹ The rigour with which the Dutch sought to preserve 'tradition' within a colonial state legitimated by its obligation to 'develop' its subject peoples is a clear indication that it was the practical, administrative logic of state formation which determined the content of the Ethical Policy, not vice versa.⁵² It is in these particularly local reinterpretations of Dutch policies that we find the roots of 'aliran'.

The primary area of political struggle lay in the tension between customary law (adat) by which the Dutch ruled indirectly, and 'religion', a Dutch category, which allowed 'universal' rights and privileges that exceeded the localising constraints of that tradition. Both areas were subject to colonial discourses of control, and to local reinterpretations and battles. One set of colonial discourses, known as adat law studies, provided the particularistic information which the colonial administration required to rule indirectly (or failed to do so). It defined the distinctive 'ensemble of a population' to which various state administrative and disciplinary practices could be applied, and the range of variation of practices that could be safely tolerated.⁵³ The administration of adat law was left to the Ministry of the Interior (*Binnenlands Bestuur*). Although the substantive law applied in each 'adat law area' (*adatrechtkring*) differed, the bureaucratic mechanisms by which it was administered were rationalised along western lines. Indirect rule required the codification of 'tradition' in such a form that it could be administered as law; since the law was being defined substantively, the abstraction of 'law' from 'religion' became problematic, and it was this administrative problem which gave rise to the theoretical debate about the universal features of 'religion'. This ideologically-charged debate was influenced not only by the prevailing political debate in the Netherlands but also by the administrative logic of the colony. Since 'religion' and 'law'

were administered by two different departments of the NEI government, the ultimate resolution of the theoretical debate in turn determined departmental competence. More importantly it also set legal restrictions on the actions of missionaries.⁵⁴

It is in this tension within the ranks of the colonial elites – between the colonial state and the local representatives of the powerful Dutch churches – that we find a second factor strengthening the religious pillarisation of Indonesia. By reinforcing the position of adat law for the non-Islamic peoples among whom the missions had been granted permission to work, the government worked against mission efforts at religious conversion since many of these peoples made no distinction between the two.⁵⁵ Drawing on dominant German theological models, which emphasised the role of the *volk* and culture in 'national conversion', Ethical theologians such as P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye and J.H. Gunning⁵⁶ came to embrace adat studies in the service of missions as a means of defining 'religion' in the East Indies social formation. Their ethnographic work took place within the common framework established by the colonial state's adat law studies, themselves influenced by German ethnography. Prominent missionaries like Albert C. Kruyt and Nicolas Adriani argued that:

To mix in the affairs of a people a fixed program is required wherein the one thing is allowed, the other not, which is primarily a political matter and thus not something offered with free choice. Only knowledge of a people, and love for a people give insight in that which we may interfere in [...] We cannot know beforehand what a people really needs, but we can discover it. This applies to both civil servants as well as missionaries, and the best service they can offer each other is to stand by each other in the search for that which they still need to become good leaders of the people who are entrusted in their care.⁵⁷

As Pels points out, 'the combination of religious teaching, massive involvement in colonial education, and relative autonomy from the practice of colonial control gave missionaries a special position at the juncture of colonial technologies of domination and self control'.⁵⁸ The Ethical theologians were cultural relativists, eager to sift out the differences between local cultures and a universal religion, Christianity. Dutch Reformed missions in both Indonesia and South Africa were influenced by German debates on the value of 'single conversion' versus 'national Christianization'.⁵⁹ 'National Christianization' as a mission strategy transformed the subject of missionisation: this was now 'culture' rather than a series of individual converts. They were intent, not on imposing an alien culture, but on encouraging a religious-cultural conversion. As long as 'conversion' implied 'becoming Dutch', they argued, such conversion would only breed syncretism. But where a 'people' remained true to their cultural ethos, they could retain their distinctive cultural identity yet still develop a pietistic faith in a Christianity which transcended that local culture. The end product of the process they envisioned was a series of *volkskerks*, ethnic

churches which defined 'nations' in the same way as 'adat studies' defined the basic administrative regions, the 'traditional law areas' (adatrechtkringen) of the Netherlands East Indies. This Ethical reinterpretation of the volkskerk-ideal, which emphasised 'cultural ethos', piety and social service, can thus be contrasted with that of the juridico-confessional ideology of Van Prinsterer and Kuyper, which emphasised the independence of religious institutions in the civil sphere from state control; Ethical theology and the Ethical Policy of the confessional government of Kuyper thus have different theological origins and effects.

Both church and state were thus critical actors in the colonial processes by which populations were defined as 'peoples', that is, as distinct and separate ethnic groups. As Côté argues,⁶⁰ 'both were part of a "progressive" discourse, a settler transformation of metropolis liberal policies'; and as both Côté and Stoler emphasise, this progressive discourse exposed the implicit contradiction of liberalism, demonstrating that racism 'emerges not as the ideological reaction of those threatened by the universalistic principles of the modern liberal state, but as a foundational fiction within it'.⁶¹ The modernisation and reform of the liberal colonial state was thus predicated upon legal pluralism, on the separation of 'Dutch' and 'inlandse' (indigenous) legal systems and rights. The aim of this 'new colonialism [...] was the protection of the standards of "civilization"'.⁶² The encapsulation of 'tradition' within modern bureaucratic forms thus served to isolate the Dutch elite from their 'racial inferiors', while offering 'tutelage' to them, so that they might be educated to the point of 'association' with the Dutch, if not ultimate assimilation.

