

Comparative Studies in Society and History 2010;52(2):1–37.

0010-4175/08 \$15.00 © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History, 2010

doi:10.1017/S0010417510000058

The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems: Societies of Intermediaries

STEFFEN HERTOOG

Chaire Moyen-Orient, Sciences Po, Paris

INTRODUCTION

Theories about the politics and economics of resource-rich or “rentier” states have been around for almost four decades now (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi 1987; Chaudhry 1997; Humphreys et al. 2007). Political scientists and economists have argued that rents have a negative impact on levels of democracy (Luciani 1990; Ross 2001), on the quality of institutions (Chaudhry 1997; Isham et al. 2005), and on economic growth (Sachs and Warner 2001). Although much debate has been conducted over these macro-correlations, far less attention has been devoted to the causal mechanisms behind them. There is still no unified theory of rentier states, and the micro-foundations of rentier systems in particular have gone largely unexplored.

As long as we do not know the mechanisms through which rents are distributed, and what kinds of interests and social relationships this process generates, it will be difficult to unpack rentier state effects. What is lacking in the current debate, in other words, is a concrete political sociology of rent circulation.

This paper proposes a theoretical and empirical micro-basis for rentier-state analysis by examining one core social mechanism characteristic of rentier systems that has hitherto been overlooked: brokerage of state resources through individuals in privileged positions. I will analyze the particular histories of brokerage in six oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as case studies to develop my general argument. While the latter is tentative and calls for future comparative research, my account of the cases is more conclusive and gives us a new handle on the economic sociology of six of the world’s richest rentier systems.

My guiding assumption is that rentier states, especially during early resource booms, tend to be characterized by an imbalance of resources between state and society. The relative abundance of state resources gives societal actors strong incentives to seek access to them. Because rentier state bureaucracies are

Acknowledgments: I thank Michael Herb, Sebastian Karcher, Dirk Vandewalle, and three anonymous *CSSH* reviewers for their helpful comments.

44 relatively inaccessible through conventional administrative channels, societal
 45 actors seek alternative ways of tapping state resources. These are provided by
 46 “brokers,” intermediaries who hold privileged positions and can make state
 47 resources available to nationals and foreigners who are not as well connected.
 48 Such brokers are a defining feature of state-society relations in rentier states.

49 Although bureaucratic brokers exist in practically every political system and
 50 in developing countries with weak administrations in particular, the specific
 51 combination of abundant state resources and limited state capacity seems to
 52 make them ubiquitous in rentier systems. “Brokerage” captures many of the
 53 characteristics of state-society relations in the Gulf rentiers and is different in
 54 several important ways from conventional, more general arguments about
 55 “rent-seeking,” “clientelism,” and “corruption.”

56 Although a strict quantitative proof that brokerage is more prevalent in rentier
 57 states is not possible, I do offer a qualitative account of their omnipresence in the
 58 Gulf as well as a number of sector-specific quantitative estimates. As important, I
 59 recount how Gulf governments have deliberately created regulations that encour-
 60 age the emergence of brokers, and in many cases have made mere citizenship an
 61 important base for brokerage of state resources to non-nationals.

62 After developing my theoretical argument and linking it to existing literature,
 63 I analyze a variety of important brokerage positions that are widespread in
 64 state-society relations in all GCC countries and provide a general taxonomy.
 65 I complement this survey with an overview of goods that are typically brok-
 66 ered. I briefly compare rentier brokerage in the Gulf to brokers in non-rentier
 67 developing countries, and link my findings, in a more tentative fashion, to the
 68 broader debate about the politics of rentier states.

69 Empirical sources for the article include one and a half years of field research
 70 and participant observation in the Saudi Arabian bureaucracy, and shorter field
 71 visits to other GCC states, as well as local press materials and governmental
 72 and non-governmental reports.¹

74 ASSUMPTIONS AND ARGUMENT

75 The rentier literature has usually dealt with states and societies in the aggregate
 76 (Luciani 1990; Anderson 1987; Shambayati 1994; Karl 1997). Alternatively,
 77 rentier systems have sometimes been analyzed at the level of individuals,
 78 with “rent-seeking” (Krueger 1974) or, in the fashion of folk psychology, a
 79 “rentier mentality,” posited as a defining feature of the behavior of bureaucrats,
 80 businesspeople and citizens more generally (Beblawi 1987).

81 Between these extremes, there is a large gap in that social structures and
 82 relations between political actors on the micro-level have been overlooked. I

84
 85
 86 ¹ I have conducted visits to the region continuously since 2003. My most recent field interviews were conducted in Bahrain in November 2008, in Saudi Arabia in January 2009, and in Kuwait and the UAE in February and March 2009, with businessmen, and current and former bureaucrats.

87 argue here that it is on this level that rentier systems provide the most interest-
 88 ing and distinct empirical material, which allows for the richest theoretical find-
 89 ings. Even if one's interest is in macro-outcomes, micro-mechanisms will
 90 arguably be needed to explain them: lack of growth, lack of democracy, or low-
 91 quality institutions—as far as they obtain—will be difficult to comprehend
 92 without an understanding of how rents impact the mundane social behavior
 93 and state-society interactions that produce these results.

94 This paper treads into largely virgin territory since little has been written on
 95 the political sociology of rentier states. My analysis will draw eclectically upon
 96 concepts taken from the patron-client literature in anthropology and political
 97 science, writings on corruption in economics and political science, and, in
 98 more general terms, micro-oriented economic and analytical sociology.

99 “Brokers” between bureaucracy and individuals in society have been dis-
 100 cussed in a few case studies on India (Reddy and Haragopal 1985; Khanna
 101 and Johnston 2007; Oldenburg 1987; Jeffrey 2002) and are sometimes men-
 102 tioned in passing in the writing on other developing countries. Although the lit-
 103 erature on India offers some useful conceptual insights, on which I will draw, it
 104 is based on micro-case studies of brokers in very specific social and insti-
 105 tutional contexts. No one has attempted a systematic general survey of broker-
 106 age roles between state and society, and there is no general model of brokerage.

107 The present article will treat the Gulf states as “critical cases” on which the
 108 theory of brokerage makes particularly strong predictions. My analysis is thus
 109 exploratory: If brokerage does not occur here, the theory will not hold any-
 110 where. On the other hand, if brokerage indeed is particularly pronounced
 111 here, this will allow us to single out and unpack its mechanisms with more
 112 clarity, laying the groundwork for future comparative research. My findings
 113 on the comparative prevalence of brokerage outside of the Gulf are suggestive
 114 rather than conclusive, but nonetheless a strong case is made that nowhere does
 115 brokerage reach as deeply into the lower rungs of society as in the Gulf.

116 *Definitions*

117 A broker in my understanding is an intermediary between state resources and a
 118 non-state party trying to access these resources who is less well connected than
 119 the broker is. Brokers can peddle access to state resources—and usually little
 120 else—thanks to some kind of privileged position relative to the state. They
 121 usually do this in return for something from the supplicants who avail themselves
 122 of their services. This “something” can take many forms, including a direct
 123 payment, some other directly reciprocal act, a more diffuse future-oriented obli-
 124 gation, general loyalty, or signs of deference to the broker's social status.²

125
 126
 127
 128 ² For two useful conceptual discussions of brokerage, see Corra and Willer 2002, who call the
 129 broker “gatekeeper,” and Oldenburg 1987. Neither engages with the macro-context I am interested
 in.

130 Brokers are usually individuals. Their brokerage function is often concealed
 131 behind a more innocuous outward position: businessman, lawyer, provider of
 132 “typing services,” consultant, prince, and bureaucrat are some of the roles
 133 behind which a broker can lurk. Brokerage is not necessarily the person’s
 134 main vocation; it is a function that many players can perform to various
 135 degrees in different social and institutional contexts. Brokers in one context
 136 can be supplicants in another. The more complex the system, the more likely
 137 it is that transactions will involve cascades of brokerage, with several intermedi-
 138 diaries between a good and its recipient.

139 Brokers can be office-holders, but do not have to be. Their privileged status
 140 can be formal or informal in nature; often it is merely their citizenship. The
 141 resources they can provide access to include valuable information, state-
 142 provided goods and services, and specific bureaucratic acts and decisions.³
 143 The latter are generally individual, one-off acts, differentiating brokerage
 144 from political lobbying that is oriented towards more fundamental changes
 145 of rules and regulations. The more monopolistic a broker’s position is, the
 146 higher the value of the access they provide (Corra and Willer 2002).

147

148 *Conditions for the Emergence of Brokers*

149 Some authors in the rentier debate argue that large rent inflows accruing to the
 150 state tend to give it a particularly large role in politics and economics (Karl
 151 1997: 59; Ross 2009: 49f.). A natural corollary of this observation would
 152 seem to be that state resources will also play a larger role in both arenas.
 153 This in turn should boost the role of actors who can make these resources avail-
 154 able. Despite the great importance of brokerage for state power as well as quod-
 155 idian social practices in rentier states, this has not yet been clearly spelled out
 156 in the literature, and the consequences of this causal conjecture for state-society
 157 relations have gone unexplored.

158 To be precise, what matters is not so much the absolute size of the state’s
 159 resources as the ratio of its resources to resources in society: state services
 160 will be relatively less valuable and sought after if society has enough pro-
 161 ductive capacity to satisfy individual needs through private provision. Less
 162 individual effort will be put into accessing state services and resources. Conver-
 163 sely, less private wealth and lower productive capacities in society relative to
 164 the state will reinforce the reorientation of individuals towards goods provided
 165 by the state. The ratio of state to societal resources, however, is specifically
 166 skewed in rentier states.

167 The disproportionate role of state resources in GCC nationals’ lives is
 168 reflected in state provision of free or subsidized health, education, and utilities.

169

170

171

172

³ Even if they might not entail distribution of goods or services with immediate material value, information and bureaucratic acts tend to be more valuable in the broader context of interaction with a state that has more resources to distribute.

173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215




FIGURE 1 Government Final Consumption as Percentage of GDP.

As Figure 1 shows, the share of government-final consumption in GDP has historically been high in the GCC rentiers. Note that this measure severely understates the role of the government, since it excludes the oil sector that is largely or wholly state-controlled.

This is only an aggregate measure of the state’s resources relative to society. A more useful way to categorize material resources and productive capacities in society is in terms of specific economic production factors such as capital, human resources, and organization. These are distributed unevenly and can therefore be used by specific groups to generate non-state services and resources even in the face of a generally dominant state.

Different production factors are present in very different degrees in GCC societies. While the private sector in the Gulf has by now accumulated large capital resources and has also improved its managerial capacities, enabling the privatization of at least some public service functions, the broader outlook on human resources and labor productivity among GCC nationals remains rather bleak. Excepting Bahrain, in each country the majority of the national workforce is employed in the overstuffed public sector, compared to a developing-world average of 6 percent (International Labor Organization 1994). Expatriates dominate private labor markets in the Gulf, where most nationals are unable to compete in either salaries or skills. GCC countries rank badly on international benchmarks of educational attainment like the TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA tests.⁴

The dearth of opportunities for gainful and productive employment for semi-educated nationals denotes *low societal capacities* on the individual level of most Gulf citizens. We should expect that this will drive them to seek state resources, and to invest in becoming brokers rather than in private activities that generate value-added.

⁴ Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, Progress in International Reading Literacy Study, and Programme for International Student Assessment.

216 A resource imbalance between state and society is a necessary, but not suffi-
 217 cient condition for brokerage to emerge on a large scale. If a state, however
 218 rich, delivers all its goods and services swiftly, equitably, and transparently
 219 to all supplicants, there is little need for intermediation. Brokers can only
 220 enjoy a privileged position if others are less privileged, that is, if the general
 221 degree of state accessibility through non-brokerage channels is relatively low.

222 Unresponsiveness and low accessibility of the state through non-
 223 discriminatory, public channels is usually tied to low “unfocalized” (i.e., not
 224 personalized) trust between bureaucrats and subjects (Roniger 1990). This
 225 tends to obtain in the Gulf rentier states, which have been built recently with
 226 external resources, do not look back on a long bureaucratic tradition, and in
 227 which bureaucratic posts are often treated as sinecures. Accessibility is
 228 further limited through fragmentation and over-centralization of decision-
 229 making structures that reduce the formal bureaucracy’s accountability and
 230 responsiveness (Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 2003; Hertog
 231 2010).

232 While much of the writing on Gulf and rentier bureaucracies is anecdotal,
 233 recent statistical research has found that rent income is indeed a strongly nega-
 234 tive predictor for the quality of state institutions in a number of categories
 235 (Isham et al. 2005).⁵ A simple scatter plot confirms that all six Gulf cases
 236 perform significantly worse than countries with similar income when assessed
 237 for “government effectiveness” (see Figure 3).

238 There is another, subtler observation to be made: although GCC states score
 239 worse than other rich countries in government effectiveness, they are around or
 240 above the global median. That means they are doing better than the great
 241 majority of developing countries—a finding impressionistically confirmed by
 242 most of my interviewees with experience outside of the Gulf and my own
 243 field research non-Gulf Arab countries. What makes richer oil rentier states
 244 special is therefore not a particularly low state capacity by global standards
 245 (as Chaudhry 1997 seems to argue), but their low state capacity relative to
 246 the size of their economy and their resources (as the brokerage argument
 247 assumes).

248 What matters for our argument is the *relative disparity* of state resources and
 249 state capacities, and it hence applies even when some of the coarser predictions
 250 of rentier theory do not obtain. This relative disparity is arguably what makes
 251 rentier states unique and interesting, but to my knowledge, the consequences of
 252 this particular relationship have not been investigated.

253 Against the background of rich but relatively un-transparent bureaucracies, a
 254 final factor has affected brokerage in the Gulf specifically: brokerage can be
 255 boosted through formal state acts which *explicitly provide* privileged access
 256
 257

258

⁵ “Large-n” studies employ many cases/observations, and in practice are usually statistical.

259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301

Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia
32%	87%	52%	90%	54%

FIGURE 2 Share of Public Employment Total Employment of Nationals (2005). Source: based on Gulf Investment Corporation data. (No detailed UAE data is available; the ratio probably is close to that in Qatari and Kuwaiti.)

to state resources for certain strata within a rentier society. Although such acts are possible, and do occur, in many other states, it is the specifically high relative value of state resources in the Gulf that gives such measures unique importance there. All Gulf governments have given local business and nationals in general channels of privileged access that have turned large swathes of local society into part- or full-time brokers of state resources for those lacking such privilege. This deliberate strategy to channel state resources through local society has had momentous consequences for social structures in the GCC countries.

To sum up, the guiding assumptions of this paper are that rentier states are systems that, at least during a crucial formative phase, have resources that are (a) disproportionate to the resources available in society, and (b) disproportionate to the state’s capacity of administering them and making them available in a non-discriminatory fashion. This leads to the emergence of large strata of “brokers”—intermediaries who specialize in making the state’s resources




FIGURE 3 Government Effectiveness and GDP per Capita (with Bivariate Regression Line). Source: based on World Bank Governance Indicators, IMF data.

302 available to individuals who are less well connected, be they locals or
 303 foreigners. Deliberate state policies creating privileged access for local strata
 304 can further boost the phenomenon.

305
 306 *The Argument and Existing Approaches: What Is New?*

307 The term “broker” has been used before in the patron-client literature, for
 308 example in the shape of the “patron-broker,” a higher-status individual who
 309 provides access to an otherwise inaccessible institution or senior individual
 310 for his personal clients (Roniger 1990: 3; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Scott
 311 1972). The meaning in which I use “broker” in this paper is considerably
 312 broader: Whereas brokers indeed often are personal patrons of the supplicants
 313 at hand, in many other cases brokers are on the same or even a lower level of
 314 hierarchy than the supplicant. Moreover, the relationship between broker and
 315 supplicant need not be long-term, and need not have the moral or personal
 316 dimension usually found in patron-client relationships (Eisenstadt and
 317 Roniger 1984). Finally, conventional patrons tend to have considerable
 318 resources of their own, whereas brokers focus on mediating *state* resources
 319 in a larger institutional context (Scott 1972). This is why the patron-client lit-
 320 erature is relevant for the present research, but does not allow for direct com-
 321 parisons, since the categories of actors involved overlap, at best, only partially.

322 Although this paper draws on insights from the literature on administrative
 323 corruption, brokerage is not identical with it, but again broader. The main dis-
 324 tinction is that brokerage can involve forms of influence peddling that are not
 325 illegal, which can actually be formally licensed and, in some cases, encouraged
 326 by governments. Moreover, brokerage does not always involve the exchange of
 327 money for state services—it is often used for “softer” purposes of building
 328 relationships. Corruption is clearly present in the Gulf, but it is not clear that
 329 it is more pervasive there than in other developing countries. What arguably
 330 distinguishes the Gulf is the ubiquity of brokerage in general.

331 Finally, brokerage is related to, but distinct from “rent-seeking” (Krueger
 332 1974; Khan and Jomo 2000). Rent-seeking in its most basic form simply
 333 involves one actor skimming off resources from another institution or individ-
 334 ual. Brokerage requires at least three parties, rent-seeking only two. Moreover,
 335 while a broker might siphon off resources himself, his main function is to make
 336 resources available for others, and sometimes brokers get no direct material
 337 rewards for this. Rent seeking is of course widespread in the Gulf—the scale
 338 of idle state employment alone is staggering—but its presence as such tells
 339 us little about the sociology of rent distribution or the structure of state-society
 340 relations in a rentier system.

341 The closest existing concept to brokerage is the idea of “*wasta*,” a term
 342 widely used in Arab societies. It stems from the Arabic root for “middle”
 343 and vividly depicts the idea of social intermediation. Having *wasta* means
 344 knowing someone who can provide access to something otherwise

345 inaccessible. Bureaucratic and other forms of *wasta* play an important role in
 346 daily life in most Arab countries; it is the stuff of much informal chatter and
 347 is routinely decried in local editorials. Yet with the exception of one useful
 348 descriptive account of the Jordanian case (Cunningham and Sarayra 1993)
 349 *wasta* seems to not have been taken up by social scientists. Moreover, *wasta*
 350 relates to informal, personalized influence peddling, whereas brokerage can
 351 also be formalized or, even if informal, so anonymous and monetized as to
 352 lose the personal character of *wasta*.

353
 354 BROKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF

355 GCC states are rich and relatively inaccessible through formal channels, while
 356 productive capacities in society are limited. Where, then, are the brokers? The
 357 short answer is that they are almost everywhere. The following section will give
 358 a detailed overview of brokerage in GCC state-society relations, from two per-
 359 spectives. The first is a survey of a number of formal and informal *positions*
 360 which are defined through brokerage of specific goods. The second is an over-
 361 view of *goods and services* that are brokered in more diffuse ways and are less
 362 neatly tied to specific positions. The latter is complemented by a discussion of
 363 two important general positions—ruling family member and bureaucrat—
 364 which can be used for more diffuse brokerage of a variety of goods.

365 It should be pointed out that mine is a structural political economy account
 366 rather than a thick ethnography. This is due to the necessarily broad empirical
 367 scope of the article, and because the different variants of brokerage often have
 368 little in common in terms of the cultural and linguistic concepts involved, since
 369 they occur in very different social contexts and on very different levels of hier-
 370 archy. Brokerage is a crosscutting phenomenon that is defined by important
 371 structural commonalities—in terms of the resources involved and the material
 372 positions of brokers and supplicants relative to the state—rather than by cul-
 373 tural and discursive ones. It is, in this sense, an external analytical imposition.

374
 375 *Gatekeepers around Senior Regime Players*

376 The kind of broker that is perhaps best documented in the Western press and
 377 popular writing about the region is the gatekeeper around senior regime
 378 figures, usually princes and shaikhs. Part of the wider entourage around Gulf
 379 VIPs, gatekeepers control access to a high-level individual and therefore,
 380 indirectly, to the resources this individual can dispose of. “Gatekeepers”
 381 existed already in pre-oil Arabia, but they have gained much in significance
 382 with the increasing riches, centralization, and administrative complexity of
 383 Gulf monarchies.

384 Famous examples from the 1970s oil boom are Adnan Khashoggi and
 385 Ghaith Pharaon in Saudi Arabia, who acted as go-betweens for such senior
 386 royals as Crown Prince (later King) Fahd and Minister of Defense Prince
 387 Sultan. Taking care of the nitty-gritty of large state contracts, they took

388 notoriously large cuts,⁶ providing Western contractors with access to a
 389 decision-making system that commanded large resources, but was informal
 390 and opaque at its core.

391 Although the most flamboyant gatekeepers of the first oil boom are by and
 392 large gone, the function still exists and is now taken by lower-profile individ-
 393 uals. The Tuwajri family around King Abdallah in Saudi Arabia, and the close
 394 merchant friends of rulers in the UAE from families such as Tayer, Tajir,
 395 Ghurair, and Gergash fall into this category. So do personal secretaries and
 396 advisors and, sometimes, close family members of senior shaikhs such as
 397 brothers, wives, cousins, and sons.⁷ Not all of them monetize the privileged
 398 access they can provide, but all can broker large-scale resources for third
 399 parties. Due to the over-centralization of Gulf government systems and the dis-
 400 cretionary power of rulers, the information-filtering function that gatekeepers
 401 undertake is of great importance.

402 Gatekeepers and senior advisors are generally considered more powerful
 403 than other commoners with a formally senior cabinet post, whose function is
 404 more technocratic.⁸ They have historically often come from non-tribal (“*khad-*
 405 *hiri*” or “*bayasir*”) backgrounds, and as such have no status group to fall back
 406 on. Together with the “contract brokerage” described below, gate keeping is the
 407 form of brokerage that has imparted the highest social mobility. Id bin Salem
 408 rose from being a simple car mechanic to become keeper of the privy purse
 409 and lead advisor under King Saud in 1950s Saudi Arabia. The Darwish
 410 family, of humble non-Arab background, worked its way up to leading advi-
 411 sory positions at the court of the Al-Thani rulers in Qatar, acting as go-betweens
 412 for foreign companies.⁹ Although gate keeping usually implies complete
 413 dependence on the patron, the links involved are often “sticky” and stable
 414 over generations and can lead to the cooptation of gatekeepers’ families into
 415 the national notability.

416 Many ruling family members also maintain a traditional court structure
 417 around themselves, which can include manumitted slaves and their descen-
 418 dants, other servants, and “little brothers” (“*khuwayy*”), scions of servant
 419 families with whom a prince or shaikh was brought up. The aggregate size
 420 of these courts is large—in Saudi Arabia they count tens or even hundreds
 421 of thousands of individuals¹⁰—and court positions are frequently used to
 422 provide access to a ruling family member. This can be used to guarantee
 423
 424

425
 426 ⁶ Field 1984; phone interview with a former U.S. Aramco functionary, Jan. 2007.

427 ⁷ The *Mail on Sunday* (6 May 2006) documents how King Fahd’s secret Lebanese wife acted as
 428 a broker for friends and relatives to get them visas, jobs, and other perks through her access to Fahd.

429 ⁸ Various interviews.

430 ⁹ The Royal Cabinet, 24 Aug. 1960, Mulligan Papers, Special Collections Division, Lauinger
 431 Library, Georgetown University, box 3, folder 61; Field 1984.

432 ¹⁰ Interviews with senior advisors to the Saudi government, 2004–2007.

431 legal protection, influence administrative decisions and contract awards, or
 432 provide access to state services on behalf of a supplicant.

433 Several factors combine to give the access-brokers around regime decision-
 434 makers inordinate influence and a widespread presence: the resources at stake,
 435 the informal and opaque nature of the regime cores in all Gulf states, the large
 436 number of ruling family members (between a couple of hundred and many
 437 thousands) and the weakness or absence of more formal mechanisms to
 438 access the elite.

439
 440

441 *Mu^caqqibs: Paper Pushers around the Bureaucracy*

442 The gatekeeper has a more mundane cousin, familiar from other developing
 443 countries: the petty administrative paper pusher who uses his inside knowledge
 444 and contacts in a bureaucracy to help applications along that would otherwise
 445 become stuck. In the Gulf, these individuals are sometimes known as *mu^caq-*
 446 *qibs* (derived from to the Arabic verb for “to pursue”).