Although these processes overlapped, prescriptively defining ethnic boundaries, they posited differing relationships between state and 'nation', and 'church' and state; these internal debates within the colonial elite opened up a dangerous arena for indigenous political mobilisation. These debates follow from the two major governmental tropes, 'tradition' and 'religion': on the one hand, ethnic boundaries were far more porous than required by the legal system, especially as regards definitions of 'Europeanness'.⁶³ And secondly, the explicit racial categorisation which distinguished 'Dutch' from 'Other' and formed the basis of both legal system and volkskerk, undermined the universal claims of equality between churches, between Christians. Insofar as indigenous Christians were accepted as Europeans – as they had been in the past – they undermined the racial basis of the plural state, and opened doors towards expanded legal rights for Muslims seeking independence. Insofar as indigenous Christians were denied equality, they came to see that 'Bangsa goes above agama', nation precedes religion,⁶⁴ and hence themselves came to the forefront of the nationalist cause.

Of critical importance in these debates were those at the margins of Dutch colonial society, the mestizo class, 'not quite/not white'. The mestizos or Indo-europeans were a critical social and ideological problem because of the particular class position they occupied: 'Mixed bloods were seen as one problem, poor whites as another, but in practice these persons were often treated as

indistinguishable, one and the same. In each of these contexts, it called into question the very criteria by which Europeaness could be identified.⁶⁵ This problem, like the 'Social Question' in the Netherlands, became the subject of intensive governmental scrutiny in the *Pauperisme Commissie* (Pauperism Commission) of 1903. 'At base, the "problem" was seen as a moral one and defined in terms of new eugenic discourses of race involving notions of family and motherhood, health, ultimately race hygiene.'⁶⁶ The traditional method of the NEI state in dealing with poor whites – repatriation to the Netherlands – was in this case impossible: these mestizos gave an 'impression' of Europeaness but could not be repatriated since they had been born in the Indies of Indies parents. Their poverty was the product of an underlying moral degeneracy, a combination of the worst of 'native custom' and the Dutch 'pauper' class. 'Such traits amounted to a lack of "energy", the absence of vitalism, an unwillingness to work, and an unrealistic expectation that "their" government would provide employment.'⁶⁷

The mestizo class were well educated (by Indies standards), frequently Dutch-speaking, and familiar with the European life styles they 'imperfectly' emulated; their difference and poverty, a product of exclusion from the legal rights of Europeans, were thus reinscribed as a product of racial inferiority. They were, however, a class crucial to the machine of state, providing the ranks of the lower bureaucracy. Although the cognitive dissonance induced by their continued presence disrupted the racial categories upon which the legal pluralism of the state was based, they were an indigestible anomaly. Resolving this 'poor white' problem thus became a critical project calling forth the Pauperism Commission and other 'progressive' attempts at colonial reform.⁶⁸ This report was the clearest official statement of a new discourse on colonial respectability, which linked race and moral culture, and implied that racial 'purity' formed the basis of moral purity, cultural evolution and material progress. The question of pauperism combined concerns for the moral and physical fibre of European society in eugenic terms, and suggests that it was the welfare of the European community rather than native welfare that was the main focus of the colonial 'ethical' reforms.

As Côté⁶⁹ emphasises, the discourse of 'progressive reforms' created to deal with the 'poor white' problem similarly inflected the continuing debates on the 'ethical' rule of indigenes. The 'ethical policy' of the metropole government was reinterpreted by its local Dutch functionaries in terms of their concerns to establish clear racial boundaries which maintained their own elite status. The 'Ethical' reforms to the colonial government of Netherlands East Indies with which this volume is concerned are thus phrased in terms of a basic contradiction; the 'ethical' desire to 'develop' subject 'peoples' occurred within a plural legal system which sought to preserve their 'traditions' (and hence maintain their inferior status). 'Ethical' reforms of the colonial administration simultaneously defined 'traditional peoples' while attempting to resolve the basic problems of 'poverty'. As a result, class inequalities ('poverty') were frequently reinscribed as 'racial' and 'ethnic' tensions.

Dutch missionaries also took a large role in this progressive discourse, as Côté's and Schrauwers' discussions⁷⁰ of *Nederlands Zendeling Genootschap* (NZG) missionary Albert C. Kruyt illustrate. Influenced by both Ethical theology and confessional politics, Dutch missionaries were intent on creating religious school systems, hospitals, marketing associations, etc., like the ones they had struggled to create at home;⁷¹ such institutions in the Netherlands had similarly attempted to resolve the Social Question and create class alliances within religious 'nations'. Since religion was defined by the colonial state as a 'non-political' sphere, as a delimited social domain rooted in individual rights, it offered greater room for local agency than the political realm itself. Dutch definitions of religion placed it outside or above the 'tradition' through which the colonial state ruled. The churches of the Netherlands progressively expanded the boundaries of these religious rights at the turn of the century and increasingly limited the purview of the secular state; religious rights, hard-won in the Netherlands, were actively pursued by Christians in the Netherlands East Indies.⁷² Christianity became a means through which 'loyal opposition' to the colonial state could be voiced.⁷³ This religious expansion into civil society was particularly modernist in focus precisely because it was viewed as transcultural and not rooted in local tradition. However, it was precisely this transcultural status which freed Islam (and to a lesser extent, Christianity) from the taint of colonial collusion and made it an ideal forum within which to grapple with emerging questions of modernity and tradition. The successful strategies adopted by Christians were quickly emulated by Muslims seeking parity. Rationalised religious bureaucracies offered Muslims the only legitimate means of wresting control over large areas of everyday life out of Dutch colonial hands.⁷⁴ In this volume, we trace how some Christian missions led these battles to expand the role of religion in civil society, and thus opened the way for similar Islamic organisations. What we seek to emphasise is that the cultural form that religion takes in Indonesia – whether Christianity or Islam – cannot be essentialised, but must be seen as the product of these struggles with and within Dutch colonial culture.

Local Islamic leaders, like the Christian missions, were thus able to form associations with social welfare or cultural ends while being actively discouraged from any overt form of political action.⁷⁵ It was not a homogeneous and 'inherently' political Islam which later entered the political fray in the republican era, but these particular Islamic cultural organisations formed on Christian missionary models. The most prominent Islamic organisations to invade this arena of contestation were *Sareket Islam* (Islamic Union) and *Muhammadiyah* ('Way of Muhammad') followed later by the 'Old School' *Nahdatul Ulama* (Association of Muslim Clerics). These innovative Islamic associations rejected earlier organisational models and adopted Dutch (usually glossed as 'modern') forms of bureaucratic organisation specifically aimed at resolving the Social Question and creating class alliances through which they could challenge the colonial state. As specifically mass organisations they spread across the archipelago gaining a visibility which both underscored the

potential threat they posed, as well as easing the burden of colonial supervision. While each is usually carefully cited in the lineages of later political parties, they were born within that arena of cultural contestation opened up by the Ethical policy. These religious organisations were not founded to meet specific 'political' goals (a proscribed and policed domain) but as a means by which a 'modern' transcultural Islam could come to grips with the newly defined secular civil sphere and the rights and opportunities it offered.

We thus cannot argue that Indonesia was 'pillarized' in the same fashion as was the Netherlands; we have maintained that pillarisation in the Netherlands was not the product of an 'emancipation movement' by a religious 'nation' but the result of a series of confrontations that solidified particular class alliances through the language of religion. Since the pillarisation of the Netherlands was itself unplanned, it could not be simply exported. In particular, the plural legal system created by the Dutch in Indonesia was predicated upon an ethnic rather than a religious basis. Race and ethnicity were used as critical tools of 'divide and rule'. This gave rise to the central contradiction in the Dutch civilisational mission: its 'ethical' call to shepherd its colony to modernity was administered through a system predicated upon the preservation of 'tradition'. The taint of colonial collusion precluded the use of 'tradition' as root for a pan-Indonesian nationalism (although this has become a central plank of New Order cultural policy). In contrast, religion offered many ideological advantages as a basis for resistance to Dutch colonial rule; religion was a dividing political factor within the Dutch colonial elite itself. The pillarised Dutch religious communities sought to maintain their hard-won rights within their mission territories, to recreate the familiar *volkskerk* of the Motherland on foreign soil. And such rights were quickly demanded by Muslims as well. There was, however, a degree of overlap, as the *volkskerk* ideal of the missions shared basic assumptions with the state on the naturalness of adat communities. Both church and state thus fostered ethnic divisions in their 'ethical' quest to develop their charges.

Apartheid in South Africa

It is this dynamic interchange between religious pillarisation, racial ideologies and class interests which makes a comparison of Indonesia and South Africa of such interest, and which distinguishes these cases from other examples of European colonialism. As Giliomee notes,⁷⁶ apartheid can be distinguished from earlier British practices of indirect rule in two respects; first, it systematically classified the entire population, including those of racially mixed background, in statutory groups. And second, drawing on German romantic conceptions, apartheid policy sought to 'rehabilitate' subordinate races (or ethnic groups) by turning them into incipient nations. Both the Netherlands East Indies and South Africa are thus characterised by a racialised legal separation effected by a 'white' minority which defined itself confessionally; with the pluralist systems of government they imposed upon the colonised running

counter to the universalistic secular liberal regimes of their imperialist European contemporaries.