447 Due to the much larger size of bureaucracies and budgets in the Gulf, the
 448 number of these individuals is probably greater there than in most non-rentier
 449 cases. Again, the combination of large state resources with relative bureaucratic
 450 impenetrability creates demand for brokers. This is not to say that some parts of
 451 Gulf administrations are not working rather well and operating on clear formal
 452 rules, after four decades of oil-funded development. Yet, the most efficient parts
 453 of Gulf states are usually not in charge of large-scale interactions with citizens
 454 and business; instead, the most prominent “islands of efficiency” tend to be
 455 insulated bodies like central banks, national oil companies, or utility regulators
 456 (Hertog 2007; 2010). Service-oriented line ministries such as commerce, labor,
 457 education, or health are often still slow and opaque by rich-country standards,
 458 and hence they nurture legions of paper pushers.

459 *Mu^caqqibs* are often lower-class nationals, frequently of non-tribal back-
 460 ground, and sometimes expatriates who have invested time in establishing net-
 461 works in such government agencies that they use to expedite paperwork for less
 462 patient or well-connected customers. Although less glamorous than even the
 463 lowest-profile senior gatekeepers, they sometimes are under the patronage of
 464 (usually lower-tier) ruling family members, whose names they can deploy to
 465 speed up procedures.¹¹ *Mu^caqqibs* closer to senior positions have in the past
 466 worked their way up to become full-blown gatekeepers to senior decision-
 467 makers, usually on the basis of luck and persistence rather than education.
 468 More often, however, their unglamorous work around the lower rungs of
 469 large bureaucracies does not lend itself to easy social climbing.

470
 471

472 ¹¹ One taxi driver taking me from Riyadh airport to the city in 2004, for example, earned extra
 473 income by chasing documents in the notoriously opaque Saudi Ministry of Interior by virtue of a
 prince’s patronage, about whose generosity he seemed genuinely enthusiastic.

474 Paper pushers often run small “typing offices” in front of administrative
 475 buildings, and some of them also act as consultants or lawyers.¹² They seem
 476 to be particularly ubiquitous in front of large passport and labor agencies and
 477 customs offices.¹³ Different services come at different prices, and the better-
 478 connected touts can also deliver services which are technically illegal, such
 479 as coming up with “missing” documents and getting them accepted (such as
 480 visa transfers of foreign workers, see below). Scarce coupons and documents
 481 are sometimes leaked from the administration and traded informally.¹⁴ It is
 482 usually obvious to all parties involved, including the bureaucrats, that certain
 483 procedures are illegal; how spoils are divided tends to be the secret of the
 484 tout. Crackdowns against paper pushers are rare and usually half-hearted.¹⁵
 485 In some cases, such as in the UAE, “typing offices” are formally regulated,
 486 and in the emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah they are now even allowed to conduct
 487 official licensing procedures.¹⁶

488 Larger private companies usually keep their own “government relations”
 489 staff, which specializes in getting access to government agencies, sometimes
 490 cooperating with and sometimes supplanting independent paper pushers.¹⁷ A
 491 European company I was associated with employed a non-Gulf Arab for just
 492 this purpose on an impressive salary. He had little education and no grasp of
 493 the company’s business, but an amazing facility in establishing contacts and
 494 getting paperwork done; it was generally recognized that he was taking his
 495 share, too. In the UAE, the job of government relations officer has recently
 496 been restricted to Emirati nationals. Saudi Arabia has officially restricted all
 497 *mu^caqqib* jobs to Saudis (Economic Studies House 2002).

498 *Contract Brokers*

500 A less petty variant of the administrative intermediary is the contract broker.
 501 This role entails the peddling of exclusive information, and of bureaucratic
 502 decisions over government contracts. This function is usually performed by
 503 well-connected local companies (sometimes under shaikhly control) toward
 504 either foreign or less-connected local companies. The contract broker function
 505 can overlap with that of the gatekeeper, as in the Khashoggi and Pharaon
 506 examples, or that of Wafic Said in the more recent Yamamah defense procure-
 507 ment affair, who has acted as private advisor for sons of the Saudi defense
 508

509 ¹² *Arab News*, 15 June 2005; *Khaleej Times*, 20 June 2005, and 15 July 2006. Lawyers can be so
 510 important that they have in the past even been taken on as joint venture partners by foreign
 511 businesses seeking access to the state; Business International 1985: 199.

512 ¹³ *Khaleej Times*, 28 May 2005.

513 ¹⁴ *Arab News*, 10 July 2006.

514 ¹⁵ *Saudi Gazette*, 14 Sept. 2004; interviews with Saudi businessmen and ex-bureaucrats, 2004–

515 ¹⁶ *Gulf News*, 9 Oct. 2008.

516 ¹⁷ See Oldenburg (1987) for a useful typology of middlemen according to their proximity to
 either service provider or supplicant.

517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559




FIGURE 4 The *Mu'aaqqib*. *Saudi Gazette*, 30 June 2008. ("Iqama" is the residency permit for foreigners in Saudi Arabia.)

Q1

minister. Here too, the modal pattern is one of creating access to large state resources in an otherwise impenetrable environment. Contract brokerage can also lead to rapid social ascendancy, though much less so today than during the 1970s boom period, when many of these links were first established.

Contract brokers can act either as joint-venture partners or simply as representative "agents" for foreign companies, working for a fee that often depends on the size of awards.¹⁸ In still other cases, businesses winning contracts simply sub-contract most of the work for smaller fees, limiting their own role to that of rent-seeking intermediary. The infrastructure of many companies during the first oil boom was limited to a desk, a telephone, and a fax machine.¹⁹

Closely related to contract brokerage was the introduction of "commercial agency" regulations in the 1960s, which forced foreign companies to sell

¹⁸ *Middle East Economic Digest*, 5 Jan. 1979: 3 (henceforth *MEED*).

¹⁹ *MEED*, 23 July 1976: 3.

560 their goods through local intermediaries, with the state usually being the largest
 561 customer. Although agents could be established commercialists with a serious
 562 distribution infrastructure, others, notably ruling family members, contracted
 563 out little more than their name. Compulsory agency rules were generally intro-
 564 duced when oil income took off, as were ceilings on foreign direct investment,
 565 forcing foreigners into joint ventures with locals.²⁰ Many large Gulf family
 566 companies got their first break as commercial agents, including Juffali for Mer-
 567 cedes in Saudi Arabia, and Ghanim and Mannai for General Motors in Kuwait
 568 and Qatar, respectively. Rulers would on occasion award agencies as personal
 569 rewards.

570 During the 1970s boom, any local could in principle act as intermediary for
 571 foreign enterprises, resulting in what Chaudhry with only slight hyperbole
 572 called a “whole society of commission entrepreneurs” in the Saudi case
 573 (1997: 153). Hundreds of thousands of small-scale national contracting and
 574 trading enterprises were registered in the 1970s and 1980s. In Saudi Arabia,
 575 the number of registered companies increased from 77,304 in 1975 to
 576 144,436 in 1980, and reached more than 200,000 by 1985.²¹

577 Tenders for state contracts usually needed to be submitted through locals in
 578 all GCC states, and were preferentially given to nationals,²² who were often
 579 incapable of fulfilling them on their own. Relationships between contracting
 580 agencies, contractors, and sub-contractors frequently were highly personalized
 581 (Moon 1986). Even in cases when brokerage was not objectively necessary,
 582 contract brokers tended to plant rumors that they needed to be paid a commis-
 583 sion for specific projects to move ahead, browbeating companies into cutting
 584 them in.²³

585 Much of the apparently unproductive “leakage” of resources that resulted
 586 was arguably part of regimes’ deliberate distributional policy: having local
 587 companies share in the oil wealth without creating formal distributional obli-
 588 gations, and channeling capital their way, even if it could not be immediately
 589 put to productive use. This intentional, and formalized, creation of brokerage
 590 seems to differentiate the “leakage” in rentier states from that in other develop-
 591 ing countries (Reddy and Haragopal 1985) and, together with the larger size of
 592 state resources, contributes to its larger scope. By giving a special value to
 593 rentier state citizenship per se, Gulf governments created traditions of broker-
 594 age that have defined GCC business and state-society relations until today.

597
 598 ²⁰ Based on a survey of *Arab Law Quarterly*, *MEED* archives; U.S. Trade Representative Reports
 599 ([http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publications/2009/2009-national-trade-estimate-
 report-foreign-trad](http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publications/2009/2009-national-trade-estimate-report-foreign-trad)); and GCC ministry of commerce websites.

600 ²¹ Saudi Arabia 1985.

601 ²² Montagu 1994: 65.

602 ²³ U.S. National Archive and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, Record Group
 603 59, box 1793, folders DEF 12-5 SAUD, and DEF 6-4 SAUD.

603 Local business in the Gulf states have been playing a much more serious role
 604 in contracting during the recent oil boom. Although commission entrepreneurs
 605 are still around, it has generally become much harder to get a contract just on
 606 the basis of personal connections and without demonstrated project management
 607 capacities. Although many businessmen got their first break as mere contract
 608 brokers, the bust of the 1980s has separated wheat from chaff, favoring the sur-
 609 vival of the more productive ones, and forcing companies to find private, more
 610 demanding clients (Vasiliev 2000: 454; Luciani 2005). Similarly, many commer-
 611 cial agents, even if most of them have kept their national privileges and brand
 612 monopolies, have built up a well-developed distribution infrastructure.

613 Yet, there remain cases of full-blown businesses that specialize most of all in
 614 paving the administrative path for foreign companies in return for being taken
 615 on as joint venture partners. Such businesses have often built up a close
 616 relationship to specific government agencies issuing contracts that allow
 617 them to gather insider information or influence tender specifications.

618 Contract brokerage within ruling families might have been curtailed, but it cer-
 619 tainly has not stopped. Allegations sometimes make it into the Western press, as
 620 is the case with former Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar and
 621 former Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ali Khalifa. The current Qatari and Bahraini prime
 622 ministers also have a reputation for contract brokerage.

623 Today, the most important field for unreconstructed brokerage of state assets
 624 is probably not government projects but rather the sale and resale of
 625 government-owned land.²⁴ Because it does not directly drain the state
 626 budget, it is easier to conceal; due to continuing population growth it functions
 627 as a self-replenishing source of rents. The modal pattern seems to be the follow-
 628 ing: Ruling family members receive land as a grant from the ruler or through
 629 their personal control of a government agency. They resell it in turn to
 630 trusted real estate brokers with whom they have a long-term relationship.
 631 These then parcel the land out into smaller bits that can be resold to other
 632 players on the real estate market (and are often resold again, making for
 633 large cascades of brokerage).²⁵ At every stage, a more privileged player sells
 634 to a relatively less plugged-in actor and large profits are made. In some
 635 cases, governments buy back land, converting land handouts to more or less
 636 direct fiscal handouts.²⁶

637 The value of land can be strongly influenced through zoning and infrastruc-
 638 ture decisions which more senior players often have influence over. The values
 639 involved can be gigantic. "Construction" and "ownership of dwellings" con-
 640 tributes between 10.6 and 22.7 percent of GCC non-oil GDPs, and most of
 641
 642

643 ²⁴ Interviews with real estate brokers, lawyers, and businessmen in Saudi Arabia, 2004–2006;
 644 Field 1984: 99f.

645 ²⁵ Interview with a former senior Saudi bureaucrat, May 2004.

²⁶ Tetreault 2000; Naqeeb 1990.

646 the land involved has at some point passed through regime hands.²⁷ In Saudi
 647 Arabia, most of Riyadh's land seems to have passed at some point through
 648 the hands of either Prince Sultan or Prince Mish'al, often to be resold by little-
 649 known but very rich broker families like Musa or Sweidan.²⁸ In Bahrain, real
 650 estate politics are highly charged since most of the island's territory is owned
 651 and resold by royals. (Some 90 percent of the coastal lands are supposedly controlled
 652 by members of the Al-Khalifa, as Bahraini oppositionists have recently
 653 tried to demonstrate with the help of Google Earth.²⁹) Not coincidentally,
 654 cadastral administrations are among the least developed branches of government
 655 in the Gulf countries.³⁰

656
 657 *Brokers in the Trade in Labor*

658 Real estate brokerage is important in terms of value, but the number of privi-
 659 leged actors involved is relatively limited. Possibly the largest market for
 660 brokers in terms of their sheer numbers is that of trade in visas and expatriate
 661 labor. About a third of the GCC's total population, or some twelve to fifteen
 662 million people, are expatriates, and they dominate private labor markets.
 663 With the renewed oil-driven construction boom since 2004, millions of new
 664 work visas have been issued annually.