In applying the 'pillarization' model to South Africa one must, however, take some important considerations into account. Two key contrasts to Indonesia lie in the British imperial presence and in South Africa's rapid industrialisation in the first few decades of the twentieth century. It has been claimed that the lineaments of what later became the apartheid system had, in fact, been established during the period of British rule, in response to social changes brought about by the country's swift industrial growth. Known in the literature as 'segregation' rather than apartheid proper, the basic principles of a capitalism utilising racially segregated labour, justified by reference to 'tradition' and underpinned by systems of 'customary law', were in place before the rise and eventual political supremacy of Afrikanerdom gave fresh impetus and new ideological motivation to racial separation. Here, the politico-economic factors and the logic of class which laid the foundations upon which Calvinist ideology was to build, had been established through a regime with few if any Calvinist influences and sustained by a variety of missions other than those of the Dutch Reformed Churches. Perhaps more than in the Netherlands or Indonesia, then, the case of South Africa shows that the process of pillarisation was more contingent than a matter of careful design, and as much about political and economic processes as it was about the successful imposition of a religiously derived cultural model.

If one looks at debates in South African history, the assertion that apartheid – or its precursor, British-legislated 'segregation' – owes something to the influence of Dutch colonialism is thus a contentious one. Although one view has it that a key factor determining and shaping the later trajectories of racial separation was Dutch settlers' denial of the status of burger (citizen) to the Khoi people with whom they interacted at the Cape,⁷⁷ the assumption that these settlers and their descendants were the main agents of racial separation, and that such separation owed its existence primarily – as in the US – to earlier traditions of slave keeping or to frontier experiences, has been disputed.⁷⁸ A more commonly held position is that segregation was a product of the British imperial moment and of the peculiar form which capitalism, through mineral discoveries and the rapid development of mining, took in South Africa: it was, hence, a modern institution rather than being an archaic throwback.⁷⁹ Hence, the South African equivalents of the Indonesian *aliran* – indirect rule and the associated elaboration of forms of 'customary law' – had originally been produced under British imperial guidance, especially in the colony of Natal, and owed little to Dutch or broader European influence.

The existence of segregation, like that of its successor apartheid, was initially explained in strictly localised terms: as an economic strategy enabling cheap labour for South Africa's industries. But a subsequent analysis shows it to have a 'cultural' dimension, and to owe much to broader imperial ideologies about race.⁸⁰ a view similar to that explored by Cooper and Stoler in their book.⁸¹ Tracing these continuities makes it possible to understand South

African attitudes about race and separation in terms which undermine 'South African exceptionalism' and which enable comparisons between different colonial and postcolonial scenarios. In the terms of the present volume, however, we investigate whether South African ideologies of race, laid over those deriving from the general colonial mismatch between the liberal visions of humanity that imperial powers applied 'at home' and the inequalities they engendered abroad,⁸² were fed additionally by a distinctly anti-liberal, or pluralist, vision deriving from Calvinist origins. Put differently, we aim to establish whether the separatist vision underlying apartheid – as distinct from its British precursor – arose from currents running entirely counter to British bourgeois hegemony, rather than from contradictions in the imperialist bourgeois vision,⁸³ or a declining Victorian liberal-humanist tradition.⁸⁴

Giliomee argues that Calvinist ideology did play a later role in creating a form of colonial government distinctively different from the earlier policies of segregation.⁸⁵ This was inextricable from, and predicated upon, its logically prior role in creating a viable group/national identity amongst those – the Afrikaners – from whose ranks the new ruling elite was being drawn. Although A. du Toit argues⁸⁶ that an emphasis on theology obscures important political factors, Moodie makes a strong case for the influence of Kuyperian theology on the emergent Afrikaner nationalist movement and its 'civil religion'.⁸⁷ Giliomee also points to the critical role played by Afrikaner politician and religious minister D.F. Malan, who was influenced by Ethical theology.⁸⁸ At this point, pillarisation became a process both explicitly pursued and cultural in nature, consciously undertaken by an intelligentsia in the process of defining itself as the driving force behind the new Afrikaner nation, and of defining others as subordinate.

While the earlier role of British rule must be acknowledged, a comparison of Dutch and Afrikaner colonial cultures can nonetheless be drawn at multiple levels. Both the Dutch and the Afrikaners came to define themselves as 'Great Protestant Nations'. Drawing on Kuyperian theology and its concept of a *volkskerk*, and outlining the ethnicity of local underclasses in religious terms, both shaped political constituencies by linking ethnicity with religion. In both cases these religious nationalisms were composed of complex class alliances which arose out of attempts politically to mobilise 'poor whites' through an alternate language to class: a strategy which led to the 'pillarization' of the resulting Dutch and Afrikaner 'nations'. Ethical theology proved a critical ideological tool in these attempts to 'save the volk'. With the application of this ideology among colonised peoples, institutionalised racism became a key means of delimiting the boundaries of the newly created 'nation', and of ensuring its political domination; both the Dutch in Indonesia and Afrikaners in South Africa imposed legal systems which differentiated between 'whites' and those 'not quite/not white'. These legal systems were predicated upon non-liberal, pluralist principles, which prioritised group over 'universal' individual rights for both coloniser and colonised. And South African *volkekunde* (anthropology or ethnology) served as a key ideological tool in the creation

of these plural legal systems and of the volkskerks associated with these separate identities.

Investigating this possibility involves defining precisely the role played by Calvinism in apartheid's twinned projects: the creation of an Afrikaner nation and, for the subject populations, of a series of subordinate and subdivided 'nations', with separate citizenships and legal systems. The myth of the Dutch Calvinist origins of Afrikaner nationalism, as perpetuated by Afrikaner political ideology, has now been thoroughly discredited.⁸⁹ According to this myth, the Afrikaner 'nation' was the product of a covenant made by the trekboers, who adhered to a form of 'primitive Calvinism' inherited from their Dutch forebears and untouched by modern liberalism. The crucial feature of Calvinism was thought to be the doctrine of election, hence the 'calling' of this nation as 'God's Chosen People', and its rejection of racial equality with Blacks. But there is little evidence to support the view that those who founded the independent Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State viewed themselves as a chosen people.⁹⁰ Overall, this myth is cast in the same terms as the 'emancipation struggles' of the Orthodox Calvinists in the Netherlands, and is subject to the same kinds of criticism; i.e. it presupposes that the outcome of the political process, the pillarised religious 'nation', existed prior to the struggle and was the agent of its emancipation.

In fact, it was at the turn of the century, as both Dutch and Afrikaners sought to define themselves against a dominant British imperialism, that they discovered their latent 'kinship'.⁹¹ It was during this period that the myths of Afrikaner nationalism were formed; of a Dutch diaspora of God's 'Chosen People', the *Voortrekkers*, and of their struggle for emancipation from encroaching British secular liberal rule.⁹² Rather than essentialising Afrikaner ethnic identity, the need has been stressed to acknowledge the contingent nature of the cultural struggles through which Afrikaners were politically mobilised,⁹³ and ask why such primordialist terms of reference have been adopted and which factors have shaped and moulded these particular features.⁹⁴ Indeed, there were initially more impediments to Afrikaner nationalist unity than there were enabling factors. During the late nineteenth century, the consolidation of Afrikaner ethnic identity had been impeded by the integration of these nominally independent states in the system of English capitalism centered in the Cape colony, and by the informal economic and cultural control exerted by the British Empire as a result. Further, these nascent Afrikaner states had been torn asunder by religious divisions between competing Calvinist churches, and by class: so severely that over 5,000 dispossessed Afrikaners sided with the British in the South African War, hoping for a better deal under English rule. All these cross-cutting ties had to be overcome before an Afrikaner ethnic identity could acquire dominant political saliency.

It was the South African War which proved pivotal in providing the conditions under which the myth of a Calvinist 'chosen people' became politically salient in the organisation of Afrikaners within the South African state; at this stage the myth 'caught up with its ex post facto appropriation by Afrikaners them-

selves and its regeneration within neo-Calvinist and nationalist notions [...].⁹⁵ The originary myth was now retold 'as a series of heroic uprisings against British rule'.⁹⁶ In the wake of the war, the British failed to take advantage of the class divisions dividing the Boer republics, or to resolve the problem of the 'poor whites', most of whom were Afrikaans-speaking. At this pivotal moment, the renewed ties between the Dutch and South African churches provided the political language by which the class divisions between Afrikaners could be bridged, and the 'nation' mobilised to protect itself from the dangers of English liberalism on the one hand, and the threat posed by cheap African labour on the other. Hence, the ideological basis of Afrikaner nationalism was 'the result of the ideological labours of a modernising elite seeking to ensure social cohesion in transitional times'.⁹⁷

The theological underpinnings of pillarisation in the Netherlands as developed over the previous thirty years by Abraham Kuyper, having been elaborated in the late nineteenth-century Cape by S.J. du Toit through his *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners*,⁹⁸ now suffused the Dutch Reformed churches of South Africa. From the notion of 'the absolute sovereignty of God in every sphere of life' it was a short step to demanding sovereign independence under one's own flag:⁹⁹ thus was the intervention of religion in a secularised civil society sanctioned.

Critical to this project were the ideological tools provided by confessional Calvinist theology to bridge the class divisions which had earlier bedeviled the Boer republics and weakened their unified front against British imperialism. Taking a page from the paternalist Ethical theology of the Christian Friends in the Netherlands, the Afrikaner elite sought to save the volk, the poor whites.¹⁰⁰ One means was through the establishment of voluntary organisations in parallel with those of English-speaking society: cultural organisations, boy scouts, first aid groups, and the like.¹⁰¹ Here, perhaps, was the closest literal parallel to Netherlands pillarisation. Another, through the church, involved the founding of work colonies, boarding houses and orphanages.¹⁰² Encompassing both of these was the development of *volkskapitalisme* (people's capitalism). To resolve the Social Question – the class divisions which undermined Afrikaner political hegemony – Afrikaner petty capitalists proposed a class alliance with 'poor whites' by which the capital acquisition of the former would be predicated upon protecting the latter from competition with cheap African labour.¹⁰³ The Afrikaner Broederbond sponsored Christian-National trade unions of the type found in the pillarised Netherlands, as well as Afrikaner capital funds (*reddingsdaadfonds*) to sponsor Afrikaner business ventures in competition with better-financed British companies.