665 Supply of foreign labor however is tightly regulated in theory, restricted pri-
 666 marily to the businesses that receive a permission to "import" foreign laborers
 667 through government-granted visas. The formal domestic labor market for expatriates
 668 is rigid, since they cannot switch to another employer (or "sponsor") without
 669 the acquiescence of the present one, and in some cases not at all (Hertog 2006;
 670 2010). Most sponsorship rules were first introduced with the oil boom in the
 671 1960s, Kuwait being the last to impose them in 1982 (Atiyah 1990).

672 The large demand for foreign labor in the Gulf oil economies combines with
 673 weak labor administrations to create an inordinate number of brokerage opportu-
 674 nities that allow businesses to skirt national quota and sponsorship rules. The main
 675 mechanism for making the formally rigid labor market supple, and profiting from
 676 discriminatory access to the labor bureaucracy, is that of the "free visa" market.

677 The basic mechanism is that a sponsor acquires more labor permits from the
 678 government than they actually need, usually through a combination of inaccurate
 679 documentation and privileged access to the bureaucracy. The laborers that are
 680 imported on this basis are then resold on an informal market to other employers
 681 who are actually in need of labor but could not acquire it due to their worse access
 682 to the labor bureaucracy. Many of the better-connected sponsors conversely own
 683

684
 685 ²⁷ Calculations based on Gulf Investment Corporation 2006.

686 ²⁸ Interview with Saudi real estate investors, Jan. 2007.

687 ²⁹ Discussions with Bahraini businessmen; and Ogle Earth, *Bahrain in Google Earth*. At: <http://www.ogleearth.com/BahrainandGoogleEarth.pdf>.

688 ³⁰ *Gulf News*, 9 Dec. 2007; interviews with lawyers and real estate traders in Riyadh, Jan. and Feb. 2007.

689 companies only on paper.³¹ Trade in labor, even if it happens in bulk, is not
 690 usually an avenue of for social climbing; it involves few social or managerial
 691 skills and rather reflects one's pre-existing access.

692 Once again, the largest brokers are often ruling family members,³² since they
 693 find it easier to get "block visa" grants to import larger numbers of workers.
 694 Brokers around them frequently do the reselling. Many free visa workers,
 695 however, especially domestic helpers, are directly imported by petty broker-
 696 sponsors. By one estimate, 95 percent of Indian maids come to Kuwait illeg-
 697 ally,³³ most of them through small-time sponsors. In the UAE, employees of
 698 the Ministry of Labor are known to issue visas illegally against bribes,³⁴ and
 699 have themselves registered letterbox companies to import workers. In the
 700 summer of 2005 they were rather generously allowed to transfer company
 701 registrations to relatives in cases where they had more than ten establishments
 702 registered.³⁵ In March 2004, I spoke to a Saudi contractor with three hundred
 703 employees of whom he had not imported a single one himself.

704 The direct service that sponsor-brokers receive from the state is only an
 705 allowance to import labor, and no direct distribution of material benefits is
 706 involved. Visas are of obvious material value, however, which has to do
 707 with the high demand for foreign labor that in turn is caused by the GCC
 708 countries' rentier nature: local riches increase the demand for labor in (often
 709 state-driven) services and construction, while the relative paucity of productive
 710 capacities among nationals limits the supply of local human resources.

711 Sponsors often use their position to extract additional rents. Labor traders
 712 can skim off up to 80 percent of the salaries of the labor they sponsor.³⁶
 713 Many sponsors also demand money for visa cancellations when workers
 714 want to return home, and ask for extortionate sums if workers want to officially
 715 transfer their sponsorship to their real employer. During autumn 2007 amnest-
 716 ties for illegal laborers in the UAE and Bahrain, many sponsors refused to
 717 return passports to workers unless they paid them back a year's wage or
 718 more.³⁷ Language barriers, fear of detection, and low levels of education
 719 among many expatriate workers increase their helplessness and dependency
 720 on sponsors. Foreign workers are often intimidated into dealing only with
 721 their sponsors even if they in fact have the right to engage with the labor admin-
 722 istration directly, for example in the course of labor market amnesties.

723
 724

725 ³¹ Some 70 percent of construction companies in Bahrain are estimated to be "ghost companies";
 726 *Bahrain Tribune*, 20 Feb. 2008. See also *Peninsula*, 25 Mar. 2008.

727 ³² Interviews with former Saudi bureaucrats, Jan. 2007; *Arab Times*, 18 Jan. 2008.

728 ³³ *Arab Times*, 11 Aug. 2005.

729 ³⁴ *Gulf News*, 18 Aug. 2008.

730 ³⁵ *Khaleej Times*, 15 May 2005.

731 ³⁶ *Arab News*, 4 Apr. 2005.

³⁷ *Gulf Daily News*, 18 Aug. 2007; *Gulf News*, 13 Aug. 2007; *Bahrain Tribune*, 12 May 2007;
Peninsula, 19 Aug. 2006.

732 Estimates of the number of free visa workers vary widely, but they constitute
 733 a considerable share of the GCC countries' labor force. The Bahraini govern-
 734 ment gave a cautious estimate of forty thousand out of three hundred thousand
 735 private workers in 2005. According to Bahrain's minister of labor, some nine
 736 thousand unemployed Bahrainis have been using commercial registrations to
 737 import expatriate labor for prompt resale.³⁸ A Bahraini labor inspection cam-
 738 paign in 2008 showed that of 6,277 establishments visited only 3,644 were
 739 actually active in business.³⁹

740 The UAE in 2004 was estimated to harbor six hundred thousand free visa
 741 workers, more than a quarter of the total workforce.⁴⁰ A 2008 press estimate
 742 of free visa workers in Kuwait is eight hundred thousand, out of a total work-
 743 force of about two million.⁴¹ In 2004, the new Saudi minister of labor claimed
 744 that 70 percent of the work visas issued by the government were sold on the
 745 black market.⁴²

746 If on the basis of the above figures we cautiously assume a share of free visa
 747 workers in the total Gulf labor force of one third, this would make for more than
 748 four million of them. Presuming that the ratio of free visa sponsors to free visa
 749 workers in the whole region is similar to the one observed in Bahrain, we would
 750 have about a million free visa sponsors, or more than *all* privately employed
 751 Gulf nationals in 2005. It is hard to think of another country with such a
 752 high share of access brokers (of only one type!) relative to productively
 753 employed citizens. The estimates are of course rough, but the order of magni-
 754 tude quite likely is right.

755 The scale of income from free visa brokerage is even harder to estimate, but
 756 individual prices alone—which are better documented—are staggering. GCC
 757 workers are reported to pay between US\$800 and \$8,000 to their sponsors
 758 for a visa; the most frequently quoted figures fall between \$2,000 and
 759 \$4,000.⁴³ They are also reported to pay similar amounts for officially shifting
 760 their registration to a different sponsor.⁴⁴ This compares to a monthly income of
 761 many expatriate workers in the Gulf of barely more than \$150. The annual fees
 762 free visa workers often have to pay to their sponsors range from \$1,000 to
 763 \$3,500, according to a Kuwaiti estimate.⁴⁵

764 If we presume that of the four million estimated free visa workers an annual
 765 six hundred thousand are replaced, and that the average free visa price is \$2,500
 766 (both low estimates), this would make for a total GCC-wide free visa income of
 767
 768

769 ³⁸ *Gulf Daily News*, 13 Nov. 2005. On Qatari free visa, see *Peninsula*, 28 Dec. 2005.

770 ³⁹ *Gulf Daily News*, 24 Aug. 2008.

771 ⁴⁰ *Gulf News*, 13 Apr. 2004.

772 ⁴¹ *Gulf News*, 1 Sept. 2008.

773 ⁴² *Arab News*, 29 Apr. 2004.

774 ⁴³ Interviews and articles from the local press of all six countries.

⁴⁴ Interview with senior Saudi bureaucrat, Dec. 2005.

⁴⁵ *Arab Times*, 20 Sept. 2008.

775 \$1.5 billion annually from the issuing of visas alone.⁴⁶ This is in addition to
 776 similarly substantial income from the other extortionate schemes outlined
 777 above. Our estimates are on the low side: according to one Kuwaiti civil
 778 society activist, the free visa market is worth \$3 billion annually in Kuwait
 779 alone,⁴⁷ about 5 percent of the country's non-oil GDP. Whatever the exact
 780 figure, the visa brokerage market has a considerable volume.

782 *Peddling Citizenship to Foreigners for Business: "Cover-up" Companies*

783 Free visa trade is based on two forms of unequal access to the bureaucracy: The
 784 first is access enjoyed by specific individuals who have either cultivated links in
 785 the labor bureaucracy or who by virtue of their senior position can extract visas
 786 more easily. The second, especially in the pettier variant of visa trade, is more
 787 general access that is simply based on the privilege of being a rentier state
 788 national, as exemplified by the scores of unemployed Bahrainis moonlighting
 789 as sponsors.

790 An even more brazen version of such "renting out" of citizenship is that of
 791 the "cover-up" businesses ("*tasattur*" in Arabic, from "to be veiled or covered
 792 up"). These are enterprises, usually small, in sectors that are off-limits to
 793 foreigners, and therefore are formally registered under the name of a national
 794 but are in fact owned and run by an expatriate.⁴⁸ They include small-scale res-
 795 taurants, grocery stores, service companies, and workshops—that is, most of
 796 the hundreds of thousands of small enterprises clustered throughout the
 797 GCC's cities. Once more, it was usually boom-time decrees from the 1960s
 798 onward that limited small-business ownership to locals.

800 The large scale of the phenomenon again reflects the low productive
 801 capacities in local societies relative to the resources and demand at hand. As
 802 in the visa trade, the players involved are both senior actors who operate on
 803 the bulk level and use their privileged access to have dozens or hundreds of
 804 companies registered under their name,⁴⁹ and small-time brokers who might
 805 sell their name for only one establishment. Many of the latter are reportedly
 806 uneducated and jobless, and see the sale of their citizenship privileges as the
 807 only readily available income. "Saudis engaged in cover up either have protec-
 808 tion or have nothing to lose."⁵⁰

809 "Cover-up" practices are illegal. The occasional crackdowns are desultory,
 810 however, and the anti-cover-up commission in Saudi Arabia appears to be

812 ⁴⁶ With the new boom-induced labor scarcity, free visa prices in many cases doubled in 2008;
 813 *Saudi Gazette*, 16 Feb. 2008; *Arab Times*, 7 July 2008.

814 ⁴⁷ *Kuwait Times*, 24 Aug. 2008.

815 ⁴⁸ Hertog 2010: 164–67; *MEED*, 10 Dec. 1976; *Bahrain Tribune*, 20 Aug. 2007; *Khaleej Times*,
 4 Feb. 2006; *Gulf News*, 12 May 2004; *Peninsula*, 28 May 2007; interviews with businessmen and
 816 chamber of commerce representatives in various GCC states.

817 ⁴⁹ *Saudi Gazette*, 12 Aug. 2004; interviews with Saudi lawyers and bureaucrats, 2003–2006.

⁵⁰ Interview with senior Saudi bureaucrat, Nov. 2005.

818 “weak and riddled with corruption.”⁵¹ A study by a Saudi economist in 2004
 819 estimated the number of cover-up businesses in the kingdom at 155,000,⁵²
 820 arguably a low estimate.⁵³ Extrapolated to the total population in the GCC,
 821 we might presume that at least 250,000 to 300,000 of these companies exist,
 822 if not more, since both the relative size of the expatriate population and the
 823 reservation wage of nationals are higher in most other countries.⁵⁴ If the
 824 average broker registers three businesses under his name, perhaps one
 825 hundred thousand GCC nationals profit from cover-up. Again, the estimate is
 826 rough, but the sheer order of magnitude is impressive.