But, as in the case of Indonesia, the process of religious pillarisation cannot be transparently applied to subject peoples in a colonial context; the issue of race worked tangentially to the process of religious nation-building in the plural societies under construction. In both countries the means through which the protection of 'poor whites' could be assured – the colour bar – was also the means through which different 'nations' were separated. At one level it is

easy to trace the process through which the Afrikaner nationalists, now espousing a variant of the Netherlands' 'Great Protestant Nation' ideology, sought to reorganise the secular liberal state of South Africa into a plural state of many 'nations' each of which was entitled to self-determination. A legal pluralism which differentiated between racial classifications served, as in Indonesia, to ensure 'self-determination' and tutelage of 'independent nations', yet this civilisational mission was predicated upon the preservation of the 'traditions' of these nations, and hence of their differences.

Here we recall our earlier question concerning whether apartheid's separatist vision ran counter to the bourgeois racism which had informed segregation: one of the ways in which it differed from its segregationist predecessor was in its privileging of 'nation', 'culture' and later 'ethnos' over the idea of 'race'. Indeed, one of apartheid's most infamous exponents, the Netherlands-born prime minister of South Africa, Dr Verwoerd, was averse to biological notions of race; these came uncomfortably close to encompassing Afrikaners within the ranks of the biologically less intelligent.¹⁰⁴ Where the 'scientific racism' of the segregation era had assumed biological difference between groups of people,¹⁰⁵ the inequalities inherent in Afrikaner nationalism were premised, instead, upon the proposition that more developed people have a 'calling' to educate and develop the less-developed: paternalism or 'guardianship' as it was termed was thought to embody 'the ethnical norm of justice'.¹⁰⁶ It was 'nation', and later 'ethnos', with their connotations of cultural rather than rigidly physical difference, which were made to substitute in official discourse for 'race',¹⁰⁷ and which gained wide currency during the 1960s as a justification for subdividing the populace, already partitioned into broad 'nations', into smaller cultural/linguistic entities with separate territories or homelands.

In tracing the logic of how Calvinist ideology was used to create, and justify, this regime of racial/national separatism, one should not, however, ignore the range of socio-economic and material factors which fed into the making of apartheid, as they had done into the segregationist policies preceding it. Again, we draw attention to South Africa's level of industrialisation as a key factor differentiating it from Indonesia. As a project of massive social engineering and state control, apartheid was as much a response by a modernising state to the exigencies imposed by large-scale industrialisation, proletarianisation, and the urbanisation of both African and white country-dwellers during the early years of the 20th century, as it was an ideologically-driven scheme. Indeed, many of the draconian measures used to relocate, govern, house and educate the African population during the years after the Nationalist government took power in 1948 had been designed before that date. Some of these measures were made all the more stringent by the failure of attempts by earlier governments to control the rate of urban in-migration and to handle associated problems. And many of them were strongly contested within the ranks of the Nationalist party itself. The fiercest debates raged over the extent to which full 'separation' between white and 'non-white' could realistically be achieved.¹⁰⁸ Our aim here is not to offer an alternative to the many thorough analyses of

apartheid as a secular, and often contradictory, programme driven by capitalist forces and by the countervailing struggles of subject people to elude state control. Rather, it is to suggest and illuminate some under-explored areas in which the culture of Calvinism and allied European religious ideas can be said to have had some influence upon forms of governmentality and the way these were resisted.

In Indonesia, as we have demonstrated, it was the colonial government's reinforcing of adat law which preceded attempts by missionaries and ethical theologians to define an appropriate realm of 'religion': they attempted, through the development of the *volkskerk*, to enable subject peoples to salvage and stay true to their own cultural ethos. In South Africa, similar attempts were made, somewhat belatedly, to pillarise the dependent and separate African and indigenous 'nations' by encouraging religiously inscribed ethnic identities, which would feed into and legitimate apartheid ideology.