827 Monthly cover-up fees can lie between one hundred and several thousand
 828 dollars per month, depending on the scale of the business.⁵⁵ If we presume
 829 \$300 as the average monthly charge, then three hundred thousand cover-up
 830 businesses would yield an annual income of more than a billion dollars
 831 GCC-wide. Nationals can extract further ill-gotten gains from cover-ups
 832 through the expropriation and expulsion of the informal owners.

833 Cover-ups apparently exist at the highest levels: in spring 2009, an Iranian
 834 businessman sued Dubai ruling family member Hasher Maktoum bin Jumaa
 835 al-Maktoum for US\$1.9 billion, claiming that he was the actual owner of a
 836 real estate company registered under the shaikh’s name in 2004.⁵⁶ In
 837 Kuwaiti, the national “owners” of cover-up companies are sometimes brazen
 838 enough to apply for state grants reserved for innovative small and medium pro-
 839 jects run by nationals.⁵⁷

840 There are further, more diffuse forms of peddling citizenship as channel of
 841 access to the state. During the pre-2006 Gulf stock boom, for example,
 842 nationals acted as informal stock brokers for foreigners in several countries,
 843 buying and keeping stocks on their behalf in return for a fee.⁵⁸ Similarly,
 844 nationals have used their citizenship privileges to enable foreigners to invest
 845 in local property markets which are officially off-limits to them,⁵⁹ and are illeg-
 846 ally sub-letting subsidized property.⁶⁰

847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860

⁵¹ *Arab News*, 14 Mar. 2006.

⁵² *Riyadh Daily*, 19 June 2003.

⁵³ Some 90 percent of the 542,000 companies registered with the Ministry of Commerce in 2002 were small enterprises, the majority of which are probably cover-ups. Ministry of Economy and Planning 2002: 448.

⁵⁴ The expatriate-driven economy of the UAE, for example, requires many more small service and retail enterprises than nationals are willing to actually run. Interviews with Dubai Chamber of Commerce staff, Feb. 2009.

⁵⁵ *Saudi Gazette*, 12 Aug. 2004; *Bahrain Tribune*, 8 Oct. 2007.

⁵⁶ *Agence France Press*, 9 April 2009.

⁵⁷ Interview with former head of a small and medium enterprise support program, Kuwait, Mar. 2009.

⁵⁸ *Gulf News*, 21 Mar. 2006; on Oman, see *Arab News*, 16 June 2005.

⁵⁹ *Gulf News*, 29 May 2007.

⁶⁰ *Khaleej Times*, 22 Dec. 2007, and 18 May 2008.

861 Economic and administrative privileges for rentier-state nationals are not an
 862 automatic outcome of rentier-state growth. They are however widespread in all
 863 GCC rentier states and, not coincidentally, were mostly created when oil
 864 income started to rise. They seem to reflect a redistributive strategy that
 865 avoids creating direct material entitlements that could be claimed from the
 866 state, yet allows nationals to profit from the boom. Although other developing
 867 countries can in principle also embark on such strategies, privileging nationals
 868 is more affordable and much more rewarding when foreigners are keen to work
 869 in and trade with a country due to its rentier riches. Brokerage opportunities can
 870 come at a cost to productive endeavor, however. As one interviewee put it:
 871 "Being a Saudi is worth money, and this can sap incentives."⁶¹

872 Figure 5 summarizes the main forms of brokerage discussed so far, and
 873 shows that it exists on all social levels, can be dependent on specific personal
 874 access or be generalized to the citizenry at large, and can, but does not have to,
 875 draw on formal regulatory privileges.

876

877

878

Goods Diffusely Brokered

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

The article has thus far looked at specific functional positions of brokerage tied to the intermediation of specific state-provided goods. Such mechanisms are the easiest to delimit and their scale is easiest to estimate, relatively speaking. There are however also state resources that can be diffusely brokered through a multitude of social and organizational positions, and conversely there are positions which allow their occupants brokerage of a multitude of different goods through a variety of channels. It is often in these types of exchange that relationships are more diffuse, longer-term, and less monetized. In this regard, they are closer to conventional patron-client relationships, yet they do not necessarily involve the hierarchical relationships that characterize the latter.

890

891

892

893

894

Diffusely brokered goods and multifunctional brokerage positions are too amorphous to be comprehensively documented and categorized, let alone measured with any degree of precision. Field research in the Gulf shows that they are pervasive, however, not least due to the extensive scope of state services. I will first discuss goods, then positions.

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

902

903

To be sure, certain public services are delivered relatively smoothly in the Gulf; provision of and access to basic healthcare and basic education, while often brokered goods in the past, nowadays tend to be much better. While getting water and electricity connections can still be difficult, privatization and competition have strongly reduced the importance of *wasta* in telecoms services, too. Even if some basic provisions are de facto guaranteed, however, Gulf states aim to offer an extensive range of free or subsidized services

⁶¹ Interview with a senior Saudi bureaucrat, Jan. 2007.

	Formal basis*	Special networks needed	Citizenship required	Full-time job	Social position	Goods involved
<i>Gatekeeper</i>	No	Yes	No	Depends	Medium to high	Access to senior state figures
<i>Paper pusher</i>	Usually not	Yes	Usually not	Usually yes	Low	Access to bureaucratic acts
<i>Contract broker</i>	Usually yes	Usually yes	Usually yes	Depends	Medium to high	Access to contracts
<i>Labor trader</i>	Yes	Depends	Yes	Usually no	All levels	Access to work visas and foreign labor
<i>Cover-up 'businessman'</i>	Yes	Usually not	Yes	Usually no	All levels	Access to formal business registration

* "Formal basis" means that a formal regulatory privilege is used; it does not mean the practice is legal.

FIGURE 5 Types of Access Brokers in the Gulf.

above and beyond the basic level. This ambition allows for extensive brokerage of higher-quality services.

Most health services are still provided publicly in the Gulf, and coverage in principle is comprehensive. Different from developing countries, the scope of services is rather large, and in contrast with most developed countries, service provision is largely free, at least in theory. In fact, however, hospital resources are often stretched, quality is mixed, and health administrations are opaque and sometimes corrupt. To receive anything above basic care through formal channels can be difficult.

State-provided health services therefore are an important brokerage resource that can be relayed through a variety of actors: ruling family members, senior bureaucrats, or simply friends and relatives with better personal links to specific health institutions (Shah et al. 1996; interviews). Government payments for treatment abroad are brokered particularly frequently.⁶²

The situation in education, higher education in particular, is similar. Much of it is still state-provided, access in principle is universal but in fact can depend on one's connections because admission bureaucracies are often opaque and there are no meaningful appeals mechanisms. Scholarships for study in the West or access to prestigious degree programs at home can depend on *wasta*, on intermediaries with privileged access.⁶³

Finally, government jobs and promotions are an important resource in brokerage games. Although some smaller elite sections of Gulf bureaucracies are reasonably meritocratic, others are staffed with much "deadwood," a

⁶² Interviews with Saudi and Kuwaiti citizens, businessmen, and bureaucrats, some of whom were active in the health sector), 2004–2009; *Kuwait Times*, 11 Nov. 2007; *Arab News*, 11 Nov. 2008.

⁶³ *Arab News*, 16 Sept. 2007, and 10 Aug. 2008.

947 good share of which result from appointments that have been arranged through
 948 brokers.⁶⁴ These brokers are usually senior figures in the regime, often ruling
 949 family members. Because the civil service plays an inordinately large role in
 950 the labor market for nationals who lack competitiveness in the private
 951 market, hoping for the right *wasta* can be a rational strategy.

952 The public services outlined above can be accessed through brokers of
 953 various kinds. Conversely, certain social and organizational positions lend
 954 themselves to brokerage of more than one good. The most important multifunc-
 955 tional brokers are bureaucrats and members of ruling families, followed by
 956 other members of the social elite such as merchants and notables.

957 Bureaucrats are involved in day-to-day management of state resources, and
 958 there are more of them relative to the total national working population than
 959 pretty much anywhere else. The scope bureaucrats have for brokerage activities
 960 depends upon the resources they have at hand as well as their personal discre-
 961 tion over them, which tends to be closely related to the inaccessibility of their
 962 particular bureaucratic agency. Not all bureaucrats act as brokers, but many do,
 963 if only out of obligation to friends and family. Although the average bureaucrat
 964 probably practices less corruption and favoritism than in other developing
 965 countries, the overall number of bureaucrats and resources available is much
 966 higher. Even if only half as many GCC bureaucrats exert brokerage functions,
 967 their much higher share in national employment (more than half as opposed to 6
 968 percent in the developing world at large) would create a much larger volume of
 969 brokerage.

970 The lower the position of a bureaucrat, the more limited is the range of
 971 resources he can usually make available, be it services of immediate monetary
 972 value (contracts, subsidies, health and education services, etc.), or decisions of
 973 indirect material utility (licenses, certificates, information).⁶⁵ Complaints about
 974 ministerial *wasta* are often heard in the Gulf, but it is often the only way to get
 975 something done.⁶⁶

976 Members of the large ruling families are the arch-brokers in the GCC mon-
 977 archies, since they have the most immediate discretionary control over state
 978 resources. Again, the more senior a player is, the wider the array of services
 979 he can make available. Lower-level ruling family members, however, also
 980 have more multi-functional roles because their social status crosscuts adminis-
 981 trative boundaries.

982 Ruling family members are very active in free visa markets, in certain sectors
 983 of state contracting, and in the resale of government-owned land. They are
 984
 985

986 ⁶⁴ *Arab News*, 12 Sept. 2007, and 16 Sept. 2007; *Arab Times*, 19 Sept. 2005; *Kuwait Times*, 28
 987 Aug. 2008. For a historical perspective, compare Al-Awaji 1971.

988 ⁶⁵ Outside of Kuwait and Bahrain, bureaucrats outside of the education and health sectors are
 989 mostly male.

⁶⁶ *Kuwait Times*, 4 July 2007; *Arab News*, 12 Sept. 2007, and 16 Sept. 2007.

990 probably the prime brokers of advanced health and education services. Well
 991 aware of ruling family members' discretionary patronage, nationals regularly
 992 attempt to access them through petitions, and this in turn under-girds the
 993 *shaikhs'* social status and their reputation for generosity (Le Renard 2008;
 994 being called stingy, "*bakheel*," is one of the worst epithets in the Gulf). With
 995 a highly centralized formal bureaucracy—to the extent that the cabinet some-
 996 times has to decide on individual license applications—informal access
 997 through senior figures comes at a premium.

998 In addition to bureaucrats and *shaikhs*, there are many other individuals with
 999 diffuse, if comparatively less important brokerage roles. Large merchants or
 1000 notables often have privileged access to the state. In Kuwait, members of par-
 1001 liament can be important brokers. Parliamentary pork for voters exists in many
 1002 systems, but Kuwait's legislature has a whole squad of "service" MPs who do
 1003 little else but make state resources such as jobs or health treatment available to
 1004 individual constituency members (Tetreault 2000).⁶⁷ In all GCC states *wasta* is
 1005 also acted out more diffusely through links of tribal identity, kinship, friend-
 1006 ship, or shared regional background among individuals with differential
 1007 access, which can but need not involve hierarchical relationships.

1008
 1009
 1010

Brokerage and Its Social Context

1011 All forms of brokerage discussed thus far, whether regulation-based or infor-
 1012 mal, specific or diffuse, have one thing in common: an individual in a privi-
 1013 leged position makes state resources of some kind available to other
 1014 individuals lacking access. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced in
 1015 the Gulf because the state has large resources relative to society and is compar-
 1016 atively inaccessible. Just as important, governments have formally restricted
 1017 access to the state over the course of the oil boom, creating opportunities for
 1018 brokerage on a scale unthinkable in non-rentier systems.

1019 Regimes had a clear motivation for this: in the face of limited local skills,
 1020 creating formal privilege was an effective way of cutting locals in on the
 1021 boom economy. At the same time, national privileges have created new
 1022 social boundaries, as citizenship has become more valuable and the social
 1023 difference between locals and foreigners more pronounced. Policies of national
 1024 privilege have helped to rear a local private sector, but they have also created
 1025 new dependent strata of rent- and access-peddlers, creating vested interests in
 1026 structures that are inefficient in the long run.

1027 In some cases, such as that of gatekeepers, brokerage still comes with "thick"
 1028 cultural baggage, while in others, such as the free visa trade, it has become little
 1029 more than a market transaction based on formal privilege. So far as brokerage
 1030 involves informal, personalized links, it is often equated with *wasta* in local
 1031

1032

⁶⁷ See also *Gulf States Newsletter* 784, 23 June 2006: 8f.

1033 society, a concept whose generic connotation is negative (Hutchings and Weir
 1034 2006). However, as is the case with corruption in other contexts (see Jeffrey
 1035 2002), actors often denounce the *wasta* used by others, but happily and even
 1036 proudly resort to it in their own context. With the increasing complexity of
 1037 state and society, *wasta* now involves not only kinship links but also friends,
 1038 colleagues, and acquaintances.⁶⁸

1039 The growth of both population and state apparatuses has increased pressures
 1040 toward anonymization and marketization of brokerage. They have also created
 1041 cascades of brokers on several levels. A lowly *mu'qqib* can act as a broker to a
 1042 mid-level bureaucrat, who in turn might enjoy the patronage of a deputy min-
 1043 ister who allows him to make state resources available and who himself might
 1044 be under the patronage of a ruling family member. In many cases it is no longer
 1045 necessary for supplicants to become personally involved with higher-level
 1046 actors. In some sectors, such as contracting and land trade, state-provided
 1047 goods get parceled out into smaller bits as they move down a brokerage
 1048 cascade.

1049 Some of the structural effects of brokerage on state and society at large are
 1050 clear, while others require more discussion. Among the obvious effects is the
 1051 sapping of productive incentives for nationals, a frequent gripe of liberal
 1052 Gulf technocrats complaining about free visa or cover-up activities. Brokerage
 1053 opportunities increase reservation wages and deepen the division between
 1054 nationals and expatriates.

1055 Brokerage also tends to undermine the coherence of policy implementation.
 1056 Labor reforms in several countries have been stymied through the free visa
 1057 trade, and the effect of recent investment liberalization policies has been
 1058 limited in several cases through the de facto need for foreign investors to get a
 1059 local partner to push papers. In Saudi Arabia, a new “one-stop shop” for
 1060 foreign investors has in fact led to the emergence of new brokers offering invest-
 1061 ment licenses to circumvent mandatory minimum capital requirements.⁶⁹

1062 Less clear is the impact of brokerage on domestic class formation. On one
 1063 hand, during the boom era domestic merchant classes were economically
 1064 boosted through contracting and agency rules. On the other, the process has
 1065 created individualized dependence on the state, depriving them of much of
 1066 their status as “class for itself.” Merchants’ families remain important, but
 1067 unlike the past they now tend to lobby the rulers individually.

1068 Other forms of brokerage such as free visa and cover-up have arguably ham-
 1069 pered the emergence of national labor and professional classes with clear econ-
 1070 omic interests. Needless to say, these strata of brokers remain atomized
 1071 themselves—there is no organized lobby, whether directly or by proxy, of
 1072 free visa or *tasattur* interests.

1073
 1074 ⁶⁸ For a similar processes in (poorer) Jordan, compare Cunningham and Sarayra 1993: 2, 14f.

1075 ⁶⁹ Hertog 2010: 168–82.

1076 None of this is to deny that on the individual level certain social groups have
 1077 profited more than others from some types of brokerage: Urban strata have dis-
 1078 proportionately benefited from bureaucratic employment and contacts with the
 1079 state apparatus, perhaps comparable to the petty “intermediate classes” in India
 1080 that have capitalized strongly on access to the expanding bureaucracy there
 1081 (Jeffrey 2002; Harriss-White 2003).

1082 There has also been a diffuse trickle-through and trickle-up of tribal and
 1083 regional identities into informal networks of brokerage in Gulf bureaucracy
 1084 and business, resulting, for example, in an unusually high number of Saudis
 1085 from the country’s central region in privileged positions. However, this
 1086 process has developed mostly as a result of rulers’ top-down decisions. Bureau-
 1087 cratic brokers might represent their region, clan, or family individually, but
 1088 there are few cases of collective “capture” of state agencies by larger groups,
 1089 such as we know from African or Asian cases (see Bayart 1979; Szeftel
 1090 2000; Jeffrey 2002; Khan and Jomo 2000). The only exception seems to be
 1091 Kuwait, where ideological movements such as the Salafists and Muslim Brothers
 1092 have managed to gain control over specific public enterprises in the hydro-
 1093 carbons sector thanks to a much stronger tradition of organized politics. But
 1094 their class basis remains diffuse.

1095 In general, and in contrast with the Indian case (see Jeffrey 2000), bureau-
 1096 cratic recruitment and mobility in the Gulf are tightly controlled by a small
 1097 central elite and are difficult to manipulate locally. Contingency and elite
 1098 choices played a large role in who emerged on top in the course of the boom
 1099 and, as we saw, previously marginal actors sometimes found themselves in
 1100 highly privileged positions. And despite a pro-urban bias, thanks to relatively
 1101 small populations most social strata have had a shot at obtaining at least some
 1102 kind of state employment. Forms of brokerage based on mere citizenship status
 1103 have provided further opportunities for marginal groups. The system in this
 1104 sense has not been as effectively or exclusively used to reproduce class or
 1105 status group privileges as the Indian one (Gupta 1995; Jeffrey 2002).

1106 That said, the types of brokerage widely available to marginal groups usually
 1107 imply much lower chances of social mobility. Gatekeeping and business inter-
 1108 mediation have led to stellar careers when linked with the right patron-client
 1109 network. The brokerage involved in most forms of paper pushing, or the anon-
 1110 ymous brokerage that merely draws on an individual’s formal status as national,
 1111 is much less likely to transform the broker’s status.

1112
 1113 BROKERAGE IN COMPARISON

1114 The GCC countries seem suffused with brokerage. The striking similarities of
 1115 scale and scope of outcomes in the six different cases allows us to control for a
 1116 number of factors in explaining the phenomenon. Higher levels of political par-
 1117 ticipation in Kuwait as such do not seem to lead to less brokerage: although the
 1118 parliament creates tighter checks on the ruling family’s business involvement, it

1119 functions at the same time as a defender of citizen privileges and as a major
 1120 channel of brokerage itself. Size of country does not seem to have much influ-
 1121 ence on brokerage levels, nor do levels of ethnic and sectarian heterogeneity or
 1122 the (absence of) colonial experience, nor the timing of state formation or of
 1123 “first oil.”

1124 It is hard to fathom intra-GCC differences in their respective levels of broker-
 1125 age. Anecdotally, it appears that brokerage is less pronounced in Bahrain and
 1126 Oman, as one would expect for two systems with relatively higher levels of
 1127 state accessibility and a less skewed relationship of state and societal resources.
 1128 Brokerage in terms of free visa trade and cover-up businesses seems to involve
 1129 a higher share of nationals in Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Kuwait, the countries with
 1130 the highest state resources per capita⁷⁰ and the lowest participation of nationals
 1131 on private labor markets.⁷¹ The more fundamental and definitive finding
 1132 however is that all of the GCC cases evince high levels of brokerage, as our
 1133 argument would lead us to expect in broader comparative context.

1134 A brief diachronic comparison further confirms our suspicion that the ratio of
 1135 state to societal resources, combined with levels of state accessibility, influ-
 1136 ences levels of brokerage. Due to lack of detailed data, these comparisons
 1137 must remain suggestive rather than definitive.

1138 I have mentioned that brokerage has decreased in a few bureaucratic fields
 1139 that have been professionalized or privatized. More interestingly, it seem to
 1140 be exactly the strata of society that have deepened their own resources that
 1141 nowadays rely less on brokerage: Although many Gulf businessmen were
 1142 little more than commission entrepreneurs in the 1970s, those among them
 1143 who survived the bust of the 1980s have generally increased their managerial
 1144 capacities dramatically and have learned to cater to private demand rather
 1145 than relying exclusively on fluctuating state contracts.⁷² Their share in GDP
 1146 and, even more so, national capital formation, has increased strongly.

1147 Given its higher capacities, we should expect business to put less effort into
 1148 making money through sheer brokerage. This prediction is borne out by a prima
 1149 facie comparison between the 1970s boom and the current one. Although the
 1150 volume of public projects is back to the heights of the last boom, there is
 1151 much less raw contract brokerage this time around, as local businesses are
 1152 instead competing for state deals through offering substantial services.⁷³ The
 1153 new boom has not led to a reemergence of the hundreds of thousands of letter-
 1154 box contracting companies known from the 1980s.

1155
 1156
 1157 ⁷⁰ Interviews with businessmen and chamber of commerce representatives in the UAE and
 1158 Kuwait, Feb. and Mar. 2009.

1159 ⁷¹ Only an estimated 1.5 percent of the UAE’s private sector workforce are Emirati. *Gulf News*,
 1160 25 Aug. 2008.

1161 ⁷² Luciani 2005; Hertog 2010: 137–41.

⁷³ Luciani 2005; interviews with local and Western businessmen in Saudi Arabia, 2004–2007.

1162 Higher capacities in business have not been accompanied by a comparable
 1163 increase in productivity among nationals in general. Below the highest level,
 1164 local businesses are still largely staffed with expatriates, and most nationals
 1165 remain uncompetitive on the private labor market. We should therefore
 1166 expect that incentives to invest effort into becoming a broker have not
 1167 decreased significantly. This indeed seems to be the case: free visa brokerage
 1168 has recently been somewhat reduced through government crackdowns and
 1169 amnesties, but the system remains entrenched. The same is true of cover-up
 1170 businesses. Neither, outside of a few streamlined agencies, has there been
 1171 any discernible change in paper pushing or brokerage of state services
 1172 through bureaucrats and ruling family members; interviewees report that
 1173 there has been little change since the 1970s in the importance of shaihkly
 1174 patronage in the administration.

1175 Ruling family members as well as cover-up and free visa brokers find it more
 1176 difficult to evolve into a productive role in the way contracting businesses have,
 1177 while bureaucratic salaries in the GCC have hardly kept up with inflation and
 1178 important parts of Gulf administrations remain rather opaque. For all of these
 1179 actors, relative incentives for seeking brokerage roles have changed less than
 1180 they have for business actors.

1181 State access is never perfectly equitable or free of effort, and brokers between
 1182 state and society exist all over the world. To my knowledge, there are no other
 1183 system-wide studies of their scope and scale of the sort I have attempted here.
 1184 Nevertheless, by comparing our account with the more fragmented evidence
 1185 from the literature we can sharpen our understanding of the phenomenon's
 1186 range and its underlying mechanisms.

1187 The literature contains references to "gatekeepers" or their equivalents in
 1188 centralized and unaccountable systems in very different times and places, be
 1189 it King Mohammad VI's Morocco (Denoeux 2000), Suharto's Indonesia,⁷⁴
 1190 Peter the Great's Russia (Zitser 2005), or Louis XIV's France (Kettering
 1191 1988). Although the only detailed accounts I have found focus on rural India
 1192 (Reddy and Haragopal 1985; Oldenburg 1987; Jeffrey 2000), paper pushers
 1193 very likely exist in many places.⁷⁵ Cases of contract brokerage are documented
 1194 for large parts of the developing world (and certainly are not absent in the
 1195 developed world).⁷⁶ The diffuse brokerage function of bureaucrats qua corrup-
 1196 tion and patronage is also documented for many cases (Bayart 1993; Le Vine
 1197 1975; Szeftel 1982; 2000; Robertson-Snape 1999: 594f.; Waterbury 1973:
 1198
 1199
 1200

1201 ⁷⁴ Robertson-Snape 1999; *New York Times*, 22 May 1998; *Time Magazine*, 8 July 2002.

1202 ⁷⁵ When traveling by car from Saudi Arabia to Turkey in 2004, I encountered them around the
 1203 customs offices at every land border I crossed.

1204 ⁷⁶ Well-documented cases include Morocco and Indonesia. Waterbury 1973; Robertson-Snape
 1999.

1205 547f.; Wade 1982: 314ff.; Ledeneva 2006; 2008; Harris-White 2003: 79–81;
 1206 Jeffrey 2002).