For the Dutch Reformed Churches, having played a key role in defining Afrikaner 'civil religion' and hence national identity in the first few decades of the twentieth century, a pressing imperative was to play a part in the 'radical survival plan' of the Afrikaner people by demonstrating to Africans that they, too, rightly belonged with their own separate religious/national units, and that assimilation would be anathema for both.¹⁰⁹ But the DRC came relatively late to the mission field.¹¹⁰ Finding that most local communities had been monopolised by other missions, it first concentrated its activities in African countries to the north: the onset of its most concentrated mission work within the country was not until the 1950s.¹¹¹ By this time other missions – Nonconformist or Catholic English,¹¹² American,¹¹³ or from European countries such as Switzerland,¹¹⁴ Norway,¹¹⁵ or Germany¹¹⁶ – had already played an important role in positioning African Christians, or enabling them to position themselves, as members of separate churches and, in some cases, as ethnically different in the process. Among the Tswana, the assertion of an ethnic identity was defensive, in response to a 'conversation' with missionaries in which the principles of indigenous society were clarified through their contrast with Christian norms.¹¹⁷ In other cases, missionaries brought with them traditions of European nationalism in which it was presumed that the 'nation/state' was waiting to emerge in Africa as well. Swiss missionaries, for example, thinking of 'the Tsonga' as a nascent nation, in fact created many of the resources which were to facilitate Tsonga ethnicity.¹¹⁸

Analyses of the mission contribution to ethnic consciousness have assumed, though seldom making this explicit, that the creation of tribalism by the churches more or less coalesced, albeit not necessarily intentionally, with its creation by the South African state in its various guises. Some missionaries, for example, had tried explicitly to endorse liberal segregationist ideas through an exploration of the African traditional past.¹¹⁹ But the new African elites which missions had brought into being often challenged the chiefs whom the state – through its system of indirect rule and later, under apartheid, of Bantu Authorities – had endorsed as traditional leaders. This African elite became

the seedbed of African nationalist activism through which ethnic divisiveness might be challenged, but also, contradictorily, the harbinger of ethnic cultures and of 'tradition'.¹²⁰ And Christianity became the idiom through which a variety of challenges to the apartheid state would be formulated, just as much as it had been a legitimising ideology for that state.¹²¹ While these points are true of Christianity in general, we must here attempt to identify the precise role of Calvinist/European missions in helping to create ethnic communities, whether complicit or defiant ones. As stated above, the DRC delayed its entry into the mission field until a moment when much of the work of ethnicity building had been accomplished by other churches. This deferment does not, however, mean that the work of religious/ethnic pillarisation had already been completed by the time it took up the mission challenge, nor that prior mission initiatives had been innocent of ideological complicity, even enthusiastic involvement, with the segregationist schemas of the South African state. Leaving aside the particular theological quibbles which separated Kuyperian from other forms of Calvinism, one can discern many commonalities between the Dutch mission churches and others – such as the various German/Lutheran ones – in South Africa. Both, for example, drew upon common historical roots in continental European traditions of Protestant theology and piety, and both embraced the notion of the *volkskerk*.¹²² An indication of their theological closeness can perhaps be found in the fact that it was a missionary's son from the Lutheran-based Berlin Mission Society station at Botšhabelo in the former Transvaal, Werner Eiselen, who became one of the premier architects of apartheid's education system and of *volkekunde*, its associated version of anthropology.¹²³ The common roots of these European-derived religious traditions found fresh grounds for convergence when, in the 1930s and 40s, the Dutch Reformed Church took over several missions which had formerly been run by the Lutheran-based Rhenish Mission Society.¹²⁴ During its expansionist period it also assumed authority even over churches of quite disparate origins, such as the one at Griquatown formerly run by the London Mission Society.¹²⁵

The contradictions associated with encouraging Christianisation yet denying inclusion within the ranks of *Afrikanerdom* were particularly acute in the case of mixed-race communities. This volume goes some way towards filling a lacuna in our knowledge about Calvinist missions by giving an account of the work of the so-called 'daughter' churches of the Dutch Reformed Churches among such communities.¹²⁶ 'Coloureds', like the mestizos of Indonesia, transgressed basic racial and cultural categorisations, hence the special effort to encompass them as *Afrikaans*, as Christians, but 'not quite/not white'. What complicates the case, and differentiates these from the Indonesian mixed-race communities, however, is that they did not arise simply from miscegenation between settlers and locals, but that they included Malay slaves (and hence a substantial Islamic component) and members of the Khoi and Nama indigenous groupings. Nevertheless, the *volkskerk* ideology was propagated among these subordinated groups, attempting to provide a means of cultural as well as religious identification, which nonetheless gave no grounds for

assimilation or for equality with whites. As in the Indonesian case described by Kipp,¹²⁷ Christian claims of universal equality were secondary to the Christian endorsement of a separate and subordinate status.

The volume also gives insights into parallel European missions, such as those of the Lutheran church.¹²⁸ Papers with both DRC and Lutheran settings demonstrate how, at the local level, identities formed on the basis of an ideology positing ethnic or racial inferiority may nonetheless be appropriated locally, give rise to strong and enduring communities, and form the basis of challenges to that ideology, and of claims for autonomy and independence. In the absence of other means whereby citizenship of a broader nation can be claimed, belonging to such communities may even constitute a form of mini-nationhood – what Carstens refers to as ‘theological republics’¹²⁹ – albeit one different from membership of the *volk* as envisioned in the Calvinist schema. Belonging to a Christian elite has, as mentioned above, provided the basis for political challenges to white minority rule. When buttressed by the ownership of land, it has, however, alternately laid the foundation for a sense of community so strong and so exclusive – so ethnicised perhaps – that prospects for a broader political unity are diminished.¹³⁰