1207 The literature is heterogeneous and does not usually focus on brokerage (or
 1208 rentier states) per se, but certain themes do recur. The rise of the state and its
 1209 resources encourages brokerage, as do opacity and high centralization of the
 1210 administration. Privileged access is the main basis for the activities of
 1211 brokers, who can have a vested interest in making the bureaucracy appear as
 1212 less transparent and more arbitrary than it in fact is.

1213 The corruption and favoritism described in the literature are often more
 1214 brazen and wide-reaching than in the Gulf, as are the obligations office-holders
 1215 have to their friends and kin (Szeftel 2000; Bayart 1979). Nowhere in the lit-
 1216 erature, however, is a stratum of brokers mentioned that approaches the scale
 1217 of what I have described for the GCC. This is no surprise, since none of the
 1218 developing world cases involve such large budgets and state apparatuses, or
 1219 governments providing as many goods in daily life as do those in the GCC.

1220 The best-documented case study of pervasive bureaucratic brokerage prob-
 1221 ably is Robert Wade's detailed investigation of the irrigation bureaucracy in
 1222 a Southern Indian region (1982). Irrigation bureaucrats act as brokers of state-
 1223 provided resources and services vis-à-vis peasants and public works contrac-
 1224 tors, using lower-level administrators as go-betweens. Despite pervasive cor-
 1225 ruption that allows mid- and higher-level officials to augment their income
 1226 many times above their official salary, Wade estimates the direct financial
 1227 costs of brokerage as rather low for peasants (about 1–5 percent of their
 1228 profits). This apparent discrepancy can only be explained by the limited
 1229 number of brokers relative to the population at large.

1230 A similar, if less detailed account of the manipulation of land records by local
 1231 bureaucrats in India mentions an average of two officials per village, a far cry
 1232 from the omnipresent bureaucracy in the Gulf (Gupta 1995: 379). In his field
 1233 research on rural elites in Uttar Pradesh, Craig Jeffrey found three to four
 1234 middle-caste individuals acting as informal brokers to the local administration
 1235 in each of three settlements that contained between 4,000 and 10,000 inhabi-
 1236 tants (2000: 1029). This is about one broker per thousand villagers in the
 1237 smaller settlements, while in our Gulf free visa estimate, for example, we
 1238 arrive at one free visa broker per twenty Gulf nationals. In Sarayra and Cun-
 1239 ningham's 1993 book on *wasta* in Jordan, those providing access to the state
 1240 also seem to be a relatively few senior individuals serving larger communities.

1241 Even if developing country systems are more corrupt and impenetrable than
 1242 those in the Gulf—as seems the case in the Indian examples—they seem to
 1243 provide space for fewer brokers than in the GCC countries. This is not to
 1244 deny that bureaucratic access in poorer countries can be as vital as in the
 1245 Gulf, but there is a quantitative difference in that most GCC citizen have to
 1246 deal with their bureaucracy much more frequently than does the average
 1247 Indian peasant.

1248 Further evidence for the wider presence of brokers among Gulf citizens is
 1249 that many of them are lower-class individuals, who seem to predominate in par-
 1250 ticular lines of brokerage, such as paper pushing. In India, by contrast, few individ-
 1251 uals below the country's "intermediate classes" (Harriss-White 2003; Jeffrey 2000)
 1252 manage to carve out brokerage positions.⁷⁷ In the literature on Africa, too, broker-
 1253 age seems to mostly involve privileged strata (Bayart 1993; Le Vine 1975;
 1254 Szeftel 1982; 2000).

1255 In addition to the putative quantitative differences, there are also qualitative
 1256 differences between brokerage in the Gulf and elsewhere. The non-Gulf litera-
 1257 ture holds no examples of individuals brokering their status as nationals
 1258 through mechanisms such as trade in free visa or cover-up business licenses.
 1259 Rentier citizenship seems to impart unique opportunities in this regard.
 1260 Rentier resources have allowed the GCC states to engage in a special redistri-
 1261 butive strategy in which citizenship plays a pivotal role, and can itself become a
 1262 brokered good, as has happened for example in Kuwaiti and Bahrain. Some
 1263 Kuwaiti nationals reportedly offer to register expatriate Arabs' children as
 1264 their own for a fee of \$35,000 to \$70,000.⁷⁸

1265 Conversely, there are forms of brokerage in the wider world that are absent or
 1266 only marginally present in the GCC. Brokerage of state resources through pol-
 1267 itical machines, parties, and career political bosses, known from the United
 1268 States, India, Africa, and Latin America (Jeffrey 2002; Johnston 1979;
 1269 Schmitt 1974; Lemarchand 1972; Wantchekon 2003; Van de Walle 2003;
 1270 Szeftel 2000; Fox 1994) is absent in the Gulf with the partial exception of
 1271 the Kuwaiti parliament.

1272 Some developing countries such as Indonesia also have seen the sale of
 1273 offices through senior bureaucrats (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006), and in
 1274 India there are shadow markets in government jobs that exclude specific
 1275 social strata (Jeffrey 2000). Such phenomena are hardly known in the more dis-
 1276 creet Gulf, where jobs are rather used as tokens of soft, personalized patronage
 1277 controlled by high-level figures. Bureaucracies in the Gulf are comparatively
 1278 more institutionalized and contain fewer full-scale "prebends" (Van de Walle
 1279 2003) below the highest level. Although bureaucratic posts can be given as a
 1280 reward, the intended enrichment tends to take place through salaries rather
 1281 than through "planned corruption."

1282 In general, in the GCC distributional brokerage seems to be stronger than the
 1283 extortionate corruption familiar from developing countries, where supplicants
 1284 engage in an exchange not to receive a service of material value, but simply
 1285
 1286

1287 ⁷⁷ Although the intermediate classes are "numerically vast" (Harriss-White 2003: 48), they con-
 1288 stitute a minority.

1289 ⁷⁸ *Kuwait Times*, 4 Jan. 2009. Nigeria, another, much poorer oil state has also seen the emer-
 1290 gence of "cover-up" businesses in its private sector after the formal nationalization of small and
 medium enterprises during the 1970s oil boom decade (Lewis 2007: 138).

1291 for the privilege of being left alone by the state, be it the police, tax authorities,
1292 or health and safety inspectors (Bayart 1993; Jeffrey 2000).

1293 CONCLUSION
1294

1295 In this paper I have developed a simple model to explain why “brokers” of state
1296 resources emerge, and I have presented evidence of brokerage in the GCC
1297 countries across sectors and over time. I have also briefly compared brokerage
1298 in the Gulf with some of the available fragmentary evidence from other cases.
1299 These comparisons have pointed to further sub-types of brokerage outside of
1300 the GCC, but they also seem to show underlying causes for brokerage to be
1301 the same, regardless of the social level or level of formality it is embedded in.

1302 Brokerage emerges due to both structural causes—low state capacity and
1303 large state resources—and specific government policies of creating national pri-
1304 vileges and *formal* exclusion. The latter however will only induce large-scale
1305 brokerage if the former conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, large-scale,
1306 state-induced brokerage is hard to conceive of outside of rentier states. In con-
1307 trast to the general rentier debate, my argument focuses on relative rather than
1308 absolute weakness of state institutions, and on the state’s resources relative to
1309 society rather than its absolute resources.

1310 Although brokerage is universal, the Gulf rentier states seem to be unique in
1311 two regards. First, brokers appear to be more prevalent in the Gulf than in any
1312 non-rentier state—hundreds of thousands of them among relatively small
1313 national populations of several millions. Second, the GCC cases exhibit
1314 some sub-types of the phenomenon that seem to be unique, among them free
1315 visa traders and cover-up businesses. These are linked to the extensive use of
1316 rentier citizenship as a brokerage resource and, in parts, to the encouragement
1317 of brokerage by the state at different points in history through policies of
1318 national privilege. In no other system in the world, it seems, is citizenship
1319 such a prized and fungible economic resource.

1320 The ubiquity of brokerage has important consequences for economic incen-
1321 tives in society, for social stratification, and for state-society relations. It can
1322 make the state more accessible, but also creates great inequalities in access
1323 and deadweight losses, and it can undermine the coherence of the adminis-
1324 tration. Moreover, once a brokerage role has been established, it creates
1325 vested interests that endure beyond the time when it might have served a
1326 useful purpose. Cover-up businesses and free visa trade are notoriously difficult
1327 to eradicate side effects of a protectionist policy that has outlived its usefulness
1328 as device for creating a national business class.

1329 *Politics of Brokerage*

1331 Brokers are a large “interest group” that has been left out of the literature on the
1332 politics of development (Oldenburg 1987: 533). One reason they have been
1333 overlooked might be that they are such a heterogeneous group, with little in

1334 common and interests that are usually local and highly specific. Moreover, in
 1335 the GCC many forms of brokerage are part-time occupations at best, acted
 1336 out in specific social and institutional contexts that constitute just a small
 1337 part of the broker's life.

1338 Only some sub-classes of brokers have collective political agency: ruling
 1339 families and, sometimes, sections of business. Contractors and commercial
 1340 agents in the Gulf have repeatedly managed to stymie official attempts at redu-
 1341 cing their national privileges (Chaudhry 1997; Hertog 2010). Beyond this role of
 1342 veto player, they have not pursued their collective interests as brokers sys-
 1343 tematically. Small-time brokers such as *mu'qqibs*, lower-level courtiers, or
 1344 cover-up business "owners" have almost no collective agency.

1345 As I have argued, brokerage in the GCC context is, if anything, likely to
 1346 undermine class formation and collective action. Brokerage interests are indi-
 1347 vidualized, often personalized, informal and local in nature. As far as they
 1348 are tied up with illegal activities, political lobbying on their behalf is a risky
 1349 undertaking. Many brokers moreover are in hierarchical relationship to state
 1350 agents in a highly centralized and authoritarian system. In many regards indi-
 1351 vidual brokerage *substitutes* for collective interest representation (Khanna and
 1352 Johnston 2007), and some authors have linked the emergence of brokerage to a
 1353 weakness of the public sphere (Reddy and Haragopal 1985). With the exception
 1354 of Kuwait, GCC states score very badly on measures of voice and accountabil-
 1355 ity, making individual and informal as opposed to collective and formal access
 1356 to the state the preferred choice of most nationals.

1357 Altogether, the tradition of accessing the state through brokers has probably
 1358 led to atomization of state-society relations. Though brokerage can also occur
 1359 among peers, it tends to be enmeshed in vertical structures of authority and
 1360 dependence which are, in the final analysis, linked to the regime elite. This
 1361 works against horizontal interest representation. There seems to be a political
 1362 logic in this: Gulf ruling families have discouraged or sanctioned collective
 1363 action in their societies while encouraging nationals to present petitions to
 1364 pursue their individual interests on a case-by-case basis, which can result in
 1365 generous payoffs.⁷⁹

1366 Brokerage opportunities as well as many of the brokered goods can be
 1367 granted by the regime, but do not usually constitute a formal entitlement.
 1368 They can therefore be taken away more easily, also on a case-to-case basis,
 1369 which makes them a suppler instrument of patronage. Their removal is a
 1370 potent threat, especially if they involve illegal transactions. Competition for
 1371 individual spoils and privileged access can fragment and de-politicize
 1372 elites.⁸⁰ Brokerage in this context may help to explain the persistence of
 1373

1374

1375

1376

⁷⁹ Interviews with Saudi businessmen and government advisors in Riyadh, 2003–2007.

⁸⁰ On such political uses of "planned corruption," see Waterbury 1973.

1377 authoritarianism in Gulf rentier states. While brokerage creates economic costs,
 1378 it also has political uses.

1379 Given the important political consequences of brokerage structures, their
 1380 secular decline in the Gulf, at least relative to the last boom, is politically sig-
 1381 nificant. With increasing nationalization of private labor markets, progressive
 1382 liberalization of business regulations, and, in some areas at least, maturation
 1383 of the bureaucracy, levels of brokerage are bound to decline. Due to inter-
 1384 national pressures, some states are now even mooting an abolition of the spon-
 1385 sorship system, which would put an end to the free visa system in its current
 1386 form.