Finally, in tandem with the resurgence of Calvinist-inspired missions designed to give theological underpinning to the project of racial and ethnic separation was the development of *volkekunde* (anthropology, or ethnology) – the ‘science’ drawn on by both church and state which naturalised and essentialised the differences between these ‘chosen people’ and their colonial Others. This science had roots in common with the *volkskerk* theology by which Dutch and Afrikaner ‘nations’ were defined. Just as adat law studies in Indonesia were utilised to systematise the plural legal system through which the Dutch indirectly ruled, so *volkekunde* provided the critical tools by which Afrikaner officialdom could both define its Others and simultaneously subordinate them.¹³¹ In both cases, Indonesia and South Africa, systems of plural government were legitimated in terms of indigenous peoples’ self-determination, yet masked a policy of divide and rule. In both these cases, minority ‘white’ communities were pivotal in creating plural legal systems within which their own emancipation struggles, and subsequent ‘pillarization’, led to the subordination of other communities. *Volkekunde* was the pivotal means by which the documentation of the ‘culture’ of the Other could be transformed into the substantive law of indirect rule.

We must, however, temper our discussion of the *volkskerk* and associated institutions with a caveat. In South Africa, the existence, and extraordinary proliferation of independent and Pentecostalist churches, and their appeal to both Afrikaner and ‘non-white’ communities, makes it difficult to discern definitively the impact of specifically Calvinist mission activity and its interaction with other, more secular aspects of pluralism,¹³² a situation not unlike the largely Muslim Indonesian case. It is intriguing to speculate, when alternative versions of Christianity come to replace mainstream ones, how far the underpinnings of ethnic identity laid down through Calvinist orthodoxies have sur-

vived communities' conversion to more immediate and satisfying forms of worship.¹³³ On the other hand, there are indications that the paternalistic project through which Afrikaner 'poor whites' were privileged over their mixed-race or African counterparts has now definitively aborted. This development comes with the end of apartheid, together with global currents tying South Africa into a broader world.¹³⁴

Conclusion

We attempt in this volume to explore, in comparative focus, an aspect of colonial culture not hitherto given much attention. While recognising the particularities which might lead one to consider the two settings separately, and despite the truth of Cooper and Stoler's point that too much coherence has been assumed for the colonial project overall,¹³⁵ there remain some remarkable continuities between Indonesia and South Africa. We have glossed these continuities as an 'apartheid of souls' to indicate the unusual intersection of religion and race in these two colonial settings. In this introduction, we have attempted to indicate the variety of ways in which the religious nationalist movements of a 'white' minority influenced their colonial policies of government; in particular, the creation of pluralist systems for governing racialised populations which ran counter to the universalistic secular liberal regimes of their imperialist European contemporaries.

But a direct answer to the question of how such continuities have been established is elusive. The source of the continuities between the social formations of *verzuiling* in the Netherlands, *aliran* in Indonesia, and apartheid in South Africa are not transparent given the lack of direct Dutch colonial influence in South Africa. While we have looked at cases in which the *volkskerk* and related Kuyperian ideas directly influenced forms of rule, or were deliberately implemented through official policy, we are as intrigued by the cases in which an effective 'pillarization' preceded its ideological justification, and by the many instances in which both coloniser and colonised found their citizenship refracted through groups in which ethnic and religious identification, in various combinations, played an important role. Given the importance of these precursors, we find it important to emphasise a still larger continuity with other colonial ventures; despite the unique religious elements introduced by a shared Calvinist ethos, *verzuiling*, *aliran*, and apartheid are not as radically different from the secular Liberal regimes they ideologically set themselves against as they (or we) might claim. Rather, they are a particular variation of Liberal modernity attempting to come to grips with familiar problems of industrialisation, bureaucratisation, and secularisation.

We have used Foucault's idea of 'governmentality' to frame the means through which this common culture has been made manifest and through which it has been transmitted. In pointing out a common governmental logic underlying the diverse institutional settings through which *verzuiling*, *aliran* and apartheid were created, we underline the importance of cultural concep-

tions to the modernist project of rule. By doing this, we have attempted to direct our line of inquiry through the inchoate space where social groupings, and the material factors that influence their formation and dissolution, deploy cultural and ideological motivations but are at the same time driven by these in ways they cannot consciously control.

Dutch and Afrikaner colonial cultures, through their pursuit of difference and their attempt to construct dual or plural forms of governance, embodied an ideology which intersected in complex ways with the more familiar colonial projects scholars have considered. Its outcomes resemble, in some respects, those of its more easily recognised liberal/humanist counterparts. One might even suppose that it traveled a different route to arrive at more or less the same place. But we feel that there is enough material in the papers here to illustrate how the uniquely Calvinist vision of separation – with its complex mixtures of ethical paternalism with anti-assimilation; of tradition with visions of modernity; and of complicity with defiance – made for a colonialism of a very 'special type'.

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