1387 Discretionary spending of rulers and some other core areas of brokerage
 1388 however are likely to remain untouchable for many years. It is no accident
 1389 that almost all economic sectors have been opened for foreign investment in
 1390 Saudi Arabia in the course of WTO accession except for labor recruitment
 1391 and real estate trade,⁸¹ two core areas of brokerage in which royals are strongly
 1392 involved and which have not evolved towards higher levels of productivity like
 1393 other areas of business have. Similarly, commercial agencies and real estate
 1394 remain off-limits for foreign investors in Qatar even after comprehensive
 1395 FDI reforms.⁸²

1396 The Gulf states arguably constitute an extreme case of rentier brokerage, not
 1397 least due to their policies of national privilege. Future research will have to
 1398 show how important brokerage is in non-Gulf rentiers, and whether it could
 1399 be the basis for a general political sociology of rentier systems, which have
 1400 too often been treated as black boxes. Much of the rentier literature does not
 1401 go beyond generalizations about patronage and the “buying off” of social
 1402 groups, leaving the specific social structures involved largely unexplored.
 1403 Brokerage is likely to be an important micro-mechanism involved in creating
 1404 various rentier effects, including slow growth, low productivity, weak policy
 1405 implementation, and weak political participation.

1406 Moreover, rentier states are merely one sub-set of cases about which the
 1407 brokerage model makes particularly pronounced predictions. The basic argu-
 1408 ment made here is more universal: the extent of brokerage depends on the
 1409 balance of resources between state and society, combined with the level of
 1410 state accessibility. Figure 6 seems to impressionistically confirm the general-
 1411 ized brokerage argument. The more extreme non-rentier cases that combine
 1412 bad bureaucracy with relatively high levels of income are all closely associated
 1413 with particularly ubiquitous clientelism and favoritism (such as Greece, Italy,
 1414 and Lebanon), or pervasive corruption (such as Russia and Belarus).

1415
 1416
 1417

1418 ⁸¹ “Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, Negative list” (of sectors closed for foreign
 1419 investors): <http://www.sagia.gov.sa/english/index.php?page=negative-list>.

⁸² Simmons and Simmons 2007.




FIGURE 6 Government Effectiveness and GDP per Capita (see fig. 3).

This calls for further, more detailed research on non-rentier states, both those with accessible bureaucracies and high levels of resources, and those with inaccessible bureaucracies and various levels of resources. Such comparative investigation will also allow finer-grained conceptual work on different categories of brokerage, potentially linking different types—coercive, distributional, formalized and informal, and so forth—to different regime types and resource levels. Due to the poor quality of data currently available, this will require further field research.

REFERENCES

- Al-Awaji, Ibrahim. 1971. *Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia*. PhD diss., University of Virginia.
- Al-Naqeeb, Khaldun. 1990. *Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula*. London.
- Anderson, Lisa. 1987. The State in the Middle East and North Africa. *Comparative Politics* 19, 4: 1–18.
- Atiyah, Hamid. 1990. The Sponsorship System and Infringements of the Rights of Foreign Workers in the Gulf Countries. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal* 3, 4: 267–76.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1979. *L'État au Cameroun*. Paris.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1993. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. New York.
- Beblawi, Hazem. 1987. The Rentier State in the Arab World. In Hazem Beblawi and , Giacomo Luciani, eds., *The Rentier State*. London.
- Business International. 1985. *Saudi Arabia: A Reappraisal*. Geneva.
- Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. 1997. *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East*. Ithaca, N.Y.
- Corra, Mamadi and David Willer. 2002. The Gatekeeper. *Sociological Theory* 20, 2: 180–207.
- Cunningham, Robert and Yasin Sarayrah. 1993. *Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society*. London.

- 1463 Economic Studies House. 2002. *Siyasat wa Ijra'at as-Sa'wada* (Policies and measures
1464 of Saudization). Riyadh.
- 1465 Eisenstadt, S. N. and Luis Roniger. 1984. *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal*
1466 *Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*. Cambridge.
- 1467 Field, Michael. 1984. *The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and*
1468 *the Gulf*. New York.
- 1469 Fox, Jonathan. 1994. The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons
1470 from Mexico. *World Politics* 46, 2: 151–84.
- 1471 Guilain Denoeux. 2000. The Politics of Morocco's "Fight against Corruption." *Middle*
1472 *East Policy* 7, 2: 165–89.
- 1473 Gulf Investment Corporation. 2006. *GCC Economic Statistics*. 6th ed. Kuwait.
- 1474 Gupta, Akhil. 1995. The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Ima-
1475 gined State. *American Ethnologist* 22, 2: 375–402.
- 1476 Harriss-White, Barbara. 2003. *India Working: Essays on Society and Economy*.
1477 Cambridge.
- 1478 Hertog, Steffen. 2006. Labour Policy in the Gulf: Unintended Consequences of Regu-
1479 latory Ambition in Rentier Societies. Paper presented at the Mediterranean Meeting
1480 of the European University Institute, Montecatini, March.
- 1481 Hertog, Steffen. 2007. Shaping the Saudi State: Human Agency's Shifting Role in
1482 Rentier-State Formation. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, 4:
1483 539–63.
- 1484 Hertog, Steffen. 2010. *Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi*
1485 *Arabia*. Ithaca, N.Y.
- 1486 Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and , Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds. 2007. *Escaping*
1487 *the Resource Curse*. New York.
- 1488 Hutchings, Kate and David Weir. 2006. Guanxi and Wasta: A Comparison. *Thunderbird*
1489 *International Business Review* 48, 1: 141–56.
- 1490 International Labor Organization 1994. *World Labor Report*. Geneva.
- 1491 Isham, Jonathan *et al.* 2005. The Varieties of Resource Experience. *World Bank Econ-*
1492 *omic Review* 19, 2: 141–76.
- 1493 Jeffrey, Craig. 2000. Democratisation without Representation? The Power and Political
1494 Strategies of a Rural Elite in North India. *Political Geography* 19, 8: 1013–36.
- 1495 Jeffrey, Craig. 2002. Caste, Class, and Clientelism: A Political Economy of Everyday
1496 Corruption in Rural North India. *Economic Geography* 78, 1: 21–42.
- 1497 Johnston, Michael. 1979. Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the
1498 Uses of Patronage. *American Political Science Review* 73, 2: 385–98.
- 1499 Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. *Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley.
- 1500 Kettering, Sharon. 1988. The Historical Development of Political Clientelism. *Journal*
1501 *of Interdisciplinary History* 18, 3: 419–47.
- 1502 Khan, Mushtaq H. and Jomo Kwame Sundaram. 2000. *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Econ-*
1503 *omic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*. Cambridge.
- 1504 Khanna, Jyoti and Michael Johnston. 2007. India's Middlemen: Connecting by Corrupt-
1505 ing? *Crime, Law and Social Changes* 48, 3–5: 151–68.
- 1506 Kristiansen, Stein and Muhid Ramli. 2006. Buying an Income: The Market for Civil
1507 Service Positions in Indonesia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 28, 2: 207–33.
- 1508 Krueger, Anne. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. *American*
1509 *Economic Review* 64, 3: 291–303.
- 1510 Ledeneva, Alena. 2006. *How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped*
1511 *Post-Soviet Politics and Business*. Ithaca.
- 1512 Ledeneva, Alena. 2008. Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China. *Com-*
1513 *parative Studies in Society and History* 50, 1: 118–44.

- 1506 Lemarchand, René. 1972. Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa:
1507 Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building. *American Political Science Review* 66,
1508 1: 68–90.
- 1509 Le Renard, Amelie. 2008. Pauvreté et charité en Arabie Saoudite: La famille royale, le
secteur privé et l'état-providence. *Critique Internationale* 41, 4: 137–56.
- 1510 Le Vine, Victor. 1975. *Political Corruption: The Ghana Case*. Stanford.
- 1511 Lewis, Peter. 2007. *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia
and Nigeria*. Ann Arbor, Mich.
- 1512 Luciani, Giacomo. 1987. Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework. In
1513 Giacomo Luciani, ed., *The Arab State*. London.
- 1514 Luciani, Giacomo. 2005. Saudi Arabian Business: From Private Sector to National
1515 Bourgeoisie. In Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, eds. *Saudi Arabia in the Balance*.
1516 London.
- 1517 Mahdavy, Hussein. 1970. The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in
1518 Rentier States: The Case of Iran. In M. A. Cook., ed., *Studies in Economic History
of the Middle East*. London.
- 1519 Ministry of Economy and Planning (Saudi Arabia). 2002. *Statistical Yearbook*. Riyadh.
- 1520 Montagu, Caroline. 1994. *The Private Sector of Saudi Arabia*. London.
- 1521 Moon, Chung In. 1986. Korean Contractors in Saudi Arabia: Their Rise and Fall. *Middle
1522 East Journal* 40, 4: 614–33.
- 1523 Oldenburg, Philip. 1987. Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an
Indian Case. *World Politics* 39, 4: 508–35.
- 1524 Reddy, G. Ram and G. Haragopal. 1985. The Pyraveekar: “The Fixer” in Rural India.
1525 *Asian Survey* 25, 11: 1148–62.
- 1526 Robertson-Snape, Fiona. 1999. Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Indonesia. *Third
1527 World Quarterly* 20, 3: 589–602.
- 1528 Roniger, Luis. 1990. *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil*. New York.
- 1529 Ross, Michael. 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics* 53, 3: 325–61.
- 1530 Ross, Michael. 2009. The Curse of Oil Wealth. MS.
- 1531 Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner. 2001. The Curse of Natural Resources. *European
1532 Economic Review* 45, 4–6: 827–38.
- 1533 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Finance. 1985. *The Statistical Indicator, 1985* (in Arabic).
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Statistics on commercial registrations, [http://
1534 www.commerce.gov.sa/statistic/20y7.asp](http://www.commerce.gov.sa/statistic/20y7.asp).
- 1535 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA). 2003. *Izalat mu'wizat al-bi'a
1536 al-istithmariyya fil-mamlaka al-`arabiyya as-sa`udiyya* (Removing obstacles in the
investment environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Riyadh, May.
- 1537 Scott, James C. 1972. Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.
1538 *American Political Science Review* 66, 1: 91–113.
- 1539 Shah, Nasra, Makhdoom Shah and , Jaafar Behbehani. 1996. Predictors of Non-Urgent
Utilization of Hospital Emergency Services in Kuwait. *Social Science and Medicine*
1540 42, 9: 1313–23.
- 1541 Shambayati, Hootan. 1994. The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Auton-
1542 omy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran. *Comparative Politics* 26, 3: 307–31.
- 1543 Simmons and Simmons. 2007. *Setting Up Business in Qatar—10 key points*, [http://
1544 www.simmons-simmons.com/docs/10keypoints.pdf](http://www.simmons-simmons.com/docs/10keypoints.pdf).
- 1545 Szeftel, Morris. 1982. Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia—The State as a
Resource in Itself. *Review of African Political Economy* 9, 24: 4–21.
- 1546 Szeftel, Morris. 2000. “Eat with Us”: Managing Corruption and Patronage under
1547 Zambia’s Three Republics, 1964–99. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18,
1548 2: 207–24.

- 1549 Tetreault, Mary. 2000. *Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary*
1550 *Kuwait*. New York.
- 1551 Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2003. Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging
1552 Party Systems. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, 2: 297–321.
- 1553 Vasiliev, Alexei. 2000. *The History of Saudi Arabia*. London.
- 1554 Wade, Robert. 1982. The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irriga-
1555 tion in South India. *Journal of Development Studies* 18, 3: 287–328.
- 1556 Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field
1557 Experiment in Benin. *World Politics* 55, 3: 399–422.
- 1558 Waterbury, John. 1973. Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime.
1559 *World Politics* 25, 4: 533–55.
- 1560 Zitsler, Ernest. 2005. Post-Soviet Peter: New Histories of the Late Muscovite and Early
1561 Imperial Russian Court. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6, 2:
1562 375–92.
- 1563
- 1564
- 1565
- 1566
- 1567
- 1568
- 1569
- 1570
- 1571
- 1572
- 1573
- 1574
- 1575
- 1576
- 1577
- 1578
- 1579
- 1580
- 1581
- 1582
- 1583
- 1584
- 1585
- 1586
- 1587
- 1588
- 1589
- 1590
- 1591